

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE PANJAB,
1844-1849.

by
Sarjit Singh Bal

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
in the University of London.

November 1962.

School of Oriental and African Studies.

ProQuest Number: 11015800

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 11015800

Published by ProQuest LLC (2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

Abstract

This thesis is a study of British Policy towards the Panjab between Hardinge's arrival in India as Governor-General and its annexation by his successor. The fundamental question to be answered is whether the British had a coherent plan to meet the problems posed by the lack of stability in the formerly useful buffer State between the Afghans and the British Empire in India.

Policy was carried out through the North Western Agency and was much affected by the persons who held office there. Whether the Panjab was to remain an effective buffer State depended on the strength and disposition of the Darbar and the Chiefs. This in turn was affected by the Jagir and Revenue policies pursued by the British in the Jalandhar Doab as well as in the Lahore State. They have, therefore, been studied in some detail. The Summary Settlement and the other reforms accompanying it, which were effected after the Treaty of Bhairawal, in the Lahore State itself have been analysed. The consequences of their being effected by the British resident through the agency of British assistants when the old administrative machinery stood intact have been noted. The failure of policy as revealed in the course of the Second Sikh War has been traced. The circumstances that led Dalhousie to conclude that annexation was the only

alternative left have been examined. The last Chapter in Cunningham's History of the Sikhs, which is a strong criticism of Hardinge's Policy towards the Panjab has been critically examined.

The thesis has been written in the light of the Ripon, Peel and Broughton Papers in the British Museum, and of the Henry Lawrence and Broughton Papers in the India Office Library. Extensive use has also been made of the unpublished records in the India Office Library.

Acknowledgements

This thesis has been written under the supervision of Dr. K.A. Ballhatchet. Without his encouragement and sympathetic understanding of my problems - even personal - the work could not have been completed.

In preparing this thesis, I depended on the sources in the India Office Library, the British Museum and the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies. I would like to acknowledge the invaluable help the staff of these libraries gave me in my search for material.

My thanks are also due to Mr. John Lawrence for having made available the private papers of Sir Henry Lawrence in the India Office Library and to Mrs. Hilda Moorhouse for allowing me to see the Henry Vansittart papers which are in her custody.

In the final stages of my work, I was helped by an Edwina Mountbatten Grant awarded by the Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust. My thanks are due to the Trustees and to Mr. David Hardman, their Secretary, in particular.

Finally I must thank Mrs. M. Morris for not only typing and making the cyclostyle copies of the thesis, but also for pointing out some errors in the manuscript.

Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Abstract	2
Acknowledgements	4
Introduction	6
Chapter I. The North-Western Agency, 1844-49.	29
Chapter II. The Buffer State and the British, 1844-48.	74
Chapter III. Jagir Policy, 1846-48.	119
Chapter IV. Summary Settlement in the Jalandhar Doab, 1846-48.	157
Chapter V. Summary Settlement in the Lahore State, 1847-48.	197
Chapter VI. The Second Sikh War and the end of the Buffer State, 1848-49.	255
Conclusion	317
Appendix I. Cunningham's History of the Sikhs.	337
Appendix II. Biographical Notes.	375
Abbreviations	405
Bibliography	406
Map (Panjab in 1846)	430

Introduction

The Panjab under Ranjit Singh had served the British well. He had created an independent kingdom out of the chaos and confusion that had followed the break up of the Mughal rule in the land of the five rivers. Ranjit's was an anti-Afghan Sikh state and for the British a useful buffer between the turbulent Afghans and their own possessions in India. It, in fact, guarded the Afghan frontier in which the British themselves had a vital interest. It served that purpose all the better because it had remained on friendly terms with the British after the Treaty of Lahore, signed in 1809 between C.T.Metcalf and Ranjit Singh, which demarcated though imperfectly, the boundary between the then rising Sikh kingdom and the British. This buffer occasionally looked like crumbling after the death of Ranjit Singh due to weak successors, factional fighting among the Sardars and the rise of the army Panchas.

Ranjit Singh died on 27 June 1839 and was succeeded by his only legitimate son Kharak Singh.¹ At Ranjit's death Dhian Singh was the most important chief of the Court.

1. Lepel Griffin, Punjab Chiefs, Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families in the territories under the Punjab Government, p.5.

The other sons of Ranjit Singh whose legitimacy, however, was doubted were: (1) Sher Singh (2) Tara Singh (3) Kashmira Singh (4) Peshawara Singh (5) Multana Singh and (6) Dalip Singh.

Opposed to him were the Sindhianwala¹ chiefs. Kharak Singh soon fell out with Dhian Singh who in league with the ambitious prince, Nao Nihal Singh² confined him to captivity and the young prince became the de facto ruler of the kingdom on 8 October 1839. Nearly a year later on 5 November 1840, Kharak Singh passed away and Nao Nihal Singh who was now to become the Maharaja in name as indeed he was in fact for some time past, died the same day. While coming back from the funeral pyre of his father, he was severely hurt by the fall of an archway under which he was passing, and succumbed to the injuries.

The death of Nao Nihal Singh precipitated a crisis which was the first of the series of internal commotions that weakened the fabric of the state machinery so ably built by Ranjit Singh. There were now two claimants to the throne. Sher Singh, one of the supposed sons of Ranjit Singh made a bid for it with the support of Dhian Singh. The Sindhianwala chiefs on the other hand, supported the ~~dalim~~ of Mai Chand Kaur, widow of Kharak Singh. There took place a sanguinary conflict between 5 November 1840 and 18 January 1841 as a result of which Sher Singh was proclaimed as the

1. Dhian Singh was the most influential of the three dogra brothers who had risen to power during the reign of Ranjit Singh. The others were Gulab Singh (later the first ruler of the state of Jammu and Kashmir) and Suchet Singh. All were made Rajas by Ranjit Singh and held big jagirs on the hills in Jammu which were looked after by Gulab Singh.

The Sindhianwala chiefs belonged to the village called Raja Sansi in Amritsar district and claimed common ancestry with Ranjit Singh.

2. Nao Nihal Singh was the only son of Kharak Singh.

Maharaja with Dhian Singh as the wazir.¹ The rival Sindhiawala Sardars fled to the British side of the Satlej. It was a triumph for Dhian Singh.

An important result of this conflict was that both sides made a bid for the support of the Sikh army and made it an active participant in the politics of the state. Ever since then, the influence of the army and its panchas was on the increase.

Sher Singh ruled from 20 January 1841 to 15 September 1843. For some time, he completely relied on the support of Dhian Singh but later tired of too much power that Dhian Singh had assumed, invited back the Sindhianwala chiefs.² They had not forgotten the humiliation they had suffered. They played on the suspicions of the wazir and the Maharaja about each other and murdered both of them on 23 July 1843.³

The triumph of Sindhianwalas, however, ended the next day. Hira Singh, the son of the late wazir roused the Sikh army against the Sindhianwalas and two of them, Attar Singh and Ajit Singh were killed. Only Chatter Singh⁴ could escape by running across the Satlej. Dalip Singh, reputed to be one

-
1. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (2nd edition) pp.239-241.
 2. Sarda Ram, Sikhan di Raj di Vikhia, edited and translated by Henry Court as History of the Sikhs. p.87.
 3. For details see C.Grey (edited by H.L.O.Garrett), European Adventurers of Northern India, 1839-1845. Appendix II. 'A brief Narrative of the Anarchy in the Punjab 1839-1845' pp.xv-xvii.
 4. This Chatter Singh was different from the Sardar of the same name who during the Second Sikh war rebelled against the British at Hazara. The latter belonged to the village called Atari in the Amritsar district.

of the three surviving sons of Ranjit Singh was proclaimed as the Maharaja with the youthful dogra, Hira Singh taking his father's place as the wazir. Once more, an appeal to the army had decided the issue. The power of the army and the panchas was increased still farther.

Dalip now occupied the throne but he was a child. For the next three years the chief actors were the wazirs who succeeded one another in quick succession during these years. After some time the Rani¹ also began playing an important role. There was during the coming years much factional fighting among the chiefs for the wazarat and the chief power in the state. An appeal to the Sikh army during these recurrent fights became a regular feature. This made the army strengthen its own Panchayat system. The obedience of the Sikh army to the authority of the wazir or even the Rani could not henceforth be taken for granted, unless the panchas so wished it.

From 23 July 1843 to 21 December 1844 the wazir was Hira Singh. He had successfully used the army against the Sindhianwalas but[^] year and a half later himself fell victim to its wrath. He had isolated himself from what could possibly be his main support in his uncle, Raja Gulab Singh by leaning on Pandit Jhalla, the family priest of the dogras

1. Rani Jindan, the mother of Dalip Singh. ^{Te} Maharaja being a child she acted as the Regent and was thus placed in a position to have a prominent say in state affairs.

and Hira Singh's tutor in early life for carrying on the work at Lahore. Jhalla had angered the Sikh chiefs too by his overbearing attitude. The result was that when the latter used some disrespectful language against the mother of the Maharaja, they joined the Rani in rousing the army both against him and the wazir. They sought refuge in flight towards Jammu but were overtaken and slain on 21 December 1845.

This time the roused army did not revert back to its normal position of obedience to civil authority as represented by the Darbar. In fact there was no Darbar and the Rani sought in vain to form some sort of a council to run the state.¹ The mutinous army even played with the idea of removing young Dalip from the throne and placing Peshawara Singh on it.² The situation, however, eased for the Rani and her supporters when the army was prevailed upon to march against Gulab Singh and his hill troops.

Gulab Singh felt that his troops would be no match against the Lahore troops and so started negotiations with the army.³ He won over the army representatives by humility and flattery and came to an understanding with them by agreeing to surrender certain portions of the general possessions of the family and to pay the state a fine of

1. Hardinge to Ripon 23 January 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus.
Add.Mss. 40,871 f. 85

2. Ibid.

3. Hardinge to Ripon 8 March 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus.
Add.Mss. 40,871 f. 309.

3,500,000 rupees.¹ At this stage, the Rani took fright herself and actually thought of crossing the Satlej river and seek^{ing} British protection.² Luckily for her at Gulab Singh's end there followed an affray between his troops and the Sikh army when the promised donative was being removed. An old Sikh chief, Futteh Singh Man, and one Bachna, who had deserted Gulab Singh's service, were way-laid and slain. This compromised Gulab Singh's position with the army and the panchas, but he succeeded in gaining a section of them with the result that "he arrived at Lahore, early in 1845, half a prisoner, and yet not without a reasonable prospect of becoming the minister; for the mass of the Sikh soldiery thought that one so great had been sufficiently humbled, the Panchayats had been won by his money and blandishments, and many of the old servants of Runjit Singh had confidence in his ability and in his goodwill to the state generally."³

Gulab Singh did not become the wazir even though he remained at Lahore till the middle of August 1845. It was Jawahir Singh, the brother of the Rani, who succeeded in getting himself proclaimed as the wazir on 14 May 1845. This was after more than five months when no one was the wazir at Lahore. During these five months, the army was completely the master of the situation but could not really make up its

-
1. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (2nd ed.) p.275.
 2. Hardinge to Ripon 8 March 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus.Add. MSS. 40,871, f.310.
 3. J.D.Cunningham, op.cit. p.275.

mind as to which faction among the Sardars it should support and whom it should place on the wazarat.¹ It is, however, interesting to note that while the capital was thus all anarchy, attempts on the part of far off portions of the state to rebel against the central authority were crushed. The dismal struggle was confined only to the capital city of Lahore but it showed how helpless were the chiefs before this army which in fact, insisted on functioning in the name of Panth Khalsaji.²

The wazarat of Jawahir Singh lasted for nearly four months. He seemed to be carrying on well with the army and the panchas till he committed an unpardonable crime in their eyes, when he had Peshawara Singh murdered. Peshawara Singh was supposed to be as much the son of Ranjit Singh as the young Dalip who occupied the throne, and made a bid for the throne by proclaiming himself as the Maharaja. The attempt, however, failed and he "capitulated with the Panchayats, orders having been sent from the Lahore Panchayats to General Mehtab Singh that Peshora S. was not to be molested."³ Jawahir Singh, however, wanted to remove once for all this rival to his nephew for the throne and later when Peshawara Singh made another unsuccessful revolt, he had him secretly murdered. This angered the Panchas who were at the height of

-
1. The Sirdars were divided in their loyalties to Lal Singh, Jawahir Singh and Gulab Singh.
 2. Brotherhood of the Sikh community.
 3. Hardinge to Ripon 3 July 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus.Add. Mss. 40,873 f.10.

their power by now. They decided that Jawahir Singh "should die as a traitor to the commonwealth" and so he was put to death by "the solemnity and moderation of a judicial process, ordained and witnessed by the whole people" on 21 September 1845.¹

This unnerved the remaining chiefs so much that for some time none "seemed willing to become the supreme administrative authority in the state, or to place himself at the head of that self dependent army."² It was only when war with the English was imminent that Lal Singh came forward to become the wazir. Tej Singh at the same time, was accepted as the Commander-in-chief.

In the war that followed the Rani and Lal Singh from among the chiefs at least tried to remain on the good books of the English. Tej Singh also seems to have acted in association. It is more than likely that together with Rani Jindan, Lal Singh and Tej Singh, most of the other chiefs also sought the destruction of the army and to have a subsidiary system. Their rival on the hills, Gulab Singh was more concerned with his jagirs and had no enthusiasm for the

1. J.D.Cunningham, op.cit. p.280.

2. Ibid.

war either.¹ He remained neutral. It was thus a war of the panchas and the army in which the leaders played a dubious role. The war ended with the defeat of the Sikh army but by itself did not completely annihilate it and wreck the hold of the panchas.

This ends the first phase of the history of the post Ranjit Singh period. It was marked by rapid shifting of the scene at Lahore and the chief actors in it. One by one Ranjit's sons and ministers came to the front, but only to lose, after a brief interval both power and life. The chief feature of the period was the rapidly increasing power of the army and their panchas. The panchas came into the picture when Sher Singh and Chand Kaur contended for the throne. They were at the height of their power just before the first Sikh war when the Rani and the chiefs dreaded and feared them and looked for some means of escape from it. The end of the war still left them powerful enough to be feared by the Rani and Lal Singh.

-
1. Gulab Singh was so keen on getting his Jammu jagirs guaranteed to him by the British that as early as January 1845, he had tried to sound Hardinge and Broadfoot whether the Governor-General could assure him of the continuation of his jagirs. For this assurance, he was prepared "to see the whole of the remaining country in the Punjab made over to the Hon'ble Company". The offer was rejected.
 see. Hardinge to Ripon 7 February 1845. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add.Mss. 40,871 ff 180-197.
 C.S.Harding to Ventura 6 February 1845. Ibid. f.200.
 Raja Gulab Singh to Ventura (no date) Ibid. ff.202-203
 Brown to Ventura (no date) Ibid. f.206.
 Hardinge to Ripon 7 February 1845. Ibid. ff.191-92. Hardinge to Ripon, 20 February 1845. Ibid. f.236.

This fear of the Sikh army explains the interesting arrangement between the Treaty of Lahore and that of Bhairawal signed nine months later.¹ It was an arrangement by which the Rani as the Regent and her favourite Lal Singh as the executive minister were to attempt a stable Government at Lahore. They were to do this by reducing their own army but with a contingent of the British troops at Lahore as a guarantee against their own army causing chaos and disorder.

These months between the two treaties constitute a distinct phase. The period might be described as one of the trial of Rani Jindan and Lal Singh with the British as the judge of whether they succeeded or failed. In their attempt at establishing a stable Government they had the assurance of the help of the British agent, Henry Lawrence, who was now to stay at Lahore. The two, however, regarded the assurance of the support to be that of complete reliance as is evident from the amount of active interest that Henry Lawrence was allowed in domains that strictly belonged to the Government of the Rani and Lal Singh. In fact, they thus proved that they could not stand on their own.

In May 1846, the Sikh garrison in the fort of Kangra refused to surrender it to the British. According to the Treaty of Lahore, the Darbar under Lal Singh was to hand it over to the British but felt helpless when the Sikh garrison

1. Treaty of Lahore was signed on 9 March 1846 and the Treaty of Bhairawal on 16 December 1846.

within closed the gates of the fort and refused to surrender it to the Darbar to be passed on to the British. In this crisis which could well wreck the Treaty signed a couple of months earlier, Henry Lawrence and his brother John, who was the commissioner of the newly acquired districts in which this fort was situated, had to exert themselves a great deal.¹ But for the British army under Brigadier Wheeler, working under the political direction of Henry Lawrence and the heavy siege guns that John had managed to draw up to the heights of Kangra, the garrison would not have surrendered the fort, as was done on 26 May 1846.²

The second major crisis found Lal Singh implicated in Sheikh Imam-ud-din's refusal to hand over Kashmir. This was an important part of the agreement that followed the close of the late war and could well have meant the end of the Treaty. Here again Henry Lawrence placed himself at the head of the Sikh troops supplied by Lal Singh's rivals to see that Kashmir was really transferred to Gulab Singh.³

It is evident that the Rani and Lal Singh could not make the best of the British support lent to them for the period of nine months. They were failing to establish a stable government and this led to the next step in the history of the British association with the state, namely

-
1. Kangra was one of the three districts of the Jalandhar doab which was acquired by the British after the first Sikh war.
 2. Sir H. Edwards and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence (third edition) p.393; R. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, p.175.
 3. Ibid. p.397.

the Treaty of Bhairawal.

Henceforth the administration of the state was to be directly under the supervision of the British Agent who was given the right to interfere in all departments of the state. The Darbar was there but the directing hand was to be that of the British Agent who was also to be the resident.

As was natural, the Rani who was completely deprived of her powers under this arrangement felt very restive and became bitter and frustrated. She showed her anger first against Tej Singh, who after the deposition of Lal Singh was the foremost amongst the chiefs and who had completely aligned himself with the resident. On 7 August 1847, she prevailed upon the young prince not to put the usual tilak on Tej Singh's forehead in an open Darbar when it was decided to make him a Raja.¹ She may also have been involved in a conspiracy to murder Tej Singh.² The result³ was that Henry Lawrence removed her from Lahore to Sheikhpura.

-
1. Agent to Secretary 7 August 1847. Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. Henry Lawrence believed that the Rani was at the back of Prema Plot to murder Tej Singh. The Governor-General did not believe it. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence 30 May 1847. Ibid.
 3. In a proclamation, the Governor-General had justified the separation on general grounds of her being a bad influence on the Maharaja as he grew up and her being looked up to as the head of the state by "every seditious intriguer who was displeased with the present order of things" but the real reason was the affront to Tej Singh and other Sirdars in the Durbar by the child Maharaja Dalip Singh. For proclamation, see Sir Herbert Edwardes and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence (3rd edition) pp.415-416
- For the real reason,
Hardinge to Hobhouse 14 August 1847. Broughton Papers.
Home Misc. 854. pp.105-109.

This made her more bitter, and it was natural that she should have even attempted to rally the chiefs round her at the next favourable opportunity during the Second Sikh War - a war which resulted in the annexation of the Panjab on 29 March 1849.¹

§ 2. This thesis covers only part of the period sketched out above. It begins with Sir Henry Hardinge's arrival in India on 23 July 1844 as the Governor-General and in the main concerns itself with the problems that faced him as a result of the rapidly changing events in the Panjab. He did not remain the Governor-General for the entire period between 1844 and 1849 but his successor, Lord Dalhousie, was only trying to resolve the very problems that had been left behind by Hardinge. This study, therefore, chiefly concerns itself with how Hardinge tried to meet the rapidly changing events in the Panjab.

For Hardinge, the essential problem arose from the fact that the Sikh army in the Panjab was making a settled Government in the state difficult. Neither the chiefs, who were mostly the creation of Ranjit Singh and did not represent one single homogeneous entity, nor the army itself threw up a single leader of sufficient ability to give the

1. M.L.Ahluwalia 'Some Facts behind the Anglo-Sikh Wars'
Indian Historical Record Commission Proceedings
Vol.XXXV. Part II. pp.1-10. Vol.XXXVI. Part II. pp.125-130.

state a settled and peaceful Government. The chiefs were divided into factions and the army under the panchas was volatile and excitable. This made matters worse. And the state passed from crisis to crisis.

What attitude should the British under him adopt towards this state constituted the important question. This was not squarely faced. At least no positive decision was taken on it as the events would force themselves on the British. The result was that the British attitude, born out of the question, became a series of uncoordinated reactions to events in the Panjab as they presented themselves.

This is to be seen in the different aspects taken up for study in this thesis. It is reflected in the way the north-western Agency suffered transformation during this period. One finds it in the way the jagir question was tackled and in the new mode of revenue collection introduced in the Jalandhar Doab, which became a British possession after the first Sikh War. It becomes still more clear when we find this very mode of revenue collection being introduced after the Treaty of Bhairawal in the state still a part of Dalip's kingdom. These measures hardly fitted in with the political purpose of propping up the Sikh state through the agency of the chiefs whose influence as a class was being undermined by them. The explanation lies in the fact that the British did not regard the problem of the Panjab as one co-ordinated whole but treated each different question in

isolation. One wonders if Hardinge succeeded in looking upon these different facets arising out of the Panjab question as various manifestations of the problem which was at bottom one. It appears, he gave attention only to the political aspect of the problem that arose out of the rapidly changing situation. The others were left to the subordinates though he would formally sanction them.

The uncoordinated nature of these measures has determined the pattern of this thesis. The development of policy in each field has been treated separately.

Chapter I traces the history of the North-Western Agency between 1844 and 1849. Each new crisis in the Panjab increased the importance of the agency and Hardinge and Dalhousie had to decide as to what would be the best way of running it. Its constitution, the limits of the power of the Agent, and its jurisdiction had to be repeatedly changed to adjust it to the rapidly changing situation in the Panjab. All this made it especially difficult to find the right man for the post of Agent.

Chapter II covers the political aspect of the Panjab problem and the policy pursued during Hardinge's Governor-Generalship. This was the most important facet and was sought to be most thoroughly thrashed out at the highest level. In essence, it was an attempt to enter into some arrangement short of annexation, the necessity^{of} which was

felt from time to time. How the desire to see a strong Sikh State gave place to the necessity of weakening it has been traced. In that attempt the creation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to act both as a counterpoise to that State and as a help in defending the Afghan frontier has been noted. The failure of the weak Sikh State to stand on its own and the arrangement by which the British tried to run that State by more active interference has been traced. The drawbacks of that arrangement have been noted.

Chapter III deals with the British attitude towards the Jagirdars both in the Jalandhar doab and the Lahore State. The attitude towards the Jalandhar jagirdars in particular has been thoroughly examined. This examination is both important and relevant. It is important because it throws light on the nature of the differences between the two Lawrences even at this stage of their career. It is relevant because the decisions on this important class in the new acquisition of the British was bound to have its repercussions on Lahore politics. Some of the important functionaries of the Lahore Darbar held large jagirs in this doab.

Chapter IV concerns itself with the settlement of the land revenue on the British pattern in the Jalandhar doab. This is necessary because what was done here was sought to be introduced in the kingdom of Dalip Singh when after the Treaty of Bhairawal, its administration came under

British supervision. The fact of its being disadvantageous to chaudharis and lambardars and the likelihood of its causing discontent in the Lahore State has been noted.

Chapter V attempts to depict the reasons for starting the British type of revenue settlement in the Lahore State, and to show how John came to undertake it and to finish the major part of it through the British assistants within the short span of six months. The possibility of the anti British repercussions of the step among the influential classes has been pointed out.

The last Chapter depicts the failure of Hardinge's policy early in the administration of his successor. The course of the Second Sikh War has been traced and how Dalhousie moved to the policy of annexing the buffer state between the Afghans and the boundary of the British Empire in India has been sketched.

In the conclusion, three important phases in British Policy towards the Panjab as mainly determined by Hardinge within the short span of less than four years have been brought out. The major aspects of that policy have been distinguished and the question raised whether they co-ordinated one another and if they did not whether that explained the rebellion of Mulraj, the

revolt of Chutter Singh and the defection of Sher Singh assuming a widespread character.

The thesis has been based, not only on official records but also on the private papers of individuals who had to give thought to the Panjab problem between 1844 and 1849. Among them were Ripon and Sir John Hobhouse. Ripon was the President of the Board of Control from 1843 to July 1846 in Peel's ministry and Sir John Hobhouse (later Lord Broughton) was Ripon's successor in Russell's cabinet. The Henry Lawrence Papers in the India Office Library have been used. The Currie Papers as compiled and printed by Ganda Singh, have been found useful. One volume of the Peel Papers in the British Museum and printed letters in The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell have also been found of some help.

There is something useful to be found in the two standard biographies of the Lawrences. H.B. Edwardes and Herman Merivale's Life of Sir Henry Lawrence throws some light on the period. R. Bosworth Smith's Life of Lord Lawrence gives some interesting details of the work done by

the younger of the two Lawrences in the Jalandhar doab and at Lahore between 1846 and 1848. For the period prior to 1846, the biography of Hardinge by his son who himself was in India as the private secretary of his father has something to say from the point of view of the chief figure in this thesis. Life of George Broadfoot written by his brother William Broadfoot is another useful work.

All these are, however, life sketches and in the very nature of things can be only of limited use. The fact of their being written in the nineteenth century when the tendency was to glorify the characters who contributed to the building up of the British empire also limits their usefulness. The events were looked at from the point of view of the individual whose biography was being written. Their historical significance as such was missed or distorted. Care has, therefore, been taken to use them only in so far as they corroborated the evidence made available from the private papers.

The period chosen for study is one of the most crucial in Panjab's history. It was during this period that the downfall of the Sikh kingdom took place. The sudden collapse of the Sikh rule has been a mystery. Sardesai expressed the difficulty of many when he wrote, "During my long studies in the history of India it had been a great puzzle for me to explain satisfactorily the sudden fall of the great Sikh

power so assiduously built up by the genius of Ranjit Singh."¹ The question whether British policy, by design or otherwise, contributed to this sudden downfall would alone make the study of the period worthwhile.

But other events of great historical interest took place. The state of Jammu and Kashmir came into existence. The two Lawrences came to the Panjab to begin tradition of rule associated with their name. In the villages of the Panjab, Hardinge, the Governor-General for most of the period under study, is still remembered more than his illustrious successor.

It is little surprising then that the British Policy towards the Panjab in this period has not been the subject of any scholarly work so far. The nearest that comes to tackling this subject is Dr. K.C. Khanna's thesis entitled, Anglo-Sikh Relations, 1839-1849. He, however, covers a wider period than the one taken up for study in this thesis. He was mainly concerned, as the very title of his thesis suggests, with the relations of the two states and not with British Policy as such. Moreover, he confined himself mostly to the political aspects of the question. Perhaps because he was dealing with a wider period, he failed to note the special significance of Hardinge's problem. It chiefly arose from the fact that while the Government in the erstwhile friendly buffer state of the Panjab was rapidly becoming

1. See R.B.Dr. G.S.Sardesai remarks on the flap of H.R.Gupta, Panjab on the eve of the first Sikh War.

difficult and the attitude of the dominant Sikh army to the British becoming uncertain and menacing, he was expected to avoid war and conquest. The Court of Directors in particular expected him to follow the policy of peace and retrenchment. Dr. Khanna also failed to note the reaction of the ministries in England to Hardinge's Panjab arrangements. Hardinge seemed to be very sensitive about these reactions and they are worth recording. This was because he failed to use the papers that have gone in the preparation of this thesis. He refers to the two volumes of Broughton Papers in the British Museum in his bibliography and used one of them in discussing the attitude of the then President of the Board of Control towards the annexation of the Panjab which Dalhousie had done on his own responsibility. The Ripon papers in the British Museum he could have used very profitably but seems to have failed in tracing them. The Peel papers that help in understanding the attitude of the Prime Minister towards events in the Panjab and the extent to which he was consulted by Ripon could also have been used by Dr. Khanna. There were some other papers that he could not have used even if he wanted them. The Broughton Papers in the India Office Library which contain not only the letters written to Hobhouse but those written by him were not available then.¹ The Henry Lawrence Papers were still lying with the family and had not

1. Broughton Papers in the Br. Museum contain only the letters written to Hobhouse. The Collection in the India Office Library also have the copies of one written by Hobhouse and are therefore much more useful than those lying in the British Museum.

been lent to the India Office Library, The Currie Papers at Poona had not then been printed. In the absence of these papers, his treatment of the subject though so full of minute information lacks the insight necessary to depict a historical phenomenon changing rapidly. His method of treating the subject also came in his way of gripping the important facets of the Panjab problem as they posed themselves to the British. As we go through his voluminous work, we get the impression that he was more interested in the day to day events in the Panjab. Perhaps Sohan Lal's diary of which he made a detailed use, determined his treatment of the subject.

J.D.Cunningham's History of the Sikhs merits special attention because the author was a contemporary and actually a participant in some of the events. His last chapter was a strong criticism of the British Policy towards the Panjab as it had been pursued ever since Ranjit Singh died. He was particularly severe in critising Hardinge and his agent on the North West Frontier. This chapter has therefore been critically examined in an appendix to this work. In this appendix an attempt has been made to understand why Cunningham wrote the last chapter of his book. His motivations are investigated so as to put ourselves on guard against all his conclusions blindly as has been done by writers on the Panjab history so far.

There is no other work that needs any detailed reference. A casual mention to a few that had been undertaken in India would suffice. One in Jagmohan Mahajan's Circumstances leading to the Annexation of the Punjab, 1846-1849. Another is N.M.Khilnani's The Punjab under the Lawrences (1846-1858). Their work suffers from the limitations natural to those that fail to make extensive use of private papers. The only papers available to them were the Currie Papers at Poona. Moreover both Mahajan's book and Khilnani's thesis have avoided the period prior to the Treaty of Lahore except by way of background to the main body of their work. It was natural for them, therefore, to depend entirely on secondary published material in writing on half the period covered in this thesis.

The monograph by R.R.Sethi entitled John Lawrence as the Commissioner of the Jullundur Doab may also be mentioned. Sethi deals with John's disposal of the Jagir cases and the Summary Settlement of the three districts in the Jalandhar and doab between 1846 and 1848, but in isolation/^{and}without reference to the wider context of the British Policy towards the Panjab during these years.

This thesis treats of the political, economic and administrative policies pursued by the British towards the Panjab between 1844 and 1849. It studies them as facets of what should have been one co-ordinated policy. It is based on a variety of sources, most of which have not been used before.

Chapter I

§ 1. The North-Western Agency, 1844-1849

Between 1844 and 1849, a number of changes were brought about in the structure and functions of the North-Western Agency.¹ There were at the same time successive changes in the persons holding the office of the Agent. This was partly because Hardinge did not feel sure about the right man to run the difficult affairs in this part of the Empire. The complexity of the Panjab problem and the rapidity with which events were moving in Lahore during this period were the other factors responsible for these changes.

George Russell Clerk had been in charge of the Agency for a little more than three years but in the middle of 1843, he was made the Lieutenant Governor, North-Western Provinces. He was succeeded by Colonel A.F. Richmond who assumed charge on 21 June 1843.² The latter was given "the officiating appointment" because Lord Ellenborough, the then Governor-General "could make no arrangement at short notice, and at this season quite satisfactory".³

1. Since March 1840, there had been only one Agency in the North West under George Russel Clerk. Between 1827 and 1840, there has been two with headquarters at Ludhiana and Ambala.
2. Indra Krishna, An Historical Interpretation of the Correspondence of Sir George Russell Clerk, Political Agent, Ambala and Ludhiana, 1831-43. p.6.
3. Ellenborough to J.H.Maddock, 1 May 1843, Private Correspondence relating to Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.1.

When Hardinge assumed charge of the Governor-Generalship, he found Richmond acting as the Agent.

The new Governor-General soon felt dissatisfied with the way the agent was conducting affairs. He felt that "Richmond gives us nothing but reports from the newswriters in the Durbar", and transferred him to Lucknow.¹ In his place, Hardinge appointed George Broadfoot, who took charge of the Agency on 1 November 1844.² The new Agent was an officer of the Madras army and had first come to the N.W. Frontier during the first Afghan War. He was the commander of the escort which accompanied the family of Shah Shuja when it was sent from Ludhiana to Kabul in 1841. This was when the British armies had installed the Shah on the throne of Afghanistan. After the Afghan war, he was made the commissioner of Tennasserim in Burma³ by Ellenborough. Hardinge's predecessor thought very highly of Broadfoot and felt offended if others did not share his opinion. When once he heard that the Court of Directors had criticised his appointment of Broadfoot to the post in Burma, he complained rather bitterly to Peel that the

-
1. Hardinge to Ellenborough 17 September 1844, quoted in W.Broadfoot, The Career of Major George Broadfoot, pp.233-34.
 2. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (2nd.ed.) f.n. p.273.
 3. Tennasserim became a British possession after the first Burmese War (1824-26).

ministry was not standing by him.¹ Ellenborough's high opinion of Broadfoot was, perhaps, an important reason why Hardinge selected him as the Agent in the North-West Frontier. Hardinge was then new to India, and so during these initial months as Governor-General relied on Ellenborough's men to a great extent.

Broadfoot inherited the structure of the Agency as it existed at the time of Clerk. He was designated Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier, and was to look after both the affairs of the Court of Lahore and those of the Cis-Satlaj States. The latter work included the conduct of diplomatic relations with the protected states on the left bank of the river Satlej and the direct administration of some territories. While conducting the work pertaining to the Lahore State, he worked directly under the supervision of the Governor-General in Council. In Cis-Satlaj affairs, on the other hand, he was under the direction of the Lieutenant Governor of the North Western Provinces. It was a cumbersome arrangement, originating when two different types of

1. This is clear from Peel's letter to Ellenborough. Ellenborough's letter is not traceable. In this letter Peel writes that he enquired into the matter and found that there was no foundation for Ellenborough's complaint.
 Peel to Ellenborough, 1 January 1845, Peel Papers, Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,466 ff 3-5.

agencies at Ambala and Ludhiana were put under G.R.Clerk¹ when Wade was removed from the Ludhiana agency in March 1840.²

Major Broadfoot worked in this capacity till his death on the battlefield of Ferozeshah.³ The Governor-General had been satisfied with the way Broadfoot had carried on the work, which during the period was of an extremely delicate nature. The fact is that both found themselves united against Clerk, whose views on the Panjab problem were being occasionally sought by Ripon, the President of the Board of Control in Peel's ministry (1841-1846). Clerk, who was then in England, on once being consulted by Ripon, had drawn up a memorandum in which he had pointed out the danger if Broadfoot did not follow a policy of reserve in relations with the Lahore Darbar in the state of anarchy then prevalent at the Sikh capital.⁴ Hardinge felt that Clerk's "advice of

1. Indra Krishen, An Historical Interpretation of the Correspondence of Sir George Clerk, p.6.
2. For the details of the removal of Wade and of Clerk's appointment to the Ludhiana agency besides continuing to hold charge of the Ambala agency, see a "very important letter". Maddock to Wade, 29 January 1840, in R.R.Sethi, The Lahore Darbar (In the light of the Correspondence of Sir C.M.Wade, 1823-40) pp.273-75. Also see, E.R.Kapadia, The Diplomatic Career of Sir Claude Wade: a study of British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840, pp.380-83. Thesis M.A. examination (1938). London University.
3. Died on 21 December 1845. For details see W.Broadfoot, Major George Broadfoot, p.392.
4. G.R.Clerk to Ripon 22 May 1845. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,872 ff 124-129.

Note: The Memorandum is in the form of a letter to the President of the Board of Control.

distance and reserve" was "not applicable to the present state of affairs". Hardinge believed that Clerk was arguing on the presumption that the then turmoil at Lahore was similar to the one that the latter had faced in 1841 when Sher Singh and Chand Kaur were contending for the throne and so was not "accurately informed of the progress made towards irretrievable dissolution of all Govt between 1841 and 1845".¹ Hardinge was thus defending Broadfoot's policy of strengthening the Satlej frontier even at the risk of some offence at Lahore. In fact Hardinge felt that Clerk's familiarity in London with Mohan Lal who was once employed in the Ludhiana agency was coming in the way of both Broadfoot and his own success in their Panjab policy. He believed that Mohal Lal was conveying an impression to his brother-in-law, Hodges, that both Broadfoot and Hardinge were prevented from taking any decisions concerning the Panjab affairs till Clerk came to India. Hodges in his turn was passing on this information to the Lahore Durbar. The result was that Broadfoot failed in "adjusting his differences with the Durbar." It was not showing the British agent due regard and was becoming extravagant in its "pretensions".² The

-
1. Hardinge to Ripon, 18 August 1845, Ripon Papers, Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,873 f.187.
 2. Hardinge to Ripon, 20 September 1845, Ripon Papers, Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,873, f.332.
See note at the end of the chapter.

Darbar's impression that even the Governor-General was bound by the Home authorities not to take any step till Clerk came to India explained "the tone of defiance & disrespect lately evinced by the Lahore Govt."¹ It appears that Clerk's objections to Broadfoot's handling of the situation on the Panjab frontier aroused Hardinge to a strong defence of his Agent. To a large extent, he continued to defend Broadfoot's actions on the frontier until the latter's death, in the midst of the First Sikh War.

Broadfoot died on 21 December 1845, and Henry Lawrence, then in Nepal, was asked to reach the war front "with all despatch".² He did so and was in time to participate in the battle of Sobraon fought on 10 February 1846.³ The Agency to which he was called had in the meantime suffered a complete transformation. By a resolution of the Governor-General dated 3 January 1846, it was split into three parts. The direct administration of the British territories on the left side of Satlej now increased by the sequestration of the Cis-Satlej

1. Hardinge to Ripon 6 September 1845. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,873, f. 266.

2. Currie to Henry Lawrence 24 December 1845, quoted in Edwardes and Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence (Third ed.) pp.371-372.

3. Ibid. 380.

possessions of Maharaja Dalip Singh¹ and the relations with the Cis-Satlej protected states were placed under the charge of Major F. Macheson. The hill states were henceforth to be looked after by the Hon'ble I.C.Erskine independent of the control of the Agent. Henry was entrusted with the conduct of political relations on the North West Frontier, which at the moment mostly meant dealing with Lahore affairs. Major Macheson and I.C.Erskine were to be supervised by the Foreign Department of the Government "in respect to their political relations and all questions connected with the Lahore frontier" but in matters of the details of administration which was to be the major part of their work, they were to be "under the control of the Lt. Governor N.W.P.". The designation of Henry Lawrence was to be "Agent to the Governor-General for the foreign relations of N.W.Frontier and affairs connected with the Punjaub" and he was evidently to be under the supervision of the Foreign Department.²

The reason, as officially given, for changing the structure of the Agency was the inadequacy of the earlier

-
1. 'Proclamation by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India - 13 December 1845'. C.U.Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.VIII, Pt.II, p.159.
 2. Governor-General's Resolution Foreign Department, 3 January 1846. B.C. 104068, p.4.

arrangement. The work of looking after affairs in the Lahore state was so absorbing that the late Agent had neglected the less exciting work of day to day administration of the Cis-Satlej British territories. The result was that "the arrears of business in the Judicial and Revenue branches of the Agency as connected with the lapsed states" was heavy.¹ There were, perhaps, other reasons too. The war with the Sikhs was still going on and the work of the Agent in the political sphere was to be both delicate and heavy, and demand his whole time attention. It is also possible that the Governor-General had decided to stay on the frontier for a long time and wanted to control all the strings of the administration of the areas above-mentioned himself. He may well have felt confident enough to do that particularly when he had in the Foreign Department Fredrick Currie, in whose "capacity and service" he had great faith.² The latter had also lately behaved "so coolly that I should have the greatest reliance on your prudence".³ Perhaps Hardinge

1. B.C.104068, p.4. Ibid.

2. Hardinge to Ripon, 2 January 1845, Ripon Papers, Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,875, f.11.

Note: The affairs of the Panjab were looked after by the foreign secretary and so most of the appers relating to the Panjab are to be found in the Political Consultations and are referred to as 'foreign'.

3. Hardinge to Currie, 20 December 1845. Printed in Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.3.

also did not have a high opinion of Henry Lawrence's aptitude for civil and revenue matters and so thought of confining him purely to diplomatic work, in which field Henry had been working in Nepal. This arrangement, however, lasted only for a couple of months. It ended with the Sikh War.

By the first Treaty of Lahore, signed on 9 March 1846, the Jalandhar Doab was ceded to the British. The hill areas between the Beas and the Ravi were also theirs.¹ These were the additional territories to be under direct British administration. According to the same Treaty the Sikh army at Lahore had to be reduced,² and to look after the fulfilment of this clause, the British Agent was to stay at Lahore.³ Then there was also the British Army that was to stay at the Sikh capital.⁴ The Agent

1. 'Treaty between the British Government and the state of Lahore, signed 9 March 1846. Article 3.' printed in C.U.Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.viii, pt.II, p.161.

2. Ibid. Article 7, p.162.

3. There is no reference to the Agent staying at Lahore in this Treaty but two days later were signed the 'Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar.' According to these articles, the Lahore army was to be reorganised and at Lahore were to be stationed the British troops. The Darbar troops were to be removed from the city. It was perhaps this agreement of 11 March 1845 that implied that the Agent would stay at Lahore.

'Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar on 11 March 1846', C.V.Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.viii, pt.II, pp.164-166.

4. Ibid.

had to look after this too.

The responsibilities at Lahore itself were heavy and it was not difficult to realize that Henry Lawrence would have remained occupied enough with them. There was no necessity to bring back the administration of the Cis-Satlej, the Jalandhar doab and the hill states under his supervision. But the Governor-General felt otherwise, and on 16 March 1846 placed them under the control of Henry Lawrence, who had only a couple of months earlier been deprived of their supervision. His designation was changed to that of Governor-General's Agent on the North-West Frontier. Unlike the earlier arrangement, it was through him that the Government of India was to exercise its supervision on the Cis and Trans-Satlej districts, not only in political matters but also in revenue and judicial administration.¹ The Cis-Satlej hill states were kept separate but it was clearly hinted that once the reports of the position and interests of the Hill chiefs in the Trans-Satlej area were examined, this might also

1. Governor-General's "Resolution, Foreign Department 16 March 1846. I.P.C. 13 June 1846, No.283.

be brought under the control of the Agent.¹ This was actually done in September 1846.²

Henry Lawrence thus reached a position which was an enviable one. He had important diplomatic work to perform in the Sikh capital itself. He had also the supervision of the civil and revenue administration of the hill, Cis Satlej and Trans Satlej districts. This arrangement lasted until the Treaty of Bhairawal in December 1846. During this period of about nine months, Henry was fortunate in having his brother John Lawrence as one of his principal subordinates.³ The latter had come to the Panjab as the Superintendent and Commissioner of the

1. Governor-General's "Resolution, Foreign Department 16 March 1846. I.P.C. 13 June 1846, No.283.
Note: The Cis Satlej hill states constituted a distinct administrative unit, subordinate to the Agency till 3 January 1846. By a resolution of the Governor-General of that date, it was taken away from the supervision of the agent. After the Sikh war, enquiry was conducted on the way the hill Rajas in the adjoining area of Trans Satlej district of Kangra had to be treated. This had become a British possession as a result of Jalandhar doab being taken by the British. Here the hint was that once the enquiry was complete, the Trans Satlej hill states might be joined to the Cis-Satlej ones and the whole constitute one administrative unit. It might then be placed under the Agent.
Actually the Trans-Satlej hill district continued to remain under the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Trans-Satlej district but the Cis-Satlej hill states were brought under the supervision of the Agent at Lahore.
2. Governor-General's "Resolution, Foreign Department 23 September 1847, para.9, I.P.C. 31 December 1847, Part 9, No.2603.
3. John Lawrence was Superintendent and Commissioner of Trans Satlej districts. The other subordinates were Major F.Macheson, Superintendent and Commissioner of Cis Satlej districts and Hon'ble I.C.Erskine, the Superintendent of Hill states.

newly obtained Trans-Satlej districts after the first Sikh war and liked his new work very much. He was not prepared to exchange it for the administration of the Cis Satlej districts, even though it would have meant for him work which was more important, because besides involving the civil administration of what was called British territory, it would have meant handling the political relations with the protected Sikh states.¹ Being near by, Henry called him to act for him when in August 1846, he left for Simla to recoup his health. John worked for his brother for three and a half months. This turned out to be the most critical period between the First Treaty of Lahore and the Treaty of Bhairawal. It needed all the tact on John's part to handle the Lahore chiefs, with the foremost among them implicated in Imam-ud-din's refusal to hand over Kashmir to Gulab Singh. It was his report to the effect that the Sikh Government at Lahore would not stand if the British army were withdrawn in December as was provided in the agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Darbar on 11 March 1846² that led the Governor-General to think of the alternative

-
1. John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence 15 August 1846.
Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. viii, pp. 164-166.
"Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Darbar, on 11th of March, 1846. Article 1."

arrangement of placing the administration of the Lahore state under the supervision of the British Agent. John Lawrence was also a member of the Commission that tried and deported Lal Singh to Benares. John, it can thus easily be seen, was actively associated with the work at Lahore. Henry, on the other hand, supervised the administration of the Jalandhar doab. In a sense, therefore, this period may be described as the beginning of the joint administration of the Panjab by Henry and John Lawrence, which was to be the characteristic feature of the years between 1849 and 1853 when both were members of the Board of Administration. Some of the differences that, in the later period, caused so much ill feeling between the two are actually to be noticed in their work during the nine months between March and December 1846. They were, however, struggling hard to shine in their respective positions. Each had the chance of his life and wanted to make the best of it. They, therefore, did their utmost for each other and did not allow these differences to lead to personal disharmony. Actually there were at moments attempts to cover them up.

The Governor-General, however, did not seem to have felt fully satisfied with the way in which Henry conducted himself while this arrangement lasted. He was not happy

about Henry's "ardent temper".¹ At the same time his suspicions that Henry had no aptitude for civil administrations perhaps became stronger. Then there was the personal factor of Major F. Macheson which caused trouble too. The latter did not hide the fact that he felt very uncomfortable under the arrangements by which his work was being supervised by the Agent. Henry had himself conveyed that to the Governor-General.²

No wonder, therefore, that when the Treaty of Bhairawal gave an opportunity to the Governor-General to change the structure of the Agency once again, he took away the supervision of the administration of the Cis and Trans-Satlej districts from Henry Lawrence. His association with them was confined purely to political matters. The two Commissioners were to look to him for guidance only in "matters connected with Lahore, Jummoo, China or other Foreign relations or duties."³ The administration proper was to be under the direction of the Governor-General in the Foreign Department.⁴

At Lahore, on the other hand, the Treaty of

1. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 25 May 1847. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 36,475, f. 286.
2. H. Lawrence to Secretary Government of India, 24 June 1846. Copy in Henry Lawrence Papers.
3. Governor-General's "Resolution, Foreign Department 26 December 1846" Para.7, I.P.C. 23 January 1847, No.138.
4. Ibid. Para.10.

Bhairowal had made Henry's work more important. Besides being the Agent of the Governor-General, he was henceforth also to be the Resident at Lahore of the British Government with the right to supervise the administration of all the departments of the state.¹ He had actually become the de facto ruler of Dalip Singh's kingdom.² The Rani's place of Regency was taken by a Council of Regency but the Resident had the right to interfere in all departments and in all matters. His duties at Lahore now were to be not merely political. They were to involve administrative work in the civil and revenue fields through the existing institutions of the old Lahore state, directed by him with the help of a number of English assistants, soon to be spread out in different parts of the land.

-
1. 'Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Darbar on the 16 December 1846. Article 2 'printed in C.U.Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.VIII, part II, p.167.
 2. Hardinge to the Queen, 21 December 1846. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add.MSS. 36,475, ff. 142-143.
Hardinge to Hobhouse, 21 December 1846. Ibid. f.149.
Note: These letters give an indication of the immense powers that the British had obtained in the opinion of the Governor-General as a result of the Treaty of Bhairawal.
Hardinge to Hobhouse, 5 April 1847. Broughton Papers, Br. Mus. Add. MSS.36,475, f. 220.
Note: In this letter the Governor-General describes the arrangement resulting from the Treaty of Bhairawal as follows: "It is in reality Annexation brought about by the supplication of the Sikhs, without entailing upon us the present expense & the future inconvenience of a doubtful acquisition."

The Governor-General's choice of Henry for the work at Lahore after the Treaty of Bhairawal was not indicative of his faith in him as the best man for the job. In fact even though he had great confidence in Lawrence's military energy, he did not have much "in his civil capacity" and did not want to appoint him.¹ On the other hand, the Governor-General felt that Currie was "the person best qualified to ensure the success of a British administration under novel and difficult circumstances in the Punjab."² It was the insistence of the Sardars at Lahore that obtained for Henry the position of Resident and Agent after the new Treaty. Currie also had at this stage, not insisted on going to Lahore, perhaps because he had an eye to the membership of the Council. Hardinge summarized the way Henry Lawrence got the appointment after the Treaty of Bhairawal in his letter to the President of the Board of Control, now Sir John Hobhouse:

"The Chiefs howr were very urgent to have Lawrence - Currie behaved as usual very disinterestedly & it ended in L being appointed."³

-
1. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 21 January 1847. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 36,475, f.164.
 2. Hardinge to Currie, 21 January 1847, printed in Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.12.
 3. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 21 January 1847. Broughton Papers, Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 36,475, f.164.

§ 2. Hardinge, however, did not completely give up his intention of sending Currie to the place where he thought he was most needed. He felt sure that Henry's health would not stand the strain of work at Lahore for long. He therefore felt that the opportunity to send Currie to Lahore would soon offer itself. He actually began preparing the ground for transferring Currie to Lahore by sounding the President of the Board of Control. He wrote to the chairman of the Court of Directors also because soon Currie was likely to become a member of Council, and then he could not have shifted the latter without taking the 'chairs' into his confidence.¹ The decision of the problem of Currie's salary at Lahore also finally rested with them.

The Governor-General began by enquiring of the Home authorities whether Currie would be able to receive the same pay as that of a Councillor if moved to Lahore. In the beginning the chairman of the Court of Directors was not prepared to sanction it and the President of the Board of Control did not feel it necessary to insist on it. There the matter rested for some time.² It appears

1. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 21 January 1847. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 36,475, f.164.

2. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 20 April 1847. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 36,475, f. 242.

Note: As a member of Council, Currie was to receive £9,000 per annum. The salary of the resident was £6,000. Currie had become a member of Council in February 1847, but it is worth noting that Hardinge had made the enquiry even when Currie was still the Secretary to the Foreign Department, in which capacity he was receiving £5,000 a year.

that Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Control in Russell's ministry, did not feel the same necessity of sending Currie to the Panjab as did the Governor-General. On the other hand, he felt that G.R.Clerk, who had by now come to India as Lt. Governor of Bombay, would be a suitable person. He hinted as much to Hardinge:

"If Mr. Clerk should be tired of Bombay, perhaps you might send him to Lahore in the event of the retirement of L."¹

The insistence of the Governor-General was, however, so strong that Hobhouse promised to do something about it.²

A confession of his rapidly approaching breakdown in health came from Henry Lawrence in the summer of 1847. On 18 June 1847, Henry wrote to H.M.Elliot:³

"It is as well that the Governor-General should be prepared to relieve me in case of my knocking up suddenly which I feel is by no means unlikely."

He even hinted that he would "most probably have to go home

1. Hobhouse to Hardinge, 7 May 1847 quoted in Hardinge's letter to Currie, dated 25 June 1847, published in Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.29.
2. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 23 July 1846. In this letter Hardinge thanks Hobhouse for his letter of 7 May 1847 promising to have Currie at Lahore in case Henry Lawrence were forced to retire.
3. H.M.Elliot had succeeded Currie as foreign secretary to the Government.

Am. Ind.

September."¹ The Governor-General, relying on the promised support of Hobhouse, immediately revived his suggestion to the Home authorities that Currie should succeed Henry Lawrence at Lahore, and again raised the question of salary for him. He pointed out that Currie's receipt of the equivalent of a Councillor's salary was absolutely necessary if he was to be prevailed upon to take up the appointment at Lahore. Even on economic grounds, Currie's going to Lahore was desirable because if the only alternative of appointing Clerk were to be followed "the expence wd. be still heavier."² The fact is that he was opposed to Clerk's appointment partly because Clerk's earlier role in England was not to his liking and partly because he felt Currie was the proper man. He, therefore, made out a strong case for Currie's appointment to succeed Henry Lawrence. He argued

"that the important interests of the Public Service require that he should be the Representative of the B. Govt. at Lahore."³

He even wrote to Currie to be ready "to come up to Lahore to take charge of the Govt. of the Punjab."⁴

-
1. Henry Lawrence to H.M.Elliot, 18 June 1847. Enclosure in Hardinge's letter to Hobhouse dated 23 June 1847. Broughton Papers, Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,475 ff.312-315.
 2. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 23 June 1847. Ibid. ff.308-309. Note: Clerk had by now come to India as the Governor of Bombay.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Hardinge to Currie, 25 May 1847, printed in Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, pp.29-30.

The matter seemed to have been well settled, but in his next letter Henry Lawrence wrote that what he sought was leave to go to England. He stated frankly that he preferred his post at Lahore to any other appointment and wanted to retain his claim to it while he was away.¹ What was Henry's intention in writing this second letter? Did he mean to prevent Currie's taking his place and thus barring him from coming back to it? Or, did he want the promotion of John to Lahore, where the latter had acted for him the previous year? Perhaps his motives were mixed. But Hardinge was placed in a difficulty. He could not force Henry to resign, but felt all the same that Currie's appointment to Lahore was essential. Currie, however, who had agreed to come to Lahore as a permanent resident, might not like to officiate for merely eight or nine months. The Court might not agree to send Currie while he still retained his Council seat. And then for that temporary work Currie might not give up his membership of the Council, even if the matter of pay might be settled.² Even while agreeing to come permanently he had put forth

-
1. Henry Lawrence to Hardinge, 5 July 1847, printed in Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.31.
 2. The sense of dilemma in which the Governor-General felt he was placed is clearly reflected in his letter to Currie: Hardinge to Currie, 15 July 1847. Ibid.p.32.

certain conditions by way of enhancing the position of the residency.¹ Hardinge found himself in what was indeed a difficult situation: he wanted Currie at Lahore, and had recommended him strongly to the Home authorities, but then Henry refused to leave Lahore permanently.

The Governor-General proceeded tactfully to overcome the difficulty. He wrote a polite letter to Henry but made it clear that the matter of Henry's successor was settled. He stood committed both to Currie and the home authorities about it. This the Governor-General felt necessary to state because he had the impression, not without reason, that Henry's intention was to have John at Lahore. He regarded Henry's second letter as "a feeler"² to see if that could be done. Hardinge further pointed out that the furlough regulations which

1. Currie wanted that the administration of the Cis-Satlaj and trans-Satlaj territories should be brought back under the agency. He also wanted that the Governor of N.W.Provinces should not in any way supervise the work of the agency. One wonders how Currie had the impression that the governor of N.W.Province was really exercising this supervision. Maybe he felt that way because Henry Lawrence used to send all his letters and diaries to the governor of N.W.Provinces.

Currie's letter in which he put forth these conditions could not be traced but his having put forth these conditions is clear from Hardinge's letter to Currie written subsequently. See, Hardinge to Currie, 15 July 1847. Ibid. pp.33-34.

2. Hardinge to Currie, 15 July 1847, printed in Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.33.

Henry wanted to avail himself of might not be passed for some time.¹ The implication was that Henry could not go on leave for a fairly long time and if he really wanted to go soon, he must vacate his seat. He wrote the same day to Currie that since the latter had given his consent to come to Lahore, the situation had changed. He sent Currie a copy of Henry's letter to him and his own reply to Henry. He pointed out that "you had better consider the matter in suspense" but at the same time informed his former secretary that he agreed to the conditions he had put forth for going to Lahore viz Currie's not "being a secondary to Lt. Governor" and placing the administration of Cis and Trans-Satlej under him. As if to ensure that Currie would not withdraw his offer to come to Lahore, he painted the prospect that

"your [Currie's] administration of the Punjab will abound more to your honour and reputation than any position within your reach for the next 5 years."²

-
1. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 15 July 1847. Henry Lawrence Papers.
Note: These furlough regulations were being considered in England by the Court of Directors and Henry expected them to arrive soon enough. He wanted to avail himself of these rules. According to the old rules, he could not go to England for more than eight months without resigning his job at Lahore. He could, of course, go on leave to any place in India or to Cape of Good Hope for two years.
 2. Hardinge to Currie, 15 July 1847. Printed in Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, pp.33-34.

The Governor-General's two letters of 15 July 1847, written to Henry Lawrence at Lahore and Currie at Calcutta, resulted in a compromise being effected by both of them. Neither of the two could in fact afford to offend Hardinge and both had to move from their original positions: Currie's of not going to Lahore except as a permanent resident and Henry Lawrence's of going to England for only a year and having John Lawrence as his substitute. The initiative came from Henry but the actual compromise formula was suggested by Fredrick Currie. And they corresponded direct in the matter and sent up the agreement to the Governor-General.

What happened was that Henry Lawrence on receiving Hardinge's letter felt that any more pleadings with the Governor-General were useless. He found the latter too much committed to the appointment of his old secretary to Lahore. It was also clear to him that the Governor-General would not agree to John being his substitute. He, therefore, thought it prudent to refrain from any further suggestions about John taking his place to the Governor-General. His own return after his leave was over, was more important, and this is what he wanted to secure by writing direct to Currie.

Henry reminded Currie of the latter's magnanimity

after the Treaty of Bhairawal in not insisting on the Lahore appointment "when you had a good deal to gain." He pointed out that the Home authorities would not allow a member of Council to come permanently to Lahore while still retaining his seat. Otherwise also, it would not be wise for Currie to come permanently because for him "recompense would be only trouble". He pleaded, therefore, that it would be a favour if the latter agreed to come for about ten months so that he might be allowed to go, even if the expected "Furlough Regulations" were not out by April 1848, in which case he could claim the leave by right.¹

Currie's reply met Henry Lawrence half way. He agreed to act for Henry Lawrence if the recommendations of the Governor-General that Currie be allowed to continue as a member of Council even while he acted for Henry were accepted by the Home authorities. This had already been recommended by the Governor-General, as was known to both. Currie presumed that it would be acceptable because the arrangement "would be an economical one to them". He insisted, however, that he could not come for less than two years, and for that period must have the supervision of the administration of the Cis and Trans-Satlej states.

1. Henry Lawrence to Currie, 20 July 1845. Copy in Henry Lawrence Papers.

He felt that two years was the minimum that he should have to effect some improvement in the administration there, a subject he was keen on because he had been associated with it as Secretary to the Foreign Department till February 1847. For another reason also, he objected to coming for nine months. It would be too much of a 'stop-gap' arrangement and not becoming the dignity of a member of the Supreme Government to accept. He emphasised that he might not have thought of going to Lahore, if he had not felt that this might allay the fears of the Darbar and the chiefs, which were likely to arise if someone else went to Lahore when Henry was away.¹ Currie seems to be thereby hinting that his going to Lahore was in the interest of the success of the experiment of the Lahore state continuing its existence. This, perhaps, was to convince Henry that the latter should welcome the arrangement suggested because Henry's own future was linked up with the success of the experiment. This is what he wrote:

"... I confess when I first heard of your illness and Lord Hardinge's note to me on the subject, I felt very disinclined to go to Lahore: but I considered the matter over, and thought whether there was any real advantage to the public likely to result from my agreement to go.

I do certainly think that there are only three people who would be completely acceptable

1. Currie to Henry Lawrence, 30 July 1847. Henry Lawrence Papers.

to the Sikh Chiefs, and in whose singleness of purpose they would have confidence. You, G.Clerk and myself.

When Lord Hardinge leaves the country, it will be more than ever necessary that a person in whom they can trust and in whose influence they can confide,¹ should be with them.

The new G.G. may be an annexer, and, if not, the papers will say he is, and will make the Durbar believe so if they can. Your leaving them at the moment will alarm them much. The presence of a member of Govt. and the man who took the leading part in the negotiations & formation of their treaty, and who is personally pledged to their interests, would I feel be a great standby for them as comfort (as you call it). Therefore I am willing to go."²

Henry Lawrence agreed to Currie's suggestion and informed the Governor-General immediately.

"As desired by Currie, I have the pleasure to send you his Letter this day received. I have written in reply that I agree to his proposal and will gladly make over the reins to him next January or February on being assured that I may return to Lahore in two years."³

1. Underlined by Currie himself.
2. Currie to Henry Lawrence, 30 July 1847. Henry Lawrence Papers.
3. "Extract of a letter from Coll¹ Lawrence to the G.G." dated 10 August 1847. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 36,475, f.353.

Hardinge on receiving this, recommended it strongly to the Home authorities. He evidently regarded it as the next best alternative to having Currie permanently at Lahore.

Henry had agreed to hand over to Currie in the beginning of the year 1848 because he had no choice in the matter. The Governor-General's reluctance to have anyone but Currie left none. He wanted John Lawrence to take his place but felt helpless. In spite of the agreement, however, both Henry and John, who had actually begun to act for his brother since 21 August 1847, continued to hope that circumstances might yet so combine as to prevent Currie from being appointed to Lahore.¹ The Home

1. In a letter of John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence written on 9 October 1847, we find John still hoping that Henry might succeed in securing him the Lahore appointment. He even referred to the pay on the basis of which he would have preferred to remain as officiating resident or get a permanent appointment.

"As regards my appointment if I am not to get it, secure me Rs.3000 a month - if I do get Lahore, find out if the officiating Resident, or pucka [i.e. permanent] will make any difference in the pay, if not, I would prefer being officiating as by that means I would not lose my hold on the Jullunder territory, but if it will make a difference of pay it would be better to be gazetted as Resident & let the man who gets my Berth officiate, so that I may fall back on my own [] when you return. Let me hear directly anything is certain for I want to arrange for [].

John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence, 9 October 1847,
Henry Lawrence Papers.

authorities might not agree to send Currie as resident while he still retained his seat in Council. John as an acting resident, might prove so successful by January 1848, that Hardinge would become less insistent later that Currie be resident. Currie himself might not like to come if that meant that he lost his seat in Council. This hope was not unrealistic because now all depended on a favourable decision by the Home authorities on the arrangement which provided for Currie's going to Lahore as the resident but without vacating his Council seat. Such a decision would have been against all precedent. The study of the arrangement by which Currie did ultimately come to Lahore would make it clear that this hope nearly came true. Currie would not have been appointed resident if he had not finally agreed to resign from the Council. It was an arrangement which was different from the one agreed upon by Currie and Lawrence and which Hardinge had recommended. To understand that we must go back a little.

It has already been noted that on receiving Henry's first letter about the prospect of his retirement, Hardinge asked the Home authorities ^{for} the right to shift Currie to Lahore if the occasion arose. The second letter of Lawrence had changed the context but Hardinge still asked for permission to shift Currie. If there was some

reluctance to send Currie permanently, he suggested as an alternative that "Currie be on deputation" while at Lahore.¹ The idea was that Currie should retain his seat but replace Lawrence when the latter was away on leave. On the request of the President of the Board of Control, Henry St. George Tucker who had succeeded J.W.Hogg as the Chairman of the Court of Directors, gave the second alternative serious attention. His main difficulty in following this step was that it went against all precedent. It was not allowed even in the cases of "Sir C.Metcalf, Mr. Ross and Mr. Robertson." He concluded, therefore, that "Sir F.C.Currie according to Precedent, must vacate his seat in Council."²

To meet the Governor-General's wish that Currie go to Lahore Tucker thought of a plan of his own. This, he believed, would meet Hardinge's desire without breaking the Precedent. It would enable Currie to go to Lahore, and Henry to have his leave, and it would facilitate Currie's return to Council on Henry Lawrence's return to Lahore. This plan was to appoint J.Littler to Currie's seat, which Currie, of course, would resign. Sir. T.M. Maddock who was the seniormost member and was due to

-
1. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 21 July 1847. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 36,475, f. 333.
 2. Tucker to Hobhouse, 26 August 1847. Broughton Papers. ~~MS. A. 1. 1. 1.~~ Home Misc., Vol. 845, p. 256.

retire was according to the Chairman's plan to be given an extension of a year.¹ The idea was that Henry Lawrence should be allowed to go on one year's leave and Currie to take his place. After Henry's return, Currie would come back to Calcutta, not to his old seat, but to take the place of Maddock, whose extension of office would expire by then.

Before this plan of Tucker could be thrashed out in detail and instructions sent to India, there came the agreement between Currie and Lawrence with a strong recommendation from the Governor-General.² This agreement was examined by Hobhouse "with the help of those who will have to decide upon it and carry it into effect namely the Chairs and Lord Dalhousie." They could not sanction it even though "these parties are fully prepared to do anything they can to carry out your views and sanction the arrangement agreed upon by Sir Fredrick Currie and Colonel Lawrence and approved by you." The difficulty, as they had already noticed, was that precedent was against a member of Council going to any other post without resigning from the Council. Hobhouse actually found out that there was a legal hitch also. In the similar case

-
1. Tucker to Hobhouse, 26 August 1847. Broughton Papers. India Office Library. Home Miscellaneous. Vol.845.p.256.
 2. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 14 August 1847. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,475. ff.351-352.

of T.C.Robertson the judges at Calcutta were consulted and their judgement was

"that the acceptance of the office of Lieut. Governor of the N.W.Provinces by Mr. Robertson would vacate his appointment of senior ordinary Member of the Council of India and that he could not resume his seat without a special re-appointment by the Court of Directors."

The President of the Board of Control regretted, therefore, that the arrangement by which Currie was to be at Lahore while continuing to be a member of the Council could not be agreed upon and

" ... if you wish to secure the assistance of Currie at Lahore, you must do so by some other scheme than that now proposed."¹

The only alternative plan which the Governor-General could adopt at this stage was the one originally sketched out by the Chairman of the Court of Directors. He was about to leave the country himself and had no time to correspond on any other plan. The possible hitch could be that Currie would not accept it, but his ambition concerning the prospects of the work at Lahore had been sufficiently excited for him to be prevailed upon to accept the Tucker plan. He, in fact, agreed to it although the Governor-General at this stage, released him from his original offer to go to Lahore.

1. "Extract of a letter from Sir John Hobhouse to the Governor-General dated Oct. 7 [1847]." Henry Lawrence Papers.

Hardinge wrote two minutes concerning Currie's appointment to the Lahore residency before he handed over to Dalhousie as the Governor-General.¹ Moreover, the second was drafted after the Governor-General designate had reached Calcutta and had Dalhousie's approval too.² These memoranda incorporated the conditions the Governor-General had promised Currie in Tucker's plan.

According to the new arrangement, Currie was to resign his seat on the Council and was to be succeeded by Littler. Maddock was to be given an extension of one year, so that when Henry Lawrence came back from his leave which was to be of one year, Currie might be accommodated back in the Council. At Lahore, Currie was not only to perform all the functions of the Resident but was also to undertake the superintendence of the administration of the Cis and Trans-Satlaj districts. Hardinge argued that since Currie had a long experience in the Judicial and revenue administration and since, as

1. Minute by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General dated 5 January 1848. Board's Collections 110840, pp.4-8;
Minute by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General dated 13 January 1848. Ibid. pp.11-13.
Note: Hardinge left Calcutta on 18 January 1848. Lord Dalhousie who had reached Calcutta on 12 January 1848 assumed charge on 14 January 1848. For six days both were together. It "afforded an opportunity for an interchange of views on those questions which pressed for consideration."
See, Viscount Hardinge, Hardinge, p.175.
2. Ibid. 13 January 1848, para.1.

secretary of the Government, he had supervised the administration of those areas, his undertaking their additional work would promote "at the present time the interests of the Government and the people."¹ Hardinge was thus keeping the promise he had earlier given to Currie.² His purpose in giving Currie this additional work was to make his charge seem an exalted one:

"I felt moreover that in taking a Member of the Government of India for the Lahore office, it was but due to him and would be conducive to his usefulness to make his position one of as much consideration & honour as possible."³

Little wonder that Hardinge proposed that this arrangement was to last only as long as Currie remained at Lahore.⁴

Currie resigned his seat on 14 January 1848,⁵ and the next day the new Governor-General ordered the arrangements suggested in the minutes of his predecessors to be effected.⁶ In guarding Currie's interests he took the additional step of prevailing upon his council to

1. Minute by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General dated 5 January 1848. para.7. Board's Collections 110840.
2. The Governor-General even proposed that Currie should get the same pay as the latter was getting as member of the Council. Ibid. para.5.
3. Ibid. para.9.
4. Ibid. para. 11.
5. 'Note by the Hon'ble Sir F. Currie Bart.' Ibid. p.15.
6. Secretary to Currie, 15 January 1849. Ibid. pp.17-19.

write to the Court of Directors that

"they would recommend to Your Hon'ble Court that his return to the Council should be secured to him without prejudice to his interests and standing which have been temporarily foregone for the service of the state."¹

This was strengthening Tucker's hands to enable him to secure the approval of the Court of Directors for the proposal. Perhaps it was not necessary from that point of view but it must have certainly assured Currie that his interests were safe even while he was away from Calcutta. It must have been some compensation for the fact that he was not going with the conditions he had insisted on so strongly only a few months earlier, viz. that he should not go for less than two years and should not give up his membership of the Council. The fact of Maddock having really been given the extension of the term for a year² must have been an additional assurance that he was really coming back to the Council.

Hardinge's efforts to shift Currie to Lahore were making John Lawrence bitter and frustrated. He had acted for his brother the previous year and very naturally expected that he would be appointed to Lahore when his brother left. Actually while the Governor-General was making efforts to

-
1. The Governor-General in Council to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors of the East India Company 21 January 1848. B.C. 110840, pp.1-3.
 2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 20 January 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,476, f.4. Note: Dalhousie notes confidently that Maddock would be given the extension. He, in fact, already had talks about this arrangement with Home authorities before he had left England.

satisfy the respective expectations of Currie and Henry, John was running the agency even in the year 1847 and for a long time expected that he would remain at Lahore for the period of his brother's absence in England too.¹

Henry Lawrence had, while announcing the breakdown of his health to the Governor-General, presumed that if he went on leave, his brother would succeed him. He had actually sought permission to call his brother John from Jalandhar for that purpose.² He was more explicit in his next letter of 5 July 1847, when he wrote:

"It would be a satisfaction to me both publicly and privately to leave my brother John if your Lordship thinks fit to recommend him to your successor."³

A fortnight later, he again threw the hint to Hardinge that in his view the best successor for him would be his own brother.⁴ He, perhaps, continued to expect it even after he had agreed to what might be described as the Henry-Currie plan, and even after that had been recommended by the Governor-General to the Home authorities. The Governor-General had, however, discouraged the idea much to the

1. John Lawrence was at Lahore as acting resident from 21 August to 17 October 1847 and again from 21 November 1847 to 3 April 1848.
2. Henry Lawrence to H.M.Elliot, 18 June 1847. Broughton Papers ~~Currie~~ Correspondence. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,475, f. 315.
3. Henry Lawrence to Hardinge, 5 July 1847, printed in Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.30.
4. Henry Lawrence to Hardinge, 19 July 1847. Copy in Henry Lawrence Papers.

disappointment of John Lawrence.¹

When John saw Hardinge's letter to Henry wherein the Governor-General had categorically stated that Currie would succeed Henry, John's comments were bitter. He actually advised Henry to wreck Hardinge's plan of sending Currie to Lahore. His advice ran as follows:

"Go to Cashmer when you like for 2 months, or 3 and then in January and February, if the rules are out write publicly for leave under them to go home, if they don't come out write and apply for two years to the Cape - taking no notice of the Lord's plans."

The extent of his bitterness can be gauged from his writing about the Governor-General that,

"... he is a gigantic humbug; as people say of the Pope. He wants to give up your appointment & go home and put Currie in your place on 10,000 a month."

He felt sure that the Governor-General was showing Currie a special favour. Currie had an eye on the Panjab appointment and Hardinge not only wanted to give him that but also to add to his prestige and power. He wrote,

"Currie I know does not like Calcutta & will therefore like coming to Lahore, for now he will prosper in the joint glory of being a member of the Council & Resident."²

-
1. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 15 July 1847. Henry Lawrence Papers. Note: This letter was sent by Henry to John for comment. The elder brother seems to have asked for advice as to what he should do. It was marked in pencil at important points by John who sent it back to Henry. John also wrote a letter to Henry advising him what to do, revealing his bitterness against the Governor-General.
 2. John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence, 21 July 1847. Henry Lawrence Papers.

He was in suspense for four months and was very disappointed when he finally learnt that he was not to be appointed to Lahore. In spite of a conciliatory letter from Hardinge,¹ his grudge in the matter continued.

"I feel very angry with him [Currie] & can't help being so, for with no advantage to himself he has come in my way and like[?] a regular Pecksniff gives out that he was wanted."²

His anger was all the greater because ever since the decision to send Currie to Lahore was taken, he was prevented from taking political decisions.³ He was expected to confine himself to completing the Summary Settlement begun by him earlier.

John's dislike for Currie at this stage was most probably reciprocated by the latter. Currie's observations on John's work during the six months the latter had acted as the resident were not very complimentary.⁴

This was certainly not a happy beginning for Currie's residentship. While working at Lahore his main assistance

1. Hardinge to John Lawrence, 20 January 1848. Published in R. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, sixth edition (Revised), p.209.
2. John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence, 1 February 1848. Henry Lawrence Papers.
3. Mulraj, the governor of Multan, had resigned and John had got the Darbar appoint a new governor. John had selected two British officers to accompany him to Multan. But an order arrived "from head-quarters to take no step in the matter till the new Resident should arrive". See R. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, p.216.
4. The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary, 6 April 1848. I.S.C. 29 July 1848, No.38. Note: It is a long report commenting on the work done by John. His main objection seems to have been that John's measures had resulted in the administration passing from the hands of the Darbar to those of the resident and his assistants.

was necessarily to be from John. John Lawrence knew Lahore much better than Currie and was to be his assistant in carrying on the Civil and criminal administration of the Trans-Satlaj districts, which was one of the two administrative units specially placed under Currie when he joined Lahore. John also had the personal affection and regard of the European assistants dispersed through the Lahore kingdom and in the capital itself. This was there if for no other reason than that he was Henry's brother.

Currie's residentship proved unfortunate. The murder of the two British officers at Multan began the Second Sikh War and ended his dream of glory on the frontier. It was soon said that he had bungled in handling the Multan affair. He was criticised both in England and India.

Henry Lawrence offered to hasten back to India. He was not encouraged in the beginning¹ but later he was told by no less a person than the Duke of Wellington that he "ought at once to go out to India" and join Dalhousie.² Henry reached India in December 1848, hurried to take part

-
1. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 31 July 1848. Henry Lawrence Papers. Note: Hardinge had seen Hobhouse who "said he saw no necessity under present circumstances to require you to proceed before the time which you originally intended so as to relieve Currie in March."
 2. Henry Lawrence to Dalhousie, 3 October 1848. Copy in Henry Lawrence Papers. Note: It is a copy of the letter from Henry Lawrence to Dalhousie. The copy is not in Henry Lawrence's handwriting and ends abruptly. Perhaps the whole of the original was not kept.

in the siege of Multan and was present at the battle of Chilianwala.¹ Even before the war ended, he took charge as resident at Lahore from Currie on 1 February 1849.² Lord Dalhousie did not disturb the arrangement effected in the working of the agency on Currie's taking charge of it.

"I have thought it desirable that Sir. H. Lawrence should for the present discharge all the functions and exercise all the powers which were conferred on Sir. F. Currie by Mr. Secretary's letter of the 15th January of last year."³

Lord Dalhousie must have looked upon this as a temporary measure. He had by this time already made up his mind about annexing the Panjab⁴ and could not have

1. H.B.Edwardes and H.Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence, (Third ed.) p.431.

Note: 1. Multan was first besieged by H.B.Edwardes but the siege was given up when Raja Sher Singh left the British camp to join Mulraj. Raja Sher Singh was the member of the Darbar and the son of Chattar Singh Attariwala, the Nazim at Hazara. Multan's seige started again when troops from Bombay arrived. It lasted from 22 December 1848 to 2 January 1849 when Mulraj surrendered.

2. The battle of Chilianwala was fought on 13 January 1849. It was the hardest fought battle of the Second Sikh War.

3. The last battle of the Second Sikh War was the battle of Gujrat fought on 21 February 1849. This ended the war.

2. This was one month before the time originally fixed. Henry took charge while on his way from Multan to Chillianwala.
3. Dalhousie to the Court of Directors, 1 February 1849. India Political Letters received 1 February 1849, p.51.
4. As early as 31 August 1848, Hardinge was telling Henry Lawrence that annexation had already been recommended though no decision was yet taken. Hardinge wrote that he was basing himself on letters from Currie and Elliot. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 31 August 1848. Henry Lawrence Papers.

thought of placing Henry in sole charge of the administration of the new British province. He had, just before appointing Henry as the resident at Lahore, warned the latter of the temptation to be liberal towards Mulraj.¹ He also knew Henry's views on the annexation of the Panjab. Then there was another consideration to be kept in view while building a new administrative structure in the Panjab. With the Panjab as a British province, it was necessary that one who was experienced in civil, revenue and judicial affairs be associated with its administration. Henry's inaptitude for that type of work was well known. Dalhousie could not have ignored it, particularly when his predecessor had not done so.

Dalhousie could have placed a civilian like John Lawrence in sole charge of the new conquest after the annexation but then there was the promise already given to Henry a year earlier that he would remain at Lahore. Even the Home authorities were committed to it. The facts that Henry had hurried back from England before the expiry of his leave and that he so acted on being asked by Hardinge and Duke of Wellington also made it difficult for his association with the Panjab to be cut off. And then where was the guarantee at this stage that the younger brother

1. Dalhousie to Henry Lawrence, 12 December 1848.
Henry Lawrence Papers.

would have agreed to supplant the elder? Henry's popularity with the chiefs of Lahore was also an asset which Dalhousie may have thought of exploiting in the pacification of the newly conquered Panjab. That the position of some of the chiefs had been badly compromised because of the late events, in fact, made this all the more necessary. Henry was also the hero of the British assistants who had played so prominent a part in the late war. The dilemma of Dalhousie was indeed a real one. He could not have placed the new territory in the charge of Henry and yet could not have turned him out of the Panjab either.

Dalhousie's way out of the difficulty, as is well known, turned out to be the formation of the Board of Administration. Henry, though the head of it, had his hands tied by two civilians, John Lawrence and C.E. Mansel.

§ 3. We thus see that between July 1844 and March 1849, there were rapid changes in the structure of the North-Western Agency. This was natural and reflected the rapid entanglement of the British in Panjab affairs. In fact, in each of the changes in the Agency and the scope of its work, we can notice the British becoming more and more involved in Panjab affairs. Hardinge's rapid changes in the extent of the responsibilities that the Agent was to

undertake were indicative of the variety and the urgency of the problems that resulted.

There were a number of changes during the same period in the person holding the important post of Agent of the Governor -General on the North-West Frontier, who after December 1846, was also the Resident at Lahore. This was rather unfortunate. It was all the more so because none of the individuals who were the Agents one after the other, felt sure that he would remain long enough to carry through his plans. Colonel Richmond was on an officiating basis. Broadfoot constantly had the impression that Clerk would supplant him or begin to supervise his work on his return from England. There was every likelihood, he feared, that Clerk might undo the measures he had adopted on the Panjab frontier. The two Lawrences, who between themselves had run the agency for nearly half the period under study, had actually to struggle hard lest Currie should receive the prized appointment. Currie, in his turn, when he did come to Lahore in March 1848, was a substitute for Henry Lawrence for the limited period of a year.

An agent functioning under a sense of insecurity could, consciously or unconsciously, complicate matters. The particular Agent who might have some decided views on a certain measure was likely to be unduly assertive about

executing it. He would even hurry through it lest he might be replaced and his successor take a different line. At moments, he could even initiate a measure to justify his continuance in the post. The closest of supervision of the Governor-General or the Secretary of the Foreign Department who dealt with the Agents could not avoid these happenings. The position of the Agent was so strategic that he was bound to wield a great influence not only in determining the policies of the Government but also affecting the speed with which they should be executed. The Governor-General himself and even the authorities in England had to depend almost completely on the reports of the man on the spot.

The Panjab policy, in its turn, that the British had to pursue during this period was rapidly becoming more and more important. Hira Singh and his adviser Pandit Jhalla were killed on 21 December 1844. Hira Singh exercised some semblance of a civil government at Lahore but since his death the ascendancy of the army and the Panchas was nearly complete. What attitude the British should have towards such a state was their problem till the first Sikh war. What should be done with the Sikh state when the war had been won and the Sikh army weakened was the main issue afterwards. After the war there were a number of subsidiary questions connected with

administering the newly acquired territory like the Jalandhar doab, that needed attention too. These problems, however, arose with a rapidity that it was difficult for the Governor-General and the Home authorities to give full consideration to all of them. Under the circumstances, the rapid changes of the Agents and their sense of insecurity about losing a coveted post could well come in the way of a consistent Panjab policy in all its aspects.

Note: Mohan Lal Kashmiri was at one time attached as a Persian translator to Sir Alexander Burus and seems to have rendered valuable secret service to the British in the first Afghan War. He later worked in the Ludhiana Agency. His brother-in-law Hodges had also at one time worked in the same agency but was dismissed by Broadfoot "for misconduct". Hardinge wrote about them as follows:

"... Mohan is a Cashmere Brahmin - he turned Mohemmeden in Affghanistan [sic], & his wife or mistress is a daughter [at another place Hodges is described as the brother-in-law of Mohan Lal] of Mr. Hodges? The Brahmins at Lahore in spite of his being a renegade attach importance to his statements because they are confirmed by his mission to London. Hodges communicates through the Lahore Vakeels with

the Darbar, & our own native portion of the Pol Agency by the Letters of Mohan Lall are impressed with the same belief of his power & of Broadfoot's disgrace"1

Also, "Hodges was dismissed by Major Broadfoot for misconduct. Mohan Lall his connection left the Agency on pretence of going to Bombay & without leave went to England - his pay from the Agency was of course stopped. This pay we are instructed to refund & under these circumstances it is, that Mohan Lall having received a Pension for his Services is not unnaturally supposed by the Sikhs to have great influence in London. His Agent & connexion Hodges represents him as having triumphed over the Pol. Agent & the Govr. Genl. that the latter is restricted in His power & as these letters are probably interspersed with paragraphs of his interviews with Mr. Clerk, the latter is represented as being about to take the settlement of the Punjab out of Govr. Genl. hands, Major Broadfoot being recalled. The admission of Mohan Lall to the Queen's presence is stated as confirmation of his authority, & I have no doubt that, Hodges & Mohan Lall receive presents from the Durbar."2

-
1. Hardinge to Ripon, 20 September 1845, Ripon Papers, Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,873, f.333.
 2. Ibid., f.331.

Chapter II

The Buffer State and the British, 1844-1848.

The Panjab had been a useful buffer for the British between their Sattlej boundary and the Afghans for more than three decades. Would it or would it not play that rôle in future? An answer to this question was to determine the political and the most important facet of British policy towards the Panjab between 1844 and 1849. Events in that state, however, moved with a rapidity that made it extremely difficult to be sure of the correct answer to that question and that threw the political aspect of that policy in a state of flux. Hardinge, who was the Governor-General during the major part of the period under study, had consequently to change his policy quite often. It was his successor, Dalhousie who saw in the Second Sikh War the failure of the Panjab to continue as a buffer state and annexed it.

Part A

§ 1. Hardinge's Panjab policy between his arrival in India on 23 July 1844 and the beginning of the first Sikh War on 13 December 1845, may be divided into two parts. Till the death of Hira Singh, the dogra wazir of Dalip Singh, Hardinge continued the old policy of having a strong Sikh state as a buffer between Afghanistan and the British

possessions in India, with some faith in its success. After Hira Singh was murdered by the army on the instigation of the rival Sikh Sardars, he became extremely doubtful of the success of the old policy and sought agreement with Lord Ripon, the then President of the Board of Control in Peel's ministry (1841-1846), about a new one.¹ The two, however, could not agree and Hardinge's efforts till the war itself were a desperate attempt to continue the old policy when the presuppositions on which it could stand and succeed had disappeared. To meet the new situation, he sought remedies in measures that turned out to be self defeating in their purpose.

The Panjab policy that the English had followed for long was that of having a Sikh state as a buffer between the Afghans across the Khyber^e and their own territories with the Satlej as the frontier. The foundations of that policy were, in fact, laid in the Treaty of 1809 signed between C.T. Metcalfe and Ranjit Singh, when the latter was given a free hand north of the river Satlej. In spite of occasional friction natural in two neighbouring states, this policy in its fundamentals had continued ever since.

There were two important conditions which it was necessary for the Sikh state to fulfil if this policy was to be a success. It had to be a strong state, capable of defending itself against the Afghans at least. It had also

1. Ripon was the President of Board of Control from 1843 to 1846.

to be friendly with the English and never too powerful to challenge them. Both these conditions were ideally fulfilled by the Sikh state during the reign of Ranjit Singh. According to Hardinge,

"The Sikh Nation was under Runjeet S. powerful enough to guard this entrance against all Intruders, but so hemmed in by natural boundaries, that it never could increase its power, so as to be an object of jealousy to us."¹

During the short reign of Kharak Singh when his ambitious son, Nao Nihal Singh, and the powerful wazir Dhian Singh combined to develop a strong anti-English feeling at Lahore, one of the essentials of the Panjab policy seemed to be disappearing. Lord Auckland, the then Governor-General, was, however, too occupied by the Afghan war to think seriously about any change. The replacement of Sir Claude Wade, the British Agent at Ludhiana by George Russell Clerk was expected to correct the damage.² Wade's friendship with the late Maharaja Ranjit Singh had always excited the jealousy of Dhian Singh and the other Sardars that constituted the Lahore Darbar. Moreover the situation

-
1. Hardinge to Ripon 23 January 1845. Ripon Papers Br.Mus. Add. Mss. 40,871, folio 89.
 2. Sir Claude Wade was replaced by George Russell Clerk for this reason. Wade was removed from Ludhiana and the two agencies of Ludhiana and Amballa were combined and placed under Clerk. See R.R.Sethi, The Lahore Durbar, p.24; E.R.Kapadia, The Diplomatic Career of Sir Claude Wade, p.22.

was of a very short duration.¹ After the death of both Kharak Singh and Nao Nihal Singh on 5 November 1840, when Sher Singh and Chand Kaur contended for the throne the state was weakened a great deal and another of the essentials necessary for the success of the Panjab policy was being undermined.²

Ellenborough, who succeeded Auckland, was occupied first in pulling the British out of Afghanistan and later in the affairs of Sind and Gwalior. He therefore made no major change in policy even though the Sikh state in the Panjab had in the meantime further weakened itself by a blood bath in the murders of both Maharaja Sher Singh and the wazir, Dhian Singh, by the Sindhianwala Sardars only to be succeeded by their own at the hands of the army which was roused by Hira Singh.³ "Whatever views may have floated in Ellenborough's mind as to the future necessity

1. The entire reign of Kharak Singh lasted from 27 June 1839 to 5 November 1840. His son became a power in the state only after the murder of Kharak Singh's favourite, Chet Singh on 8 October 1839. Even after this for some months Kunwar Nao Nihal Singh and Dhian Singh ran counter to each other before they joined hands together. It would thus be seen that the above situation lasted for about six months at the most.
See R.R.Sethi, The Lahore Darbar, pp.296-7 for details.
2. Sher Singh, the reputed son of Ranjit Singh and Chand Kaur, the widow of the late Maharaja Kharak Singh contended for the throne between 5 November 1840 and 18 January 1841 when Sher Singh was proclaimed the Maharaja. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (2nd.ed.) pp.239-241. and 16
3. This was on 15/September 1848. See J.D.Cunningham, op. cit.pp.262-63.

for interference,"¹ he did not take any positive steps at the moment to change the basis of that policy. In fact, the success of Hira Singh as a wazir led him to recognize the accession of Dalip Singh to the throne in March 1844² in the hope that matters would return to normal again.

Hardinge, who succeeded Ellenborough on 23 July 1844, though not quite sure of the stability of Hira Singh as the wazir continued with the old policy and tried to improve relations with the Sikh government. This he strove to do with sincerity as can be seen from his anger with Colonel Richmond on his missing an opportunity to return Suchet Singh's treasure to the Lahore Government. It was a subject to which both the Lahore Government and its wazir, Hira Singh, attached considerable importance. Raja Suchet Singh, the youngest of the three Dogra brothers, had secretly deposited at Ferozepore a large quantity of coin and bullion worth about fifteen lakhs of rupees. Suchet Singh, who had no son, had died in an attempt to raise a revolt against the Lahore Government but was killed in the attempt to rouse the Sikh army at Lahore. The Lahore Government claimed the treasure at Ferozepore both as escheated property of a feudatory without male heirs of his

-
1. Ripon to Peel 30 April 1844. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add MSS. 40,866, f. 167.
 2. Governor-General's Agent N.W.F. to Governor-General 24 February 1844. I.S.C. 23 March 1845, No.15; Governor-General to Agent 7 March 1844. Ibid. No.68.

body and as the confiscated property of a rebel killed in arms against his sovereign. The British agent, following the practice of disposing off a personal property after the death of the owner had asked three individuals whom he believed to be the possible claimants to the treasure, to submit their claims. These three were Raja Gulab Singh, the surviving brother, Hira Singh the nephew of the deceased and the widow of Suchet Singh. They were asked to do so within a period of three months. None of them complied and Richmond reported the matter to the Government at Calcutta. The Governor-General asked Richmond to return the treasure to the Government of Lahore to be disposed of as it pleased. This the agent did not do soon enough. In the meantime claims were made to the treasure by the widow of Suchet Singh and by Gulab Singh, and the case started afresh. Hardinge felt angry that Richmond had missed a good opportunity to return the treasure so earnestly demanded by the Lahore Government and thus win its friendship.¹ Hardinge's keenness to be on good terms with the then Lahore Government is also evident from the fact that he readily agreed, when requested by the Lahore authorities,

1. Governor-General's Council to Court of Directors 22 October 1844, para.3, I.S.L. from India Vol.I, No.69 of 1844. For the legal aspect of the case and the grounds on which the Lahore Government demanded the treasure, see J.D.Cunningham's 'Memorandum. with regard to the Treasure lodged in Ferozepore by the late Raja Suchet Singh'. The memorandum is dated 8 April 1846 and its copy is to be found in Henry Lawrence Papers.

to send the complimentary mission to the capital of the Panjab to complete the formality of recognizing Dalip's accession as the Maharaja.¹ At the same time, he removed an important grudge lately developed by the Lahore Government. Hira Singh and the Lahore Darbar seem to have had an impression that the British were having direct correspondence with some of the influential subjects of the state. Hardinge assured that in future there would be no correspondence with any Sikh chief except through the Darbar.²

This was as long as Hira Singh was the wazir. When Hardinge heard of his assassination,³ he began to doubt whether the old policy could be continued, and whether the Panjab would henceforth be a buffer between Afghanistan and the British territories.⁴

§ 2. Hardinge thought that as a result of the murder of Hira Singh, the Sikh state was heading towards a dissolution. The army was mutinous and there were revolts in the muslim dominated areas of Multan, Kashmir and the territory lying between the Indus river and Afghan border. What was most serious the combination of the Sikhs and the dogras,

1. Hardinge to Ripon 23 December 1844. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 40,870 f. 394.

2. Ibid.

3. Hira Singh was assassinated on 21 December 1844.

4. Hardinge to Ripon 8 January 1845. Ripon Papers Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 40,871 f. 27.

the main stay of the Lahore Government during and after Ranjit Singh's rule had ceased. He felt, therefore, that it would be difficult for the Sikhs to retain their hold on the entire kingdom.

The main problem for the British, in that case, would be the emergence of Muslim powers, in those areas of the state in which the Muslims were in a majority. These were three: Kashmir, Multan and Trans Indus parts of Dalip's kingdom. The last were the tributary districts of Peshawar, Hazara and Bannu. These muslim powers would be a threat both to Upper Sind and to the Sattlej frontier. There was also the danger that, "It would excite & revive Mussalman hopes throughout India & would be a perpetual source of anxiety to the Govt of India."¹

He saw no prospect of the Dogra chief, Gulab Singh, supplanting the Sikhs. At the best, he might set up a separate kingdom and thereby further weaken the authority at Lahore. On the other hand, he saw no chance of the Sikh subduing Gulab Singh in the existing state of affairs either. He felt that in this mutual fight the Sikh state would wither away to the advantage of the muslims. If that happened, which to him seemed likely, then the entire fabric of the policy that the British had been pursuing so far would tumble down.

1. Hardinge to Ripon 23 January 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add. Mss. 40,871 f. 91.

Should then the British interfere in the Panjab affairs and establish a Sikh Government by destroying the mutinous army which was the cause of all this trouble? In other words, should they establish a subsidiary system? Hardinge posed this solution only to reject it outright. He had many objections to establishing a subsidiary system in the Panjab. It would necessitate a costly military operation with no benefit in return. It would actually mean the British undertaking to defend the frontier of the Sikh kingdom with British resources. It would also tend to encourage misrule in a frontier kingdom, not surrounded by British territories. This could be dangerous. On all these grounds, Hardinge felt thoroughly convinced that a subsidiary arrangement for the Panjab would not be in British interest.¹

Hardinge's own solution was that if the Sikhs failed to retain their hold over the entire kingdom then the British must step in and take over.² He was emphatic that the British must be "prepared for acting upon this alternative - The Govt. of the Panjab must be Sikh or British".³

It is not without significance that at this very time, he ordered that the British forces on the frontier be

1. Hardinge to Ripon 23 January 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS. 40,871, ff.81-91.

2. Ibid.

3. Hardinge to Ripon, 8 January 1845. Ibid., f.27. Hardinge's underlining.

strengthened. He also wanted the construction to be completed of the barracks at Ferozepore which had been earlier discontinued so that Hira Singh's Government might not feel embarrassed.¹

We thus see that he was fully preparing to act on the principle which he had propounded that if the Sikhs failed to retain their hold over the Panjab and the muslim powers looked like emerging even in parts of it, the British must step in. Such an eventuality, however, never arose. The Sikh armies crushed the muslim revolts. They even brought the powerful dogra chief humbled to Lahore.²

The reaction of Ripon, the President of the Board of Control in Peel's cabinet, to Hardinge's suggestion that the British should seize power if the Sikhs failed to hold the whole of the Panjab was not encouraging. Hardinge's apprehension that the British frontiers on the Satlej and in Upper Sindh would be endangered with the emergence of muslim states was regarded as illusory. There was no danger because there were friendly Rajput states in the rear of both the frontiers. The likelihood of the muslim states of Bahawalpur joining the muslim power to emerge in the Trans Indus was remote, in view of the friendly relations existing between the British and that state. Moreover, if an independent Rajput state did emerge on the hills, it could

-
1. Hardinge to Ripon 23 January 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS.40,8471 f. 86.
 2. J.D.Cunningham, op.cit. pp.274-275.

be made to help defend the existing frontier against the Afghans. Since this state was likely to be the result of antipathy against the Sikhs, it would look to the British for guidance. The Sikhs too with this state existing as a counter-balance would be friendly to the British. Both under British advice could be made to defend the Afghan frontier.¹

Hardinge had this dispatch in mind when after the first Sikh war, he recognised the severance of a hill state under Gulab Singh from the Sikh state of Lahore. He used the argument of raising "a counterpoise in the Hills of interests as irreconcilable & different as the hills to the plains" in defending the creation of "a Hindoo power in the Hills independent of the Sikhs but protected by us."² To Ripon who had pointed out how such an arrangement could help, in guarding the Afghan frontier, he wrote,

"The Rajpoot king of the Hills, extending from the Ravee to the Indus including Cashmere, the treaty with whom I ratified 3 days ago, will have a Territory as large as Nepaul & a more productive revenue. He is a most able man & being declared independent of Lahore & under our protection, will be a great counterpoise in the balance of power left to the Sikhs, & equally influential in resisting Affghan pretensions in which we shall all unite."³

-
1. Secret Committee to the Governor-General of India in Council 24 March 1845. Board's drafts of Secret letters to India 5 January 1844 to 24 December 1845. Vol 18, No 1063
 2. Hardinge to Hogg, 19 April 1846. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS.40,876, f.69.
 3. Hardinge to Ripon 18 March 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS. 40,875, f.284.

That was, however, at a later date. The immediate effect of Ripon's despatch was that Hardinge made an effort to enter into amicable relations with the Lahore Government under Jawahir Singh who had been proclaimed the wazir on 14 May 1845. The effort failed because he had no faith in the capacity of Jawahir Singh to control the army and the panchas who had considerable influence in the politics of the state as long as he remained the wazir.

Hardinge continued with the concentration of troops on the frontier.¹ An effort was, however, made to convince the Lahore Darbar that these measures were defensive in their intentions and occasioned by the indiscipline in the army.² It is doubtful whether the other side really believed this, because the British tried to conceal from the Lahore Government during Jawahir Singh's vazarat another matter of interest to it. The secret seems to have leaked out and went far to spoil relations between the two Governments. It concerned the Cis-Satlej territories of the Lahore State.

1. For the details of the concentration of troops made by Hardinge between his arrival and the beginning of the First Sikh War, see Viscount Hardinge, Hardinge, p.76.

That this concentration of troops was made mostly after January 1845 is made clear by the details given in the same book. See Viscount Hardinge, op.cit., p.77.

2. Governor-General in Council to Secret Committee, 7 February 1845. S.L. from India, Vol.1, No.12 of 1845.

These territories were the legacy of the Treaty of 1809 signed between Maharaja Ranjit Singh and C.T.Metcalf. Ranjit Singh's right to all his conquests before the last of his three campaigns in 1808/1809 in the Cis Satlej country, was recognised by this Treaty on the understanding that he would not keep more troops than were necessary "for the internal duties of that territory."¹ The exact places and the tenure on which they were held were not defined then² and later formed a subject of controversy between Captains W.Murray and C.M.Wade, when the former was the Superintendent, Sikh and Hill Affairs, with headquarters at Ambala and the latter Political Agent at Ludhiana. The Vakils from Lahore had claimed that these territories were to be treated as part of the kingdom of Lahore itself and there was no distinct tenure on which they were held. Murray, on the other hand, wanted them to be treated as held by the Lahore ruler in the same way as other chiefs under the British protection south of the river Satlej held theirs. He was for treating them as being held on personal tenures and so liable to escheat on the failure of heirs to the ruler of Lahore. Wade had supported the claim made on behalf of Ranjit Singh, and the decision of the Government at Calcutta, was that these territories were held by the ruler of the

-
1. C.U.Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.viii p.144. "Treaty with the Rajah of Lahore - 1809. Article 2"
 2. C.M.Wade, A Narrative of the Services, Military and Political, p.10, note. I.O.L. Tract 216.

Panjab in the same way as the kingdom to the right of ^{the} Satlej itself. In other words, it was part of the Lahore state and not liable to escheat as were the personal possessions of the chiefs on the British side of the Satlej where the British paramountcy was recognised by them. This is how Ranjit Singh himself and all those engaged in the discussions had understood the decision of the Calcutta Government.¹

There was a peculiar feature about the administration of these territories also. From the time of Wade, at least, the administration was under the supervision of the British Agent at Ludhiana.² In practice the Vakil appointed by the Lahore Government would look after these territories with troops drawn from Lahore but his work in general and the movement of troops from Lahore in particular would have to obtain the sanction of the Agent. This made the position of the Cis-Satlej territories of the Lahore ruler all the more vague.

In February 1845, Broadfoot heard of the intended flight of Rani Jindan with the child Maharaja across the Satlej. He requested Hardinge's Government to enlighten him concerning Dalip Singh's position with regard to the Cis Satlej estates of Lahore, in order to decide how to entertain the Maharaja if he fled south of the Satlej. He

1. Clerk to Ripon 22 May 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus.Add MSS.
40,872 f.125.
2. R.R.Sethi, The Lahore Durbar, p.21.

suggested that the Cis Satlej territories of Dalip be regarded as personal to him and the fugitive Maharaja be then treated on the same basis as any other Cis Satlej chief.¹ The idea was to give the Rani and Dalip Singh protection against the mutinous troops that might try to follow them.

The projected flight was given up but the Cis-Satlej territories and the tenure on which they were held became a subject of correspondence between the Governor-General and the President of the Board of Control. Hardinge, following the suggestion of his Agent, was for declaring the property personal to Dalip. There would be advantages in following that course because

"the risk of disputes & collision would be diminished - our occupation of Sutlej as the frontier would be strengthened by the gradual acquisition of these lands by Escheat."

Evidently his main concern in taking that stand was to make the Satlej frontier a distinct and well-defined one because on the tenure itself his feeling was that the matter was involved "in a good deal of obscurity and contradicitions."² Perhaps the Governor-General took this line because till then the likelihood of an established Government at Lahore was not in sight and at the earliest opportunity, he wanted to take over these territories.

1. Agent (G.Broadfoot) to Secretary (F.Currie) 23 February 1845. I.S.C. 4 April 1845, No.147.

Note: Rani Jindan had taken fright because the army panchas had started negotiations with Gulab Singh, against whom the Rani had prevailed upon the army to march after some time of confusion in the capital following the assassination of Hira Singh.

2. Hardinge to Ripon 22 March 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add. MSS. 40,871, ff. 331-332.

Hardinge, however, had not taken up the matter with the Lahore Government. It was an important subject and he wanted to take Ripon into his confidence before taking up the issue with the Lahore authorities which were in confusion. As he was doing that Jawahir Singh's wazarat was proclaimed at Lahore and it was with the Darbar under that wazir that the relations were to deteriorate on this issue of the Cis Sattlej territories of the Maharaja. The matter had become all the more serious because Jawahir Singh was basing himself on conjectures and had not been sounded on the subject by the British Agent or the Governor-General.¹

Ripon agreed with Hardinge about the desirability of taking over these territories but not by raking up the issue of Dalip's tenure. He opposed this method because

1. Hardinge to Ripon 20 September 1845. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add.MSS.40,873 f.331.

Note: In this letter, Hardinge writes that Cis Sattlej territories never formed "part of any differences with the Durbar" and had not been taken up with the Lahore Government. The subject of taking over their administration had been discussed only with Ripon. The latter had consulted Clerk who had drawn up a memorandum on the subject. The Governor-General wondered how the arrival of this memorandum coincided with the demand of the Lahore Darbar "to send over Troops when and how they please." He suspected that through Clerk's indiscretion the Lahore Darbar had come to know of the discussion concerning the proposal that the British should take over the administration of the Cis-Sattlej territories of the Lahore Government. Mohan Lal, who frequently met Clerk in London, conveyed this information to his brother-in-law Hodges in India, who in his turn would pass it on to the Lahore Darbar.

Clerk had assured him that these territories were not held by Dalip Singh on any distinct tenure but formed a part of the Lahore kingdom itself. Clerk, all the same, agreed that in view of the disturbed state of the army at Lahore, the Government there should not have any more say in the administration of these territories. Clerk's suggestion was that the British should take over the administration temporarily by talking direct to the Darbar.¹ Ripon went a step farther and suggested that the Governor-General should demand these territories as compensation for the trouble and expense to which the British were put on account of the mutinous state of the army at Lahore.²

It has already been pointed out that while the Governor-General was corresponding on the subject with London, Jawahir Singh, who had been the wazir since 14 May 1845, was kept in the dark.³ He came to know of it, however, and on his part thought of taking over the administration of these territories completely under the Darbar. Having gone suspicious of the British intentions

-
1. G.R.Clerk to Ripon, 22 May 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS. 40872, ff.124-129.
 2. Ripon to Hardinge, 23 May 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus.Add. MSS. 40,872, f.134.
Ripon promised to take up the matter of the tenure and the administration of these territories in the Cabinet but wanted Hardinge to ask for the territories from the Lahore Darbar. He explained himself to Hardinge by "throwing out hints and suggestions, if not giving instructions in what I am now writing."
 3. Hardinge to Ripon, 20 September 1845. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add.MSS. 40,873, f.331.

towards these territories, he actually started sending troops there without the permission of the British Agent which was against the earlier practice. At the same time, he sought to prevent Broadfoot from supervising the administration of these territories.¹ The matter was thus approaching a crisis and the Governor-General felt that he would personally resolve it on reaching the frontier where he had been preparing to go for some time past.

Jawahir Singh was tried and killed by the army Panchas on 21 September 1845, while the Governor-General was on his way to the frontier. The late wazir however left behind a legacy of suspicion in the army and the panchas concerning British intentions about the Cis-Satlej territories of the Lahore state. This was at its height as the Governor-General marched towards the frontier.

§ 3. The suspicion of the Sikh army was, perhaps, welcomed by the Sikh chiefs who assumed power some time after the death of Jawahir Singh. Even while he was alive, they were thinking of the means by which they might make British

1. Governor-General's Memorandum: 18 August 1845. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS.40873, ff.185-86.
 Note: The memorandum deals with an incident only in one village but is sufficient to indicate how Jawahir Singh was trying to prevent Broadfoot and his men from having any say in the administration of the Cis.Satlej Lahore territories.

intervention unavoidable. Their aim was to have a subsidiary system or general protectorate of the Cis Satlej type. According to Broadfoot these chiefs believed that Hardinge's Government was prevented from taking a decision on the offer of a subsidiary system for the Panjab till forced to do so by some acts of Jawahir Singh's Government. After the trial and murder of Jawahir Singh by the army panchas, it seems they felt all the more the necessity of such an action.

Their calculations, perhaps, were that British intervention, would never lead to annexation. If forced to intervene all that Hardinge would be allowed by the home government to do, would be to impose a subsidiary system or protectorate of the type existing over the Cis-Satlej chiefs. This suited them very well.

They sounded Broadfoot on the subject. The Agent could not have given a reply on such an important and delicate matter without consulting the Governor-General. The latter was averse to any understanding and actually wrote to England to this effect.¹ But since he was going to the frontier himself, he asked Broadfoot not to give any reply to the chiefs till he himself was on the spot. In the meantime, Broadfoot was asked to collect data which might help the Governor-General "to have some approximation as to

1. Governor-General in Council to Court of Directors
8 September 1845. Paras. 23-24. Copy in Peel Papers.
Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,466 f.293.

the importance of these chiefs."¹

There was nothing new in these overtures. They had been made earlier in the year also, when in January and February 1845, the agent was asked whether the British troops could be employed to destroy the Sikh soldiery.² Then too, these overtures were not given any reply. Now, however, the ascendancy of the Panchas was complete as was evident from their publicly trying and executing the wazir and so the position of the chiefs was really desperate. Even without any reply, therefore, the chiefs were prepared to take the risk of compromising the army by instigating it against the English.

The result of all this was that by the time the Governor-General did reach the frontier, he had nothing else to do but to determine whether or not to declare war on the Sikhs. He found the news of the Sikhs preparing to cross the Satlej already a fortnight old. He waited for an explanation from the Darbar as demanded by his agent. It never came, and when he heard that the Sikh army had crossed the frontier, he declared war. This was on 13 December 1845.³

The war had in a way become inevitable. The chiefs

1. W. Edwardes to Broadfoot, 10 September 1845. para.14. Peel Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 40,466, f.300.
2. Hardinge to Ripon, 23 January 1845. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 40,841, f.88; Hardinge to Ripon, 7 February 1845. Br. Mus. Add.MSS.40,871, f.192.
3. Hardinge to Ripon [?] 27 December 1845. Peel Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS.40,466, f.333.
C.U.Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.viii p.169. 'Proclamation by the Right Honorable the Governor-General - 1845.'

wanted it. The Sikh army was instigated to it by the chiefs with a view to getting rid of it because they feared it.¹ Hardinge's concentration of troops on the Satlej frontier and the desire to take the Cis Satlej territories of Dalip Singh under the complete administration of the British, if not annex them, possibly were the factors that helped the chiefs in provoking the army to go in for it.

The war that followed was short and lasted for less than two months. In it the Rani and the chiefs, of whom Lal Singh and Tej Singh were the foremost, succeeded in what seems to have been their aim - that is, in having their own army beaten and yet in retaining the existence of their state.

The first battle of this war was fought at Mudki on 20 December 1845. The Sikh armies had crossed the Satlej river near Firozpur but did not attack the small British garrison under John Littler at that place. The explanation lies in Lal Singh provoking them to march to Mudki where the Governor-General had been concentrating most of his troops after the declaration of the war. He, perhaps felt that the troublesome army would meet its destruction there. According to Peter Nicholson, who was the assistant Political Agent at Firozpur,

1. Hardinge to Ripon 3. December 1845. Ripon Papers.
Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,874 f.273.

"... the troops have marched with the idea of attaching the Lord Sahib who they heard was there with 8 Battl. But the Rajah himself has induced the troops to march in the hopes of his so doing being considered a recommendation of him by the British Govt."¹

Lal Singh had earlier wanted to be assured that Nicholson "would consider him and the Bebee Sahib our friends and cut up the 'Boorchas' for them."² The Sikh army was beaten but not destroyed at the battle of Mudki. In fact the British casualties itself were heavy amounting to 872 killed and wounded.

Now it was the turn of the British to be on the offensive. Three days after the battle of Mudki, they marched to attack Firozshah where the Sikh army had encamped itself. The British Commander-in-chief had decided to attack the Sikh early in the day but Governor-General insisted on Littler's force at Firozpur to come and join the British army before this was done. The result was that the British attacked the Sikh army just before sunset. The Sikh resistance was tougher than was expected. The British had made a frontal assault, but two divisions were

-
1. Extract from a journal kept by Captain Nicholson, the assistant Political Agent at Firozpur (found after his death) forwarded with the Memorandum relative to the Paper given by Henry Lawrence to Raja Lal Singh as sanctioned by the Governor-General in the letter of the Secretary to Government written to Henry Lawrence, 4 May 1846. I.S.C. 26 December 1846 No.899.

2. Ibid. This was on 12 December 1845, i.e. one day before the Sikh army had crossed Satlej.

Notes: Bebee Sahib refers to Rani Jindan;

'Boorchas' is the Sikh army.

provisionally repelled and the Sikh line was only partially captured when it became too dark to continue the fight. The British troops

"bivouached on the battlefield, having lost touch with one another and being still exposed to a spasmodic and harassing fire from the enemy's batteries" "found themselves half outside and half within the enemy's position, unable either to advance or retreat. Regiments were mixed up with regiments and officers with men in utter confusion."¹

The British position was indeed perilous.

"We had no alternative but to make the men lie down and be quiet. The Commander-in-chief soon joined me - we knew nothing of what had passed on our flanks - & we agreed to keep our men together to collect what troops we could, and if possible communicate with Sir. H. Smith's Division and Sir L's. The Arty. was no where to be found but we considered it to be safe in our rear. In this state, we lay on our arms, the enemy firing from his Batteries, harassing, [?] and exploding mines during the night Towards the morning, the cries of the Sikhs and the tramp of bodies of men showed that they had reinforced that part of the position which we had not attacked It was indeed a night of terrors."²

The next day the English carried the day but their position looked perilous on Tej Singh appearing on the scene.³ But,

"... he rather skirmished and made feints than led his men to a resolute attack, and after a time he precipitately fled, leaving his

1. Roberts, History of British India, p.332.

2. Hardinge to Ripon, 27 December 1845. Peel Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 40,466, ff.341-342.

3. Tej Singh and troops under him were earlier in the neighbourhood of Firozpur and came to Firozshah when they learnt that Sir John Littler's contingent had left Firozpur to join the main army of the British on the battlefield of Firozshah.

subordinates without orders and without an object, at a moment when the artillery ammunition of the English had failed, when a portion of their force was retiring upon Feerozpoor, and when no exertions could have saved the remainder if the Sikhs had boldly pressed forward."¹

Instead, the Sikh army perhaps feeling abandoned by its own Commander-in-chief retired from the field.² The Governor-General felt that while on the retreat, the Sikh army could be pursued and defeated,

"... but such another Victory, unless fought at Lahore, giving us as the result their Arsenal & the Palace would cripple the British part of the force, which is so difficult to replace."³

This was on 22 December 1845.

It was followed by a lull. The British waited for the seize trains from Delhi. The Sikh army and their panchas on the other hand, perhaps wondered what to do next. It had encamped itself north of the river Satlej but near enough to threaten Firozpur and the British army there.⁴

1. J.D.Cunningham, op.cit., 1st.ed.) p.309. The explanation of Tej Singh's action must be sought in his desire to get the army under him involved in the battle, rather than save the British from being beaten as Cunningham seems to suggest. Note: We have here followed J.D.Cunningham in saying that Tej Singh arrived in the morning after the army under Lal Singh had been beaten. The Governor-General however, reported to Ripon that Tej Singh had arrived during the night of 21 December 1845 and actually participated in the action fought the following morning. Hardinge to Ripon, 27 December 1845. Peel Papers, Br.Mus. Add.MSS. 40,466, f.323 and f.340.
2. Hardinge's letter to Ripon hardly gives the impression that the British took the offensive on 22 December 1845. They were mostly on the defensive. Ibid.
3. Ibid. ff.348-349.
4. After the battle of Firozshah, the British army had retired to Firozpur.

Almost a month after the battle of Ferozshah, a section of the Sikh army recrossed the Satlej near Ludhiana with Ranjhor Singh in command. Fearing that this force might plunder the British cantonment at Ludhiana, the Governor-General asked Sir Harry Smith to proceed there with a small force.¹ On 21 January 1846, while on its way to Ludhiana, Sir Harry Smith's force met a severe check by the Sikh army under Ranjhor Singh which captured the whole of the baggage of the British force. But a week later the Sikh army under Ranjhor Singh were driven across the Satlej following their defeat in the battle of Aliwal on 28 January 1846.

It was at this stage that Gulab Singh came down to Lahore from the hills

"with 10,000 men including 'Molkeas' or Militia and 32 guns, encamped at Shahadura on the right bank of the Ravee. On 28th ultimo [28 January 1846] he visited the Ranee in Durbar and was received with distinction, but he is himself suspicious of the Sikhs, nor has the Durbar confidence in him. Still the troops wish him to be their commander, and a deputation has gone from the main army to become the General-in-chief against the English."²

The Sikh army had itself, in the meantime, recrossed the Satlej river on the Ferozpur front and encamped itself at Sobraon. It had built up a position of considerable

-
1. Ludhiana was at a distance of about 50 miles from Ferozpur and the Governor-General could not afford to send a large force away from Ferozpur because the major portion of the Sikh army after crossing the Satlej had entrenched itself on the other side of the bank and so very near Ferozpur. Hardinge to Ripon, 19 January 1846. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add.MSS. 40,875, f.22.
 2. Memorandum of intelligence 4 February 1846. Henry Lawrence Papers.

strength, and had constructed a bridge of boats in their rear to effect a retreat in case of emergency. Gulab Singh, in spite of the request of the Sikh army, did not consent to lead this army. On the other hand, now installed as the minister of the Lahore state by the Rani, he approached the Governor-General on 3 February 1846 through his munshi about the terms on which peace could be effected.¹

The Sikh army at Sobraon had, therefore, to content itself with the leadership of Lal Singh and Tej Singh. Lal Singh busied himself in communicating with Henry Lawrence through his "confidential agent", conveying the information which helped Henry to prepare

"a rough sketch of the position and strength of the enemy at Sobraon on the night of 7th February for the transmission to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief."²

Tej Singh did no such thing, but was all the same, perhaps, prepared to see the army under him destroyed.

On 10 February, the battle of Sobraon was fought. Tej Singh abandoned the Sikh army quite early and as he fled "either accidentally or by design sank a boat in the middle of the communication."³ The Sikh army actively

-
1. Hardinge to Ripon, 3 February 1846. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 40,875, f.65.
 2. Henry Lawrence to Secretary, 16 May 1846. Henry Lawrence Papers.
 3. J.D.Cunningham, op.cit., (1st ed.) p.327.

participating on the front was defeated and routed. It was, however, not completely annihilated. There were still sections of it across the river.

Part B

§ 1. Hardinge's arrangements after the war, as revealed by the different treaties with the defeated Lahore Darbar, were no indication of his wishes. They were chiefly dictated by the fact that conquest was out of the question, without a prolonged conflict. In fact his associates on the front, including Sir Charles Napier, agreed with Hardinge that easy annexation was not possible.¹

The Sikh armies had shown more power on the battlefield than they were ever believed to be capable of, and then the Sikh troops at the fortified places of Peshawar, Lahore,

1. Hardinge to H.B. Edwardes, 9 November 1850. Henry Lawrence Papers.

Govindgarh (a fort near Amritsar) and Multan were still intact.¹ The way Hardinge had argued for the desirability of English interventions, if the Sikhs failed to hold the entire Panjab, indicates that if annexation were possible now that the Sikhs had challenged the British and evidently ceased to be a buffer state for the time being, he would have preferred it. But he was reluctant to enter into a prolonged war and so after the narrowly won battles of Mudki and Firozshah, he was forced to an alternative policy.²

The necessity of ending the war quickly made it essential that full advantage be taken of the wedge that existed between the chiefs and the army. For that it was necessary to give the chiefs some assurance that they would gain by the British arrangement after the war. One of the very minimum that was necessary for that was to make it clear that annexation would not follow the close of the war.³ There was the danger that if that were not done, the chiefs would make a common cause with their armies and

1. Hardinge to Hogg 19 April 1846. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS.40,876 f. 61.

2. This was in the middle of the war. The battle of Mudki was fought on 18 December 1845, and that of Firozshah on 20 and 21 December 1845. The final battle of the first Sikh war, namely the battle of Sohraon was fought on 10 February 1846.

3. In the case of annexation, chiefs' intention of seeing a troublesome army destroyed and have the full enjoyment of their power and privileges would have been defeated.

prolong the war. It was felt that the chiefs could not have desired that even though they wanted the destruction of the army. A categorical assurance to the chiefs to that effect was, therefore, necessary and this is what Hardinge had to give them if the war was to be ended early.

This was done both privately and publicly. Privately it was conveyed to the Rani and the Darbar through Gulab Singh's Vakil when he had contacted Henry Lawrence's munshi after the battle of Ferozshah but before that of Sobraon.¹ After the battle of Sobraon had been fought and won, it was stated publicly.²

In view of these assurances, the arrangements that had to be entered into after the war had to be within the framework of the existence of the Sikh state. It would have been impolitic, however, to allow this state to continue as strong in its armed strength and resources as before. One important lesson of the war was that instead of playing the buffer between the English and the Afghans, it could itself

1. Hardinge to Ripon 3 February 1846. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS. 40.875 f.65.

J.D.Cunningham seems to have vaguely known about this and so made while referring to the battle of Sobraon the remark in his History of the Sikhs that "under such circumstances of discreet policy of shameless treason was the battle of Sobraon fought".

See J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (2nd.ed.)p.277.

2. Proclamation of the Governor-General of India 14 February 1846. Inclosure 3 in No.15. Further Papers respective of the Late Hostilities on the North-Western Frontier of India and the conclusion of the Treaties with Maharaja Dhuleep Singh, of Lahore, and the Maharaja Golab Singh, of Jummoo. Accounts and Papers 1846 Vol.xxxi, p.87.

turn against the British. The new state had, therefore, to be weakened in the British interest itself.

This was the main feature of the Treaty of Lahore signed on 9 March 1846. According to Article 2 of that Treaty Maharaja Dalip Singh was made

"to renounce for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connexion with, the territories lying to the south of the river Sutlej"

The next Article went farther. It laid down that

"The Maharaja cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty all his forts, territories, and the rights, in the Doab, or country, hill and plain, situated between the rivers Beas and Sutlej."

This had advanced the British frontier within fifty miles of the Sikh capital. Most important part of the Treaty, however, was the weakening of the Lahore army. It was to be reduced to one-fourth of its former strength:

"The regular army of the Lahore state shall henceforth be limited to 25 battallions of the infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each with 12,000 cavalry: this number at no time to exceed without the concurrence of the British Government. Should it be necessary at any time, for any special cause, that this force should be increased, the cause shall be fully explained to the British Government; and when the special necessity shall have passed, the regular troops shall be again reduced to the standard specified in the former clause of this article."

The Lahore Government was also to

"surrender to the British Government all the guns, thirty-six in number, which have been

pointed against the British troops, and which having been placed on the right bank of the river Sutlej, were not captured at the battle of Subraon."¹

Another feature of the Treaty was to make Jammu a separate kingdom to act as a counterpoise to the Sikh state at Lahore.² It was, perhaps, felt that this would not make it strong enough to play that rôle, and therefore "... the hill countries which are situated between the river Beas and Indus, including the provinces of Cashmere and Hazara", handed over as part of the war indemnity by the Lahore Government were transferred to Gulab Singh. This was by the Treaty of Amritsar³ signed a week after the Treaty of Lahore. The Governor-General would have actually wished to demand these territories straight away when the Lahore representatives were discussing the terms of the Treaty of Lahore⁴ but desisted from doing so because there was the danger of the "beaten army throwing itself into Lahore, if the terms were severe," Later when the Lahore Government could not pay the entire indemnity "we pressed for territory

-
1. Treaty between the British Government and the state of Lahore, concluded at Lahore, on March 9, 1846. Accounts and Papers 1846 Vol.xxxi, pp.99-102.
 2. Ibid. Article 12.
 3. Treaty between the British Government and Maharaja Gulab Singh concluded at Umritsa, on 16 March 1846. Accounts and Papers 1846, Vol.xxxi, pp.104-5.
 4. This was on 16 February 1846. See, Governor-General to the Secret Committee 19 February 1846. Secret Letters from India, 1846.

as an equivalent & the offer of the Lahore Govt, was the cession of Cashmeer in lieu of paying the crore." This was naturally welcomed because "it was very desirable to make Golab Singh a separate hill power independent of the Sikhs." The Lahore Government was therefore released "from the crore in consideration of the cession of their rights to all the hill countries."¹

Kashmir's transfer to Gulab Singh has been the subject of criticism ever since it was brought about. Much of this criticism might well be justified, It is not realised, however, that its transfer to Gulab Singh followed logically from the desire to weaken the Sikh buffer state and the raising of the Rajput hill state as a counterpoise. The intention was to use both these states to defend the Afghan frontier, the possibility of which was pointed out by Ripon in the dispatch of 24 March 1845. The transfer of Kashmir and Hazara² brought the frontier of the new hill state right to the Trans-Indus districts of the Sikh state and so

-
1. Hardinge to Ripon 4 March 1846. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus. Add.MSS.40,875 f.167.
 2. The transfer of Hazara to Gulab Singh in March 1846 was significant. It brought the boundary of Gulab Singh right up to the river Indus. It has not got the attention it deserved by historians because Hazara was later exchanged by Gulab Singh with the Lahore Darbar for the territories on the plains adjoining Jammu. Henry Lawrence had prevailed upon the Darbar to go in for that exchange because after the Treaty of Bhairawal which had brought the administration of the Lahore state under the supervision of the British, the earlier role expected of Gulab Singh to defend the Afghan border was not that important.

placed it well for such a rôle.

Gulab Singh's neutrality in the late war was, perhaps, an additional consideration, but only in the sense of a confirmation of the belief that Gulab Singh would play the rôle intended for him and that he would follow British advice in defending the Afghan frontier.

There was another important step taken after the Treaty of Lahore was signed. By an agreement with the Lahore Government two days later, it was agreed to leave behind a British contingent.¹ In a way this was a logical thing after the Treaty itself. The Sikh army had to be reduced not only in numbers but also to the old scale of pay that existed during Ranjit Singh's time. This was a task which would have taxed the ingenuity of the ablest of men. For the Rani and the wazir, with their unpopularity, it would have been impossible without British help. In fact without this help even the fulfilment of the other clauses of the Treaty of Lahore would have been difficult.

It is to be noted that this agreement was in part the fulfilment of the desire of the Rani and the chiefs for the protection of the subsidiary system. For another nine months, at least, the Rani and the Darbar could go their own way under the protective wing of the British army at

1. C.U.Aitchinson, A collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.viii, pp.164-166.
 "Articles of Agreement concluded between the Lahore British Government and the Lahore Durbar on 11 March 1846."

Lahore. The consolation of the Governor-General perhaps, was that the British army was to stay at Lahore only till the close of the year 1846.

Hardinge had to undertake these arrangements in the Panjab, without waiting for the instructions of the home authorities. On hearing of the course of the war, Peel's cabinet had given its attention to the disposal of the Panjab question and had decided not to send any instructions, though two memoranda drawn up by Ripon and Ellenborough were sent to Hardinge for his guidance. Both differed from the arrangements actually brought about by Hardinge.¹ J.W. Hogg, the then deputy-chairman of the Court of Directors, also had his own views which were different from those of Hardinge.² But they reached the Governor-General after the Treaty of Lahore and the subsequent arrangements, and apart from the fact that Hardinge had to defend his Panjab settlement privately, they had no practical effect.

-
1. Ripon to Peel 10 March 1846, Ripon Papers Br.Mus. Add.MSS. 40.875 ff.252-53.
 Ripon to Wellington 10 March 1846 Ibid. ff.254-259.
 Peel to Ripon 10 March 1846 Ibid. ff. 256-57.
 Confidential memo for the Cabinet 12 March 1846 Ibid. ff.264-65.
 Ripon to Hardinge 23 March 1846 Ibid. ff.326-327
 Note: The two memoranda could not be traced but from the above letters, it is clear that both Ripon and Ellenborough would have preferred the boundary to be pushed to Ravi. These, however, reached the Governor-General too late.
 2. J.W.Hogg was for full annexation. This would be clear from a letter written by Hardinge to Hogg arguing why he could not follow that policy.
 Hardinge to Hogg 19 April 1846 Ripon Papers. Br.Mus.Add. MSS. 40876 ff.58-76.

Two important consequences that followed from Hardinge's arrangements must be noted because they have a bearing on later events. In the first place, they made the position of Lal Singh, the wazir of the state which had lately fought the war against the English, extremely strong. He had the complete support of the Rani. He could count on the support of Henry Lawrence.¹ His chief rival, Gulab Singh, was no longer participating in Lahore politics and so he could go his own way.² The second of the results of the new arrangements was the near bankruptcy of the new state. Its economic resources had been considerably reduced with the British taking away the Cis-Satlaj territories and the Jalandhar doab, and Jammu and Kashmir no longer remaining part of it. At the best the reduced Lahore state could show a very meagre surplus and it needed some one highly efficient to administer it.³

-
1. Henry Lawrence believed that Lal Singh had been helpful in winning the Sikh war. This view was not shared by the Governor-General or by Frederick Currie. See India Secret Consultations 26 December 1846, Nos. 894-9.
 Agent to Secretary 23 April 1846
 Proposed certificate by Henry Lawrence to Lal Singh
 Secretary to Agent 4 May 1846
 Agent to Secretary 17 May 1846
 Memorandum by Secretary to the Government of India.
 For Henry Lawrence view also see Agent to Secretary
 16 May 1846 Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. Sir Herbert Edwardes and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence Third ed. (1873) p. 395.
 3. John Lawrence in November 1846 put the net revenue at Rs. 1,08,19,160 and the expenses on the army alone at 80 lacs per year. This was when "nothing, except perhaps kine, escapes taxation in the Panjab." This was also on the assumption that the powerful governors like that of Multan and influential jagirdars paid their dues.
 See Statistical Notes on the Punjab by the Commission and Superintendent Trans Satlaj Territories, on special duty at Lahore dated 10 November 1846. Henry Lawrence Papers.

Unfortunately Lal Singh had not the ability to meet the situation which demanded that he should effect two measures quickly so that the state could stand on its own legs. The first was to reduce the army to the stipulated strength and prevail upon it to accept the old scale of pay as it existed at the time of Ranjit Singh. The second was the reduction of the jagirs of the powerful Sardars of the state but without provoking unnecessary jealousy and suspicion of his own intentions in the matter.

He did try to carry out these measures but in such a way as to make himself extremely unpopular both with the army and the chiefs. He seemed to be reducing the army merely in order to recruit "foreigners from his own country and Hindustan." He was also isolating himself by taking away the jagirs of the powerful chiefs in the state and bestowing them "on his relatives and servants."¹ The result was that he became completely dependent on Henry Lawrence and the British army with no prospect of his establishing a Government that could stand when, following the Treaty of Lahore, the British army was to be withdrawn from Lahore at the end of the year.

At this stage, he further committed the blunder of compromising himself with the British. His jealousy of Gulab Singh led him to encourage Sheikh Imam-ud-din in his

1. Henry Lawrence's report on the trial of Raja Lal Singh para.9. See Sir Herbert Edwardes and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence (third ed.) p.405.

refusal to hand over Kashmir to Gulab Singh. This removed Henry Lawrence's support for him, on which he had depended so long. It was easy enough under these circumstances for a British court to try him in the midst of the rival Sardars and send him away from Lahore with their approval.¹ This was not only the end of Lal Singh's wizarat of the Lahore state but also the end of the arrangements whereby that state had been governed.

§ 2. Henceforth the administration of the Sikh state was to be carried on, as arranged in the Treaty of Bhairawal. It amended the Treaty of Lahore radically and brought the administration of the Lahore state under the control and supervision of the British. It provided for the appointment by the Governor-General of a British officer with an efficient establishment of assistants. That officer was to have "full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the state." The Darbar, now officially to be called the Council of Regency, was there but it was appointed by the British and its personnel could not be changed without their consent. The Treaty provided for a

1. For the details of Lal Singh's trial, see: Papers relating to the Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, in the 16th of December, 1846 for the Administration of the Lahore State during the minority of Maharaja Duleep Singh, Accounts and Papers 1847, Vol. XLI, pp. 22-24.

British force to be stationed at Lahore, for which the Lahore government had to pay 25 lakhs a year. Unlike the earlier arrangement following the Articles of Agreement (concluded on 11 March 1846) which confined the British army only to the city of Lahore, now

"The Governor-General shall be at liberty to occupy with British soldiers any fort or military post in the Lahore territories, the occupation of which may be deemed necessary by the British Government for the security of the capital, or maintaining the peace of the country."¹

Thus the administration of Lahore state had literally passed into the hands of the Agent who in his additional capacity as resident had not only immense powers but also the ready means of enforcing his will.

The Treaty as worded gives the impression that it was the trial of Lal Singh that had led to it.² It would be a mistake, however, to regard that Treaty as the result of that trial. That was just a coincidence. The arrangements of the Treaty were envisaged before the complicity of the Lahore wazir in Sheikh Imam-ud-din's refusal to hand over Kashmir

-
1. Second Treaty of Lahore (better known as the Treaty of Bhairawal). Papers relating to the Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, on the 16th December 1846, for the Administration of the Lahore state during the Minority of Maharaja Duleep Singh. Accounts and Papers 1847, Vol.XLI.
 2. Treaty of Bhairawal. Papers relating to the Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, on the 16th December 1846, for the Administration of the Lahore state during the Minority of Maharaja Duleep Singh. Accounts and Papers 1847 Vol.XLI.

to Gulab Singh was even known. Strangely enough Lal Singh and his chief supporter, Rani Jindan who lost all her power with this Treaty were themselves the unwitting instruments of the Treaty.

The Treaty of Bhairawal was the result of mature consideration on the part of the Governor-General. It originated from his apprehension that the Sikh Government at Lahore would not stand if the British armies were withdrawn from Lahore in December 1846, in accordance with the earlier treaty. It was the same old fear that the Sikh army would again have the upper hand and that a regular Government to administer the buffer state would not survive the withdrawal of the British troops that led Hardinge to formulate the policy which later formed the basis of the Treaty of Bhairawal.

As early as August 1846, Hardinge had been anxious to learn from his resident at Lahore whether the Sikh Government would stand if the British troops were withdrawn.¹ It was John Lawrence, then acting for his brother, who was required to give his opinion on the subject. In the beginning, the acting resident was hopeful though he had put forth the promise that this would be so if "Lal Singh can conciliate the chiefs."² Soon, however, the Rani and Lal Singh

1. Hardinge to Hobhouse 2 ~~February~~ ^{September} 1846. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add. MSS. 36,475 f.11.
 2. Ibid.

themselves confessed that they could not carry on the Government when the British troops were withdrawn. John, therefore, changed his opinion and reported to Hardinge that his earlier impression was wrong. It was at this stage that Hardinge sketched out the entire plan under which the Panjab had to be governed after December 1846.¹

Hardinge, perhaps, felt it necessary to do so because the ministry in England had changed. His relations with the late ministry were very amicable. He had actually been a member of that ministry before he had come to India as the Governor-General. His relations with his immediate superior, Lord Ripon, were very friendly and he was always sure of the latter's support though they might not completely share each others views on any particular problem under discussion. Now ⁱⁿ he was placed/the unenviable position of serving under his political opponents. There are indications that he even thought of resigning but desisted from doing that on the advice of Peel and Wellington.²

In clearly laying down the scheme on the lines on which he would have liked the Panjab administration to be carried on three months before the old arrangement was to lapse, his intention was to secure the approval of the new

-
1. Hardinge to Hobhouse 19 September 1846. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36475, ff.45-52.
 2. Duke of Wellington to Hardinge 4 July 1846. Ripon Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 40,877, f.169; Ripon to Hardinge 6 July 1846. Ibid., f.205.
Peel's ministry was defeated on Irish Coercion bill and resigned in the first week of July 1846. Peel's ministry was succeeded by that of Sir John Russell with Sir John Hobhouse as the President of the Board of Control.

ministry to it before he could prevail upon the Sikh Sardars at Lahore to accept it. This, however, did not arrive in time and like the Treaty of Lahore nine months earlier, he had to conclude this Treaty also on his own responsibility.

One wonders why he did not suggest annexation. Possibly the explanation is twofold. In the first place, when he was considering the alternative to the Treaty of Lahore, there was no occasion for that suggestion. He had himself let the Sikh state stand after the war, when annexation would have looked justifiable to the public opinion in England. That was, as we have already noted, not possible then. Secondly the Treaty of Lahore had won for him the reputation of moderation and had the approval of the Government with which he was politically aligned. His suggestion now, so soon after Peel's ministry had been succeeded by Russell's, to the effect that the Panjab be annexed would have looked dishonest, the more so when at the time he was posing the new alternative, the Government at Lahore was not known to have broken any clause of the Treaty of Lahore. While laying bare the outlines of the new arrangement, the problem he was really seeking to solve was to enable the weak Sikh state that survived the war of 1845/46 to exist without the continuation of the subsidiary system which was implied in the articles of agreement signed after the Treaty of Lahore six months earlier and which was

to last only till December 1846.¹

When the Treaty of Bhairawal was signed, he felt satisfied that he had succeeded in the attempt. The Sikh state was to continue its existence for the next eight years under the close supervision of the British but with the evils of the subsidiary system obviated. He further felt that "it is conformable to the Instructions of the Govt. which approved of the policy of last march."²

There were many anomalies in the arrangement that perhaps did not strike the Governor-General. One of the most important was that the Rani was completely deprived of power and influence under the terms of the Treaty. Her place was in every way taken by the British Agent. It was natural for her to have a grudge both against the Resident and the Sardars who had given their consent to the Treaty. From the Rani's point of view, the substitution of the British Regent for her was the last thing she had bargained for. She had asked for British help to maintain her authority and could not have wished for her place to be taken by the British Resident and the Council of Regency consisting of eight Sardars.

1. C.U.Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, pp.164-166.

"Articles of Agreements concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar on 11th March 1846".
For explanation see pp 106-107

2. Hardinge to Hobhouse 21 December 1846. Broughton Papers, Br.Mus.Add.MSS, 36,475 ff. 151-152.

These Sardars in the Regency, and others who constituted the ruling hierarchy, were likely to feel the disadvantages of the Treaty with respect to their power and prestige. Once the dread of the Sikh army had been removed by its reduction they were likely to feel the presence of the British army and the resident with his unlimited powers of control at Lahore as irksome. Eight years were obviously too long a period for the Sardars to remain under the watchful eye of a foreigner. Till very recently people of their station in life had had considerable power in the state. Now to be under the strict control of the Resident, or rather a succession of Residents could well give to at least some of them many regrets about the arrangements they had agreed to in the Treaty of Bhairawal.

The composition of the Darbar was also such that its loyalty to the resident could not be taken for granted. It consisted of eight members. Tej Singh was the foremost member after Lal Singh had ceased to be the Lahore vazir. Henry Lawrence, his brother John, and Currie, who succeeded one another at Lahore after the Treaty of Bhairawal, were all able to trust him. He had supported Henry Lawrence in his march to Kashmir with Darbar troops to crush, if need be, the revolt of Sheikh Imam-ud-din. Moreover, he was in constant dread of the Rani and so his dependence on Henry Lawrence and other agents was complete. There were a few others in the Council about whose loyalty to the British

agent there could not be any certainty. Even Henry Lawrence, who was generally popular with the chiefs, had to handle them cautiously. Among such men in the Council was Diwan Dina Nath whose expert knowledge of the finances of the state made him indispensable. Sher Singh was another member whose adherence could not be taken for granted. Ranjhor Singh Majithia who had taken a prominent part in the first Sikh war was in the Council of regency also. These were the counterweights to Tej Singh who perhaps had the support of Shamsher Singh then the head of the Sindhianwala family which was known for its pro-British sentiments. Other members, Bhai Nidhan Singh, Fahir Nur-ud.Din and Attar Singh Kalianwala represented the Sikh priesthood, an old Muslim family which had been high in the Councils of the state ever since Ranjit Singh's time, and a section of the Sikh soldiery. These three did not have much political influence and were more or less silent members. It was this heterogenous group of which Dina Nath was the ablest and the most outstanding that constituted the Darbar and with whose help the resident was to run the state during the period of British guardianship of the child Maharaja.

Lower down on the level of functionaries like Nazims^m and kardars, the presence of the British officers which were given to the resident to be spread out in the state was likely to set up a parallel administration^{ve} machinery to the one already existing. In the very nature of things the two

with their different traditions could not have pulled together. With the relations between the Darbar officials and the British assistants not clearly defined, the chances of friction were great and could be avoided only with the greatest tact on the part of the resident at Lahore. This was particularly true of the darbar functionaries and the English stationed on the frontier districts adjoining Afghanistan.

It would have been fortunate under the circumstances if Hardinge's new arrangements could have lasted the whole of the long period of eight years. Perhaps if Henry Lawrence had continued to be at Lahore for the entire period, this novel experiment of running the Panjab administration through British means but with the old administrative apparatus intact might have succeeded. As it was, he was required to leave for England within a year of the Treaty of Bhairawal and his departure was soon followed by the Multan rebellion¹ which later assumed the form of the Second Sikh war in which the Rani, the chiefs and the disbanded Sikh soldiers seemed to have all combined against the English. This led the new Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, to feel that the policy of having a buffer state between Afghanistan and the British territories would never succeed and the Panjab might as well be made a British territory.

1. It began on 20 April 1848.

Chapter III

Jagir Policy of Hardinge, 1846-1848

One of the intricate problems that Hardinge had to tackle after the first Sikh War was that of jagirs in the Jalandhar Doab. As has already been noted, this territory was severed from the old Panjab according to the Treaty of Lahore in March 1846 and was now a British possession. It consisted of the three districts of Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur and Kangra. We know that it was placed under John Lawrence, who till the Treaty of Bhairawal worked under the supervision of his brother Henry Lawrence but later was directly under the Government of India. The two brothers were required to decide what policy should be pursued towards these Jagirdars in the newly acquired British territory. They disagreed in their attitude towards some of the important classes of these jagirdars. It was in view of this disagreement that Hardinge laid down the general principles on which their cases were decided in 1847. Hardinge retained the rules on which they agreed but chose the recommendation of John Lawrence in cases on which they disagreed.

There were many types of Jagirdar in this doab. Firstly, there were the jagirs held by the old hill chiefs.

They were once independent Rajas but Ranjit Singh had conquered their territories and reduced them to the level of Jagirdars. He had deprived them of their principalities but left them with the Jagirs which they still held when war between the English and the Sikh started in 1845.¹ These Rajas had armed retainers whom they were expected to put at the disposal of the Sikh ruler at Lahore in case of emergency. Their Jagirs were held in Kangra, the hill district of the Jalandhar doab, and were in the territories that originally constituted their kingdoms.²

The Jagirs in the lowland districts of the doab were of a different nature, and of various types. The most important of them were the ones held by the descendants of the old misaldars. These misaldars belonged to the Majha, the territory between the Ravi and the Bias. With the decline in the muslim power, they had conquered this doab and parcelled it amongst themselves. They had succeeded in breaking the muslim power but then commenced attacking each other, the greater chiefs "swallowing the possessions of the smaller ones."³ Later

1. Remarks made by Henry Lawrence in 'Tabular Statement of the Hill States between the Sutlej and Ravi' 13 June 1846. Henry Lawrence Papers.

2. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Agent, 28 November 1846. Para.54. B.C. 117165, p.30.

3. Ibid. Para.55. p.31.

Ranjit Singh and his associate Fateh Singh Ahluwalia absorbed the territories of all other large chiefs. However they left a few villages with the descendants of the chiefs subject to military service.¹ People who had sided with Ranjit Singh and his associate were rewarded in the form of similar jagirs. Ranjit Singh's policy was to weaken this class of jagirdars. He was gradually resuming the lands of all the descendants of the conquering class and when he left them in possession steadily increased their burdens, so as by degrees to assimilate their condition with that of the rest of the country. He began by exacting Military Service to which he later added "a money payment of so much per saddle."²

Apart from these were the jagirs held by Bedis and Sodhis. The Bedis were the descendents of Guru Nanak, the Sodhis of Guru Gobind Singh. Maharaja Ranjit Singh had alienated a number of villages to them. They had strong forts and used to keep large bodies of armed men. There was subsequently an increase in the size of these jagirs. In part this was due to the offerings made by followers. It was also due to the fact that in the anarchy succeeding the death of Ranjit Singh " a petty

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Agent 28 November 1846. Para. 55. B.C.117165. p.31.

2. Ibid. Para.57, p.33.

Jagirdars dreading the violence of a powerful neighbour, made a like gift and thus gained the protection and countenance of the warlike Priests."¹

Then there were the assignments of pay. The Sardars who rendered military service in the regular and irregular wing of the army would receive these grants as their pay and that of their men. Similarly the Civil Officers of the State, both big and small, would be granted jagirs. Such grants were resumed on the death of the holder. The heirs would be allowed to succeed only to a portion of the grant formerly enjoyed; and to that on the payment of a fine or Nazarana.² Among the Sardars who had such jagirs in the Jalandhar doab were the important functionaries of the Lahore state like Shaikh Imam-ud-din, Lehna Singh Mājithia, General Kanh Singh, General Ram Singh and Bhur Singh.³ The Ranis and some members of the royal family of the Lahore state also held their jagirs in this area.⁴ A number of Dharam-urths or religious endowments were another of the rent free holdings found in the Jalandhar doab. They were attached to the religious institutions or buildings like Dharamsalas. Apart from these regular

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlej to Agent, 28 November 1846. Para.56.
2. Ibid.
3. Based on the examination of the different Registers of Jagir cases submitted by John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence. Henry Lawrence would then transmit them to the Governor-General. See B.C.117166.
4. Ibid.

jagirs, there were a number of others held without sanads or on the basis of sanads granted by people who had no right to do so.¹

How were these different types of Jagirdars to be dealt with was the problem that faced the new administration? The first to be tackled were the erstwhile Rajas of the hill states. They were fourteen in number and had been investigated by I.C.Erskine, the Superintendent of the Cis-Satlaj hill states² and by John Lawrence and Henry Lawrence.³ Their case was important because they were accustomed to arms and possessed much military spirit. The hill area was also studded with strongholds. The families of these jagirdars were proud of their lineage and claimed descent from the former rulers. They had been excluded by the Sikh Government at Lahore from all authority but in the late war they had "asserted and in some instances effected their own independence." It was consequently felt that under the circumstances "they will not willingly return to their recent insignificance." There was the danger that if

-
1. Based on the examination of the different Registers of Jagir cases submitted by John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence. Henry Lawrence would then transmit them to the Governor-General. See B.C.117166.
 2. Superintendent of the hill states was in charge of a subordinate agency and functioned under the Agent, Governor-General on the North-West Frontier. His headquarters was Simla.
 3. Henry Lawrence to Currie, 31 July 1846. Henry Lawrence Papers.

something was not done immediately, there might be partizan hill warfare.¹

In the later stages of the first Sikh war, the hill chiefs had sided with the British in the hope that the latter would give them their old chiefships and territories of which they had been deprived by the Sikhs. They had the example of the hill states on the Cis-Satlej side. The latter had helped the British in the Nepal war of 1814-16 and after the Gurkhas had been driven away from these states, the hill chiefs there were re-instated to their old principalities. In the first Sikh war itself two proclamations issued by the Governor-General on 13 December 1845 and 17 February 1846 had given them an impression that if they exerted themselves against the Sikhs, they would get back their old chiefships. This impression was confirmed by a proclamation issued by I.C.Erskine and a personal letter written by him to Raja Narain Pal, one of the chiefs.

The proclamation of the Governor-General of 13 December 1845, was the declaration of war against the Lahore state. By it the Cis Satlej territories of that state were sequestrated. The people of these territories were assured that:

1. Henry Lawrence to Currie, 13 April 1846. Para.3.
Henry Lawrence Papers.

"The Governor-General will respect the existing rights of all Jagirdars, zamindars and tenants in the said possessions who by the course they now pursue evince their fidelity to the British Government."

The Cis Satlej chiefs already under British protection were told that

"Those of the chiefs who now show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty, which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby"¹

The proclamation of 17 February 1846 seems to have extended both these assurances to the Jalandhar doab. The reference to the chiefs was particularly meant for the hill chiefs.²

We may wonder why the Governor-General thought it necessary to give such an assurance to the hill chiefs in the Jalandhar doab by his proclamation of 17 February 1846. It was quite understandable in December 1845 for the Cis Satlej chiefs, when war operations against the Lahore state were to be undertaken. But by 17 February, the British had won the war. The British army had crossed the Satlej. On 15 February 1846 the representatives of the Lahore government had agreed to cede the Jalandhar

-
1. C.U.Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, vol.VIII, pp.159-160.
 2. This proclamation is not traceable but there are references to it.

doab to the British.¹ Why then was this proclamation issued? The probable explanation is that the Governor-General felt that the Lahore Darbar might find it difficult to implement the transfer of this doab to the British if the defeated Sikh army thought of defying their own government. The difficulty was then likely to be the greatest in Kangra district. There were many forts there and contingents of the Sikh army were stationed in them. These contingents could make it difficult for the Darbar to transfer, at least, the hill district of the doab to the British peacefully. Hardinge, perhaps, felt that a regular conquest of the district might then be necessary. In that case the issue of an assurance of the type that was contained in the proclamations of 13 December to the hill chiefs, of the Jalandhar doab, by a new proclamation could be very helpful.

-
1. Governor-General to the Secret Committee 19 February 1846, Para. 11. Ripon Papers. Br. Mus. Add. 40,875, f.86.

Note: The Darbar representatives under Gulab Singh came to Kasur on 15 February 1846 and remained the whole night with Currie discussing the terms on which peace could be effected. They agreed to all the terms insisted on by Currie. The Jalandhar doab was demanded and its transfer was agreed upon.

It must be noted however that this agreement was still to be ratified. Actually till the Treaty of Lahore was signed on 11 March 1846, the Governor-General had to keep himself prepared for any eventuality that might arise. It was necessary because the beaten army was still an unpredictable factor. See Ibid. Para.31.

This proclamation was "a very carefully worded document"¹ and perhaps did not commit the Government to giving the hill chiefs their old principalities. It might have just meant that the jagirs that they had under the Sikh rule would be confirmed to them. But I.C.Erskine's commitment was more categorical. Erskine had sent for the motmid or Vakil of the Kotlehr chief through his relative Raja Ram Singh of Nalagarh.² Through the mot mid, Raja Narain Pal of Kotlehr was given to understand that if he

"would exert myself in turning the Sikhs out of my hereditary domains and in recovering possession, thereof, every favourable consideration would be shown by the British Government to my right of holding my ancient country."³

A little later Erskine wrote a personal letter to the Raja in which this assurance was "even conveyed to me in a written communication."⁴ With this letter, Erskine had also enclosed the proclamation issued by the Governor-General on 17 February 1846, which the Kotlehr chief was

-
1. Remarks made by Henry Lawrence in 'Tabular Statement of the Hill States between the Sutlej and Ravi 13 June 1846'. Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. It was a hill state in the Cis-Satlej area and under British protection.
 3. Translation of a Persian Khut [letter] from Raja Narain Pal of Kotlehr to Mr. John Lawrence, Commissioner and Superintendent of Trans Satlej dated 21 Bysakh Sambat 1903, i.e. 1 May 1846. See Appendix No.1 in Agent to Secretary 31 July 1846. I.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.650.
 4. Ibid.

"at liberty to show to whosoever you might think proper."¹
 Two days later, on 24 February 1846, Erskine had issued a proclamation from his own office. In it he asked all the "Sirdars and Jageerdars" of "Kohistand or Hill Country" to join the army of the Narain Pal and "expel the soldiers of the Lahore state from the territory of Kotlehr on this [left] bank of the Byas". He promised that

"After the entire clearance of the whole territory, and enquiry has been made [huk bu hukdar khwabud ruseed] every man will receive his right."²

His use of the Persian expression "huk bu hukdar khwabud ruseed" read in the light of his personal letter to Narain Pal resulted in "a very strong expectation" being "excited in the minds of the Chiefs and of their retainers, that the ex-rulers would be restored."³ At least this is what Henry felt in July 1846.

At the time of enquiry both John and Henry Lawrence, however, opposed the restoration of the old territories of the trans Satlej hill chiefs on the basis of taking

1. Translation of a letter from Hon'ble I.C. Erskine to Raja Narain Pal of Kotlehr. Appendix No.2 in Agent to Secretary 31 July 1846. I.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.651.
2. Proclamation from the Court of the Superintendent of the Kohistan.
3. Henry Lawrence to Currie 31 July 1846. Henry Lawrence Papers.
 It should be "Haq bahagdar Khawabid rasid" and would mean that "justice will be done to the rightful owner."
 Note: See Appendix.

tribute from them as was suggested by Erskine in some cases. To John the idea of giving back the ancient territory of the hill chiefs was "ridiculous".¹ Henry felt the same way and while opposing the return of the old chiefships to the hill rajas who had been deprived of them by Ranjit Singh argued that:

"The circumstances of these hill states are perfectly different from those of the chiefships south of the Satlej. During the Nepal war, a proclamation was issued distinctly promising restoration to such Exiles and ousted Rulers as might come forward & exert themselves on the side of the British but the Govt. proclamation of Dec. 1845 & Feb. 1846 simply promised protection and support to persons in possession."²

Both the Lawrences were for improving the condition of every chief and they therefore wanted a liberal provision to be given to every family but were on no account prepared to give them back their ancient possessions. A grant in perpetuity was liberal enough a provision in their eyes. They felt that this, with the security that the chiefs would obtain under British protection, would be no small advantage.³ The Rajas, however, were not satisfied with this decision as may be gathered from the

-
1. John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence 26 [4.1846] Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. Henry Lawrence to Currie 31 July 1846. Para.6. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

representations made by Raja Narain Pal of Kotlehr¹ and by Raja Ranbir Chand of Kangra against the decisions to confer on them merely their old jagirs.² The others remained silent but it is more than probable that they felt discontented with the decision of the British not to restore them to their old principalities. Here Hardinge merely followed the recommendations of the two Lawrences.

There were a number of forts situated in this hill area. The Hill Chiefs had expected during the war that after the Lahore troops were driven away these forts would

1. Translation of a Persian Khut from Raja Narain Pal of Kotlehr to Mr. J. Lawrence, Commissioner and Superintendent of Trans Satlej, dated 21st Bysakh Sumbat 1903, i.e. 1 May 1846. Agent to Secretary 31 July 1846. Appendix No.1. I.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.650.
2. Raja Ranbir Chand was the grandson of Raja Sansar Chand who had raised his small principality into a powerful kingdom but was attacked by the Gurkhas and sought Ranjit Singh's help. Ranjit Singh asked for the fort of Kangra in return. In 1827 Ranbir Chand's son was asked for the hand of his sister for Raja Dhian Singh, the powerful wazir at Lahore. The former refused and Maharaja Ranjit Singh proposed to attack the country. The Raja on hearing of it fled to the British. Colonel C.M.Wade, then the political agent at Ludhiana intervened and secured him a small jagir from Ranjit Singh. It was this jagir that was now restored to him but he claimed the entire Kangra state carved out by his grandfather. See, The Memorial of Ranbir Chand, Raja of Kangra to the Rt. Hon'ble Lord Hardinge 13 August 1846, I.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.1056; Abstract Translation of a Kureetah from Raja Ranbir Chand of Katoch to F.Currie, Esqr. without date, I.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.1058; Abstract Translation of a Kureetah from Raja Ranbir Chand addressed to F. Currie 20 July 1846, Enclosure No.1 in Agent to the Secretary, 25 September 1846, I.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.1053.

become their personal property. In a few cases some of them had even succeeded in capturing them from the Sikh contingents. These were, however, all declared to belong to the Government. In a memorandum on the subject of these forts, Alexander Cunningham, who was then the assistant Agent to the Governor-General on the North-West Frontier, suggested that, with the exception of Kangra, Kotla and Nurpur, all the forts in the hill states should be demolished. These were to be retained because they were secure places for treasure, ammunition and military stores. The others were to be demolished for two reasons. They were likely to bring expense with the maintenance of an extra body of troops to carry on harassing duties in scarcely accessible places, where even wholesome water could only be procured with difficulty. The more important reason, however, was that the existence and possession of the strongholds would offer a temptation to rebellion on the part of the chiefs. This temptation would be altogether removed by their destruction.¹ John Lawrence strongly recommended these measures and gave the additional reason that though these fortresses would not stand a seige, if they were to be

1. Alexander Cunningham, Memorandum upon the Forts of the Jalandhar Hill States. I.P.C. 31 December 1847, Part 6, No.2026.

made the centre of rebellion against the British Government, it would "be a work of great labour and much expence for extensive tracts of most difficult mountain country" to be traversed to bring Guns against them.¹ After these strong recommendations, Hardinge approved of the idea and all these forts, with the exception of Nurpur, Kotla and Kangra were destroyed in the year 1847. Here too, it appears, the two Lawrences were in agreement and Hardinge merely approved of their proposals.

In the cases of Jagirs in the plains of the doab, the two Lawrences agreed in their recommendations only in the cases of numerous but minor types of jagir. They, in fact, agreed mostly over jagirs which appeared to them as illegal. They agreed on treating all jagirs acquired after the death of Maharaja Sher Singh as recent and worthy of resumption. The cases of people having old sanads but recent possession, both the Lawrences agreed, deserved the same fate. Jagirs held on the basis of sanads granted by people who had no authority to issue them, viz. from people like Nazims and Kardars were recommended by the Lawrences to be immediately resumed. It was only in the case of the Ranis and widows of the old

1. John Lawrence to Currie 5 January 1847. I.P.C.
31 December 1847, Part 6, No.2024.

jagirdars that both were for showing liberality. If they happened to be in actual possession, both the Lawrences were for converting these jagirs into money payments for life.¹ These cases, though numerous, touched only the fringe of the problem.

Over really important jagirs, the two had their differences. This is to be noticed in the cases concerning the jagirs of old misaldars, religious chiefs like Bedis and Sodhis and those of the important functionaries of the Lahore Government who held Jagirs in the Jalandhar doab. Henry wanted to be liberal towards them. John, on the other hand, made suggestions that were harsh. Henry wanted that no tax should be levied on those jagirdars who had not paid any tax to the Sikh rulers. This recommendation was applicable to the Sodhis and Bedis, as also to the misaldars. John Lawrence wanted a rental and proposed one-fourth of the assessment on the land. Henry suggested that the jagirs held by the religious sects like the Sodhis and Bedis be granted in perpetuity. John, on the other hand, wanted them to be conferred only for life. Likewise, Henry wanted the jagirs held by old misaldars to be conferred in perpetuity.

1. See the recommendations of the two Lawrences in the statement of jagir cases submitted to Government.
B.C.117166.

John was for granting only a life interest in them.¹ Henry also wanted to continue the jagirs of the functionaries of the Lahore state, but John was for resuming them immediately.

John's approach was actually born out of the belief that the institution of the jagirs as such was bad. It neither led to better cultivation nor conferred any other benefit on the people. In support of this view, he cited the example of the jagirdars in the Cis-Satlej states.

"As regards the country at large, what benefit have they conferred on it? in the place of one Govt. levying the land tax, it has had a thousand collecting it between whom and the people, it is an eternal struggle. Are the Cis Suttlej states better cultivated, are the people happier than in any other part. Certainly not?"²

He argued for slowly annihilating the jagirdars as a class on political grounds. He pleaded that the policy that they should adopt towards the Jalandhar jagirdars was merely a matter of expediency. This was because the British were not bound as in the case of the Cis-Satlej territories. There the Jagirdars had voluntarily placed themselves under the British protection and the British were pledged to respect their tenures by

-
1. Note by Commissioner and Superintendent of the Trans Suttlej Territories, 16 December 1846. B.C.117166, pp.233-236.
 2. Ibid. Para.5. p.233.

the Treaty entered with them.¹ The Jalandhar doab was a conquest and so the British were not bound by any course of conduct. In determining the policy, he felt that the conduct and example of the Cis-Satlej Jagirdars in the late war showed that their retention was in no way helpful to the British. Here, it seems, he had the conduct of the Nabha ruler and the role of the chiefs of Ladwa and Ruper in mind. They had sided with the Lahore army. The others too had been lukewarm in their support of the British in the initial stages of the war. Even when they did start to lend their support, their contingents had not been of any use.² Arguing against retaining the Jalandhar Jagirdars permanently, he observed,

"It is simply a matter of policy, whether we treat the Jagirdars there as we have done those in the Cis Sutlej states or as we have acted throughout the rest of India. To affirm the advantages of the former line of policy it is necessary to prove, that it has been beneficial, that it has been politically useful to ourselves and good for the country. It is notorious that in the Cis Sutlej states our policy had had neither the one nor the other effect. There is perhaps no portion of our Empire, in which the resources of the country were so little at our

-
1. In 1809, the Rajas and jagirdars of the Cis-Satlej area had sought the protection of the British for fear that Ranjit Singh might attack them and deprive them of their territories. The British had guaranteed them their territories and jagirs and taken them under their protection.
 2. For the conduct of the Cis-Satlej chieftains in the first Sikh war, see
Agent to Secretary 29 September 1846. I.S.C. 26
December 1846, No.1300.

disposal or where a less friendly feeling was evinced during the late hostilities."1

His explanation why the Cis-Satlej jagirdars were not disposed to be friendly also pointed in the direction of his desire to slowly annihilate the jagirdars as an institution:

"Setting aside local circumstances, the Jagirdars were the conquering race and as such looked on us as their competitors and rivals, not as their friends. Forty years security from outward enemies and immunity from taxation, have not erased this feeling, and they would still willingly have sided against us."2

He himself pointed out that it was purely on political grounds that he was arguing for this policy. Increasing the revenues for the new Government was not the consideration that weighed with him. He wrote,

"I am not advocating these views for the sake of increasing the revenue - if Govt. can afford it, I would give up revenue in proportion to the Jageers resumed but in so doing, I urge the policy and justice of granting it to the country at large in the form of a general reduction of the land tax. I would give it to the industrious and hard-working, not to the idle and useless who are always drones except when opportunity allows to be wasps to sting us."3

These being his views, it is not at all surprising that he should

-
1. Note by Commissioner and Superintendent of the Trans Satlej Territories 16 December 1846. Para.5.
 2. Ibid. Para.6.
 3. Ibid. Para.8.

"advocate resumption of every Jageer possible, simply granting to the occupants of any number of years, a life interest, so as gradually and steadily but without a convulsion, to ensure the annihilation of every Jageer tenure in a course of years."¹

Another reason that he gave in favour of doing this was the success of this policy in the Delhi territory.² He suggested this policy in a Note submitted by him to the Government on 16 November 1846.

Whether he had received Currie's advice to do this is difficult to say. But he had certainly sought the advice of the Governor-General's secretary in the foreign department almost a month before he submitted his note. He wanted Currie's advice on the jagir policy to be pursued with special reference to Misaldars. In a personal letter to Currie, he wrote:-

"I am anxious for your opinion on the following point. There are some five hundred villages in the Jullundur, worth about five lacs of rupees, which were conquered by different Sikh chiefs seventy or eighty years ago. In some cases, three or four, or even more, villages are held by one or two persons; in others, there are from five to thirty and forty share-holders. I propose to recommend to Government that the possession in all these cases be affirmed merely for life, and the shares lapse to Government on

1. Note by Commissioner and Superintendent of the Trans Satlej Territories, 16 December 1846. Para.6.

2. Ibid.

the demise of each occupant. My brother thinks we ought to maintain them for ever, subject to certain payment. What do you say? These are not private properties, but alienations of the Government rights. They won them by the strong hand; they have now forfeited them by the same law by which they held them, namely, that of the sword. Why should we give up the Government right? I see no policy in so doing; politically, these people will never support us, and to the country they are a perfect incubus. Why not let them gradually fall in, and let the descendants of these conquerors return to the plough whence their fathers came? What increases the difficulty is, that by the Hindu law of inheritance these lands will be divided into infinitesimal portions gradually, and as the occupants are not proprietors, they will not become petty yeomen cultivating their own lands, but beggarly gentlemen, too proud to work and unwilling to starve. You cannot remedy this by entailing the property on the eldest son, for, in that case, where you please one, you put up the backs of ten, besides going against custom and precedent."¹

Hardinge seemed to have been greatly impressed by John's note on Jalandhar jagirs and an analysis of the rules laid down by him reveals that he accepted his suggestions. Following John Lawrence, he laid down that in all cases where some sort of Nazarana, Paishkash or the like were paid the jagirs be held only for life.² Till then, they were to pay a quarter of jama as rental. On their death, the survivors were to pay the full rent and

-
1. John Lawrence to Currie, 17 October 1846, quoted in Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, p.201.
 2. Nazarana and Peshkash were paid by the successor of Jagirdars who got their jagirs for rendering service to the state. On the payment of this, they would succeed to a portion of the jagir. This was the Sikh system.

thus were to be reduced to the status of ordinary proprietors of land. The Sodhis and Bedis were declared to be performing religious service, as suggested by John, and were asked to pay one-fourth of the jama as the rental. For the time being, they were to hold their jagirs only for life and not in perpetuity as Henry Lawrence wanted.¹ The recommendations of Henry Lawrence that misaldars be granted their jagirs in perpetuity was also rejected. In the cases of the functionaries of the Lahore state, Hardinge ordered the resumption of the jagirs, as suggested by John Lawrence.

We can only guess what were the intentions of Hardinge in agreeing to John Lawrence's recommendations. Perhaps he felt it would bring the administration of the newly acquired doab into conformity with the system of the North-Western Provinces and the Delhi territories. British land revenue Policy had moved a great deal since the permanent zamindari settlement when perpetual rights were conferred on the intermediaries between the peasants and the state. The ideas and influence of Munro, Elphinstone, Holt Mackenzie, R.M. Bird and James Thompson had brought about a radical departure from the Cornwallis system of land revenue. The permanent existence of a

1. Secretary Government of India to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej 23 February 1847. Para.5. B.C.117166. p.251.

number of jagirs could not, therefore, be allowed in the Jalandhar doab which was now a British possession. It is, perhaps, this that explains his reluctance to agree to the granting of jagirs in the plains of the Jalandhar doab in perpetuity. The fact that John had pointed out that even politically the existence of these jagirdars was not beneficial must have influenced Hardinge against granting the terms which they probably expected and which had been recommended by Henry Lawrence. We may wonder whether Hardinge gave the subject the attention it deserved. Politically his decision could be expected to have an adverse effect in the Lahore state where the members of the Darbar and the chiefs who held extensive jagirs must have looked to the jagir policy of the British in the Jalandhar doab with close attention. Yet British policy was to maintain the stability of the Lahore state and also conduct its administration with the help of these very groups.

A powerful section of the Jalandhar jagirdars was also hit by the decision that was taken about the contingents that they kept for rendering service to the state. These contingents gave them a social status. By recruiting their relatives and followers, they could also exercise some sort of patronage. But on the subject of these contingents the two Lawrences had been in agreement

and Hardinge followed their advice. However, he realised the special importance of these contingents to the jagirdars and modified the severity of their suggestions.

John Lawrence, who first enquired into the subject of these contingents, pointed out that the amount that the state was actually required to forego was substantial. He put it at about one-third of the annual rental of the doab.¹ For foregoing this huge amount the new Government was not likely to gain anything. He regarded the contingents as "nearly worthless and utterly inefficient."² This was particularly true of those supplied by petty jagirdars. Their troops were under no control and the men when despatched on any duty performed it with the "greatest indifference and often absconded to their homes."³ The contingents supplied by the larger Jagirdars were "a degree better than those of the Petty Sirdars, but still all are decidedly bad."⁴ More important than these was the political argument wherein he had stated that

"in a crisis, we are more likely to have the contingents of the Chiefs against than for us, as was exemplified during the late Sikh invasion."⁵

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sattlej to Agent 23 April 1846. I.P.C. 26 December 1846, No.1170.
 2. Ibid. Para.2
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

Here again one of the important arguments of John was based on the British experience of the Cis-Satlej Jagirdars during the late war. He strongly recommended the policy of commuting this service of troops into money payment, to be paid twice a year at the harvest time,¹ Henry Lawrence agreed with these recommendations. In fact, Henry went a step farther and suggested that this principle of commutation of service to money payment be extended also to the Cis Satlej states.²

Both the brothers also agreed on the rate at which this commutation was to be effected. John's suggestion was that the Government should demand a commutation of twenty rupees per mensem for each horseman and eight rupees for an infantry soldier.³ He regarded this rate as moderate on the plea that "in some Sunnads 250 a year is the calculation for each horseman."⁴ Henry Lawrence also thought that

"The rate of 20 Rs per horseman taking one with another, and including officers, is a fair and moderate one; and when fines and extras are considered is perhaps less than it costs the Jageerdars - Eight Rupees per footman seems also a fair commutation."⁵

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Agent, 23 April 1846, Para.2.
 2. Agent to Secretary, 7 June 1846, Para.5. I.P.C. 26 December 1846, No.1169.
 3. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Agent, 23 April 1846, Para.5, I.P.C. 26 December 1846, No.1170.
 4. Ibid. Para.5.
 5. Agent to Secretary 7 June 1846. Para.3. I.P.C. 26 December 1846, No.1169.

With the money raised by commuting these troops, John Lawrence was for raising three corps: Hill Corps, Local Corps for the Plains and Mounted Police Corps.¹ Henry, on the other hand, wanted to raise a body of Irregulars to be divided into Guides and Pioneers. Both of these, he suggested, should be under his control. The former he wanted to be largely employed "in making themselves acquainted with localities, and with highways and by-ways of the frontier." The latter, he suggested would "be employed in making roads through the ceded and protected states."² The difference between the two brothers, it must be noted, was minor. They both wanted that the contingents that were to go unemployed as a result of the policy of commutation should be employed somewhere and since the money was there, it might be done by raising these corps.

Hardinge agreed with the two Lawrences in commuting the Jalandhar levies to money payments but was hesitant about extending the same principle to the

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sattlej to Agent 23 April 1846.
'Memorandum of Corps proposed to be raised for Local duties in the Jalandhar doab.'
 2. Agent to Secretary 7 June 1846. Para.5. I.P.C.
26 December 1846, No.1169.

Cis-Satlej territories.¹ He also agreed that with the money a political corps for the frontier should be raised which might be used as Henry suggested but trained in such a way as to be capable of being used with other troops in the regular British army.² On ~~the commutation~~ ^{of commutation,} of the rates, however, he disagreed with both John and Henry Lawrence. He felt that the rate proposed was high. He rightly pointed out that it was not proper to take the view that since the figure for commutation was nearly equivalent to the payment made to the horseman or infantry soldier, it would be proper to fix that rate. He wanted it to

"be borne in mind, that though the average rate of pay of each man [the officers' salary being taken into account] may equal or exceed that rate, the system enabled the Jageerdars to provide for relations and dependents to a very considerable extent, and that when not employed for the state, these levies performed services for their own Chiefs and leaders. Of these two advantages, the commutation will deprive the Jageerdars."

For these reasons, he tended to be liberal and reduced

"Mr. Lawrence's rates from 20 to 16 Rs for each horseman,

1. Governor-General's Memorandum dated 12 July 1846. I.P.C. 26 December 1846, No.1171.

Note: The Governor-General asked for additional information about the rights of the chiefs in the Cis Satlej area to keep these contingents and the power of the British to supervise them before he would sanction these contingents to be commuted in money terms.

2. Secretary to Agent 8 August 1846. Para.10. I.P.C. 26 December 1846, No.1171.

and from 8 to 6 Rs each Infantry soldier."¹ The influential and powerful section of the Jalandhar Jagirdars were thus deprived of their contingents in the year 1847 and henceforth asked to pay money instead. In spite of the Governor-General's liberality in commuting the contingents into money terms, the resentment of the Jagirdars in the Jalandhar doab must have been great.

Even as the cases of the jagirdars of the Jalandhar doab were being decided in the manner pointed out above, Henry Lawrence was relying on the Jagirdars who happened to be the members of the Darbar as well as on the Nazims and Kardars to run the administration of the Lahore state. The Jagir policy in the Jalandhar doab could not have but made that difficult. The Lahore Sardars were interested in the cases of these jagirs. Some of them had their own jagirs in the Doab. Till very recently, Jalandhar was a part of the same state and the chiefs of the Lahore state were related by blood and marriage with the Jalandhar Jagirdars. The Sodhis and Bedis who suffered a good deal from this policy were looked upon with veneration even by the lower strata of society. It was likely, therefore, that the Jalandhar

1. Secretary to Agent 8 August 1846. Para.3. I.P.C.
26 December 1846, No.1171.

jagir policy should have produced repercussions in the Lahore state and adversely affected the success of the experiment of building up the buffer state of Lahore which had been taken by the British into their own hands after the Treaty of Bhairawal.

This was to be so even if the Jalandhar Jagir policy was not to be pursued in the Lahore state itself. In fact, Henry could not have done it even if he wanted to. All that he actually did was to reform the system of the abuses that had lately crept into it. He found that sometimes jagirdars retained lands in excess of those specified in their deeds. Often a dharamurlhi¹ or rozidar² continued to hold allowances even after the old sanad was cancelled. It was to discover these that an enquiry was begun by the "Durbar on the suggestion of Henry Lawrence." The total amount thus resumed was estimated at a little over than sixteen lakhs per annum.³ It is worth noting that unlike the Jalandhar doab, neither the big Jagirdars nor the institution of jagirs as such was sought to be uprooted. The enquiry was on the

-
1. A man performing religious service. The term seems to have been applied to those who rendered this service in the villages.
 2. A man whose jagir was based on the calculation of the amount of service rendered by him on daily basis.
 3. Sita Ram Kohli, Catalogue of Khalsa Darbar Records, Vol.II, p.298.

whole not likely to be resented to the extent that it would have been if the Jalandhar policy were followed.

Here we are tempted to ask what did this Jagir policy between 1846 and 1848 really amount to? One obvious characteristic to be noted is that there was a difference of approach in the territories that had become a British possession and in what remained of the Lahore kingdom after the first Sikh war. The difference was there even when the supervision of the administration of the Lahore kingdom had passed to the British after the Treaty of Bhairawal. In the Jalandhar doab, the intention was to follow the same policy as was then prevalent in the rest of the country under the British. John was the exponent of this policy and he could see it through even when Henry Lawrence was opposed to it. In the Lahore state, however, Henry Lawrence was on surer grounds because the state was not a British territory and all those whose co-operation was necessary in running the administration of the state were linked with the Jagirdari institution. They held Jagirs and could not have agreed that this institution be wiped away completely. At the best they could tolerate some reforms in it.

It is inconceivable, however, that the jagir policy in the Jalandhar should not have produced some effect on the minds and thoughts of the people still associated

with the administration of the Lahore state as members of the Darbar, Nazims and Kardars. We can only surmise the extent of their bitterness but there can be no doubt of its existing and creating apprehensions in their minds as to how they would fare now that the Treaty of Bhairawal had made the British Agent (henceforth also the Resident) so powerful.

The resentment in the Jalandhar doab itself was likely to be so great as to have its effect on the other side. The execution of the jagir policy pursued in the year 1847 must have been galling to almost all the classes of jagirdars there. The old hill Rajas must have felt angry about it even though they had obtained their jagirs in perpetuity. This was because they had hoped for much more on the British taking over the Jalandhar doab. The two powerful jagirdars of the lowlands - old misaldars and religious grantees - had not been granted their jagirs in perpetuity as, most probably, they had hoped for. They had also lost their contingents and with them the social status attached to them. The smaller jagirdars in the doab were no better off. In the period of anarchy and confusion, many of them had obtained jagirs to the retention of which they had eagerly looked forward. They were, however, deprived of them. All this had been executed in the short span of a few months and the impact of the whole policy must indeed, have been tremendous.

Appendix

A note on the Proclamations issued between the outbreak of the first Sikh War (13 December 1845) and the Treaty of Lahore (11 March 1846), containing some references to the chiefs and Jagirdars.

The Governor-General heard that the Sikh army had crossed the river Satlej on 13 December 1845 and declared war on the Lahore Government by a proclamation. He annexed the Cis-Satlej territories of Dalip Singh by this proclamation. In it he assured the people of the newly annexed territories of their "existing rights" if they "evince their fidelity to the British Government." This is how a part of the Declaration of War ran:

"The Governor-General hereby declares the possessions of Maharaja Dhuleep Singh on the left bank of the Sutlej, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

The Governor-General will respect the existing rights of all Jagirdars, zamindars and tenants in the said possessions who by the course they now pursue evince their fidelity to the British Government."

This proclamation also had something to say to the chiefs and Jagirdars of the Cis-Satlej area who had been under British protection since 1809. It extended hope of reward to those who remained on the British side and a warning to those who went over to the other. This

is how the relevant portion ran:-

"Those of the chiefs who now show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty, which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby; and those who take a contrary course will be treated as enemies to the British Government, and will be punished accordingly."¹

On 14 February 1846, four days after the battle of Sobraon, when the remnants of the Sikh army, after suffering defeat had been on the run towards its capital, and when the British army under its Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General had crossed the Satlej river and stationed itself at Kasur, the Governor-General issued a proclamation. It declared that the existence of the Panjab state would not be subverted but the Jalandhar doab would be annexed. The declaration ran as follows:-

"No extension of territory was desired by the Government of India. The measures necessary for providing indemnity for the past, and security for the future, will, however, involve the retention by the British Government of a portion of the country hitherto under the Government of the Lahore state. The extent of territory which it may be deemed advisable to hold, will be determined by the conduct of the Durbar, and by considerations for the security of the British frontier. The Government of India will, under any circumstances, annex to the British Provinces the districts, Hill and Plains, situated between the rivers Sutlej and Beas the revenues thereof being appropriated as a part of the indemnity required from the Lahore state."

1. C.U.Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.viii, pp.159-160.

This proclamation had no guarantee extended to the Chiefs, jagirdars or others in the Jalandhar doab but called upon all the chiefs of the Lahore state to co-operate with the British in effecting peace after which in the rest of the Panjab a Sikh Government might be established.

"The Governor-General calls upon all those Chiefs who are the well-wishers of the descendents of Runjeet Singh and especially such chiefs as have not participated in the hostile proceedings against the British Power, to act in concert with him for carrying into effect such arrangements as shall maintain a Sikh Government at Lahore, capable of controlling its army and protecting its subjects, and based upon principles that shall provide for the future tranquility of the Sikh state, shall secure the British frontier against a repetition of acts of aggression, and shall prove to the whole world the moderation and justice of the paramount power of India."¹

On 15 February 1846, Raja Gulab Singh and the other representatives of the Lahore Government came to Kasur. They remained the whole night with the Secretary to the Governor-General in the foreign department, Fredrick Currie and agreed to all the conditions the British thought of imposing on the Lahore state. They signed a paper laying down these conditions and went back to Lahore. Among other things they agreed to transfer

1. Proclamation issued by the Governor-General on the British Army crossing the Sutlej for the occupation of the Panjab. 14 February 1846. I.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.427.

Jalandhar doab to the British. Two days later (18 February 1846), ^{the} Governor-General issued a proclamation addressed to the citizens of Lahore and Amritsar. Part of it ran as follows:-

"The inhabitants of Lahore and Amritsur have nothing to fear from the British army. The Governor-General and the British troops, if the conditions above adverted to [detailed in the proclamation of 14 February 1846, chief of which was the surrender of Jalandhar doab] are fulfilled and no further hostile opposition is offered by the Khalsa army, will use their endeavours for the re-establishment of the Government of the descendents of Maharaja Runjeet Singh, and for the protection of its subjects."1

The reference to the possibility of the resistance of the Khalsa army should be noted. It was, perhaps, to isolate this army from the citizens of these two cities that this proclamation was issued.

It appears that with the same end in view viz. to isolate the remnants of the Sikh army, another proclamation had been issued by the Governor-General on 17 February 1846. This proclamation has not been traced but Henry Lawrence refers to it in his report on the hill chiefs. He describes the proclamation as "a very

1. Proclamation by the Governor-General dated 18 February 1846. F.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.431.

carefully worded document." It seems to have extended the same assurance to the inhabitants of the hill territories of the Jalandhar doab as was done to the people of the Cis-Satlej territories of Dalip Singh when those territories were sequestrated at the commencement of the war. The proclamation also seems to have assured the Trans Satlej hill chiefs that if they exerted themselves on the side of the British they "will find their interests promoted." We must remember here, that the war with the Sikhs had not officially ended and the Governor-General perhaps suspected that contingents of the Sikh army stationed at inaccessible places in the Kangra district might not agree to the terms signed by the representatives of the Lahore Darbar.¹ A copy of this proclamation was sent to I.C.Erskine.

The Superintendent of the hill states on his part sent this proclamation to Narain Pal of Kotlehr, with the permission "to show it to whosoever you might think proper." This proclamation was accompanied by a personal letter which shows that he meant to encourage that chief and the others who had been reduced to the level of jagirdars by Ranjit Singh to turn out the Sikh

1. In May 1846 when the Treaty of Lahore had already been signed and when the Kangra district and all the forts situated in it were to be surrendered to the British by the Darbar, the contingent in the Kangra fort did actually refuse to surrender it to the British.

contingents from the different forts which the district of Kangra had in great number. At least one was to be found in each of the fourteen principalities in which the district was divided. This letter of Erskine to Narain Pal is dated 22 February 1846 and runs as follows:-

"After Compliments.

I have received your friendly letter intimating that you have caused the fort of Chowkee to be occupied by your Troops, and that you intend causing that of Kotwalbuha also to be vacated, and expressing your hopes that assurance will be afforded to you by me, as to the maintenance of yourself & your dependent Jageerdars both Civil and Military in your respective possessions, and as to your confirmation in those holdings which you have lately acquired - my friend it behoves you without loss of time to use every effort in your power to cause all the forts situated within the limits of your hereditary country to be evacuated by the Lahore troops & to bring them into your own power & possession - by so doing you will ensure to yourself the satisfaction of the British Government, who, after investigation of your rights will render you every justice - You are requested to give your dependent Jagheerdars full assurance that every well wisher of this Government will derive advantage.

Enclosed I send you a proclamation issued by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India which you are at liberty to show to whomsoever you may think proper.

Keep me always informed of the pleasing intelligence of your welfare.

(True Translation
sd. H.M. Lawrence
Agent Gov. Genl. N.W.F.)¹

1. Agent to Secretary 31 July 1846. Appendix 3.
I.S.C. 26 December 1846, No.650.

Two days after he had written this letter, he issued a proclamation from his own office.

"Proclamation from the Court of the Superintendent of the Kohistan or Hill Country to all the Sirdars and Brethren, great and small, of the Chiefs of Kootlehr.

As according to the orders of the Rt. Hon'ble the Governor-General, the Jullundher territory, Hill and Plain [sic] has come into the possession of the Hon'ble Company, it is proclaimed that all the Sirdars and Jagirdars of the aforementioned country having joined the army of the Kotlehr Rajah, shall expel the soldiers of the Lahore state from the territory of Kotlehr on this (left) bank of the Byas. After the entire clearance of the whole territory, and enquiry has been made (Hak bahaqdar Khuwahad Ruseed~~or~~) every man will receive his right.

Dated 24 February 1846
(True Translation)

Sd. (H.M. Lawrence
Agent Governor-General,
N.W. Frontier."1

This letter and the proclamation seems to have excited a hope among all the fourteen hill chiefs of the Jalandhar doab that, as in the case of the hill chiefs in the Cis-Satlej side after the Nepal war, they too would be reinstated in their old territories as Rajas. All that they had to do was to exert themselves in turning out the Sikh contingents that wer there in the hill territories. About the effect of Erskine's letter and

1. Agent to Secretary 31 July 1846. Appendix 2. I.S.C.
26 December 1846, No.650.

proclamation, Henry Lawrence wrote:

"A proclamation of the 24th Feb and a letter of the 22nd of that month addressed to the Kotleir Rajah and attached to this report do however seem to have raised the expectations of the Chiefs who one and all assert that these documents promised the restoration of their respective hereditary Principalities. The documents alluded to make no such promises but they do urge exertions in clearing the country of the Seikhs and promise 'justice'. The letter of the 22^d Feb. calls the country the 'hereditary country' of the Rajah, urges his conquering it and holds out the direct promise that when it has been subdued and enquiry has been made, every justice will be rendered. This letter is, perhaps, expressed in stronger terms than was intended for it enclosed the Govt. proclamation which made no promise beyond protection. Two days later that is on the 24th Feb. Mr. Erskine issued a proclamation to all the chiefs [north] of Kohistan urging unanimity and exertions in expelling the enemy and ending with these words 'after the entire clearance of the whole territory, and enquiry has been made (huq bahuqdar khwahid ruseed) every man will receive his rights.' Mr. Erskine does not appear to have supposed, he had compromised himself or the Govt. by these expressions but they are unquestionably open to misconstruction and the chiefs naturally interpret them in the manner most favourable to themselves, and are now disposed to consider Mr. John Lawrence & myself as harsh and inimical because we refer them to the terms of the Govt. proclamation which Mr. Erskine sent with his letter of 22nd Feb. to the Kotler [sic] Rajah."¹

-
1. Tabular statement of the Hill States between the Sutlej and Ravee to accompany letter No.149 of 31 July 1846 by Major H.M.Lawrence. See Henry's remarks in case I. Henry Lawrence Papers.

Chapter IV

Summary Settlement in the Jalandhar Doab, 1846-48

Apart from the Jagir cases, another important problem in the new acquisition of the Jalandhar doab was to fix the land revenue. This was done on a summary basis and was mainly the work of John Lawrence. His effecting it at a rapid pace showed his aptitude for the work. In this he was strongly supported by his brother. Hardinge's approval was also there. The driving force behind it, however, was that of John Lawrence himself. John was eager to complete it as early as possible because if he had shown any slackness "the Government would have suffered, for the crops were ripe for cutting, minds of the people unsettled and anxious, and actual warfare going on between the Sikh garrison and the Hill Rajas."¹ He began it when the three district officers who were to work under him had not even arrived, and actually carried out the major part of the summary settlement himself in

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Agent Governor-General N.W.F. 28 November 1846. Para.4. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2443.
 Note: The Sikh forces belonging to Lahore and the hill Rajas continued to fight for some time even after the First Sikh war between the English and the Lahore State had come to a close. The hill Rajas referred to in this quotation belonged to Kangra which was now one of the three districts under John Lawrence.

the three districts of Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur and Kangra placed under him. He would begin the work, collect information, assess a number of villages, and then hand over to the district officers who later came to take charge of their duties. The extent of his contribution to the summary settlement in the three districts was nearly double what was done by his three assistants. The following table would give the precise assessment effected by him and the three assistants who helped him in 1846 when the entire work was begun and finished.¹

	Past Collection	Present Settlement	Reduction	Percentage of Reduction		
By Commissioner	15,06,068	13,69,275	1,36,793	9	1	4
District Officers	8,07,604	7,08,614	98,990	12	4	2
Total	23,13,672	20,77,889	2,35,783	10	3	1

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Agent Governor-General N.W.F. 28 November 1846. Para.39. I.P.C. 31 December 1847, Part 8, No.2443.

The fact is that excepting Jalandhar, where H. Vansittart had to do more than half of the total assessment,¹ at other places what remained was not much. The contribution of R.N.Cust, who was put in charge of Hoshiarpur, was nominal.² Edward Lake at Kangra assessed only three of the twenty-three 'Taluks' in which the district

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Agent Governor-General, N.W.F. 28 November 1846, Para.12. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2443.

	Taloo	No.	Past	Present	Reduc-	Percentage		
	quas	of	Settle-	Settle-	tion	of		
		vill-	ment	ment		Reduction		
		ages						
Commis-	28	304	3,66,579	3,23,365	43,214	11	12	7
sioner								
District	29	435	5,42,207	4,66,122	78,085	13	10	7
Officers								
Total	57	739	9,08,786	7,91,487	1,17,299	12	14	5

2. Ibid. Para.19.

	Taloo	No.	Past	Present	Reduc.	Percentage		
	quas	of	Settle-	Settle-	tion	of		
		vill-	ment	ment		Reduction		
		ages						
Commis-	41	1026	6,73,331	6,17,265	56056	8	5	2
sioner								
District	14	202	1,37,437	1,31,196	6241	4	8	7
Officers								
Total	55	1228	8,10,768	7,48,461	62307	7	10	11

was divided.¹ He had, however, earlier fixed the assessment in the Nurpur principality which had problems similar to those in Kangra.

The assistants who completed the Summary Settlement had practically no option but to do the work in the manner in which it had been begun by John⁷. They would find the plan already laid down, the data collected and the procedure fixed. But for this very reason they could, and at times did, comment strongly on one or other aspect of the way the settlement was effected by John Lawrence. They would indicate the peculiarities of the district placed under them and point out the drawbacks which would particularly strike them in the work initiated and done by their superior, in their district. John, in

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sattlej to Agent Governor-General, N.W.F. 28 November 1846, Para. 29.
I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No. 2443.

	Taloo quas	No. of vill- ages	Past Assess- ment	Present Assess- ment	Reduc- tion	Percentage of Reduction		
By Commis- sioner	20	566	4,66,158	4,28,645	37,573	8	-	9
By Distrt. Officers	3	196	1,27,960	1,09,296	18,664	14	9	7
Total	23	762	5,94,118	5,37,941	56,177	9	7	1

his turn, would then put forth his view point, at times more for the consideration of the Government than to guide the assistants completing the Summary Settlement. One finds thus the interesting phenomenon of John defending himself against his own subordinates.

There was nothing surprising in this. The Jalandhar doab was a new acquisition and all were probing and enquiring about the best way of fixing the land revenue in a territory which till very recently was part of a kingdom which had its own traditions in revenue affairs. The differences between individuals actively participating in it was consequently natural. These, however, shall be noted later. We must pause here to see the procedure followed by John Lawrence and the characteristics of his Summary Settlement.

John's first step was to collect the information. He was keen about it from the very beginning. In the very first month of his coming to the Jalandhar doab he procured "information regarding the country and the system of revenue administration which prevailed and the data which was procurable."¹ He wrote to his brother,

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sattlej to Governor-General's Agent, N.W.F. 28 November 1846, Para.4. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2443.
Note: John arrived in the Jalandhar doab on 7 March 1846.

"I will see after the revenue directly, get Dena Nath to give me a copy of all information regarding the Doab-list of the Pergunnahs - villages - Arzies - jummas etc. I am getting one already made out here, but his will be a check."¹

Earlier he had asked Henry for a map to be procured for him from the Surveyor-General's office.² Having thus collected the rough data, he corrected and supplemented it "by the information I picked up from the people of the assets of their own villages and those of each other."³

The information so gathered was evidently neither detailed nor exact. John's difficulty was that the villages had neither any accountants nor any records to rely upon.⁴ The alternative of collecting the exact information by sending Amins to the villages was very slow. Also, John had no faith in their honesty. Sending them to the villages would be to "throw a host of harpies" who would "enrich themselves at the expence of the Govt. and still more of the people. This would not be the best way to pacify the country and gain a good name for the Govt."⁵ He therefore contented himself with the rough

1. John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence 11 March 1846.

Henry Lawrence Papers.

2. Ibid. 7 March 1846. Ibid.

3. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Agent Governor-General N.W.F. 28 November 1846. Para.2. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2443.

4. Ibid. Para.4.

5. Ibid.

information that he had collected on the basis of which to settle the revenue. One of his subordinate district officers was to feel that this faulty data vitiated the entire settlement of his district.

John's Summary Settlement was to be for three years. It was a period neither too short nor too long if its summary character is kept in mind and if it is remembered that it was based on information that was hurriedly collected. The land had yet to be surveyed and measured. A full knowledge of the people and their customs had still to be collected. The Summary Settlement, in fact, was to be one way of obtaining this knowledge.

The aim was to attempt a light assessment for this new acquisition. This was the direction of the Governor-General.¹ The Agent also wanted it.² But what was most important John himself felt that the error of over assessment "now generally acknowledged to be the grand defect in the lately revised assessment of the N.W.

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Sutlej to Governor-General's Agent, N.W.F. 28 November 1847 Para. 10. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8.
 2. Agent Governor-General N.W.F. to Commissioner and Superintendent Cis Sutlej 20 April 1846. Circular No.4. I.P.C. 7 August 1847, No.767,
Note: Copy of this circular to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Sutlej could not be traced but there is no doubt of its being sent. Both Trans-Satlej and Cis-Satlej administration, were being supervised by the Agent during this period.

Provinces" was to be avoided.¹ A light assessment according to him was necessary for various reasons. The Jalandhar doab was on the frontier and that made this essential:

"The policy and wisdom of a moderate assessment is now universally admitted and if more particularly necessary in any one part, it is in a frontier country."²

Over assessment "In a new country situated on the frontier ... would both politically and financially be a great error. Instead of the cultivators and the wealth of the Sikhs taking refuge with us, our people would be flying to them. Instead of being looked on as Benefactors, we should be considered as tyrants. Our rule instead of being eagerly desired as it now is by the Border villages would be feared and execrated."³

To fix a light assessment, John wrote off all that was collected in excess of the Government demand proper under the old Sikh system. He found that the "old dewans had collected from 20 to 30 per cent in excess of the Govt. demand."⁴ Further he brought down the old assessment itself though he felt that the charge of excessive severity against it was not just. The

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Satlej to Governor-General's Agent, N.W.F. 28 November 1846. Para.9. I.P.C. 31 December 1846. Part 8, No.2443.
 2. Ibid. Para.8.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid. Para.6. Note: Here the use of the word 'dewan' by John Lawrence is rather intriguing. Perhaps he meant Kardars. It appears that these kardars in their turn shared these excess collections with chaudharis and Lambardars in the villages.

percentage of this reduction was within the range of eight to ten per cent of the old demand.¹

The most distinctive feature of John's Summary Settlement, however, was the change in the mode in which the payment of the land revenue was to be made. Earlier it had been paid in kind but he settled for money rates. He regarded this reform as important because he disliked the grain payments which

"are remnants of barbarism, with them Govt. is the great monopolist to the ruin of all dealers of grain and often to their own loss. By doing away with the metallic currency you necessitate a system of barter and prevent the accumulation of wealth."²

It never occurred to John Lawrence that this was a radical change and had in it the possibilities of undoing the benefits brought about by his reducing the revenues to be paid to the new Government. It was/^{Edward} Lake working at Kangra who pointed out such a probability.

Apart from these major characteristics, there were a few others. The Summary Settlement dealt with the village communities: the revenue was settled with the representatives of the villages in an open court and after

-
1. See the tables of the assessment work done by John Lawrence and his assistants.
 2. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to 2nd Assistant Commissioner, Kangra, 12 November 1846. Para.10. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2444.

enquiry had been made from them about the extent of the old revenue that they had been paying.¹ John presumed the existence of such communities even where they did not exist. The assessment was made in a hurry and consideration was not shown to the interests associated with the revenue collection and management under the earlier system. The Chaudharis and the Lambardars had a privileged position under the old revenue management in the form of rent free lands. John deprived them of these.

The assistants who had taken up the work of John Lawrence were to point out what they believed to be drawbacks in John's work. They were sometimes to suggest means by which this settlement could be improved. They would even try to go their own way and John Lawrence had to bring them back to the lines laid down by him. Two of his subordinates, however, had a very strong faith in their own observations and regarded John's settlement in their areas as faulty. John had to admit while referring to their remarks on his work that

"I have not been very fortunate in their judgements, in [sic] that part which I executed myself."²

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to Governor-General's Agent, N.W.F. 23 November 1847. Para.5. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. No.2443.
 2. Ibid. 28 November 1846. Para.2. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2443.

Edward Lake,¹ the assistant commissioner at Kangra was the first to point out the chief defect in John Lawrence's settlement, as it was effected in Kangra. By and large Lake's was a conservative attitude and he was against any innovations. It is significant that while assessing the Nurpur principality, which was not the continuation of John's work but entirely his own settlement, he should have been taking special note of the character of the villages there. He pointed out to John Lawrence then that the villages in the Hills so far differ from those in the plains, that while in the latter all the inhabitants formed one close mass, in the hills all the houses were scattered about: "nine or ten zemindars living together in one place, nine or ten in another."² These were called tappas. A group of these tappas had been regarded by Lake himself as one village of the type existing in the plains though he now found out that they were not one community. The Mukaddam or the head of the so-called village, Lake found, would belong to one of the tappas and so would not be the true representative of all the people for whom he would agree in the settlement. This Mukaddam would consequently "have

-
1. Acting as the District officer, he carried out the assessment work.
 2. Assistant Commissioner Kangra to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej 14 April 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2444.

an undue preference for his group and to appear in the position of a Middleman to all other groups." Lake's feeling was that ultimately he himself might decide to give Pattas to all these different groups.¹ The same conservative attitude of not disturbing the old customs is to be noted in his deciding to collect the land revenue of Nurpur in future through the old agencies of Kotwal and Mukaddams. He felt that "by making use of persons acquainted with the people and their customs the realization of revenue will be less harassing and vexatious than it otherwise would be."²

To Lake, with his conservative approach, the money assessment introduced by John Lawrence in Kangra looked too radical. He also tried to prove that John's assessment in Kangra was heavy. He began by giving his impressions that the old assessment in the Kangra district was heavy. He, in fact, painted a very dismal picture of the situation that existed as a result of that assessment.

"A high assessment has produced here the same effect that it has produced elsewhere. The people are poorer and more wretched than they are in the most barren and sterile districts of the Hindoostan. The whole country is in debt, and to satisfy the demand of his

-
1. Assistant Commissioner Kangra to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 1 May 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8. No.2445.
 2. Ibid.

creditors a father has been forced to sell son, daughter and wife until he & his own family have become virtually the property of another. The system of putting persons into pawn is peculiar to the Hills, but the system has become so general that there is hardly a village in which it is not practiced. There is an artfulness and a design in the system which renders it the most atrocious that was ever invented for the slavery of God's creatures. A man borrows a sum of money, no matter however [sic] trifling; but instead of paying interest for it, he agrees to place his entire services at the disposal of the lender, until the debt shall be repaid, stipulating at the same time, that he will take no hire but content himself with the mere necessities of life. How then I ask, is it ever possible that he shall repay the loan. Let him work ever so laboriously, he does not reduce by one iota the principal of his debt. That shall remain the same and many a poor creature, in selling himself to bondage, has sold his son and son's son still unborn." ¹

This over assessment was also reflected in the position of the women of Kangra.

"If the condition of man in these hills is degraded the condition of women is still worse; like a four footed beast she is hawked about and put up for sale to the highest bidder. Sold to one man, she lives with him, until such time as his necessities force him to raise money when he sells her to another. Where the woman is held in such light esteem, it cannot be wondered if she is wanting in chastity, modesty, and all the virtues which we look for in the fairer sex." ²

In such a district, Lake thought that a light assessment was absolutely necessary. He in fact felt that

-
1. 2nd Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent Jalandhar Doab [E.Lake] to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 24 September 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1842. Part 8, No. 2444.
Note: Lake's report is a long essay and its paragraphs are not numbered.
 2. Ibid.

at any place one-third "is as much as a benevolent Govt. ought to expect." John Lawrence's assessment, on the other hand, according to Lake, was fifty per cent. This was because he had converted the old assessments in kind into money terms. Lake felt it was heavy.

Lake's more serious criticism, however, was of the conversion of the old mode of revenue collection into money payments. The old system was of a long standing and distinctive in nature. This is how he described it:

"While in other parts of India, the Govt. revenue is either a fixed share of the produce or else a money proportioned to the area of the village, here the Govt. revenue is a constant quantity, paid in kind, without any reference to the actual produce. For example there is a village called Bulerh, formerly enjoyed in Jagheer, and upon which hitherto, no assessment has been fixed. For the last 200 years this village has paid Seventy-nine maunds of barley and about fourteen rupees in cash for the winter crop, and in the same way every village in the Pergunnah Kangra has paid¹ in kind for the last two or three centuries."

This system had lasted so long in the Kangra district because a large portion of the land in it was irrigated and the produce was more or less constant from year to year. In any other district "dependent for its fertility upon the rain, if a fixed quantity of grain were taken each year, without reference to the actual produce,

1. 2nd Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent Jalandhar Doab (E.Lake) to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 24 September 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1842. Part 8, No.2444.

the settlement would, of course, break down in the very first season of drought." Lake was convinced that the system of payment, in spite of the assessment being heavy, was "in high favour with the people."¹

The people of Kangra had always hated the introduction of a money assessment. Lehna Singh, the Sikh governor of the hills had earlier tried to introduce it in the area now covered by Kangra district but had not been successful. The people "were as deaf to his entreaties as they were to his threats & during the whole period of Sikh ascendancy, the people of Kangra continued to pay in kind."² Lake, therefore, felt that it would have been better if John Lawrence had not introduced the money assessment.

If the change had to be made, Lake would have preferred the introduction of the batai system i.e. the collection of the revenue by the sharing of the crops. He, however, would not have liked the Government to do the sharing. He would have preferred the land revenues of the villages to be farmed out to the Lambardars who in their turn would have made the collection in kind through batai. The amount to be collected by the Lambardars was at the same time to be limited to a rate less than the one

-
1. 2nd. Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent Doab (E.Lake) to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 24 September 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1842. Part 8, No.2444.
 2. Ibid.

prevalent earlier. He believed that if the revenue had been settled according to this plan it would have been better for the cultivators than the money rates introduced by John.

"Of all the modes with which I have hitherto become acquainted I think the Batai system is the most favourable to the zemindars, and if we were to farm out a village to a Lumbardar, directing him to take two-fifths of the produce, where hitherto he had been accustomed to take one-half, I think the condition of the cultivator would improve more rapidly than it does under our own present light money rates."¹

He was so convinced that this plan would be liked by the people that he sought permission from John Lawrence to try it on an experimental basis in one of the villages.

The money rates of John Lawrence, Lake felt, had made the incidence of the assessment dependent upon the season. Those with capital at their command were likely to gain by it. They would not sell in a season of plenty when the prices would be low because they could afford to wait. The poor men, on the other hand, had to meet the revenue demand in money and had no option but to part with the produce. When the prices were high, the rich would gain but the poor might yet be losers. The crops might have failed and then to pay the land revenue, they would have to borrow with the result "that we have liberated our

1. 2nd Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent Doab to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 24 September 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1842. Part 8, No.2444.

cultivator from the oppression of farmers to plunge them into the worse bondage of Sowcars and bankers."¹

Still another objection of Lake's to the money rates was that they might not turn out to be fair and equitable in future. John had fixed the rates by converting the old assessment in kind into money rates on the basis of prices prevailing in one particular year. If in the following year there were a bumper crop prices would fall and the peasant who paid the revenue would suffer. He conceded that it could be argued that if the crops were not enough to satisfy the demand then prices would rise and the cultivator would gain. Lake, however, had his doubts on that score:

"when we consider how many circumstances tend to raise and depress the Market, we must feel satisfied that prices are not dependent upon the quality of the harvest."²

In other words, he emphasised the fact that the oscillation in grain prices over which the peasant had no control could make the new land revenue in money terms inequitable. The extent to which it would be so would vary from year to year.

And lastly Lake pointed out that the new money assessment had fallen more heavily on some villages than

1. 2nd Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent Doab to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 24 September 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1842. Part 8, No. 2444.

2. Ibid.

on others. This was because of what Lake believed was the system of calculations adopted by John Lawrence. John had not taken into consideration the variety in the crops grown in different villages. He had also ignored the fact that the quality of the same crop differed from village to village. While converting the old assessment in kind into money rates John had presumed that either wheat or rice was grown and that these crops were uniform in quality in all the villages. Even when inferior crops were grown, the rent calculations were made on the presumption that wheat or rice of a superior quality was grown.

"The result of this is that in those villages where the finer kinds of rice are principally produced, there the assessment is particularly light but in those villages where the inferiority of the soil forces the cultivator to content himself with barley, and the coarse description of rice, there zemindars are scarcely better off than they were before our arrival."¹

Lake summarized his evaluation of John's assessment and the Summary Settlement of Kangra as follows:

"Having thus recorded what little information I have obtained, regarding the Pergunnah Kangra, I would in conclusion beg to observe that in my opinion the people are too highly assessed. There is no doubt that the grain prices formerly fixed upon the people were determined

1. 2nd Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent Doab to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 24 September 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1842. Part 8, No.2444.

according to a scale, which allots to the ruler one half the actual produce of the soil I feel convinced that the cultivator is unjustly and unfairly burdened. Supposing this fact to be allowed I would next humbly beg to state that in my opinion the people of these Hills are not sufficiently advanced for a money assessment. The cultivator appears to be uncivilized and barbarous to a degree and what is worst, he has no capital."¹

John's reactions to Lake's observations were rather sharp and quick. He began by challenging the presumption that the land revenue formerly paid by the villagers on the basis of which money assessments were made was really half the produce. This might have been so when that revenue was originally fixed which according to Lake himself had been a constant quantity for each different village for about two hundred years. John argued that

"in the progress of society, in the increase of population, it is obvious that new land must gradually have been broken up, and as the quotas have remained the same, in all such cases the proportion of the crop subscribed by the people to make up such assessment in kind must have diminished."²

He, therefore, did not agree with Lake in regarding the new money assessment as equivalent to half the gross

-
1. 2nd Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent Doab to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 24 September 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1842. Part 8, No.2444.
 2. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to 2nd Assistant Commissioner, Kangra, 12 November 1846. Para.2. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8. No.2444.

produce of the village.

But even if it were fifty per cent, argued John, the fact that the grain quota had been paid throughout the course of years "with little difficulty" proved that it was not exorbitant. He further argued that if it were really exorbitant people with capital would never have come forward to advance money to the proprietors, a fact which was emphasised a great deal by Lake to point out the poverty of the people. Actually John went farther and pointed out that these advances were sometimes made to purchase the property rights. If the land revenue were excessive people with capital would never have done that.¹

Lake's objections to the introduction of a money assessment were not dealt with exhaustively by John. All that he admitted was that the money rates were subject to oscillations but did not agree even then that a village would be better off if it were to pay in kind, as was suggested by Lake. Under the British when "trade is free and unhampered", the only danger in the payment of land revenue he could think of, was that of the season when the crop might fail. But he refused to admit that even on that score there was anything to choose between money

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlej to 2nd. Assistant Commissioner, Kangra, 12 November 1846.
Para.2. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2444.

assessments and the fixed grain payments, prevalent in Kangra earlier. Actually John hoped to see a rise in the prices of agricultural produce in Kangra in future, much to the advantage of the proprietors who were assessed at the level of prices in existence earlier. This would be so because the quality of land in Kangra was limited and there was no room for any extension in cultivation. At the same time trade was becoming free and the wages of labour were rising.¹

To Lake's suggestion of a Batai system of collection by farming the villages to Lambadars, John objected strongly. His grounds for doing this were many. One was to the batai system itself which at many times existed between the proprietors and the cultivators. John's experience was that "when the cultivators are numerous and resolute, and the proprietor weak, the latter suffers and vice versa. From the time the crop is cut until it is housed, it is a constant struggle between the parties to over reach each other." For him Lake's suggestion of a batai system by farming the village to a Lamberdar was worst: "... to give a lumberdar the farm of the village is perhaps the most objectionable system, I have ever

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Sutlej to 2nd Assistant Commissioner, Kangra, 12 November 1846. Para.4. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2444.

heard advocated." He had an additional objection to it, besides the one he had against a batai system in operation between the proprietors and the cultivators. Lake's plan would raise the Lambardar from being a co-sharer with other proprietors in their rights and interests in the villages, to be their master and "for the time being the virtual ruler of the whole village." The other co-sharers, on the other hand, would be reduced to the status of tenants, "... from having a hundred proprietors, you degrade ninety nine into mere cultivators and make over their rights to a single individual."¹ For John, the Lambardar was only an agency through whom the land revenue of the village was to be collected. He was opposed to changing the Lambardar's status to anything higher.

Having thus dismissed Lake's objections to his settlement, and having objected strongly to Lake's suggestions that villages should be farmed out to Lambardars, John Lawrence came out in defence of his own assessment. He, in fact, took the criticism that his assessment was heavy more seriously than any other criticism of Lake's because he himself laid great emphasis on a light assessment. He therefore detailed the way in

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to 2nd Assistant Commissioner, Kangra, 12 November 1846.
Para.5. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2444.

he had fixed a light assessment.

"When I consider that wherein almost every case any doubt existed, I permitted them to rate their crops at whichever kind they themselves pleased, that in this valuation I gave the whole Pergunnah 8 per cent reduction, I am perfectly at a loss to understand how they can be overassessed. Had I maintained grain payments and converted them into the prices of the day, the Government demand for that harvest would have been prodigiously enhanced."¹

John also pointed out that Lake's belief that he had converted the grain payment into the money assessment on the prices existing in one particular year was wrong. He was therefore not impressed by Lake's criticism that his assessment of the Kangra district was high.

"I by no means assert absolutely that the assessment of Kangra is not high, but I am not satisfied from your data that it is so. On the contrary, I am inclined to think that it is moderate. The present settlement is but a trial, let us collect data for that which will follow, and if it is proved that mine is too heavy no man will be more happy to advocate its reductions than myself."²

In this controversy between John and Lake, Henry Lawrence supported his brother. He referred to the survey that had already started and remarked that he had no doubt that it would prove John's estimate of the evaluation of the Settlement more correct. His own observations were

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to 2nd Assistant Commissioner, Kangra, 12 November 1846. Para.8. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2444.
 2. Ibid.

that Lake had failed to prove that "the rate of Kangra was too high." On the question of money payments, his observations were that "The objections made by Lt. Lake to money payments are not peculiar to the Kangra district".¹

Henry Vansittart, the district officer at Jalandhar, was the other assistant who criticised John's settlement. This was with respect to that part of the Settlement which John had effected in the district later entrusted to Vansittart. About him John admitted after an experience of a year and a half of his having seen Vansittart as his subordinate that

"there is hardly one subject in which we agree. The lights and experience of the elite of the Civil Service who have been engaged in laying down the rules and principles of the Revenue System which now prevails in the North-Western Provinces would appear to him to be mere folly."²

John attributed these differences to the different types of training they had received. John had received his earlier training in the Metcalfe school at Delhi, whereas Vansittart was trained in the zamindari areas of the Bhagulpore division in Bengal. John wrote to Vansittart:

-
1. Agent Governor-General, N.W.F. to Secretary Government, 17 December 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part.8.
 2. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to Secretary Government of India. 16 October 1847, Para.18. B.C.117172. p.214.

"There can be no doubt that there are few points in Revenue or judicial matters on which we concur, but I attribute this to the different circumstances under which we have received our official education"¹

On the other hand Vansittart once felt so strongly about one of the measures John wanted him to be effected that he wrote to him:

"... my conscience would not acquit me were I to enforce your order in this instance without making a reference."²

The story starts with Vansittart beginning his very first report with the remark,

"I some months ago had drawn up a report on the Summary Settlement of the District that has been effected partly by you and partly by me; But such report necessarily was imperfect, and growing acquaintance with the district confirmed me in my opinion that the data on which it was founded were incorrect."³

He, therefore, destroyed that report and wrote a new one only on the repeated insistence of John Lawrence.

Vansittart's chief objection to John's assessment in the Jalandhar doab was that the latter had assessed the district very lightly and thus deprived the Government of the income that was its due. He argued that under

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Sutlej to Deputy Commissioner, Jalandhar, 26 May 1847. Para.3. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2292.
2. Deputy Commissioner Jalandhar to Commissioner and Superintendent Jalandhar Doab, 7 April 1847. Para.8. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2292.
3. Ibid. 5 August 1846. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2444.

the rule of Rup Lal who was the Kardar of part of Jalandhar district before Sheikh Imam-ud-din had become the Nazim of the Jalandhar doab, the assessment under Rup Lal's charge was eleven lakhs and this had prevailed for seven or eight years and was generally acknowledged to be light. Besides this there were "other demands amounting to 7 or 8 per cent."¹ John on the other hand, according to him, had put the assessment on this part of the district at seven lakhs which was obviously very low. Vansittart's feeling was that even if the demand of the Government were the same as that of the former Government, it would have been light.

According to Vansittart, John's mistake was due to the false returns which were supplied by the Sheikh's men and kardars. They, perhaps, did it under the impression that the British would farm out the district to their master, Sheikh Imam-ud-din.² Vansittart himself had to proceed on the basis of these returns, and so the mistake continued. Vansittart's opinion was that not only the returns of the previous Government's collections were wrong but even the returns of the areas of the villages and estates had been falsified. He observed,

1. Deputy Commissioner Jalandhar to Commissioner and Superintendent Jalandhar doab, 5 August 1846. Para.5. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8. No.2444.
2. Ibid. Para.6.

"I have measured several villages, the returns of land of which I most doubted. In several instances, I found a difference of one-third between the extent of the land forming the area of the estate & that prepared in your office."¹

These wrong returns had made the entire Summary Settlement defective, besides involving a big loss to the Government. He observed,

"I would willingly see the term of the settlement shortened in case such a proceeding could be effected without a breach of faith."

He admitted, however, with a feeling of regret, that this would be impracticable.²

John did not attach much importance to the observations of Vansittart. For the satisfaction of the Government, however, he detailed the data and the grounds on the basis of which the assessment in the Jalandhar district was settled. He was keen on proving that this data "if not of the best possible description" was "the best available under the circumstances."³ He met one major objection of Vansittart by declaring that he had not relied in fixing the revenue on the returns of the area

1. Deputy Commissioner Jalandhar to Commissioner and Superintendent Jalandhar doab, 5 August 1846. Para.7. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8. No.2444.
2. Ibid. Para.8.
3. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to Agent Governor-General, N.W.F. 28 November 1846. Para.8. I.P.C. 31 December 1846. Part 8, No.2443.

but on the past collections alone.¹ About the charge that the returns of these collections were wrong, John had made a thorough enquiry afresh. He sent for Rup Lal who was still alive. From the old kardar he learnt that the former took charge in the Jalandhar district

"after the Nabia or Sambat 1890- 1833-34 A.D. which is known throughout the North-West as the great Famine which desolated these provinces. He assured me that in consequence of the ruin caused by that fearful visitation, together with the exactions of his predecessors, the country when he assumed charge, had become a perfect wilderness; and that for the first year, he collected but (6) six lacs of rupees - which was gradually increased to 12 lacs."²

John then asked for the records from Dina Nath and on the information obtained from them made a comparison of the collections of Rup Lal, Sheikh Imam-ud-din and the one that was to be made under the new administration. His conclusions were that

"Misr Roop Lal's highest assessment was Rs 11,93,748. Sheikh Imamooddeen's returns are 12,66,744, the present assessment is 11,25,676 which is 68072 Rs less than that of the Misr and 1,41,098 than that of the Sheikh."

These figures, rightly felt John "hardly bear out that the Summary Settlement was too low."³

John felt that since Vansittart made a mistake in

1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to Agent Governor-General, N.W.F. 28 November 1846. Para.6. I.P.C. 31 December 1846. Part 8, No.2443.
2. Ibid. Para.7.
3. Ibid. Para.8.

attributing John's assessment to be based on false returns of the areas supplied by the Sheikh's men, Vansittart's conclusion that the new Government had been defrauded of its dues was wrong too. John argued that he had, in making the assessment, based himself on past collections. The wrong returns in the areas of the villages and estates, he conceded, could have led to some villages and even some estates being highly taxed and some others escaping with light assessment. But that could not have deprived the Government of its revenues.

Actually John even doubted whether the false returns in areas were really made by the Sheikh's men to the extent that Vansittart believed. His impression was that some favouritism might have been shown to relatives and friends as was done by the Indian subordinates elsewhere functioning under the British officials but no more. These, he believed, would be corrected in the regular settlement. Vansittart, John believed, had taken the representations of the people about false returns too seriously. His own experience of such charges against the Indian subordinates preparing these returns did not dispose him to believe that the Sheikh's men really made false returns to the extent Vansittart believed them to have done:

"I do not doubt for a moment that frauds exist in the returns I Received. Are there any in India in which the officers of the Govt. are not to some extent imposed on? Here and

there the villages of favourites and friends have very probably been spared but such errors are of little importance, and will all be ascertained and remedied by the ensuing Revenue Survey Moreover, it must be remembered that experience proves that we are too apt to think that Govt. is defrauded by lands and assets being kept back at the time of settlement. Hence public officers are too little inclined to make allowances for the representation of the people. The native officers are bribed for what they promise to do, than for what they actually effect. A man pays for a false measurement of his Lands the bribe is taken, but a true return is made."¹

In this controversy also as in the one between Lake and John Lawrence, Henry Lawrence sided with his brother. He reported to the Government that Vansittart had failed to prove that the assessment of Jalandhar was too low. He was sure the Revenue Survey would prove John Lawrence correct.² But even if the assessment were low as a result of the false returns of the Sheikh's men, Henry was prepared to take the entire responsibility on his own shoulders.

"I have endeavoured to impress on the officers employed under me that the Govt. interests can be best served by equal and light assessments; that if mistakes are to be made, it is better that they should be so against Govt. than the cultivator."³

-
1. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej to Agent Governor-General, N.W.F. 28 November 1846. Para.9. I.P.C. 31 December 1846. Part 8, No.2443.
 2. Agent Governor-General N.W.F. to Secretary Government, 17 December 1846. Para.2. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2442.
 3. Ibid. Para.4.

It is obvious from the above that excepting H. Vansittart, the main aim of all who had a say in the Summary Settlement of the Jalandhar doab was to so fix the assessment that it might be light. John intended that Henry Lawrence and the Governor-General approved of his wish. John's intention at least was that the village peasant proprietors who also cultivated their own lands should regard the change of masters as a boon. Even one of the chief critics of his work from amongst his own subordinates, Edward Lake, felt that the assessment should be light. Lake's objection actually was that John's assessment in Kangra was really not low enough.

At this stage, we are tempted to ask a few questions. Two of them pertain to the aim of fixing a light assessment. Was the one fixed really low as was the intention or was it high in spite of the best intentions of those responsible, partly because it was fixed in a hurry and partly because now it was to be in cash and not in kind? And how did the people who had to pay it really feel about it? Another question we are tempted to ask is whether in the process of the Settlement, any interests that were earlier associated with the management of the land revenue were affected?

As for the assessment being high or low there are two ways of looking at the subject. One is to compare it with the assessment prevalent earlier and another is to do

that with the rates prevalent in the rest of British India. There should be no denying that it was certainly low when compared with what the villagers had to pay in the period immediately preceding the British rule in the Jalandhar doab. The exactions had disappeared. The assessment itself had been lowered after converting it into money rates at the then current rate of prices or at the average prevalent during the preceding few years. But was it lower according to the standard in other parts of the British possessions? The Governor-General or at least his then Secretary, H.M.Elliot, seem to have doubts about it, in the only places about which they were supplied full facts. While approving of the Settlement of John Lawrence and while agreeing with the desirability of having kept the assessment low, the official letter to John from the Government of India pointed out:

"... that in Hoshiarpur the only district in which the extent of area is given, we find (if we exclude the Pergunnah of Juswan Doon of which the area returns are incomplete) that an area of 251,765 acres is assessed at the Jumma of Rs 655866 or an average of Rs 2-9-8 per acre. Again Pergunnah Hajeepur is assessed at an average of Rs 2-0-1 per acre. Pergunnah Mukerian at an average of Rs 2-7-0 per acre and the pergunnah Hoshiarpur at an average of Rs 2-15-8."¹

It was not clear from the facts supplied by John Lawrence and his assistants at Hoshiarpur whether the area shown in

1. Secretary Government of India to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlej, 20 March 1847. Para.4. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 9. No.2453.

the returns and on the basis of which the above averages were worked out represented the total area, or only the area under cultivation but in either case the assessment looked high:

"If the former it [area] would argue that the assessment was high, if the latter that but little profit was left to the cultivator."¹

That might or might not have been true of the assessment in all the districts of the Jalandhar division but there was certainly the possibility of the money assessment introduced by John Lawrence being regarded as heavy if the prices of the agricultural products had fallen in the year following the assessment. This however did not happen and the circumstances so combined as to make this assessment very light for the peasant proprietors of the doab. There were many reasons for this. There was a bumper crop in the year 1847. At the same time the prices of agricultural products went up considerably. The reason for this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon lay in the numerous cantonments raised in this frontier acquisition. According to R.N.Cust, the district officer at Hoshiarpur,

1. Secretary Government of India to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlej, 20 March 1847. Para.4. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 9. No.2453.

"The prices have kept during the whole of the last year unusually high, with little or no variety, on some occasions verging on scarcity. Tho' proverbially a grain country, and tho' the heavy early rains have secured an universally fine crop, yet the large concourse of consumers, brought together by the numerous cantonments in the Doab, have kept the prices of the grain at an unhealthy and unnatural height."¹

The rise in prices was big and that made the assesement extremely light in the year 1847. According to G.Barnes, the district officer at Kangra,

"The harvests have been most abundant. But the prices of grain in seeming contradiction have risen by 60 or 80% since our accession. Rice and wheat are the staple food produce of the District. Rice which sold last year at 36 seers for the rupee now sells at 22 seers and wheat has risen to 26 seers which fourteen months ago were selling at 48 rupees."

Like R.N.Cust, Barnes too attributed the rise in prices to a large British force in the Jalandhar doab. He, however, felt that increase in trade that came with the British rule also contributed to it:

"For the last six months the roads have been thronged with bullocks, camels and mules from all parts of the Punjab and the Jullundhar and even from Loodiana and Umballa. These traders usually bring up cotton and salt and carry away our rice and wheat."²

The rise in prices in the year of a bumper crop thus made this assessment seem very light to the peasant

1. Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlaj, 8 July 1847. Para.14. B.C.117172. pp.162-163.
2. Deputy Commissioner Kangra to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlaj, 9 June 1847. Para.8. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. No.2280.

proprietors of the Jalandhar doab. That would not have been the case if the prices, instead of rising had fallen. Then perhaps the fears expressed by Lake about the money assessments would have come true not only in the Kangra district but in the entire Jalandhar doab. In the year 1847/48 this, however, did not happen and the small landholder who had not otherwise lost any privileges could have no grudge against the Summary Settlement fixed a year earlier.

The peasant proprietor perhaps also gained by paying the land revenue in 1847 in the currency that had depreciated in value during the previous one year. When the land revenue was fixed in 1846, it was understood that it would be paid in the most valuable of the Nanak shahi currencies in circulation in the Jalandhar doab. This was the Nanak shahi currency of the chitta sort. A rupee in this currency was then regarded as equivalent in value to the British rupee. The following year, even as the British currency started circulating in the Jalandhar doab, the old Nanak shahi currency suddenly depreciated in value. There were many reasons for this. The accountant of the N.W. Provinces had forbidden the Nanak Shahi coin to be received in lieu of bills. This was followed by the sale of the rupees received in Nanak shahi currency from Maharaja Gulab Singh at Jalandhar. Later the new regiments

of the company that came to replace the old ones stationed in the doab refused to receive their pay in this rupee. This led to an immediate suspension of issue of that coin from the Public Treasury and its rapid depreciation in the market.¹ All the same it continued to be in circulation in 1847 but was not at par with the Company's rupee in the market.² The peasant most probably sold his grain in the Company's rupee and paid the land revenue in Nanak shahi. The peasant was thus paying less in real terms than even the nominal cash revenue fixed a year earlier.

Little wonder that when this assessment was evaluated in 1847 in the 'Reports on the Revenue Administration for the Past Year' both the Commissioner and his assistants at Kangra and Hoshiarpur felt that the peasants regarded the assessment as extremely light. They were happy that the peasants had indicated their satisfaction by paying the revenue readily. That was, in fact, taken to be expressive of the joy that the peasantry felt on the substitution of the Sikh rule by that of the British. Barnes, who was by now the deputy Commissioner at Kangra, pointed out that the land revenue of the previous

-
1. Deputy Commissioner Hoshiarpur to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 8 July 1847. Para.4. B.C.117172, pp.152-153.
 2. Ibid. Note: It was in circulation and could be exchanged with the Company's rupee. R.N.Cust refers to Nanak shahi rupee being thus exchanged in the market with a *bottai* (i.e. exchange) of two to five per cent.

year had been collected without the smallest arrears and without alienation by farm or sale, "without resort to coercive measures in any shape, without I might almost add the issue of a dustack or the institution of a single suit." He regarded this "unanimity and punctuality on the part of the people" as a proof of the moderate character of the settlement. He, in fact, went farther and remarked that

"By a cheerful and [prompt] payment of the revenue and by a studious obedience to authority the country has striven to express by the only practical means at its disposal the general joy at our accession The mass of the population are on our side and a few years under God's grace will consolidate the regard and reverence of which our natural repute has already laid the broad foundations."¹

R.N.Cust in charge of Hoshiarpur district felt the same way:

"The Settlement which was made hastily has one general recommendation which more than counter-balances all disadvantages or faults in particular. It may be said to be unequal, & to be deficient, as in fact possessing none of the component parts of a Settlement beyond the limiting of the Govt. demand, but its extreme lightness has been a relief to the people which all classes appreciate & are gratified for."²

Like Barnes, Cust also found proof of the lightness of the land revenue in the ready payment made by the peasants. He

-
1. D.C.Kangra to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 9 June 1847, Para.4. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2280.
 2. Deputy Commissioner Hoshiarpur to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej, 8 July 1847. Para.3. B.C.117122. pp.152-153.

reported with satisfaction that not a single Dustuck was issued and

"... that no attachments have been made from the collector's office, no sales have been thought of, no arrangements have been made for the reception in Gaol of Revenue Defaulters and no villages have been held Kham for which some substantial reason did not exist, independent of Balances."¹

The Jalandhar District Officer, Vansittart, had regarded the assessment as light even while it was being fixed. Now with the rise in prices, he felt that whereas the value of land in the Jalandhar district had doubled since the British occupied the district, "The assessment already light is rendered very light."² John, the author of the assessment, naturally felt happy and reported to the Government that

"the Revenue management of the first year of Br. rule in this territory as evinced in the smallness of the real Balances has been satisfactory."

For him, "It appears substantial evidence that the assessments are light and the people contented. The collections were made with a facility and expedition which I have never known exceeded."³

But how about the interests that had lost by the Summary Settlement? How about the Chaudharis and Lambardars

1. Deputy Commissioner Hoshiarpur to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlej, 8 July 1847, Para.3. B.C.117122. p.153.
2. Deputy Commissioner Jalandhar to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlej, 7 September 1847. Para.8. I.P.C. 31 December 1847, Part 8, No.2289.
3. Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlej, to Secretary Government of India, 23 July 1847, Para.7. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8. No.2279.

whose privileges stood curtailed? Their Inams were uncertain, their rent free lands taken away and the favourable assessments on their lands gone. So they may well have felt. That these things would be more thoroughly enquired into at the time of the regular settlement could not be much of a consolation to them. Little wonder that they felt discontented and joined the Jagirdars in hating the British rule. R.N.Cust had the penetration enough to note it in his district:

"If the introduction of our rule has been popular to the majority of cultivators, & generally the lower classes of society, it has been decidedly contrary to the [interests of] higher. The Jageerdars have seen their power, influence and property entirely destroyed; the chaudharies and headmen of Talooquas & villáges have in the same way been reduced to the level of their poor brethren and being restrained on the one hand from enriching themselves by appropriating an undue portion of the village profits, they have also at the same time been shorn by Govt. of the highly prized possession of cash, Inams, rent free lands or favourable assessments."¹

Cust actually found the influential residents of the towns from whom the Kardars were recruited also feeling discontented:

"The Canoongoes and other influential residents of the smaller towns from whom the class of Kardars are taken, are equally dissatisfied at the change of their prospects."²

1. Deputy Commissioner Hoshiarpur to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlaj, 8 July 1847, Para.11. B.C.117172, pp.160-161.

2. Ibid.

From Jalandhar H.Vansittart reported a similar feeling:

"The Jagirdars are unfavourably disposed towards us, for their jagirs have been resumed. The Chaudharies of villages are already losing their influence. Their 'Inam' or money allowances are reduced, and their claims to hold rent free lands are summarily dismissed."¹

The Summary Settlement in the Jalandhar doab thus, in the year following its introduction, was proving to be beneficial to the small peasant in the village but for the well to do who were associated with the old revenue system, it was an unwelcome innovation. It had deprived them of their power and privileges. They had reason, therefore, to feel discontented about it. One wonders if across the border their counterparts - the Kardars of the Lahore state and the chaudharis and lambardars in the villages of Dalip's dominions - did not feel apprehensive lest this Summary Settlement be introduced, much to their disadvantage, in the Lahore kingdom itself when after the Treaty of Bhairawal the administration of that state passed into the hands of the British. John's arrival there in July 1847 and his Summary Settlement on the Jalandhar pattern justified these apprehensions.

1. Deputy Commissioner Jalandhar to Commissioner and Superintendent Trans-Satlaj, 7 September 1847. Para.12. I.P.C. 31 December 1847. Part 8, No.2289.

Chapter V

Summary Settlement in the Lahore State, 1847-48

The extension of the Summary Settlement of the Jalandhar type in the Lahore state forms a very complicated story. It is indicative of a lack of serious thinking on the part of at least Hardinge who had the ultimate authority to sanction it. Perhaps the subject was not important enough to be decided after mature considerations at that level. The two individuals, Fredrick Currie and Henry Lawrence, who had most to do in determining Panjab policy were at the moment not acting together and Hardinge was probably influenced by his new secretary, H.M.Elliot,¹ who he thought was "a very quick and sensible man"² and "a sudder court man, & understands Revenue affairs".³

The Summary Settlement in the Lahore territories, like that in the Jalandhar doab, was mainly the work of John Lawrence when he was acting for his brother as resident at Lahore. Henry Lawrence was opposed to it. In the case of two of the frontier districts of Hazara and

-
1. H.M.Elliot succeeded F.Currie as the secretary in the foreign Department on 27 February 1847.
 2. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 26 February 1847. Henry Lawrence Papers.
 3. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 21 January 1847. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,475, f.167.

Peshawar, it followed from the Governor-General's desire to place them under the direct administration of the British political assistants stationed there after the Treaty of Bhairawal. In the rest of the Panjab lying on the Cis-Indus side, the initiative was taken by John Lawrence, and Henry agreed to it most reluctantly. Henry might not have agreed at all if he had not been anxious to have John at Lahore to act for him when he himself was away in England and if he had not been at the same time trying to prevent Currie's appointment to the Lahore residency. Henry might be said to have really initiated this work only in the case of Bannu, which forms a story by itself. Bannu might be described as a case of re-conquest for Dalip's Government.

The settlement of land revenue touched many interests and individuals, and the decision to undertake it on the lines followed in Jalandhar was a mistake. Whatever might have been its merits in the Trans-Satlej territories, fixing the land assessment through the agency of the British assistants was too radical a step for a state which was not a British territory and which had its own revenue administrative system. It alienated many old interests and so became the despair of Currie when he took over as Resident at Lahore. Currie had not been consulted by the Governor-General when he had sanctioned the step. In fact

there was no official reason for asking Currie's advice because after he had become a member of Council, he had nothing to do with Panjab affairs.¹ The matter, perhaps, was too trivial to be taken up privately with the ex-Secretary who was at the moment far off in Calcutta.

The Summary Settlement was contrary to the wishes of the Darbar. We have already noted that the composition of the Darbar was such that its loyalty could not be taken for granted. It should have actually been handled with care in a matter like undertaking the Summary Settlement because it meant encroaching on a field that had been so far the exclusive concern of Dina Nath, the ablest and the most influential of the Darbar members.

The co-operation of the Lahore Darbar, even though it no longer enjoyed its old powers, and was working under the supervision of the Resident, was politically desirable because the army was being reduced at the same

1. In September 1845 when Hardinge left his Council to come to the Panjab border, he came with the power to take all political decisions without consulting his Council. At that time, he had Currie as the Secretary to the foreign Department. Hardinge depended on Currie for conducting the foreign affairs. Currie had left Hardinge and shifted to Calcutta as a member of the Council in February 1846. The Governor-General was not bound officially to consult Currie who was now a member of the Council. The Council itself was not being consulted on Panjab affairs.

time. It was particularly necessary in effecting the settlement. A large number of soldiers were losing their vocations and had to fall back on the land. Their pay, which in part had gone to the villages, was lost at the very time when the British were to introduce the cash assessment and when this money was most needed. In theory it could be argued that they would sell their produce to pay the money assessment but in the absence of easy transport, and in view of the number of currencies in circulation, the prospect of their being required to pay in cash instead of in kind was likely to be looked upon as a galling innovation by the cultivators and proprietors. For this reason alone, if none other, it was therefore necessary that the Darbar co-operate in effecting this measure.

The complexity of the earlier revenue system also made it necessary that this co-operation should have been sought. There was no uniformity in the old system. It differed from district to district. The fact is that Ranjit Singh himself had failed to give his kingdom one single pattern of revenue collection and administration. His revenue system was in a state of evolution. It was mostly that of batai in the beginning. The state revenue from the land was a pure and simple division of the crops between the state and the cultivators. The demand of the

state was as a rule collected in kind. Later, Ranjit Singh had at places introduced kankut. According to this system, the standing crops were estimated, and the share of the state evaluated in money terms. Collection was thus begun to be made in money but we should not forget that it was linked up with the produce in a particular field in a particular year. This new system slowly began replacing that of batai. The defect in both batai and kankut was that the Governments income was known only at the close of the harvest time. It would prevent the Government from forecasting its budget. The expenditure of Ranjit's Government had during the later period of his reign increased a great deal. To meet this ever-swelling demand on his revenues, Ranjit Singh had, perforce, to devise some methods as would enable him to estimate his receipts, in order to adjust them to the expenditure. The way that suggested itself to him was to give henceforth greater encouragement to the practice of farming out the revenue of the large districts for a period extending from three to six years to contractors who undertook to pay the amount in cash. This system was originally devised for the frontier districts but he later extended it to other places also. The lessee paid the stipulated amount to the state and was free on his part to realize the sum from his tenants by applying kankut or batai as was convenient to him. At places Ranjit had contracted for the revenue direct

with the village zamindars as a community thus dispensing with the farmer or the middleman and allowing the cultivator full advantage of his labour. Such instances were, however, rare, though proving the existence of the principle, albeit in an embryonic form, of the state dealing directly with the village communities. Ranjit Singh had also tried the experiment of cash jama in some of the parganas. While describing the land revenue system, as it existed during the closing years of Ranjit's reign, Sita Ram Kohli writes:

"... the practice of short periodical settlement, direct settlement with zemindars, and lastly the practice of imposing cash jumma were initiated and set on foot during the close of Ranjit's reign. It is to be noted, however, that though there was a general drift from batai, kankut, or farming to cash assessments, all the three were prevalent at the time Ranjit Singh died."¹

In his system the men of influence and chiefs had a vested interest. The kardars also gained by it. The management and the collection of the revenue was in the hands of three classes of officers - (1) men of wealth, position and influence who were sent to the distant provinces as farmers of revenue - Hari Singh, Sawan Mal, Desa Singh, Lehna Singh, Avitabile and others. They managed the administration of their territories and very seldom

1. Sita Ram Kohli, "Land Revenue under Ranjit Singh", Journal of the Panjab Historical Society, Vol.VII (1918) No.1, pp.76-77.

reported any case to Ranjit Singh. (2) The military chiefs, who held feudal demesnes on the condition of sending contingents in the field and who had also unlimited authority within their jurisdiction. (3) The Kardars, whose power varied according to the influence they possessed at the courts. The pay of these local tax gatherers and other secondary officers varied and mostly uncertain. It was tacitly understood that they were to live by the perquisites of their own appointments.¹

Ranjit Singh had made his revenue administration work by the sheer force of his personality. All the systems prevalent worked more or less satisfactorily. Even the great managers of his provinces were made to account for the revenue regularly. The awe in which he was held prevented them from being very extortionate either. After his death, when rivals contended for the throne, the revenue collections and administration seems to have gone more in the direction of farming of the revenues. Chiefs and Kardars appear to have farmed out the revenues of the district amongst themselves. They rendered no accounts and collected "20 to 30 percent above the sums they credit to the Government."²

1. R.K.Sinha, Ranjit Singh, pp.131-132.

2. Statistical Notes on the Punjab, 10 November 1846 by the Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej on special duty at Lahore. para.11. Henry Lawrence Papers.

That being the situation, to introduce the Summary Settlement was to hit the chiefs and the kardars. It was politic, therefore, to carry the Darbar along while reforming this system so as not to give the impression to the chiefs and kardars that it was being forced on them by the British.

To have the co-operation of the Darbar was also necessary because the finances of the state were not quite sound. Undertaking the settlement involved the British in taking over the financial responsibility of the state from the shoulders of the Darbar in general and Dina Nath in particular. The Lahore state at the moment was showing a very small surplus. According to John's estimate, made in November 1846, it had a net revenue "of 108 Lacs or one million and eighty thousand pounds".¹ Out of this eighty lakhs constituted expenditure on the army.² Twenty-two lakhs had to be paid according to the Treaty of Bhairawal to the British for the force they kept at Lahore.³ A year later when the army had been reduced still further, Henry estimated the surplus at seven lakhs.⁴ This was

-
1. Statistical Notes on the Punjab, 10 November 1846 by the Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej on special duty at Lahore. para.10. Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. Ibid., para.26.
 3. C. Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.VIII 'Articles of Agreement concluded between the British (p.166. Government and the Lahore Darbar on 16 December. Art.9.
 4. Henry Lawrence to Secretary, 2 October 1847. Para.8. I.S.C. 31 December 1847. No.326.

bound to be reduced on the British pattern of settlement with the accompanying reduction in the assessment coming into operation.

Henry Lawrence was for securing the cooperation of the Darbar in effecting the settlement but did not succeed. Neither the Governor-General nor John Lawrence seems to have been anxious about it. The British assistants were also for active interference in the affairs of the state and without regard for the co-operation of the Darbar, or the Nazims and Kardars under it.

II.

For the purposes of this study the Lahore state can be divided into two parts. There were, on the one hand, the three frontier districts of Bannu, Peshawar and Hazara, and, on the other, the rest of the Panjab divided into doabs. Each of the frontier districts, was a problem by itself. Bannu and Peshawar might be described as tributary areas, i.e. the Lahore Government did not deal with the people but with the chiefs; it did not collect land revenue but exacted tribute. The chiefs in the district, also recognised the sovereignty of Lahore. The Lahore Government was content if the khans and Maliks recognised its supremacy, did not disturb the peace, and continued to pay tribute. When one or the other duties was not done, a

force would be sent to punish them. They had lately paid no tribute to the Government and it was, therefore, decided to effect a settlement with the people. Both these districts and that of Hazara, as has already been pointed out, had problems of their own, which H.B. Edwardes, George Lawrence and James Abbott solved under the direction of John Lawrence and at times in a manner which Henry did not like.

§ 1. Bannu: Bannu, lying to the south of the Peshawar district of the kingdom had been conquered by Ranjit Singh in 1823 and had all along been a problem district. He contented himself by just laying a tribute on the Maliks and had not placed it under a regular governor or Nazim. The collection of the tribute from them, however, would always present a difficulty. The amount involved was not big¹ and perhaps Ranjit would not have cared about it, if he valued Bannu for other reasons. The Maliks continued to recognise his sovereignty and there was the likelihood that the chiefs in Dera Ismail Khan and Derajat which

1. Edwardes estimated in 1846 that if Bannu were occupied, it would yield about two lakhs. Evidently the tribute that the Mailks paid could not have been more than this. Lieutenant H.B. Edwardes to Acting Resident, 27 Dec. 1847. Inclosure 3 in 20. Parliamentary Papers (East India, Panjab). Papers relating to the Punjab 1847-49. Accounts and Papers 1849, Vol. XLI. p. 95.

Ranjit had conquered at the same time as Bannu would follow the example of the Maliks at Bannu. Right from 1823, therefore, the practice was that a large Sikh army would invade Bannu every second or third year for the purpose of exacting the tribute and collecting the arrears.

When, after the Treaty of Bhairawal, Henry Lawrence began supervising the administration of Dalip's kingdom, he learnt that the Maliks of Bannu had not paid their dues for two and a half years. The suggestion of the Darbar was to send an expedition as was the traditional practice. To this Henry did not agree at first. When later he did agree, it was on condition that a British official accompanied the expedition "to see that it resorted to arms only in extremity, and committed no excesses".¹ The British official who accompanied the force was H.B. Edwardes. On his initiative, an understanding was sought to be reached with the Maliks. They were promised a reduction of arrears and a very light rate for the future. This was an arrangement that would have been useful both to the Lahore state and to the Bannu chiefs.² But the Maliks did not agree. The expedition was thus a failure from the point of view of the essential task of collecting the arrears and

1. H.B. Edwardes, A Year on the Panjab Frontier in 1848-49. Vol. I. pp. 13-14.

2. H.B. Edwardes to Henry Lawrence, 4 May 1847. Inclosure 2 in No. 4. Parliamentary Papers (East India, Punjab). Papers relating to the Punjab 1847-1849. Accounts and Papers 1849, Vol. XLI. p. 9.

fixing a light tribute for the future.

Edwardes suggested that Bannu be permanently occupied and should henceforth pay revenue direct to the Lahore state. This was done in November 1847, and Edwardes, who had commanded the Darbar troops there, undertook a revenue settlement.

The position in Bannu was that apart from the cultivators, there were two important classes of people to be considered. The Maliks were the lords of the tappas into which Bannu was divided. Edwardes compared them with the Khans¹ of other areas. The Malik would claim ownership of the entire tappa and collect one-tenth from the zamindars as malkiat.² Out of this he would meet the "public charges" and if anything was left it became his private property, but if there was any deficiency, he was expected to defray it out of his own resources. Presumably he had his own private land from which he would meet the deficit if any. The Maliks were divided into two factions called "goondees" which often waged war against each other but united to "resist the common enemy".³ The second important class was that of the Saiyids who enjoyed the privilege of paying less land revenue than others.⁴ Bannu

1. The Khan was a lord under whom were Maliks. In Bannu, there were no khans but the Maliks behaved and acted as khans of the tappas.

2. Malkiat, or ownership. A malik claimed this over the tappa under him.

3. H.B. Edwardes, A Year on the Panjab Frontier, Vol. I, p. 77.

4. Ibid., p. 80.

was full of mud forts, perhaps built for the purpose of defence against the Maliks belonging to the rival faction, or even against the Sikh force when it came to demand tribute.

Edwardes was expected to settle the land revenue according to the directions given to him by Henry Lawrence. Henry wanted him to make a very light assessment. Whereas at other places he assigned two-fifths of the produce as a maximum, here the highest limit he fixed was one third. He even empowered Edwardes to lower it to one-fourth if he thought that necessary. It was characteristic of Henry that he was for introducing the change in such a manner as not to disturb unnecessarily the old interests connected with the land revenue or its collection in the past. If the Maliks were affected, they were to be compensated so that they remained contented and "have a common interest with Government". Consideration was also to be shown to the saiyids.²

The practical difficulty that Edwardes faced in reducing the land revenue to the extent Henry wanted partly arose from the fact that as directly administered Bannu was not a paying proposition. The Sikh Government

1. Henry Lawrence to H.B. Edwardes, 21 November 1847.

I.S.C. 31 December 1847, No. 118.

2. Ibid.

being "in direct opposition to what in other countries is called public opinion", he felt it would always be necessary to retain a large force in Bannu. And since Bannu had to meet its expenses, the land revenue could not be reduced. Edwardes, in fact, had no faith in the belief that just laws and a reduction of the land revenue would reconcile the Bannu people to Sikh rule. His solution was to disarm the people in Bannu, reduce the strength of the Darbar army and make the conquest profitable.¹ John who was the acting resident when this suggestion came did not agree with it. He felt sure that it was only by combining reconciliation with firmness that the people of Bannu would be attached to the new rule. He directed that if this reconciliation were to be brought about by "a very light assessment", then there would be no necessity of disarming the people.² Conscious of the delicate nature of Edwardes's work, he suggested that the Maliks might be associated with the collection but to prevent extortion on their part wanted that the amount authorised to be collected by them should be fixed.³ As if to compensate them for this limitation, which was great, he wanted that they should also be made police officers. He further suggested that Sikh troops be kept away so that the people might not feel

1. Henry Lawrence to H.B.Edwardes, 21 November 1847.

I.S.C. 31 December 1847, No.118. paras.6-7.

2. John Lawrence to H.B.Edwardes, 4 January 1848. Para.10.
I.S.C. 28 January 1848, No.48.

3. Ibid.

irritated. He felt that these measures would better serve the purpose of reconciling the Bannu people to Sikh rule.¹ With the same end in view, he directed that Ameens, whom Edwardes had employed to measure the lands, should be dispensed with as early as possible by being asked to measure the land by tracts and not field by field. He admitted that the task facing Edwardes was difficult but he did not feel that it was impracticable. He felt sure that just laws and light assessments would eventually take effect and then it would even be possible to reduce the Darbar army stationed there so that it might not tax the Bannu resources. John suggested that this would be a better approach than disarming the people. His approach might be put in his own words:

"A firm but conciliatory course of policy may so far change their feelings and habits as gradually to admit of the military force in Bannu being reduced. There can be no question but that the inhabitants would prefer being left untaxed in their wild but precarious independence, yet as they cannot have that opinion, as they gradually become sensible of the benefits of peace and order and are secured in the enjoyment of the fruits of their own industry they will have little inclination to rise in rebellion against a power they must be aware can crush them."²

John was evidently for an approach which compared to that of Edwardes was moderate, though we may wonder whether he

1. John Lawrence to H.B. Edwardes, 4 January 1848, Para.11, I.S.C. 28 January 1848, No.48.
 2. Ibid., Para.4.

was fully conscious of the power and privileges enjoyed by the Maliks earlier. It is inconceivable that merely the privileges of being the instruments of collecting the land revenue would have reconciled them to the new state of things.

When Edwardes sought directions from John on the problem of the Saiyids who held land on mortgage and for which they paid nothing to the owners of the land, he showed the same lack of concern for the second important class. Earlier the Saiyids would pocket the entire produce for themselves,¹ but now John wanted that in cases where the terms of the agreement were not available, the Saiyids should be allowed to have only a fair rate of interest. The rest should go to the liquidation of the debt. All that he was prepared to do for the Saiyids was "that if the people of Bannoo are being taxed $\frac{1}{4}$ th, the Sayads should pay $\frac{1}{6}$ th."²

The work in Bannu was done by Edwardes on these lines and finished by the middle of February 1848. This was in the district almost re-conquered and brought directly

-
1. Diary 13 (Copy). Lieutenant Edwardes to John Lawrence, 22 December 1847. I.S.C. 25 February 1848. No.54. Edwardes was very satirical while pointing out this fact to John Lawrence: "The income of the said lands by the law of Mohemmed should go to the liquidation of the debt but the holy men of Bunnoo are not read in this passage of the Shurra".
 2. John to Edwardes, 30 December 1847. I.S.C. 25 February 1847.

under the Darbar administration for the first time.

§ 2. Hazara: The Sikh rule in Hazara had commenced in 1818. This was a year earlier than the annexation of Kashmir by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Lying between Attock^K and Kashmir, the district was very strategically placed. Ranjit Singh attached considerable importance to holding this district and crushing any uprising on the part of the Muslims mercilessly.

Administratively Ranjit Singh had kept Hazara a separate unit, and most of the time had his favourite general, Hari Singh Nalwa, as the governor of the place. After his death, it would at times be placed under the governor of Kashmir and at times under a governor directly under the Lahore Darbar.

Together with Kashmir, it had been transferred to Raja Gulab Singh on 16 March 1846. But after the Treaty of Bhairawal, Henry had prevailed upon the Lahore Darbar to exchange it for the Lahore territory in the neighbourhood of Jammu, even though the new arrangement was financially disadvantageous to the Lahore state.¹ The reason for doing this was political. Apart from giving satisfaction to Gulab Singh, who thus got rid of a troublesome territory, it was also in keeping with the British desire to have a

1. John Lawrence to Currie, 31 January 1848. Para.14.
I.S.C. 25 February 1848. No.60.

close watch on Afghanistan. With the Treaty of Bhairawal this could be better done by the transfer of Hazara to the Lahore State.

The British assistant here was Captain James Abbott. He was at the same time the Boundary Commissioner demarcating the boundaries between Kashmir and the Lahore State, and also between these two states and the British territory which now touched both the Lahore and Kashmir boundaries on the hills. He was also arranging for the exchange referred to above. On behalf of the Darbar, the Nazim of the area was Chatter Singh Atariwala, father of Sher Singh who was a member of the Darbar. Chatter Singh was one of the most powerful chiefs at the moment in the Panjab. His other son, Gulab Singh was the Nazim at Peshawar. His daughter was betrothed to the young Maharaja.

How was Abbott to conduct himself in such a situation? Henry's opinion was that he should not interfere much in the day to day administration of the district. This was, however, not the opinion of the man on the spot, and when the matter was referred to the Governor-General, he decided in favour of Abbott.

In June 1847, Abbott asked for the power to remove a Kardar and appoint a new one instead.¹ Henry Lawrence here raised the fundamental problem of the role of the British assistants under the Treaty of Bhairawal. Henry argued that to have a kardar removed was not difficult

1. Journal of Captain James Abbott, Para.8, I.S.C.
31 July 1847, No.118.

through him. The assistants had merely to write to him and he would see that it was done. But he felt that formally, at least, this should be done through the Darbar. Besides being politic, it would be according to the Treaty of Bhairawal:

"I beg you to understand that our position in the Punjab is not that of active agents but that of friendly advisers with powers where necessary of enforcing our advice and when justice cannot be otherwise obtained of directly acting ourselves but this must be the last resource."¹

To the Governor-General, he wrote in a similar strain with many arguments against too much interference by the assistants. He pointed out that too much of it would nullify the authority of the Darbar and its executive officers. The British, he feared, would lose their influence by interfering very much. That course would also entail an increase in the number of assistants and consequently of expense. There was further the probability that chiefs and officials of the Darbar would feel disgusted. Even if they did not, there was the danger of the Darbar "becoming virtually disqualified from managing the country" by the time the British were to leave the state.²

-
1. Henry Lawrence to James Abbott, 19 June 1846, Para.8. I.S.C. 31 July 1847, No.119.
 2. Henry Lawrence to Secretary, 21 June 1847, Para.9. I.S.C. 31 July 1847, No.117.

The Governor-General did not here agree with Henry. While for the rest of the state, Henry's policy might be adopted, he was for making exceptions at Hazara and Peshawar.¹ The two districts were "of so much importance in a political and military point of view" that he wanted direct administration by British officials. He argued rather unconvincingly that it was not contrary to former tradition. General Avitabile, a European officer, had been exercising such a power for long even when the Panjab was a fully independent state.²

The Summary Settlement naturally followed from this decision of the Governor-General to administer the district directly. It was undertaken in September, some time after John Lawrence had taken over as acting resident.

The earlier system in Hazara was that of a fixed rent which was in theory half the gross produce but in practice varied "in different talooquas, not amounting in some to more than a third". Besides this, there was a collection of about fifteen per cent under the "title of Russoom and Nuzzerana". Then there were the fines about which Abbott wrote:

"Mussalman and Sikh laws left a wide gap for exactions, under the name of fines, the Government interfering in all domestic concerns

-
1. Peshawar was already an exception.
 2. Secretary to Henry Lawrence, 3 July 1847. Para.6. I.S.C. 31 July 1847, No.122.

of the subjects."¹

What Abbott did was to abolish Rasums, Nazaranas and fines and to reduce the rent universally by five per cent. He felt, however, that the assessment was not equitable. In cases where distress continued to be felt, he gave the malguzars the choice of assessment in kind for three years. He did not submit any formal report but John came to know of it.² He pointed out both to Abbott and the Governor-General that the reduction was not sufficient. The choice of kankut was not good either. He enquired of Abbott regarding the principle on which he was making his settlement, while passing on his own view that there should be a reduction of at least fifteen per cent.³

Abbott admitted that the reduction of five per cent was not enough. He would have himself preferred even more than fifteen per cent. To make the revenue amount merely to one-third of the gross produce, he felt that a fifty per cent reduction was really necessary. His difficulty was that this was beyond the limits allowed to him by the

1. James Abbott to John Lawrence, 30 September 1847. Inclosure 1 in No.13. Parliamentary Papers (East India, Punjab). Papers relating to the Punjab, 1847-49. Accounts & Papers 1849, Vol.XLI.
2. John learnt it from the political diaries of Abbott. The assistants were required to submit weekly diaries. They were meant to keep the Agent and the Governor-General informed of what was happening in the district where they had been placed. They referred to revenue affairs only casually.
3. John Lawrence to Secretary, 25 September 1847. Para.3. I.S.C. 30 October 1847, No.95.

earlier directions of Henry Lawrence. He also pointed out that his position was peculiar. Besides being the officer in charge of Hazara, he was the Boundary Commissioner and at the moment was determining the amount of Darbar territory to be exchanged for Hazara. The territory to be given to Gulab Singh was obviously to depend on the land revenue yielded by Hazara and so if he were to reduce it too low, Gulab Singh might not like it. Another difficulty was that in the limited time allowed him, and cramped as he was with the responsibility also of the boundary Commissionership, he could not determine precisely what the worth of the estates was. Under the circumstances, he felt that too sweeping a reduction would be inopportune. He also pointed out the limitations imposed by the effort to meet Hazara's expense from its own resources. Since expenses could not be curtailed by reducing the number of troops stationed at Hazara for fear that the area would "become a harbour for all the banditti of the Punjab", no reduction could be brought about in the revenue either. Lastly he pointed out that the general arguments in favour of the reductions, viz. that cultivation would increase, did not apply to a place like Hazara. The district was surrounded by mountains and rocks and so there was no possibility of an increase

in the cultivated area.¹

These arguments did not convince John, and he still insisted on making the assessment lighter. He was sure that it would be the Darbar that could be made to bear the loss and the Kashmir Maharaja would not be allowed to have a grudge: "the Durbar will willingly at the Resident's instigation bear the loss."²

In reply to John's objection to kankut settlement, Abbott pointed out that the former was misinformed about his having gone in for that type of Settlement in all the villages which had already been settled by him. He had entered into the kankut settlement only in a few villages. In so doing, there were practical considerations. Some villages had been partially depopulated "and to these at their earnest request 3 year kankut was guaranteed by Jowala Sahai and confirmed by me."³ Abbott's defense did not seem to have much effect on John Lawrence. He directed that as far as possible only a money assessment should be effected and where this was not possible to fix a specific quantity

-
1. Captain J. Abbott to John, 30 September 1847. I.S.C. 30 October 1847, No.133. Note: In the I.S.C. this letter of Abbott's is put as "copy of Demi-official letter" and bears no date. The Parliamentary Papers however the date. See, Captain J. Abbott to John Lawrence, 30 September 1847. Inclosure I in No.13 Parliamentary Papers (East India, Panjab) relating to the Panjab, 1847-49. Accounts and Papers 1849, Vol.XLI, p.72.
 2. John Lawrence to Secretary, 6 October 1847. I.S.C. 30 December 1847, No.131.
 3. Captain J. Abbott to John Lawrence, 30 September 1847. Demi-official letter. I.S.C. 30 October 1847, No.133.

of grain rather than have recourse to kankut settlement.¹ This was, in fact, a hint to lease out in grain the lands that were uncultivated but needed cultivation. Abbott himself had in the meantime, changed his views. He now felt that kankut was actually the result of an increase in assessment effected by the Lahore Government in 1842 and 1844, to meet the increased expenses of the army. He, therefore, resolved upon acting on John's suggestion to modify into lease the lands earlier settled by him for kankut.²

Abbott finished the work of assessment by the end of November 1847 according to the plan traced out above but was worried because the income did not balance the expenses incurred in the district. He therefore attached great importance to the rehabilitation of the villages that had been deserted. The district for that reason in particular needed "careful nursing". John, as the acting resident by this time felt the necessity of bridging the gap between the expenditure and income of the district but he intended doing it by transferring the naib-Nazim to Multan and reducing the size of the "host of moonshees and kardars with which the Darbar has inundated the country."³

-
1. John Lawrence to Secretary, 6 October 1847. Para. 3. I.S.C. 30 December 1847, No.131.
 2. Summary of J.Abbott's Political Diaries. Lahore Political Diaries, Punjab Government Records, Vol.IV, pp.96-97.
 3. John Lawrence to Secretary, 27 December 1847. Para.15. I.S.C. 25 February 1848, No.50.

§ 3. Peshawar: The city and the province of Peshawar became a tributary of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1823. Ranjit won it from the Afghans after a closely fought battle of Nowshera in which he had personally led his armies. It was a critical contest, and decided once for all, whether Sikhs or Afghans should rule east of Khaiber and the mountains of the North-West frontier. The Afghans, however, continued to feel it as a disgrace, and Ranjit Singh had to be very careful if he was to hold it. This was particularly true after Dost Muhammed's accession on the Afghan throne.

Ranjit Singh nearly lost it in 1837 when his governor at Peshawar, Hari Singh Nalwa, died fighting the Afghans. Hari Singh was succeeded by Tej Singh who was shortly relieved by Avitabile. This officer was the governor from 1838 to 1842. Tej Singh got back the governorship on Avitabile's retirement and held its charge for about four years. He was succeeded by Sher Singh and after the Sattlej campaign by his brother Gulab Singh.¹

The Sikhs had left the land revenue system much as they had found it. It was that of receiving tribute from the khans who for the rest were left as lords of the tappas under them. The total amount that was demanded from the khans was changed from time to time by the Sikh Governors who succeeded one another but at the end of the first Sikh

1. He was the second son of Chatter Singh Atariwala and should not be confused with the founder of the Kashmir state.

war it was "close upon ten lakhs".¹

The British attached considerable importance to this district and so after the Treaty of Bhairawal Hardinge placed it under the direct administration of a British officer. George Lawrence, the assistant there, was designated "Principal assistant" and was vested with "greater power and more independent authority than was exercised by the assistants located elsewhere."² This was from the time he took charge in February 1847. He carried out "the system of direct but judicious interference" admirably but was for some time concerned with other matters and could not give enough attention to revenue affairs "to offer a decided opinion thereon".³

The first area under George to be systematically examined for the purposes of Summary Settlement was that of Yusafzai. That was effected by Lieutenant H.B.Lumsden. Yusafzai was divided among Khans and what struck him was "that although acknowledging the Khalsa supremacy, and paying all demands made by the Sikh Governor, each Khan is still a perfect despot as far as the management of his little Khanship is concerned and imposes taxes, levies,

1. Gazetteer of the Peshawar district (1897-98), p.75.
2. Sir George Lawrence, Reminiscence of Forty-three Years in India, p.229.
3. G.Lawrence to H.Lawrence, 19 April 1847. Enclosure 2 in No.3. Parliamentary Papers (East India, Punjab). Papers relating to the Punjab, 1847-49. Accounts and Papers 1849, Vol.XLI, p.4.

finer, and in many instances punishes capitally without further reference".¹ Under these Khans were the Maliks who were expected to collect the village quota for the tribute to the Lahore state for each village but like the Maliks in Bannu showed great reluctance to do so. Their attitude was that "if they wanted the money they must come and fetch it". When the officials of the Lahore Government appeared, the Maliks either openly resisted them, if they felt themselves able, or if not, they took to the hills, where it was difficult to follow them, leaving the officials to collect their dues from the unfortunate cultivators who had been already mulcted to the utmost farthing.² However, even that had not been done for some time and the revenue was due from the Maliks.

The first thought of George was to collect the arrears from them. With that in view, he sent a force under two of his subordinates, Holmes and Lumsden; and soon joined it himself. He began by issuing a proclamation desiring all absentee Maliks who had taken to the hills to return to their villages within a month, on pain of forfeiting their lands and rights, and announcing that equitable rates would be fixed on all lands with due reference to their situation, quality and proximity to water for irrigation, beyond which no demand would be made, while the Maliks' own dues

1. Lieut. H.B.Lumsden to Major G.Lawrence, 10 June 1847, I.S.C. 31 July 1847, No.125.
 2. Ibid., Para.48.

would be fixed at one sum permanently.¹ His marching through Yusafzai with troops and the threat in his proclamation in which the Maliks were warned to come from their hide-outs and settle for the land revenue, had the desired result. He seemed to have succeeded in convincing the Maliks that now the strength of both the Sikh army and the British would be used against them to make them pay their dues. This was, however, merely the fringe of the problem. The direct administration envisaged by Hardinge could not end there.

The system of collection followed by the Khans from the zamindars and the defective territorial units for fixing the assessment called tappas were the problems that soon attracted his attention. He found that the Government demand was merely an item in the collection made by the Khans. Much more was collected by them and their satellites than was paid to the Lahore Government. This defect needed to be remedied.² Another important defect was that the assessment was by tappas "without reference to the capabilities of the several districts". This was most injurious because it tended to the desertion of the poorer ones and a corresponding influx of population to the richer and more lightly assessed districts. Actually the

1. Sir George Lawrence, Reminiscence of Forty-three Years in India, p.237.

2. George Lawrence to Henry Lawrence, 30 October 1847. Para.7. I.S.C. 31 December 1847, No.120.

assessment at the moment was most arbitrary and might be lighter on the richer than on the poorer tappas.¹

How was the situation to be met? George's plan was to send for the Khans, and on their arrival to assemble all at his home with Gulab Singh and arrange something for them, the people and the state "which will lessen, if not put an end to oppression and intestine feuds".² George planned to fix the salaries of the Khans, to be paid from the Peshawar treasury. With the salaries of the Khans thus fixed, he meant to be very strict in prohibiting them from collecting anything over and above the land revenue proper.

The task was by no means easy. The initial difficulty lay in determining the amount that had previously gone to the Maliks on the basis of which their salaries might be fixed. For this a knowledge of their share in the collections was necessary. But little was known about their share in past collections: even the figures of the total collections made from the cultivators were not forthcoming. The Khans would not furnish true statements and the zamindars were too much in dread of them to openly come forward, fearing that immediately the troops were withdrawn, they would be at the mercy of the Khans.³ The

-
1. G.Lawrence to H.Lawrence, 30 October 1847, Para.10. I.S.C. 31 December 1847, No.120.
 2. G.Lawrence to H.Lawrence, 18 June 1846. Para.15. I.S.C. 31 July 1847, No.124.
 3. G.Lawrence to John Lawrence, 1 October 1847. Para.6. I.S.C. 30 October 1847, No.132.

difficulty of apportioning between the Khans and the cultivators could not be solved by resorting to Darbar records either, because they only showed what was received by the Government and not what was collected and the proportion kept by the Khans.¹

The other problem of making the land revenue on different tappas equitable was comparatively easy of solution. George called a meeting of the Khans and asked them to divide the aggregate sum "according to the relative productiveness". This done he called a "Jeerga" and made the Maliks distribute the total sum fixed for the tappa over the villages contained in it and then directed the Maliks of each village to subdivide this over their houses, wells and ploughs.

The details of the assessment were looked after by H.B.Lumsden in Yusafzai and Lokhore. In Lokhore, Lumsden found his work very difficult. In fact the very first task of collecting the old arrears seemed unsurmountable. It had not paid revenue for three years. The place was poor and inhabited by a lawless set of people who were exceedingly impatient of control. Geographically it was so situated that the plan followed in Yusafzai of marching troops through the district could not succeed in Lokhore.

1. G.Lawrence to John Lawrence, 1 October 1847. Para.8.
I.S.C. 30 October 1847, No.132.

Almost a brigade, felt Lumsden, would be required to keep them in order. George solved the dilemma by remitting the three years' arrears which were due. For the future he fixed "a very light assessment". At the same time, he threatened that if they did not pay the amount regularly in future, a higher assessment would be demanded, and to collect it troops would be sent.¹

It must be noted that all this was done with the approval of John Lawrence who as acting resident had sent detailed instructions to his brother on the way revenue settlement was to be effected in Peshawar.² As actually effected, it did not meet with the approval of Henry. During his short stay at Lahore in November 1847, he opposed the wholesale writing off of the arrears after a costly military operation and the big reduction for the future. Henry's objection was that " ... the Durbar will not be satisfied to receive no fruits from the late military operations."³

The fact seems to be that while arguing in this manner, Henry was raising the very fundamental of how a Summary Settlement should, in fact, have been effected. He wanted the Darbar to be the agency through which the

-
1. G.Lawrence to H.Lawrence, 30 October 1847. Para.19. I.S.C. 31 December 1847, No.120.
 2. John Lawrence to G.Lawrence, 10 September 1847. I.S.C. 30 October 1847, No.108.
 3. H.Lawrence to Secretary, 13 November 1847. Para.7. I.S.C. 31 December 1847, No.17.

Settlement work should have been done. At any rate its co-operation should have been there. Henry seems to have been genuinely concerned about the reactions of the Darbar to the steps taken by the British resident at Lahore and his assistants on the frontier districts. John Lawrence and the assistants on the other hand did not seem to trouble themselves over the Darbar's reactions.

In Henry's attitude something more fundamental was involved. He was against innovations that were not absolutely necessary and wanted to maintain the prestige of the Darbar which alone could help the state to exist on its own once the British supervision was withdrawn. He was not prepared to go beyond some reforms of recent abuses.

"I am anxious to make no innovation that is not absolutely necessary, and of which reasonable natives themselves cannot see the propriety":¹

this summarized his attitude. He thought of nothing more radical than the simplification of accounts and the investigations of the affairs of those chiefs against whom there were big arrears and with whom his "endeavours have been fruitless to induce the Durbar to effect a settlement".² He, in fact was opposed to the assessment of the land revenue without the co-operation of the Darbar and its officials. He wanted the British assistants to supervise

1. Henry Lawrence to Secretary, 3 July 1847, Para.16.
I.S.C. 31 July 1847, No.129.
2. Ibid., Para.19.

and get things done through the old functionaries. In holding this opinion, Henry was all alone.

John and the British assistant in the Panjab, on the other hand, were for active interference. John in particular was primarily concerned with economic reforms and revenue settlements on the British model, or rather on the Jalandhar pattern effected the previous year. He ignored the fact that in Lahore the situation was complicated by the presence of the Darbar and the Kardars through whom nominally at least the administration was to be carried on even after the Treaty of Bhairawal. He ignored the complications that could arise if in assessing the land revenue through the British assistants, care was not taken to make some use of the old machinery. Perhaps his desire to introduce his panacea for all evils - fixed money assessment - made him ignore the possibility of any unfavourable reactions among the chiefs, the old Darbar functionaries or even the cultivators and proprietors for all of whom this was to be an innovation.

There is another aspect of the settlement effected in the frontier districts under John Lawrence's direction which merits attention. The fixing of the collections from the cultivator on an equitable basis implied the limitation of the power and privileges of the chiefs. The intention was to save the cultivator from the exactions of the Khans

and Maliks. This might have been to the liking of the members of the Darbar in so far as it did not affect most of them personally but the tendency to depress the authority of the chiefs and the upper classes was assuredly there. It was bound to be noted by chiefs of the Lahore state when the same land revenue settlement was introduced in the rest of the Panjab also.

It is this which in fact explains Henry's caution while consenting to the introduction of the Summary Settlement in the rest of the Panjab. One wonders if he would have ever agreed to it, if he was not at the same time preparing to go to England after having arranged for John to act for him at Lahore. This becomes clear when we examine in detail the manner in which the decision to effect the Summary Settlement in the rest of the Panjab was taken by the two Lawrences.

III.

The initiative to extend the Summary Settlement in the doabs between the Indus and the Beas came from John Lawrence. He was no admirer of the old revenue system. As early as 1846 when he had first acted for his brother, he had prepared his "Statistical Notes on the Panjab" from "as complete a Statistical Return as it is possible to

collate from the records which I have had at my disposal during my residence at Lahore".¹ In these notes, he had criticised the old revenue system somewhat harshly:

"The system of management, however, is perhaps the very worst of all those which prevail in Hindustan, the revenue being all 'Amanee' (with the exception of Mooltan, for which the Nazim pays a fixed rent) that is to say the assessment of no village is fixed but varies from year to year. Hence Government have no check on the manager. In a few words he pays as little and collects as much as he can. He is supposed every season to make up his accounts and remit to Government whatever he has collected after deducting certain recognised expences. If however he be a man of ability under a weak Govt. in times of confusion, or if he have friends at court, he will often render no account for a course of years, but just pay in what he pleases."²

About the fiscal divisions or collectorates called 'dewanees' his remarks were equally unfavourable:

"Their size, the amount of revenue and the locality of the tracts of land of which they are formed, have no reference whatever to those principles which ordinarily influence a Govt. in dividing a country. These points are however deemed of little importance: every other consideration yields to the interests and influence of the particular Diwan who governs them."

He felt that Dewans gained by these arbitrary divisions at the expense of both the people and the Government:

"The profits of the Diwan, and of course the loss to Govt. and the people are in direct proportion to the extent of the charge."³

-
1. Statistical Notes, 10 November 1846. Para.4. H.L.Papers.
 2. Ibid., Para.11.
 3. Ibid., Para.9.

These being his views on the old revenue system, one should not be surprised that when he began to act as the resident, he pointed out two more glaring defects in that system which needed immediate reform. One was the amount of produce taken as land revenue. Basing himself on his experience of the Trans-Sutlej area, he suggested that the demand under the Sikh rule was half of the gross produce.¹ On top of this there were other exactions, He believed that unless the latter were removed and the former reduced agriculture would not pay.

"It is improbable that agriculture can flourish under such demands and that the occupiers of land can be other than poverty stricken. There can never be contentment and prosperity in the country until the Government demand is reduced and equalized, and the agriculturist secured from all demands but those of the State, fixed on principles of moderation and equity."²

The second great defect in his eyes was the collection of land revenue in kind. Even where the farmer or the kardar paid in cash to the Lahore Government, he himself collected from the cultivator in kind and mostly in excess of the amount stipulated by that Government. The Kardars in particular were big culprits because they would not render any accounts of their collection with the result that this "depends in the amount on the power and pleasure of the individuals." The Government and the people both

1. John Lawrence to Secretary, 28 August 1847. Para.8.
I.S.C. 30 October 1847. No.81.
2. Ibid.

suffered as a consequence.

It seemed to John that Henry's solution, of appointing Adaltis in every district to whom the people might take their complaints for redress, would not work. There were no accounts on which the Adalti could base himself and give judgement, with the result that

"when many villages complain of oppression and extortion under such a system what has the Adawltee or officer to guide him in the adjustment of the case. He has literally nothing; he is completely in the dark and must, therefore, confine his interference to urging the kardar to give redress utterly¹ unacquainted with the real merits of the case".

He, therefore, pointed out the necessity of changing the land revenue system with a view to securing the agriculturist from all demands but that of land revenue proper which too must in its turn be reduced so as to fix it "on the principle of moderation and equity". In other words, he was suggesting a regular Summary Settlement.

Hardinge had earlier assured Henry Lawrence that the system of direct administration by the British assistants would be confined only to the frontier districts and not be extended to the rest of the Panjab. John's suggestion was likely to lead to such a direct administration and so he reacted by asking for a detailed report about

1. John Lawrence to Secretary, 25 September 1847. Para.13.
I.S.C. 30 October 1847. No.95

"the measures which seem to you best adapted for the introduction of some improved revenue system into the Punjab provided that any measure proposed be in accordance with the genl views of the Resident in which case H.L. [His Lordship] would have the advantage of conferring with Lt.Col.Lawrence and of making no change during his absence until the question at issue shall have been fully discussed in concert with him".¹

This led John to submit the detailed scheme first to Henry. He sent his proposed draft of the plan to his brother and this led to an exchange of letters which reveals the fundamental difference between the two Lawrences both on the necessity of introducing the British pattern of collecting land revenue in the Panjab and also on the proper relations with the Darbar and other functionaries of Dalip's Government. In essence the issue was between carrying the Darbar along or not. The other considerations followed from it. The two Lawrences were divided on the treatment to be meted out to powerful chiefs if they had big arrears of land revenue standing against them because they had influence with the Darbar. Whether it was proper to retain the prestige of the functionaries under the Lahore Government with the people was another allied issue. John's plan was contrary to Henry's views on these questions. It seems that under ordinary circumstances, Henry would not have agreed to the settlement and the other reforms that John was proposing to make it a success. But he was

1. Secretary to Acting Resident, 3 September 1847. Para.7. I.S.C. 30 October 1847. No.32.
Note: Henry Lawrence was then at Simla. So also the Governor-General.

anxious to leave for England after seeing John as the acting resident at Lahore. And so Henry contented himself by modifying the plan slightly.

While proposing the land revenue settlement John suggested the complete overhaul of the economic administration of the Darbar. He proposed setting up three departments - customs, land revenue and treasure. All these were at the moment in the hands of one individual, the powerful Dewan Dina Nath, but John wanted to put each one of them under a different head. He wanted the resident to have complete control over the treasury. Megh Raj, whom he proposed to put in charge of it, was to be asked to keep a daily account of receipts and disbursements to be countersigned periodically by the resident. In the other two departments, according to John's draft, the resident's control was also to be tightened up.

The land revenue department was the only one that was to be under Dina Nath but to check the rapacity of the Kardars two changes were to be soon made: the amount demandable from each village was to be defined, and, secondly, punctual returns were to be insisted on. The Kardars were to account for the collections every week, and a kardar was to be suspended on the first neglect of this duty. The assessment of the land revenue on each village was to be determined through the agency of the British assistants, according to John's directions. He

evidently saw the necessity of reform in the entire system by bringing "European energy and honesty in direct contact with the finances of the state". He envisaged "More direct interference may even at times be required; certainly nothing short of it will, I believe, prove effectual". John wanted to be very severe in collecting the old arrears from powerful chiefs, including the members of the Darbar. They were to be arrested, suspended from their posts and their jagirs confiscated.¹

Henry's first impulse on seeing the draft proposed to be sent by John was to write adversely against the plan to the Government.² On second thoughts, however, he wrote privately to his brother and gave his views on the draft. He objected to the proposed report on grounds both personal and public. Henry complained that the report was so drafted as to give the impression that he himself had given no thought to the problem of land revenue and its collection, when he was resident at Lahore. He also regarded the reforms as so sweeping that Government would not sanction them. He was sure that they would make an enemy of Dina Nath, the cleverest member of the Darbar. The others would not take kindly to them either. He pointed out that the choice was between retaining the members of

-
1. John Lawrence on duty at Lahore to S. Government, 10 September 1847. Rough draft in Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. See Appendix I, Henry Lawrence to John Lawrence, 16 September [1847], first sentence. Henry Lawrence Papers.

the Darbar or getting rid of them altogether. The half way step of retaining them and yet doing something completely opposed to what they thought on the subject was not politic. Henry particularly objected to the eighth paragraph where John had suggested arrests and confiscations of jagirs of some of the powerful Sardars in collecting old arrears of land revenue from them. This was unwise from the point of view of the future career of John also. It might give an unfavourable impression to the Court of Directors:

"I think that your para 8 might be laid hold of at the India House much to your disadvantage".¹

Otherwise also, there was danger in the British taking the land revenue too quickly in their hands. The note of caution inherent in his approach is reflected when he wrote:

"I think it by no means improbable that we shall have to take the Revenue in our hands but it should not be done summarily or offence will certainly arise."²

Henry, however, was hardly in a mood to be assertive about his views. He wanted John to act for him for the entire period of his leave in England. He was anxious that Currie should not be given the appointment. He therefore concluded his letter with the remark:

"Do however as you think best, but on your as well as my account, I first give you my opinion."³

1. For para.8, see appendix no.3.

2. Henry Lawrence to John Lawrence, 16 September [1847]. Copy in Henry Lawrence Papers. See appendix I.

3. Ibid., last sentence.

At the same time he sent back the rough draft originally prepared by John.

John on receiving the letter wrote back that he never intended undervaluing the labours of his brother at Lahore. He pointed out that it was with a view to depicting the state of finances in existence and the mode of managing the revenue in future that he had drafted the report in the tone that he had adopted. His opinion was that if this state of affairs continued a little longer, it was bound to lead to bankruptcy. He suggested that the best line of action would be to bring the affairs of the state on to a sound footing and then to hand over the reformed administrative machinery to the Darbar to be run by them. He felt the work was difficult and even hinted at not undertaking it, but as far as he was concerned felt that this was the only solution. As for active interference by the assistants while settling the revenue it was essential. The absolute necessity of not allowing the kardars to fall in arrears being granted, this alone would make direct management by the resident necessary because unless he received periodical accounts of the collections he could not ascertain how affairs stood. He made light of Henry's objection that Dina Nath would become an enemy by pointing out that the aim of the diwan was to become a Raja and this would keep him on the side of the British. John actually felt that provided Dina Nath was sure of the

friendship of the English, he might even prefer the odium of collecting the balances to be diverted from himself.¹

Henry's letter, however, was not without an effect. John too had no reason to fall out with his brother at this stage. Henry was ill and about to leave for England. The elder brother had also supported John in the line that the younger had taken in the Jalandhar doab while effecting the Summary Settlement then. John had actually won high approbation from the Governor-General for that work. Even lately Henry in a way had tried to advance John's career by securing his appointment at Lahore for the period he himself was to stay in England. John therefore did not make an issue of the policies he had advocated in the draft and so changed it to meet Henry's objections.

The amended letter to be sent to the Government had one new paragraph. This made out that Henry was already collecting facts and figures with a view to introducing the revenue settlement. That Henry's plan would have been that of working through the Darbar was not referred to. In fact the paragraph was so written as to give the impression that John's own directions to the Principal assistant at Peshawar were the simple form of what Henry had been intending for the entire Panjab. As redrafted, other paragraphs gave the impression that the Darbar would now

1. John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence, 21 [September 1847]. Henry Lawrence Papers. See appendix II.

be helping in the settlement work. Two important members of the Darbar, Dina Nath and Lehna Singh Majithia were to be entrusted with the work of settlement in the Central Panjab. The most important change, however, was to drop paragraph eight of the earlier draft wherein John had suggested that to collect arrears, defaulters be arrested, suspended and deprived of their Jagirs.

Henry passed on this new draft to the Government. It seems that he felt that he had won two important concessions from John. One was that John would associate the Darbar with settlement work. This was natural because John had now suggested the association of two members of the Darbar in that work. The second was that John would not be harsh to the old chiefs in collecting arrears from them. John's deletion of the eighth paragraph of the original draft implied that. The amended draft, in short, took note of the political situation of the state in the context of which this settlement work was to be carried on.

Henry, one notices, was fully conscious of the dangers inherent in introducing this new revenue settlement in a state which was not a full fledged British possession. Here was a kingdom of a Sikh prince where old Nazims and Kardars continued to be stationed in their old provinces and districts. It was natural for them, with their bias and inclinations towards the old system, to offer resistance, perhaps passive, but resistance all the same. Their personal

interests were also linked with the old way of managing the land revenues of the state. Henry's success in persuading John to gain the co-operation of the Darbar and Dina Nath and not to be harsh towards the influential chiefs, therefore, was wise.

In fact, Henry Lawrence was agreeing to the new scheme most reluctantly. His forwarding note on John's report makes this clear:

"I regret to perceive by Mr. John Lawrence's letter no 140 & herewith enclosed that Dewan Dina Nath has done so little towards effecting the Revenue Settlement that he has now for six months promised me. By his negligence or perverseness as it may be, he has justified the steps proposed by Mr. Lawrence; which I should otherwise have been averse to take. I therefore recommend that we be permitted"

Even while thus recommending the joint draft, he did not fail to mention that the work was to be carried on "in concert with the Darbar officers".¹

Thus Henry was conscious of the dangers of introducing the revolutionary change in revenue management and collection through British assistants with the Darbar and the old administrative machinery standing intact. He was attempting to ensure that John's plan, if adopted, would be mild and would be carried through with the Darbar's approval. Kardars were certainly to be prevented from continuing their malpractices but this Henry wanted to be

1. Henry Lawrence to Secretary, Para.1.

done through the Darbar even though under the terms of the Treaty of Bhairawal, the resident happened to be not only the president but the virtual dictator. It was politic to do so. The Summary Settlement itself he wished to be carried on in collaboration with Darbar officers.

It was one thing, however, to have the draft amended and quite another to make John change his views and act accordingly. In actual practice, he and the British assistants functioned more in the spirit of his original plan. They tended to brush aside old officials harshly, and threaten imprisonment to the chiefs and sardars for not paying arrears or for not rendering accounts.

That all this was opposed to Henry's views would be clear from the directions that he gave to Bowring¹ and Nicholson² during the month and a half that he was at Lahore before his departure for England. His directions though supposed to be supplementary to those John had been issuing to assistants engaged on similar work differed in particularly emphasising that the prestige of the Darbar officials was to be maintained.

"In all complaints, civil or criminal, which may be made to you, the parties should be referred to the Adawltees and kardars in the first instance; and where the complainants are dissatisfied with the decisions of these officers,

1. Henry Lawrence to L.Bowring, 8 November 1847. I.S.C. 27 November 1847, No.46.

2. Henry Lawrence to J.Nicholson, 8 November 1847. Ibid.

you can take up the case in the spirit and on the principles which you are aware have guided me in my decisions at Lahore. The object is to support the authority and influence of the Lahore officials as far as is consistent with justice and humanity."¹

John on the other hand was soon advocating his original line of action which consisted of active British interference,

"As I daily become better acquainted with the details of the existing system, I see more clearly the utter improvidence and dishonesty with which the Darbar formerly carried on the Government and the absolute necessity of our entire interference if we hope to see affairs on a satisfactory footing."²

And since it was under the direction of John that the Summary Settlement was effected, one can imagine how his "entire interference" influenced the day to day functioning of the subordinates.

John even forgot that he had, in the amended draft as it was sent to Government, himself deleted the paragraph in which he had suggested harshness in collecting the arrears from some of the powerful chiefs in the state. Within a couple of months, he was reporting:

"The accounts of large farmers and great officers of state which have been so long under scrutiny, have been finally disposed off, with the exception of Runjore Singh's. Dewan Moolraj is in confinement and his balances placed in

-
1. Henry Lawrence to L.Bowring, 8 November 1847. Para.6 I.S.C. 27 November 1847. No.46.
 2. John Lawrence to Sec.Govt. 12 January 1847. Para.7. I.S.C. 25 February 1848. No.56.

train of liquidation. Misr Umeer Chund had paid up a considerable sum, and will within the next two months, make good the balance. Sirdar Lehna has rendered his accounts, and obtained an acquittance. Buxee Bhuggat Ram, the late Paymaster of the troops, has now given in those of his departments, involving the details of an expenditure of nine million [?] of money. Sheikh Imamooddeen has made good all the arrears due for the Jullundhur with the exception of some 70,000 rupees which I have allowed to be suspended, pending enquiries regarding certain defaulters in the Trans-Sutlej Territory, and either they or he, will eventually make good the amount."¹

That this must have affected the influential and politically powerful in the land would be clear from what John himself wrote as to the result of his scrutiny into the accounts and the recovery of the balances.

"With the exception of Sirdar Lena Singh no individual has doubtless rendered an honest account of his stewardship: this however is immaterial. Two great objects are gained, the lesser one, that considerable sums have been recovered; the greater that a system of responsibility has been introduced. For the future the most influential will feel satisfied that they can no longer hope to embezzle the public revenue with impunity."²

What had, perhaps, happened was that John had ceased to have any interest in the political aspect of the situation after it became clear to him that Fredrick Currie was coming as the resident to replace his brother and that he himself was to stay only for the revenue arrangements begun by him in August 1847. In this, he carried the young

1. John to Secretary, 12 January 1848. Para.11. I.S.C.
25 February 1848. No.56.
2. Ibid., Para.12.

British assistants attached to the residency with him. He was Henry's brother and at the moment the differences between the brothers, though real, had not come out in the open. One can imagine, therefore, their ready transferring all their loyalty and devotion for Henry to John. They regarded Currie as an usurper and shared John's anger against the newcomer.

The Summary Settlement of the Panjab therefore was completely under the direction of the British assistants. The caution of Henry was ignored and both the Darbar and the native functionaries under it were not allowed to participate in it. In a way this was natural. John's planning to bring the administration completely under the supervision of the British assistants and effecting the Summary Settlement was likely to have an appeal of its own for the assistants. It gave them power which their counterparts possessed in the Trans-Satlej districts and which most of them very naturally wanted to possess.

The Summary Settlement ceased to be John's affair on 31 March 1848. He looked upon the work effected under his direction as one which would be extremely beneficial to the Sikh state and its people. Besides the reduction of ten per cent, the benefit of which would go completely to the peasant, there would be very many indirect advantages. The

peasants would be freed from "the inquisitorial eye of the tax gatherer." The Government would receive what the people paid and "a large portion of the revenue can, no longer, be made away with, by fraudulent returns". His own evaluation of the change he was instrumental in effecting was as follows:

"Formerly was seen the extra-ordinary anomaly of the villages in farm to individuals of the Darbar, to the judges of the court, to soldiers, and civilians of every grade. Those who should have checked, and controlled the tax-gatherer, by their power and influence, set him at defiance, and rendered any account, or no accounts, as they thought proper. Now the heads of the villages engage for the revenue of their respective villages."

He believed that once the system was set going it would be easy to administer. There would then be no delays nor "can frauds pass undetected." His one regret at the moment was that he had not been allowed to extend the new system to Multan.¹

Fredrick Currie, who succeeded Henry as resident, had different views on the state of affairs resulting from what John had done with the land revenues of the Lahore state. He pointed out that the Summary Settlement had changed the whole system of revenue administration. The state demand was now completely in money. It was a fixed annual demand and was not linked with the amount of produce

1. John to Sec. 31 March 1848. Inclosure in No.25. Parliamentary Papers (East India Punjab). Papers relating to the Punjab, 1847-49. Accounts and Papers 1849, Vol.XLI, p.116.

as was the earlier system.¹ Here was an important undertaking, pointed out Currie, which affected all classes of agricultural interest, finished in the short span of six months through the instrumentality of officers who had no revenue experience. Under the circumstances, he believed it was "bound to be bristling with inaccuracies."²

But inaccuracies apart, Currie found the Darbar opposed to its working and felt anxious. Its working, therefore, had to be watched most carefully. He pointed out that Dina Nath had shifted the responsibility of the economic embarrassment of the state on to the British and even though Dina Nath himself had promised to support its working, he did not feel responsible for its success or failure.³ Currie's feelings were that this settlement should not have been undertaken.⁴

Currie may well be taken to be expressing Henry's feelings when he wrote,

"I could wish that our interference with these details had been less but it is impossible now to recede. We must do what we can to carry the Darbar and the officials with us, to instruct them in carrying on the duty, to watch that they do it fairly, and gradually to withdraw from the mere details and confine ourselves to more general superintendence."⁵

-
1. Currie to Secretary, 6 April 1848. Para.9. I.S.C. 29 July 1848. No.38.
 2. Ibid. Para.10.
 3. Ibid. Para.13.
 4. Ibid. Para.14.
 5. Ibid.

It reads like a desperate effort at reversing the process begun and completed by John during his stay at Lahore.

It is clear from the foregoing account that between the two Lawrences, there was a fundamental difference of approach in the way the Summary Settlement should have been effected in the frontier districts. They differed also in the reform that John Lawrence sought to introduce in the economic administration of the Darbar and the introduction of the Summary Settlement in the Lahore state. Henry's approach was that of caution and he sought to have the willing consent of the Darbar and the administration machinery under it in carrying these measures through. He actually understood the role of the resident and the assistants under him to be that of supervision. John on the other hand, felt that in the very nature of things the Darbar and its functionaries would never be co-operative because these ameliorations to better the lot of the peasantry and reform the economic administration were directed against the very people whose co-operation Henry sought to have. John had ~~in~~ his way in actual practice, by an accident of history which sometimes considerably influences its later course. If Henry Lawrence had not fallen ill and desperately wanted to go to England, he would have perhaps never agreed to the introduction of the

Summary Settlement and the reform of the economic administration of the Darbar introduced by John Lawrence. He would then have continued to pursue his policy of running the state through the Darbar and the chiefs that they represented. Or, if Currie had succeeded Henry Lawrence without the six months of John Lawrence's administration of the Lahore state intervening, perhaps the Darbar and the chiefs would not have been alienated. Currie would have followed Henry Lawrence's line because he believed in it. The paradox is that it was to prevent Currie from coming to Lahore, that Henry had agreed to John's reforms of the economic administration of the Darbar and the introduction of the Summary Settlement in the Lahore state.

Hardinge had not given any deep thought to the line that John had proposed. Because Henry recommended it he actually felt enthusiastic about it. After receiving John Lawrence's report on the land revenue and the reform of the economic administration of the Darbar, he wrote to Hobhouse,

"The Panjab correspondence is very satisfactory, as you will observe by the officiating resident's letter, relating to land Revenue, which is a very able paper. He is now doing what no man in India understands better, fixing the assessments on land & letting each Ryot know what he has to pay for the future."¹

1. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 20 September 1847. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add.MSS. 36,475, p.420.

He even went to the extent of expressing the view that
"this is the real and great reform on which all the others
depend."¹

1. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 4 December 1847. Broughton Papers.
Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,475, p.483.

Appendix I

16th Sept. [1847]

My dear John,

On receipt of your letter no 140 to Elliot with enclosure yesterday evening I at once wrote the enclosed but on consideration think it better to send it to you with your letters for reconsideration. You write as if I had never contemplated a settlement and as if you were bent on thorough reformation. The records will show that for the last four or five months I have been [arranging] it. I doubt moreover whether your sweeping measures will be approved and I don't think that they ought. Deena Nath consented to me to a Settlement but I cannot conceive that he would wish to surrender the settlement entirely to us. Even, if he thought it prudent to surrender the power, I think he would only be more determinately our enemy. We must either retain him as in contentment or get rid of him altogether. I see no middle course for any of the Chiefs & him above all others.

Prove Ameer Chund Bhuggut Ram etc are defaulters & then place them under arrest; They, especially the first, deny the fact: it is quite time the fact one way or other should be established. Before your arrival I had placed a Puhra [Pahra i.e. guard] over Runjhor Singh & attached his Jagheer, but you will agree with me on reflection that severe measures or recommendations will probably be better received from me who have seen the working of the last six months that [sic] from you lately entered in office. I think that your Para 8 might be laid hold of at the India House much to your disadvantage. I think it by no means improbable that we shall have to take the Rev. in our hands but it should not be done so summarily or offence will certainly arise. I thought I had told you, and Sahib Dayal in your presence, that I had intended to give him sole charge of the customs. This point would also be probably better received at home from me than you, certainly so coming from both of us than from one.

I agree as to the Treasury signature; that is let the orders come to us in the same way I had ordered all parwanahs from the Durbar to come for inspection and if you like then sign the money ones on the back as seen.

I would suggest to you to send up your letter to George suggesting some such scheme as the Peshawar one for all the Trans Jelum country as being distant and most bullied. I say that the Resident & Cocks can watch the

settlement East of that River & take such measures as are necessary to ensure the completion of the work during the next cold weather. Do however as you think best, but on your as well as my account I first give you my opinion.

Yrs very affy

Henry

Appendix II

21st [September 1847]

My dear Hal - I received yours of the 16th Sept containing yr. remarks on my letter no 41 [sic]. I think you write as if I had meant to undervalue your labors which was from I thoughts [sic]. My report on the Customs will have shown you this. I should be sorry to undervalue ~~any~~ man's labors, let alone that of my Brother. Looking at the finances & the mode of managing the revenues they appeared to me to be execrably bad & thinking so, I wrote not with reference to yr labors, but the state of affairs. I think myself that unless matters are altered for the better, that a bankruptcy must ensue. I think that if things were once in good order that the Durbar might keep them so & that we might then relax our interference, but to put them in order much interference will be necessary. You might & probably would come to the same result by different means, that [sic] I would but I do not see my way to put matters straight in any other mode than the one I suggest, indeed as I foresee failure I would rather not undertake it. I do not think that Dewan Dena Nath will break with us, he is determined to be a Raja or something of the kind & thinks he must be on our side. I have been constantly watching him ever since you left & I don't find him the least less friendly. He is perenially in good humour and offers no objections to what I urge but he can't or won't do a thing of importance unless we are friends & by insisting [sic] take the odium of [sic] his hands. To call for accounts and balances seems easy but is difficult in practice. The thing is not to let them be in arrears. Unless we get copies of the collection papers periodically, can't ascertain how affairs stand.

I have altered the letter and cut out para 8. You say prove that Misr Umeer Chund owes money etc. This has now been proved, he owes 2,85,000 & Tej Singh himself put him under arrest yesterday of his own accord & this morning urged me not to be soft towards him. Buxee Bhuggat Ram has never given in an account for 10 years. I thort [sic] & wrote so much about the accounts because there is nothing else to write about and little else to do. You did speak to me about Sahib Dayal getting the customs, but not as if your mind was made up, & so I thought it better not to say so.

I send you yr draft, do you write what you like modifying my views as much as you please. As regards the money, I think that unless we look to every item, we can never hope to curtail expenditure & even then with great difficulty. The extravagant ~~expend~~ expenditure which is put down to the poor little Maharaja is frightful

Yours affly
John Lawrence.

Appendix III

Important alterations in the draft

1. A new paragraph as no.2 was added

"2. Colonel Lawrence was for some months busily employed in obtaining returns, with the view to a settlement, with much fuller details than I propose, and many of them had already been received, previous to his departure. I merely suggest for Peshawar a simpler, not a better, statement, in order that we may be certain to get them at an early date."
2. In paragraph 7 (No.6 in the old draft) where John Lawrence had suggested the names of different officials who were to carry on the assessment, place was found for Dewan Dina Nath and Lehna Singh Majithia, two members of the Darbar, in participating in the revenue settlement.
3. The paragraph (No.8) dropped from John's report sent to the Government

"As regards the past, I would insist that such men as Misr Umeer Chand, Bakshee Bhuggat Ram, Sheikh Imamoo-deen for the Jullunder, and Sirdar Runjore Singh, should settle their accounts. Large sums are due by all these parties to the State, and those who did not at once comply with my requisition, should be placed in arrest, be suspended from every employment and their jageers attached. Dewan Moolraj at Pind Dadun Khan has been pursuing the same plan with the collection of past harvest that these parties have formerly pursued, he has rendered no account and paid little or nothing. I have requested his recall at once, and shall recommend his being placed under arrest on his arrival. I think, if the course I recommend was pursued with regard to other parties, they would speedily render their accounts and pay their balances, and that there would be little encouragement for the others to fall into arrears."

Chapter VI

The Second Sikh War and the End of the Buffer State, 1848-49.

§ 1. Within three and a half months of Hardinge's departure from India, his Panjab policy was put to the test and failed. It was found that there was no likelihood of the emergence of a strong Government which could stand on its own. On the other hand, the army and the Chiefs - politically the most dominant factors in the State - would remain neither friendly to the British nor hostile to the Afghans. The two presuppositions behind the policy of a Sikh buffer state between the British boundary and the Afghans were found to have no basis in reality.

On 3 April 1848, John Lawrence left Lahore. Frederick Currie who had taken charge of the residency a month earlier now worked on his own. He was faced with one crisis after another. Within twenty days, the revolt of Mulraj, ^{the} Nazim of Multan, began. In the middle of May, the Rani and her agents were found to be temporising with the loyalty of the Sepoys of the British contingent at Lahore. In August, Chatter Singh, whose daughter was betrothed to the young Maharaja and whose sons enjoyed prominent positions in the state, fell out with Abbott at Hazara and by the last week of August was actually in arms against the British. Three weeks later Sher Singh, son of Chatter Singh and a

prominent member of the Darbar, then co-operating with the British in the siege of Multan, joined Mulraj and called upon the Sikhs to rise against the British. By the beginning of the year 1849, the revolt against the British was wide-spread and involved the prominent chiefs.¹ On the invitation of one of the most important of them, even Dost Muhammed Khan marched into the state. His troops, henceforth, fought side by side with the Sikh Sardars against the British.

The anti-British character of these revolts was the unmistakable feature of the Second Sikh War. That they should have later taken the form of "national war" was indicative of the unpopularity of the British not only among the army but also the Chiefs. The explanation why the Chiefs felt discontented most probably lay in the egalitarian administration of John Lawrence in the Jalandhar doab and the way he treated Lahore Chiefs and the Darbar during the six months of 1847/48 when he acted as the resident at Lahore. We note that the Second Sikh War was nearly the opposite of the First in 1845-46. In the first Sikh War the Chiefs, by and large, led the Lahore armies more to get rid of it than to harm the British. In the

1. For a list of all those Chiefs who were up in arms against the British, see Signature to a letter from Sher Singh to Currie, 24 November 1848, I.S.C. 30 December 1848, No.156; Currie to Secretary, 25 December 1848, I.S.C. 27 January 1849, No.109; Currie to Secretary, 15 January 1849, I.S.C. 27 January 1849, No.127.

Second Sikh War, most of them seem to have striven to free the state of the British control over it. They called upon both the demobilised as well as the standing part of the Lahore army to fight the British. At its height, the Second Sikh War was positively in the nature of an upsurge, perhaps not national in the modern sense of the term, but in which most of the Chiefs and the army united in fighting against the British.

The end of this upsurge which began as a local revolt but which increased in dimensions with the passage of time, saw the British annexing the Panjab. The boundary of the British Empire in India at last reached the natural geographical limits of the country. The responsibility of defending the Afghan frontier was now undertaken by the British.

The decision to annex the Panjab was that of the new Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, and the home authorities merely confirmed it. Hardinge's Panjab arrangements had followed the same pattern. There was, however, an important difference. Hardinge had not known the views of the home authorities until he had made his arrangements. Dalhousie, on the other hand, suggested the desirability of annexing the Panjab for the consideration of the home authorities seven and a half months before the actual annexation and received instructions which were not quite encouraging on the subject. Once, however, he had made up his mind to

annex the State, he never changed his opinion. Indeed, he continued to insist upon its necessity. He felt the desirability of annexing the State so keenly that he acted against the wishes of the home authorities in doing so on his own initiative. The ministry of Lord John Russell would itself have liked to discuss the subject in all its bearings before authorising it.¹

Dalhousie was a member of Peel's ministry that had originally sanctioned Hardinge's Panjab arrangements after the First Sikh War. Ripon, the President of the Board of Control in that ministry, had at one stage advised against the idea of marching into the Panjab and making it British. That ministry was most probably in agreement with its President of the Board of Control, in believing that two weak states, jealous of each other and lying between the Afghans and the Satlej frontier, could be made to defend the Afghan frontier. What, then, were the chief considerations that moved Dalhousie to annex the Panjab on his own when Russell's Cabinet under whom he served as the Governor-General wanted to consider the subject in all its bearings before doing so? Why and at what stage of what is called the Second Sikh War was he converted to the idea

1. Secret Committee to the Governor-General in Council, 24 November 1848, Paras. 7 to 9, Boards Drafts of Secret Letters to India, Vol.19, 1349; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 November 1848, Broughton Papers, Home Misc. 859, pp.77-78; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 December 1848, Ibid., p.89; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 4 April 1848, Ibid., pp.143-44.

See 'note' at the end of the chapter.

of annexing the buffer state? A proper answer to that question would necessitate our tracing in brief the course of the Second Sikh War.

§ 2. One of the very first acts of Currie on taking over the Lahore residency was to find a successor to Mulraj as the Nazim of Multan. Dewan Mulraj who had succeeded to that post on the death of his father in 1844 was not a popular figure with the Lahore Darbar. He came to Lahore in December 1847 and expressed his wish to resign. John was then acting as the resident. By this time the decision of Currie's appointment was imminent. John was forbidden to take any decisions on political matters; and was expected to concentrate on the Summary Settlement so that it might be finished before Currie took over. He, therefore, asked Mulraj to continue for another year. The Dewan agreed but insisted that his resignation be kept "a profound secret until the winter revenue had been paid; otherwise he would have much difficulty in collecting it." John Lawrence gave him that undertaking¹ and Mulraj went back to Multan to continue as the Nazim for another year. When Currie took over as the resident, he did not keep that promise. He discussed the subject of Mulraj's resignation with the

1. John Lawrence to Elliott, 27 December 1847, quoted in N.M.Khilnani, The Punjab under the Lawrences, p.81.

Darbar and had Khan Singh Man nominated as the new Nazim. Khan Singh was to succeed Mulraj immediately. Currie selected two British officials, Vans Agnew of the Civil Service and Lieutenant Anderson to accompany the new Nazim to Multan. Of these two Vans Agnew was to act as the political assistant to the resident and like others holding the same designation in other frontier districts was to help the new Nazim in carrying on the administration.¹ The first task of the two, however, was to see that the old Nazim handed over the administration to his successor. A contingent of the Darbar troops was also ordered to go to Multan. This contingent "went by land" to Multan and was there joined by the new Nazim and the two British officers who travelled "by water".² The Darbar troops, two British officials and the new Nazim on arrival at Multan encamped at Idgah in the city of Multan but outside the fort which was the headquarters of Mulraj and the Multan army. This was on 18 April 1848.

The next day, Mulraj handed over the charge of the fort to the new governor in the presence of both the British officers. While the party consisting of these two

-
1. The appointment of Vans Agnew for this task which in its initial period was to be one of extreme delicacy was severely criticised by Henry Lawrence. He regarded Vans Agnew as "the most imprudent man in the residency." Henry Lawrence to Dalhousie, 3 October 1848. Copy in Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. This fact was also criticised by Henry Lawrence who believed that thus an opportunity was missed by the two British officials to mix with the Darbar troops. Ibid.

British officers and the new Nazim were about to take leave of Mulraj at the exit of the fort

"two sepoys rushed on the British officers and wounded both smartly in several places with sword cuts. The troops of Moolraj mutinied; turned the two Companies out of the fort who had accompanied the new Governor & our officers & were in a state of great disturbance - in fact in mutiny."¹

The two British officers, however, managed to reach their camp in the Idgah. The following morning (i.e. 19 April 1848), the camp at Idgah was attacked by "the troops of the Dewan [Mulraj]."² The Darbar troops that had come from Lahore

"for a time defended them but at last to a man they went over to the rebellious force - the Sirdar made terms for himself & the British officers were left to be cruelly butchered - being the only individuals of the party who were injured."³

Currie's first reaction on hearing of the revolt was to suppress it "speedily and effectually".⁴ He feared that otherwise it would acquire the appearance of a successful rebellion "and wd. kindle a flame throughout the land wh. it wd. be difficult to extinguish." He actually moved towards Multan "all the disposable Sikh force from every quarter". He thought that the Multan rebellion would be

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 2 May 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.56.
2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 4 May 1848 noon. Ibid., Ibid., f.68.
3. Currie to Dalhousie, date not given. quoted in Dalhousie to Hobhouse, Ibid., Ibid.
4. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 3 May 1848, ii a.m. Broughton Papers. Ibid., f.66.

crushed by this force. He was not sure of the loyalty of the Darbar troops but "the Sirdars are ... to be implicitly relied upon". The latter, he hoped, would control the troops and lead them successfully against Mulraj. To facilitate the work of the Sardars, he instructed Major-General Whish, who was in command of the British forces stationed at Lahore "to hold the moveable columns at Lahore in readiness to march at Multan". He believed that the British forces would not be actually required to march and "that the knowledge that the British force is in motion will be sufficient & that in all probability the demonstration only will be necessary".¹

When he learnt, however, that the two British officers had been killed, that the Darbar's contingent sent to Multan had joined the rebellion and that Khan Singh had made terms with Mulraj, he "countermanded the orders, he had previously issued for the movement of British troops in aid of the Sikh government".² This he did on 25 April 1848.³ Raja Dina Nath who was earlier asked to accompany the Lahore troops marching to Multan was also recalled. Actually Currie assembled the Sardars and threw the entire responsibility of suppressing the revolt on them. He told

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 3 May 1848, 11.a.m. Broughton Papers, Br.Mus.Add.MSS.36476, f.66.

2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 4 May 1848, noon. Ibid. f.69.

3. C.Campbell to Henry Lawrence, 6 May 1848. Henry Lawrence Papers.

them

"that he looks to the state of Lahore to suppress the insurrection of its troops, & to inflict condign punishment on those who have ordered or committed this foul crime against the Govt. he represents."¹

But the commanders of the army had depended on the British moveable column to follow them to keep their own men in order. The result was that the Lahore army that had been proceeding to Multan "loitered on their way in consequence of the distrust of the commanders in their men."² Rather

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 4 May 1848, noon. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476. f.68.
2. Gough and Innes, The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, pp.166-7. Note: The authors speak of the plan of five converging movements on Multan. Three of these five movements depended on the march of columns from Lahore. Raja Sher Singh and his troops were to march along the Ravi from Lahore to Multan. This column which obviously constituted the main part of the Darbar army chosen to go to Multan was also accompanied by two other members of the Darbar, Shamsher Singh Sindhianwala and Attar Singh Kalianwala. The second column was to go under Jawahir Mall and march through the Sindh Sagar doab. The third under the command of Sheikh Imam-ud-din was to march down the Bari doab along the right bank of Satlej. According to Innes and Gough the plan did not succeed because of the failure of "these columns to carry out the part assigned them." The result was that during the first fortnight of the Multan insurrection the action was taken solely by the remaining two columns under Edwardes and the Bahawalpur troops who acted in conjunction with each other. We could find no evidence of such a plan being laid down, but if at all it was done, it must have been between 22 April when Currie not only ordered the Darbar troops to march to Multan but also asked the moveable British columns at Lahore to be prepared for a march and 25 April when he countermanded his earlier order and asked the Darbar that it should crush the Multan rebellion on its own and should not depend on British help. That negatived the plan even if it was laid down earlier. It seems Currie's refusal to send British troops was the reason why the commanders of the Lahore troops did not proceed to Multan and loitered on their way.

than hasten to Multan the commanders strove to keep them away from the rebellious city and the force remained for the next month and a half at Chichawatni.¹

It appears that Currie's refusal to march the moveable columns was because he feared for the British position in Lahore itself.² That was natural in view of the inimical attitude of the Darbar troops towards the authority exercised by the British under the terms of the Treaty of Bhairawal. Purely from the British point of view the decision was perhaps correct. It greatly annoyed the British officers on the frontier but his retention of the British troops at Lahore enabled him to hold "the capital of the country & the person of the Maharaja wh. are quite secure".³

Mulraj's revolt, in all probability, was not premeditated but once the murder of the two British officers had taken place, he seems to have thrown himself wholeheartedly into it. Perhaps he felt his position had been badly compromised with the British and that there was no going back. In any case, he acted vigorously and the Multan rebellion soon began to have repercussions beyond the boundary of the Multan Subah. He started having "troops of every sort from every quarter".⁴ He also began sending

-
1. Chichwatni was a place not very far from Multan and they could have gone over to Multan if they liked.
 2. Dalhousie to Currie, 15 May 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p. 56.
 3. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 4 May 1848, noon. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476. f.69.
 4. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 2 June 1848. Ibid., f.90.

emissaries all around. The Sikh religion was called in aid¹ and had its effect in the north. Bhai Maharaj Singh, one of the accused in the Prema Conspiracy of August 1847 to murder Tej Singh but who had escaped being captured then, raised the standard of an anti-British revolt at Mukerian, in the Jalandhar doab. He tried though did not succeed to march with his followers to Multan and join Mulraj.²

At Lahore itself, on 8 May 1848, the Resident discovered some attempt to tamper with the loyalty of the sepoys in the British contingent at Lahore. This led to the arrest of Khan Singh,³ an ex General of the Sikh artillery and Bhai Ganga Ram, the confidential Vakil of Maharani Jindan. Both were hanged but before his death Ganga Ram revealed a conspiracy against the British in which Rani Jindan had a hand. The immediate effect was the removal of the Rani from Sheikhpura to Benares.⁴ On further enquiry Currie found that there was much more in this conspiracy than seemed at first sight. By the last week of July, he appears to have been fully convinced that this

-
1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 2 June 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.90.
 2. For a detailed account of Maharaj Singh and his attempt to organise a force to march to Multan and join Mulraj, see Currie to Elliot, 13 June 1848. Papers relating to the Punjab, 1847-49. Accounts and Papers, 1849, Vol.XLI. Inclosure 18 in No.29. pp.210-212.
 3. Not to be confused with Khan Singh Man referred to on p.160 and who was nominated as the successor Of Mulraj.
 4. It must be remembered that she was removed to Sheikhpura from Lahore in August 1847.

conspiracy was not merely the manifestation of a frustrated Rani who had been deprived of all political power by the Treaty of Bhairawal. To him, it appeared to be much more serious now. Its object was to turn out the British from the whole of northern India. Amongst the conspirators were the Chiefs of Rajputana, Cis-Satlej States, and also a number of Chiefs belonging to the Lahore State itself. What made this conspiracy particularly dangerous was that Dost Muhammad of Kabul and Gulab Singh of Jammu and Kashmir knew about it and seem to have promised support to it. And then, with one or two exceptions, the members of the Lahore Darbar itself were ~~itself~~ encouraging this conspiracy.¹

Between 18 April and 14 July 1848, while no effort was made to suppress the Multan rebellion from Lahore either by the British resident or by the Darbar which was asked by the former to do it on its own, Herbert Edwardes who was then engaged in effecting the Summary Settlement of Derajat,² started a military operation against Mulraj on his own, partly out of chivalry to save his colleagues and partly out of fear that if the Multan rebellion were to spread, the security of other frontier officers as well as

-
1. Currie to Dalhousie, 26 July 1848, Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.77; Currie to Secretary 31 July 1847, Papers relating to the Punjab, 1847-49. Accounts and Papers, Vol.XLI, 1849. Inclosure 6 in No.33, p.261.
 2. H.B.Edwardes had finished the Summary Settlement of Bannu a little earlier and then had moved to Derajat.

himself would be threatened. When he first undertook it, he also expected to be joined by the British and Darbar troops from Lahore. He added to the Darbar troops which were with him by hurriedly raising a muslim levy and crossed the Indus river. He succeeded in capturing Leia, the capital of the Sind Sagar part of the Multan province, on 25 April 1848. But he did not remain there long. The British and the Darbar troops expected from Lahore did not come. On the other hand, he began to feel suspicious of the Darbar troops under him. He therefore evacuated Leia after being in occupation of the fortress for a week and came back to his side of the Indus when he heard that Mulraj had sent a contingent against him.¹

There he got support from Lieutenant Taylor at Bannu. Strengthened in his resources, he defeated an attempt at insurgence at Dera Gazi Khan and thus eliminated the danger of Darbar contingents on the trans Indus districts following the example of Mulraj's troops. On the heels of this victory, he was joined by forces sent by Cortlandt from Dera Ismail Khan, and by Bahawalpur troops which had crossed the Indus

1. Lt.H.B.Edwardes to Resdt. 3 May 1848. Papers relating to the Panjab, 1847-49. Accounts and Papers. Vol.XLI, 1849. Inclosure 12 in No.27, p.160.

lower down, unchecked by Mulraj. He now felt strong enough to challenge Mulraj's troops at Leia. After the resident had given him the "carte-blanche to act as he thought best"¹ which he had asked for,² he crossed the Indus and won an easy victory over Mulraj's troops on 18 June 1848 in the battle of Kineyri. Encouraged by this victory and strengthened with Edwardes Lake joining him to lead the Bahawalpur troops,³ he moved almost to the outskirts of Multan and won another victory in the battle of Suddoosam on 1 July 1848.

Five days later, the Darbar contingents at Chichawatni reached Multan. They were under the command of Sher Singh Atariwala, Shamsheer Singh Sindhianwala, Atter Singh Kalianwala and Sheikh Imam-ud-din. Fearing that these Darbar armies might not actually make the position of Edwardes perilous by joining Mulraj, Currie ordered the British moveable columns under General Whish at Lahore to move to Multan.⁴ In view of the suspicions aroused in him by his knowledge of the conspiracy revealed by the confessions of the confidential agent of the Rani, he could not be sure of the loyalty of the commanders either. His

1. Memorials of Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes, p.108.
 2. H. Edwardes to Currie, 1 June 1848, Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.216.
 3. Lake joined Edwardes on 25 June 1848.
 4. Currie to Dalhousie, 26 July 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.80.
- Note: Here Currie explains to Dalhousie why he ordered the British troops to Multan.

fears were not immediately substantiated and the Darbar army, as also its commanders, co-operated with Edwardes and nothing untoward happened before the British troops joined them. That was seven weeks later on "18 or 19 August".¹ By 4 September 1848 this force was strong enough to take an offensive against the Multan fort by the "disembarkation of seige trains".² General Whish who had now assumed charge of the Multan operations issued a proclamation, calling upon Mulraj to surrender and the seige of Multan began in the confident hope that it would soon be over. It had, however, to be given up ten days later because Sher Singh and almost the entire Lahore troops bodily crossed over and declared themselves to be on the side of Mulraj.

The defection of Sher Singh was in consequence of what had happened during the month and a half between 1 August and 14 September at Hazara. Abbott, the resident's assistant, and Chatter Singh, the local Nazim, had failed to pull together. That was, in a way, inevitable because Henry Lawrence's directions in 1847 were over-ruled and Abbott began to administer the district directly. The powers and privileges exercised by the British assistant seem to have been jarring to the Nazim. The mere presence

1. Gough and Innes, The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, p.181.

2. Ibid.

of the Sikh Nazim, to whom people perhaps ran to complain against the British assistant seems to have irritated the latter. Rumours of the conspiracy of the Sardars against the British perhaps made them suspicious and even apprehensive of each other. In any case the relations between the two were far from amicable when the co-ordination between the two was most essential. They actually lived at a distance of thirty-five miles from each other. Chatter Singh at Hazara and Captain Abbott at Shirvan.

On 1 August 1848, one of the Darbar regiments known as the Pakli regiment revolted at Hazara where Chatter Singh lived. Suspecting that the latter had a hand in this revolt and fearing a conspiracy,¹ Abbott roused the muslim peasantry in the district against him. Either in sheer self-defence or by way of asserting his authority as the Nazim, Chatter Singh ordered his ordinance officer, Canora² to move out his guns and fire on them. This, the latter refused to do till ordered by Abbott. Taking this as an affront to his position, Chatter Singh had Canora shot dead on the spot,³ on 6 August 1848.

For Abbott, it was a "cold blooded murder" and "an atrocious deed".⁴ He wrote to Chatter Singh to surrender

1. Currie to Secretary, 12 August 1847. I.S.C. 7 Oct. 1848, No. 452.
2. An American who was artillery officer in the Service of the Lahore Darbar.
3. Currie to Secretary, 12 August 1848. I.S.C. 7 Oct. 1848, No. 452.
4. Abbott to Currie, 10 August 1848, I.S.C. 7 Oct. 1848, No. 453.

the murderers of Canora. The latter could not do this without humiliating himself in the eyes of his own troops and refused. The quarrel between Abbott and Chatter Singh thus headed towards a crisis. When Currie heard of Abbott's proceedings he did not like them. He felt that this quarrel, if allowed to proceed farther, would result in a new revolt which might be a much more serious affair than that of Multan. This was because Chatter Singh and his sons enjoyed influential positions in the State and also because Hazara was situated in the neighbourhood of Afghanistan on one side and Jammu and Kashmir on the other. Currie's suspicions at the moment were that the rulers of both these States were interested in seeing the British influence in the Panjab disappear. Currie, therefore, asked John Nicholson who was then an assistant at Peshawar under G.H. Lawrence and who had captured the fort of Attock on hearing of the disturbances at Hazara to enquire into the matter. The resident at the same time sent Jhanda Singh and Dina Nath to bring Chatter Singh to Lahore. John Nicholson, who like Currie believed that Chatter Singh had never intended to participate in any conspiracy against the British, tried to conciliate him by offering that his "life and izzatt" would be guaranteed, though no assurance could be given of his Nazimship and jagirs, provided that he left Hazara and went to Lahore.¹ This was not good enough for him, and he was in

1. Nicholson to Currie, 20 August 1848. Papers relating to the Panjab, 1847-49. Accounts and Papers, 1849, Vol.XLI. Inclosure 31 in No.35, p.295.

open rebellion by the end of the month.¹

It was Chatter Singh's revolt that brought about the defection of Sher Singh from the siege operations at Multan. In the last week of August and early in September, Sher Singh received letters couched in despair from his father.² After some hesitation, ~~Chatter~~^{Sher} Singh on 14 September joined Mulraj with the result that the seige of Multan had to be given up ten days after it had begun.

Sher Singh issued a proclamation on the day following his defection and called upon the Sikh community to "act with all their heart and soul" against the British. His manifesto declared:

"By the direction of the holy Gooroo, Raja Sher Singh and others, with their valiant troops, have joined the trusty and faithful Dewan Mulraj, on the part of Maharaja Duleep Sing, with a view to eradicate and expel the tyrannous and crafty feringees."³

In spite of this open declaration, Mulraj suspected the loyalty of Sher Singh to the cause of the rebellion. He refused the Sikh general admission into Multan fort and directed him to encamp in Hazari Bagh under the very guns of

-
1. Currie to Secretary, 30 August 1848. I.S.C. 7 Oct.1848, No.512.
 2. H. Edwardes to Currie, 25 August 1848, Private Letters relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.258; Gough & Innes, The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, p.183.
 3. 'Manifesto issued by Sher Singh'. Papers relating to the Punjab, 1847-49. Accounts and Papers, Vol.XLI, 1849. Inclosure 32 in No.38, p.362.
- Note: The word Feringees refers to the English.

his fort.¹ A fictitious letter addressed to Sher Singh by Herbert Edwardes which fell into the hands of Mulraj, as intended, perhaps added to his suspicions.² Under the circumstances, the Sikh general could not have stayed at Multan, even if he wanted to. He, therefore, moved out of Multan on 9 October to carry on the fight against the British in the north which was henceforth to become the main centre of the war. Mulraj actually got weakened because "the Seikhs [Sikhs] from the Manjha have left going to Multan. The tide has set to the northwards"³

Sher Singh's defection on 14 September 1848 has been regarded as "the turning point in the history of the rebellion".⁴ It is generally believed that his defection on 14 September 1848, issuing the next day a manifesto calling upon all Sikhs to rise against the British, and later marching north and carrying on the war in the

1. Gough and Innes, The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, p.185.

2. Ibid. The reference to Edwardes's letter is also found in Dalhousie's letter to Currie written on 3 November 1848. Dalhousie did not approve, and expressed his opinion in the following words:

"His [Edwardes] subsequent proceedings (between you and me) have disappointed me and I can not but regret such policy as sending a fictitious letter addressed to Sher Sing and intended to fall in the hands of Moolraj. It may perhaps have had an effect. I would far rather forego the advantage gained than obtain it by such means. All stratagems, I know, are fair in war. That however is hardly stratagem of war, and altogether it doesn't suit me and I don't like it."

See Dalhousie to Currie, 3 Nov. 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.116.

3. Currie to Dalhousie, 12 Oct. 1848. Private Letters relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, pp.105-6.

4. Lee-Warner, The Marquis of Dalhousie, Vol.I, p.172.

neighbourhood of Lahore itself gave to what was a local revolt the character of a national rebellion against the British.¹ It is further believed that it was only when Dalhousie heard of Sher Singh's defection from the army besieging Multan that he decided to annex the Panjab to the British possessions in India. Perhaps these impressions owe their origin to the oft-quoted speech of Dalhousie delivered at a ball in Barrackpore on 5 October 1848. While referring to the defection of Sher Singh and the Darbar army from the Siege of Multan and to Sher Singh's manifesto in which he had called upon all Sikhs to rise against the British, he declared:

"I hoped to see prosperity and peace realised over this vast empire. I have striven for peace, I have longed for it. But since the Sikh nation desire war, on my word they shall have it, and with a vengeance."²

-
1. W.A.J. Archbald, 'The Conquest of Sind and the Panjab'. Cambridge History of India, Vol.V, pp.555
 2. Quoted in Lee-Warner, The Marquis of Dalhousie, Vol.I, p.142; Gough and Innes in The Sikh and Sikh Wars have quoted the speech as follows:

"Unwarned by precedents, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war, and on my words, Sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance." p.186. In his letter to Sir George Couper, Dalhousie quotes the important words of his speech as, "war they shall have and with a vengeance."

Dalhousie's use of the words "war they shall have and with a vengeance" seems to have been criticised in England. He offered an explanation while writing to his friend Sir George Couper by pleading "that the three last words are an idiomatic phrase, which do not mean revenge, but merely express a superlative degree. See, Dalhousie to Couper, 5 Feb. 1849, J.G.A. Baird, Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie, p.49.

Whether Dalhousie decided for annexation because of Sher Singh's defection can be discussed later but it certainly began the war in right earnest on both sides. In an official letter, Currie was even told that

"The Governor-General in Council considers the State of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes, directly at war with the British."¹

Chatter Singh and Sher Singh, as also the great number of other Sardars who joined them also appear to have believed that there could be no going back and fought somewhat desperately.²

For some time, in the war now being fought in earnest, the British suffered adverses that caused some anxiety to the Governor-General. The British had already been forced to give up the siege of Multan till the reinforcement came from the Bombay Presidency. Up in the north, Chatter Singh marched towards Attock and Hassan Abdal and that encouraged revolts among the Darbar troops at Bannu on 20 October 1848 and those at Peshawar four days later.³ The Darbar troops at Bannu marched after the rebellion to join Chatter Singh. The Peshawar revolt led the British assistant, his wife and one Lieutenant Bowie to seek asylum at Kohat with the

-
1. Quoted in Currie to Dalhousie, 12 Oct. 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, p.103.
 2. Ganda Singh, 'Introduction to Private letters relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars', edited by Ganda Singh (Introduction), p.140.
 3. Ibid.

Barakzai chief, Sultan Muhammad Khan. The latter however made them his prisoners. Chatter Singh moved to Peshawar on 3 November 1848 and succeeded in obtaining these prisoners from that Chief. Once at Peshawar, he made matters seem dangerous for the British when he was reported to have won over the co-operation of Dost Muhammed to the Sikh war by promising Peshawar to the Afghan ruler.¹

Sher Singh was also successful. Much to the anger of Dalhousie, he moved out of Multan without being checked by the British forces.² In his march through Rechnab doab, he was joined by the demobilised soldiers of the Darbar army. In the last week of October, he was in the neighbourhood of Lahore "where the situation was felt to be somewhat critical."³ His "vanguards came actually within

1. R.B.Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence (sixth Ed.) Vol.I, p.223; Trotter, John Nicholson (edition 1904), p.101. Note: It is really doubtful whether Dost Muhammed actually came to Peshawar at this stage. According to Lee-Warner, Dost Muhammed had moved troops from Kabul to Jelalabad, but he still hesitated to commit himself to an alliance with the Sikhs. (See, Lee-Warner, The Marquis of Dalhousie, p.175). In any case the rumours had Dost Muhammed actually promised support were strong and that worried the Resident at Lahore and also Dalhousie who was by now encamped in the Cis-Satlaj districts. This was even before Dost was positively known to have crossed the Afghan border and occupied Peshawar. See, Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 December 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,476, f.298. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 4 January 1849. Ibid., f.312. Dalhousie to Currie, 12 February 1848, Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, p.132. Dalhousie to Currie, 2 January 1849. Ibid., p.147.
2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 30 October 1848, Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,476, f.262; Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 20 November 1848. Ibid., f.273.
3. Gough and Innes, The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, p.196.

sight of the city, and a party of his cavalry even set fire to the bridge of boats within a koss of the walls, carrying eighteen camel guns from a suburban post."¹

At this stage, however, Sher Singh wavered and events took a turn in favour of the British. Lahore was made secure for the British with the arrival there of the "advanced guard of the English army" under Brigadier Cureton on 2 November 1848, which was joined by the main British army under the Commander-in-Chief on 13 November.² Three days later this army crossed the river Ravi to meet Sher Singh in an open conflict. But he would not oblige them. He evidently wanted to avoid an open conflict with the British army until he had been joined by Chatter Singh. Consequently all that took place was an encounter at Ramnagar on 22 November 1848. The British army, though successful in clearing the Rechnab doab of Sher Singh's troops, suffered heavily. Two senior officers - Major General Cureton³ and Colonel Havelock were killed. Sher Singh's troops even succeeded in humiliating the British army by dragging one of its horse artillery across the river.

The next action was fought on 3 December 1848 and is known as the battle of Sadullapur. Sadullapur was situated on the other side of the Chenab river, just opposite

1. E. Arnold, Dalhousie's Administration, Vol. I, pp. 133-34.

2. Ibid., p. 134.

3. Cureton was promoted after 2 November.

Ramnagar. It was here that Sher Singh had placed his army after the battle of Ramnagar where the British had been encamping ever since. Sher Singh had thus been facing the British army with a broad river in between for ten days. In pursuance of Dalhousie's hint that he "should be happy indeed to see a blow struck that would destroy the enemy, add honour to the British arms, and avert the prospect of a protracted and costly war,"¹ the British Commander-in-Chief detached General Sir Joseph Thackwell on 30 November to cross the Chenab by a ford six miles up the river and make a surprise attack on Sher Singh's army. This ford proved impracticable and Thackwell therefore moved further on, twenty-two miles up the river to Wazirabad where John Nicholson had cleverly secured sixteen boats which enabled the force to effect a passage to the other side of the river on the night of 2 December.² The Commander-in-Chief was so keen on a decisive victory over Sher Singh that on 2 December he tried to reinforce Thackwell by sending an additional contingent under Godby. To prevent Sher Singh on the other side of Chenab facing Gough's army, from knowing of these movements, the British Commander-in-Chief pushed his batteries to the

-
1. Dalhousie to Secret Committee, 24 November 1848. Quoted in E. Arnold, Dalhousie's Administration, p.139.
Note: Earlier Dalhousie had directed the Commander-in-Chief to cross Chenab. But withdrew his instructions when the heavy guns had reached Ramnagar.
See, Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 Dec.1848, Broughton Papers, Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.285.
 2. Lee-Warner, The Marquis of Dalhousie, pp.195-6.

edge of the river, and opened a cannonade on the army of Sher Singh. Sher Singh was not deceived by this cannonade. He attacked Thackwell's force on the evening of 3 December before Godby could join them, and then disappeared. Instead of surprising Sher Singh, Thackwell himself was thus taken by surprise. According to Trotter, "both Gough and Thackwell were out-generalled and befooled by the Sikh commanders".¹ Dalhousie would not "fire a salute" for this action because he felt "it was not a victory" though the Commander-in-Chief claimed it as such.²

Now followed a period of stalemate lasting for about five weeks. Both sides were reluctant to engage in a battle. Gough waited for Multan to fall and the British forces from that place to join him before doing that.³ It had been expected then that the Multan siege would soon begin on the arrival of the troops from Bombay and then the fall of Multan would not take long. Actually the reinforcement from Bombay was delayed because of the Bombay Government's insistence that Major General Auctumuty should lead the operations because he was "Senior to every officer in Bengal except Sir D.Hill who was then at Calcutta." The

1. L.J.Trotter, John Nicholson, p.103.

2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 December 1848, Broughton Papers, Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,476, f.293.

3. That was according to the direction of the Governor-General. See, Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 December 1848, Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.286.

Governor-General regretted

"that from personal disappt. or some such motive, undue delays have been thrown in the way."¹

Even when it did begin on 26 December the fall of Multan did not take place as early as was expected and Mulraj did not surrender till 22 January 1849. And so Gough delayed his attack on the forces of Sher Singh, entrenched strongly at Chilianwala after the battle of Sadullapur. On his side, Sher Singh who had been avoiding a pitched battle ever since Gough's army had crossed the Ravi, would not like one now, till his father had joined him. Chatter Singh then on his way from Peshawar was engaged in snatching the fort of Attock at the moment held by Lieutenant Herbert.² Obviously Chatter Singh wanted to be safe on his rear before joining Sher Singh.

Attock fort fell to the Atariwala Sardar on 2 January 1849 and that precipitated matters for Gough. Perhaps fearing that Chatter Singh's force would greatly strengthen Sher Singh, he thought of attacking Sher Singh before the two could join together, even though Multan fort had not till then fallen and the British force under General Whish had not joined them. He moved forward and on 13 January 1849 took place at Chilianwala, the hardest fought battle of the

-
1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 December 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS.36476 f 289
 2. Lieutenant Herbert should not be confused with Herbert Edwardes.

Second Sikh War.

So close was the contest that both sides claimed it as a victory. The British loss was heavy and amounted to over two thousand men, six guns and several stands of colours. In a language, almost reminiscent of Hardinge's description of the desperate position in which the British were placed after the first day of the battle of Sobraon, Dalhousie wrote to Wellington:

"In public I make, of course, the best of things. I treat it as a great victory. But writing confidentially to you, I do not hesitate to say that I consider my position grave. I have put into the field in the Punjab a force fit to match all India. In the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, I do not consider that force safe, or free from the risk of disaster. There is not a man in that army from his Generals of Division to the Sepoys who does not proclaim the same thing and write it to his friends. They do not feel safe in his hands."¹

His letter to Hobhouse, which criticised the tactics followed by Gough in fighting the battle, repeated the same thing.² For almost a fortnight "much gloom" prevailed in the camp of the Commander-in-Chief. Writing on 7 February 1849, the Governor-General described it as follows:

"The feeling in the Camp for some time was almost alarming. Even now it is distressing & anxious. His own confidence in himself is utterly gone & the army, officers and men, openly proclaim they have none."³

-
1. Dalhousie to Wellington, 22 January 1849, quoted in Lee-Warner, The Marquis Of Dalhousie, p.209.
 2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 January 1849. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, ff.322-333.
 3. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 February 1849. Ibid., f.379.

Elsewhere events had been adding to Dalhousie's anxiety. The Multan siege had been prolonged. In the hills of the Jalandhar doab, Ram Singh, the wazir of Nurpur, had raised a rebellion which though crushed inspired others to follow his example.¹ The Katogh Chief raised the standard of revolt, seized his ancestral palace at Tirah with some of the adjoining forts and fired a royal salute announcing the disappearance of the British Raj. At the same time the Rajas of Jeswun and Duttarpore, lower down the hills and Bedi Bikram Singh of Una, in the plains rose against the British.² From Allahabad, the news arrived of the escape of the Raja of Ladwa who had been under surveillance there ever since the end of the first Sikh War.³ Danger was apprehended in the report of "a great hunting excursion in the Terai on our frontier accompanied by 6000 men & 41 guns" by the Maharaja of Nepal.⁴ Dost Muhammad had marched to Peshawar and declared himself openly on the side of the Sikhs. It was apprehended that he might even cross the Indus. One of his sons invaded Bannu. Another was with Sher Singh. The Chiefs of Kandhar were reported to be ready to march on Sindh on the suggestion of Dost Muhammad Khan.⁵

1. R.B.Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, p.228.

2. Ibid. p.231.

3. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 4 Jan.1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476. f.317.

4. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 Jan.1848. Ibid. ff.331-332.

5. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 Feb. 1849. Ibid., ff.380-381.

It was even feared that Gulab Singh might come out on the side of Chatter Singh and Sher Singh.

This state of anxiety, however, lasted only for a short while. The rebellions in the Jalandhar doab were easily suppressed.¹ The hunting excursion of the Nepal Maharaja proved to be an innocent affair.² The Kandhar danger faded away. Dost Muhammed did not cross the Indus, though he had become the master of Peshawar. In the main theatre of the war, the balance turned in favour of the British too. Multan surrendered on 21 January 1849 and the army under General Whish, following the orders of the Governor-General to join the Commander-in-chief "with the utmost speed"³ came by forced marches and was with him on 20 February. On the other hand, Sher Singh, though strengthened by his father (Chatter Singh) joining him on 16 January 1849, had his confidence shaken when his artillery General, Ilahi Bux "with other officers" left him and joined the British camp on 21 January.⁴ Little wonder that in the next encounter between Gough and Sher Singh at Gujrat on 21 February, the British won "a splendid victory

1. R.B.Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, pp.230-232.
2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 January 1849. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.330.
3. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 February 1849. Broughton Papers. Ibid. f. 379.
4. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 January 1849. Ibid., f.332.

& comparatively a bloodless one."¹

The only thing that remained for the British to do now was to drive the Afghan supporters of Sher Singh beyond Peshawar and make the two Atariwala Sardars surrender themselves with their army. It was necessary to bring about that surrender without any further conflict because Chutter Singh and Sher Singh had British prisoners with them about whose recovery both Dalhousie and Henry Lawrence, who had by now come back from England and taken over from Currie as the Agent of the Governor-General on the North-West frontier, were greatly worried.² It was feared that if driven to desperation, these chiefs might flee to Afghanistan taking the British prisoners with them.³ A guarantee was, therefore, given to them of what they most wanted - that they would neither be imprisoned nor banished from the Panjab. This was given through F. Macheson who had been working as "Governor-General's Agent with the C. in C."⁴ on 15 March 1849, and the next day the army under them laid down its arms to General Gilbert.⁵ The latter then tried to pursue the army of Dost Muhammed holding Peshawar and Attock

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 6 March 1849. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476. f.409.

Note: Underlined by Dalhousie.

2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 January 1849. Ibid., f.332. Ibid. 24 March 1849, Ibid., f.467.

3. Dalhousie to Couper, 16 August 1849. J.G.A. Baird, Private Letters of Marquess of Dalhousie, pp.89-90.

4. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 December 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476. f.297.

5. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 24 March 1849. Ibid., f.467.

but it retired to Afghanistan before the British General could engage it in a pitched battle. "Dost Muhammed came like a thief and has run away like a coward", reported Dalhousie.¹ The capture of Peshawar and the escape of the Afghan supporters of the Atariwala Chiefs ended the war.

§ 3. Before we try to find at what stage of this war Dalhousie thought of adopting the policy of annexing the Panjab for the first time, and determine the chief considerations that weighed with him in doing so, some points relating to the main stages of the war, to Dalhousie's movements and to his correspondence should be noted. In the first place, the Second Sikh War can be divided into four phases. Till the third week of August, it was nothing more than the revolt of the Nazim of Multan against the authority of the Darbar. The initiative seems to have been taken by the Multan soldiery, with the Nazim making it his own immediately afterwards. It was anti-British because, according to the Treaty of Bhairawal, the Darbar acted under the direction of the British resident. Whatever may have been the designs of the Maharani, which came to light later, and however widespread the dissatisfaction against the British among the demobilised soldiers and the standing

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 April 1849. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f. 497.

army of the State, the Darbar and the British stood together. The second phase of the war began when in the third week of August Chatter Singh finally rebelled against the British at Hazara. To the rebellion of a Nazim who was rather unpopular with the Darbar was added the rebellion of another Nazim who was influential and powerful. That brought a slight change in the character of the war also. It was now a challenge to the British authority exercised under the terms of the Treaty of Bhairawal by one of the signatories of the Treaty of Lahore in March 1846 and one who had approved of the Treaty of Bhairawal also. Chatter Singh could not be fighting the Darbar and the Maharaja. The Darbar had his eldest son as one of its most important members. The Maharaja was his prospective son-in-law. It was the authority of the British, as exercised in practice under the terms of the Treaty of Bhairawal, brought home to him by the actions of the British assistant in the Subah of which he was the Nazim, against which he revolted. Legally, however, the position was still the same as it was before his revolt. None of the members of the Darbar participated in the revolts either at Multan or Hazara. In the legal sense even this revolt could therefore be taken to be as much against the Darbar as against the British. Chatter Singh's revolt was, however, soon followed by Sher Singh's rebellion and that began the third phase of the war.

Now it was the rebellion of the entire Darbar army, headed by a prominent member of the Darbar and openly proclaimed to be against the British stay in the Panjab. During the first twenty-four hours of his defection, the only two other members of the Darbar who were out of Lahore were also known to be siding with him.¹ Of those who were at Lahore, one was in prison for treasonable correspondence against the British. Out of the remaining four, only one could be completely relied upon by the resident.² In his revolt, Sher Singh had the support of a great number of the Sardars, independent of the Darbar. In January 1849, the war entered into its fourth and the last phase. Chatter Singh had invited Dost Muhammed to join the Sikhs in their fight against the British. After some hesitation the Afghan ruler did so. The result was that this war, which was, after the revolt of Sher Singh at least, in the nature of an insurgence of the old set up of the Sikh state had become a joint effort on the part of the Sikhs and the Afghans to drive the British away from the Panjab with the possibility of far reaching repercussions in the rest of the country. While trying to find out when and why Dalhousie decided to

-
1. One was Shamsher Singh Sindhianwalia. He later left Sher Singh and came back to Edwardes. See Griffin, Panjab Chiefs (1890 ed.), Vol. I, p. 233. The other member Atar Singh Kalianwala and his sons were also carried away with the rebellion initially but later came back to H. Edwardes's camp. Ibid., p. 353.
 2. This was Tej Singh.

annex the Panjab, another point worth remembering is that until 10 October 1848, Dalhousie was at Calcutta. On that date, he left for the frontier and reached it by the first week of December. As long as he was at Calcutta, there would always be a time lag of at least ten to thirteen days between the date on which an event took place in the Panjab and the date when information of it reached Dalhousie. He learnt of the Multan rebellion, which began on 19 April, on 2 May, of Chatter Singh's revolt, officially reported on 30 August, on 13 September, and of Sher Singh's defection which took place on 14 September, only by the 27th or 28th of the month. Dalhousie mostly learnt of these events from the dispatches or private letters of Currie.

Dalhousie first heard of the Multan outbreak on 2 May 1848. His information then was that the two British officers and Sardar Khan Singh Man had been attacked by the Multan forces which were in a state of mutiny. The British officers, according to his information, were still alive, and so for him it was nothing more than "an ugly occurrence".¹ He shared Currie's opinion that Mulraj had not instigated it and believed that the Darbar would punish the actual culprits.² Dalhousie wanted the resident to see that these culprits were caught and punished severely so as

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 2 May 1848. Broughton Papers.
Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.56.

2. Ibid., Ibid., ff.57-58.

"to impress on the body of the people as well as on the Durbar the conviction that no British officer can be injured in person or property, no matter where he is, without its being followed by signal punishment."

He felt that this impression was necessary because on it depended "the safety of the numerous officers detached separately throughout the districts of the Punjab."¹ The next day when Dalhousie learnt that firing had broken out between Mulraj's soldiers and the Lahore troops who were then defending the wounded British officials lying at Idgah, he moved to "conspicuous reparation and punishment" but nothing more than that. The reparation was evidently to be demanded from the Multan governor. Dalhousie made it clear to Hobhouse that he had "no inclination to make this incident an excuse for picking up a quarrel with the [Lahore] state".² On 4 May, he got the information that the two British officers had been murdered, the Darbar troops had joined the Multan insurgents, and Khan Singh Man had made terms for himself. Now we find him speaking of exacting the reparation from Mulraj if the Lahore Government "is faithful to itself & us, and if it shall shew itself ready & able to control its rebellious servants." On the other hand if the Lahore Government "is faithless or tardy, or impotent to right us, then I shall feel it my duty as the

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 2 May 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.58.

2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 3 May 1848, 11 a.m. Ibid., f.67.

servant of the company and the crown to exact a national reparation from the State of Lahore."¹ A week after this, while arguing why it had been a better alternative to wait till November to send troops to Multan instead of doing so immediately, he showed his determination to insist on this reparation after the Multan rebellion had been crushed, when he wrote:

"I shall proceed to take such measures as will enable us to enter, as soon as the season will permit, on the operation necessary for exacting the national reparation wh. must be rendered for national wrong."²

The way in which he wrote made it clear that he was thinking of demanding this reparation from the Multan authorities and did not want any change in the Panjab policy as such. In fact the intention in demanding reparation was merely that of British prestige so very necessary for retaining their hold over their Indian empire. This is how Dalhousie put it in his letter to the President of the Board of Control:

"We do not and ought not to desire the Country - we have in my opinion every reason for wishing it to remain an independent & friendly power. But I am confident that you will affirm my determination when I say that in India we must not permit for a moment longer than the elements Compel us to do so, even the semblance of successful resistance of our authority, or suffer our servants to be betrayed and butchered, without signal punishment and reparation therefor."³

-
1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 4 May 1848, noon, Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.70.
 2. Ibid., 11 May 1848. Ibid., f.83.
 3. Ibid., f. 84-85.

By the beginning of the third week of May, he learnt of the Lahore Darbar telling the Resident that on its own it could not crush the rebellion. Even now he wrote of nothing more than "national reparation" for "the national injury done to the Government of the Hon'ble Company". Since the Darbar had confessed its impotence by confessing that it could not depend on its own resources to crush the rebellion, he now declared that the reparation would be demanded from the Lahore State though the punishment would be inflicted on the guilty. He told Currie that when the military operations would be practicable,

"I shall consider it my duty to put forth, if necessary, the whole power that the Govt. of India can command for the purpose of inflicting signal and severe punishment on those guilty of this outrage and of exacting from the State of Lahore that national reparation which it is my firm determination to obtain for the national injury done to the Government of the Hon'ble Company."¹

He explained to Currie why he would demand a national reparation from the Lahore State:

"This is not merely a question between the Govt. of India and the Dewan Moolraj of Mooltan. The servants of the Company have been murdered while employed in the interest of the State of Lahore by one of its chief servants; they have been treacherously betrayed to their death by the desertion of the troops of Lahore."²

He would therefore

-
1. Dalhousie to Currie, 15 May 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.55.
 2. Ibid., pp.55-56.

"hold the State of Lahore answerable for such reparation for all this hereafter as the Govt. of the Hon'ble Company may think it fitting and right to demand."¹

And so things remained till the last week of June. Dalhousie repeatedly wrote of national insult and national reparation both to Hobhouse in England and to Currie at Lahore.² He did not make clear during this period what would be the extent of this reparation but seems^{not} to have felt that it should go as far as annexation. In fact he wrote in such a way as to imply that national reparation would not involve any change in the basic policy of having a friendly Sikh State in the Panjab.

Dalhousie gave an indication of that he had lost faith in the old Panjab policy in a letter of 27 June 1848 to Currie. The reason that he gave was not that of national insult implied in the murder of the British officers nor of the national reparation which was connected with these murders but of "the impracticability of our being able to ensure the construction of a firm and self-sustaining Govt. to rule the Punjab."³ He felt this because both John

-
1. Dalhousie to Currie, 15 May 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.56
 2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 2 June 1848, Broughton Papers, Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.108; Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 9 June 1848. Ibid., f.122; Dalhousie to Currie, 13 June 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars. pp.64-65
 3. Dalhousie to Currie, 27 June 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars. p.67.

Lawrence and Currie seem to have written adversely, not only against the Darbar but also against the Sardars who were not its members.¹ That is clear from the way he explained his doubts to Currie:

"The account you give of the materials out of which it is to be formed, as they have been exhibited by the test these events have applied to them is most discouraging, and Mr. John Lawrence's estimate of the Chiefs and leaders is not a whit more favourable than yours."²

What seems to have happened was that after Currie had hinted to the Darbar and the Sardars that they must do something to suppress the Multan revolt on their own and without depending on the British, they did not do anything or perhaps could not do anything. That was a proof for him of the lack of initiative among the Lahore Sardars, and their incapacity to control their own army. He, therefore, wrote to the Governor-General against them. Dalhousie in return quite pertinently enquired whether the Panjab policy which consisted of leaving the state to the Sardars in 1854[?] would then succeed. And if it was not to succeed what advantage was there in propping up the State for the next six years, which Dalhousie believed the British were doing with big

-
1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 15 August 1847. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.203. Note: Dalhousie quotes the opinions of Currie and John Lawrence about the Sardars from letters which seem to have been written some time in June.
 2. Dalhousie to Currie, 27 June 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.67.

financial loss and a lot of inconvenience to themselves.¹
 He posed a vital question touching the very core of the Panjab policy as arranged in the Treaty of Bhairawal when he enquired from Currie,

"... are we to maintain it for six years at this sacrifice, when we can hardly doubt that at the end of those 6 years, the chiefs will be as impotent under a boy sovereign of 15 as they are now, the army as insubordinate, and consequently the frontiers of our territory as unsafe and the neighbourhood as turbulent as they are likely to be in Decr. 1846?"²

Dalhousie was evidently fast moving towards annexation. It should be noted that this was so because one of the presuppositions on which the Panjab policy was based seemed incapable of realisation. He doubted whether the Sardars could ever form a stable and strong Government which would control its army and thus act as a convenient buffer between the north-western boundary of the British Empire in India and Afghanistan.

Five days after he had conveyed these doubts he received a despatch from the latter dated 22 June which confirmed him in his feeling that there was no chance of

1. According to Dalhousie, the Lahore state was not paying its annual twenty-two lakhs to the British. This amount was stipulated in the Treaty of Bhairawal. It was meant as compensation for expenses which the British incurred in keeping their army at Lahore.

See, Dalhousie to Currie, 27 June 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.67.

2. Ibid.

setting up a stable Government in the Panjab then or after six years and he moved still nearer the idea of annexation. In his despatch, Currie informed the Governor-General of the victory of Herbert Edwardes and the Bahawalpur troops over Dewan Mulraj in the battle of Kineyri (18 June 1848) but complained bitterly against the Darbar and the Sardars:

"The Governor-General will not fail to observe that, in the operations which have been undertaken for the suppression of this rebellion, the Durbar has taken no part, and that neither the Sirdars, the Durbar officials, nor the army - with the exception of General Cortlandt and his own battalions - have given any aid. What has been done, has been effected by newly raised Muhammedan levies, under Lieutenant Edwardes, or in other parts of the country, by parties acting under my immediate orders, and by our ally Bahawal Khan, not only without the assistance of, but inspite of the machinations of, Darbar officials, the Sikh army, and the Sikh population, all of whom were from the first, and have continued to the last, thoroughly disaffected."¹

This despatch of Currie and the private letter that accompanied this letter convinced Dalhousie that the old policy would not succeed. In his letter to Hobhouse, he described Currie's despatch as containing "pregnant paragraphs".² To Currie, he confided his conclusion,

"that the experiment which has endured now for two years has proved a failure" because "the chiefs and Sirdars are hopelessly and helplessly impotent and thus material is wanting from which a Govt. may be constructed capable of sustaining itself".³

-
1. Currie to Secretary, 22 June 1848. Par.17. I.S.C. 7 October 1848, No.291.
 2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 3 July 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.139.
 3. Dalhousie to Currie, 13 July 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, p.73.

But should then a new policy be adopted and should that be one of annexing the state? Dalhousie was certain of the necessity of a new orientation in the old policy. But he was not sure that it should be annexation though he was quite near it. He opened his mind to Currie:

"When a member of the Imperial Govt., I approved of the policy observed by my predecessor Lord Hardinge in abstaining from occupation of the Punjab. I thought and I think still that the firm establishment of a Hindoo Govt. between the British frontier on the Sutlej and the Khyber is the most advantageous circumstance that could be desired for British India. I am desirous of fully and fairly carrying Lord Hardinge's policy into effect, honestly and candidly if it can be done. But if the experiment which has endured for now two years has proved a failure, and if the experiment has been continued sufficiently long to enable us to draw a sound conclusion from it, and if in the judgement of those best qualified to judge, the experiment has proved that a strong Hindoo Government can not be formed in the Punjab, if the Chiefs and Sirdars are hopelessly and helplessly impotent, and thus material is wanting from which a Govt. may be constructed capable of sustaining itself, if the army, in spite of discipline, in spite of pension and pay, is thus traitorous to a man, if both soldiers and Sikhs of every degree thus catch at every opportunity of ejecting or destroying us, altho' we are protecting and aiding them, and if, as is the case, not one shilling of the Treaty-subsidy is paid, are we to overlook this gross national offence, are we to content ourselves with hanging Moolraj, taking reimbursement of our own expense and enough to reward and reimburse Bawul Khan, then forgive the rest and go on till the 5th September, 1854, sacrificing 22 lacs per annum, bearing all the labor, all the anxiety, and then retire with the certainty that we leave a state on our frontier whose Govt, is as incompetent, and whose army is as uncontrollable as were the army and the Govt. which we found there in Feby. 1846? Are we to do this? Or are we to say ['] we have tried you enough, we have borne with you enough, we have dry-nursed

and bolstered you up enough; your army and people are and ever will be hostile to us - all our generosity is thrown away upon you, you injure us and either will not or can not give us redress, we will bear with you no longer, your power₁ is at an end and your country shall be ours!"¹

In the first week of August, Dalhousie learnt of "the grand conspiracy" and that removed the second pre-supposition on which the success of the policy of having a buffer state between the Afghans and the British frontier depended. So far his fears were that the Chiefs would fail in standing on their own and would never succeed in forming a stable Government to control the anti-British army. To that was now added the apprehension that the Chiefs themselves were anti-British and there was no possibility of having a friendly Sikh state in the Panjab. That made Dalhousie finally decide for annexation. The dangerous nature of the conspiracy to which the ruler of Kabul and the Maharaja of Kashmir had promised support made that all the more necessary. That Darbar members and most of the Chiefs should have known about the conspiracy and promised co-operation almost decided it for him. On the basis of letters written during this time by H.M.Elliot to Hardinge, the latter told Henry Lawrence that annexation had already been recommended.²

-
1. Dalhousie to Currie, 13 July 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh, pp.72-73.
 2. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 31 August 1848. Henry Lawrence Papers.

Even though what Hardinge told Henry Lawrence was not strictly a fact, there is no doubt that Dalhousie had made up his mind about it. Due to illness, Dalhousie could not take up the matter with the home authorities whom at this stage he felt it necessary to consult before effecting such a big change in the Punjab policy as such. Moreover he had written

"to Sir F.C. requesting specific answers & information on certain facts in the determination of our future policy & our relations with the Panjab."¹

He, however, hinted to the President of the Board of Control on 8 August that he felt it necessary that a re-orientation be brought about in the Panjab policy. He actually promised that

"I shall send you by next mail, wh. goes next week, a memr. on this part of this vexatious [?] subject."²

He did not send a memorandum but penned a private letter "written currente calamo without a draft" and "sent off with all its sins of omission or repetition on its head."³ This letter of Dalhousie was a strong plea for deciding in favour of annexation because he felt it "is the most advantageous policy for us to pursue." He argued that the fact that the Chiefs and members of the Darbar should

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 8 August 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476. ff.178-9.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. 22 December 1848. Ibid. f.300.

have had a knowledge of the conspiracy that aimed at turning the British out of northern India and that most of them should have promised their co-operation meant that one of the contracting parties to the treaties of Lahore and Bhairawal had broken the pledge given when these treaties were signed. The Darbar and the Chiefs had been signatories on behalf of the Lahore State and their encouragement and participation in the conspiracy meant that the Lahore State was violating them. The British who were the other party to the Treaties were consequently absolved from any obligation on their side. They could, therefore, justifiably adopt any alternative Panjab policy that would suit them.

According to Dalhousie, the British at the moment had four alternatives before them. The first, he felt, was to take Multan, hang Mulraj, punish the most guilty of his followers and then "forgive and forget the rest, and continue our protection until the expiry of the term fixed in 1854, just as before." The second was to annex Multan to the British territory, punish the guilty, hang Mulraj and "afterwards continue still our connexion till 1854." The third one that he could think of was to hang Mulraj, seize Multan, and then arguing that the Treaty of Bhairawal had been violated by the Lahore Darbar declare "our obligations thereby terminated, withdraw our protection, and return within our own frontier." The fourth was, on having taken

Multan and having hanged Mulraj,

"to tell the Sikh Govt. that they having failed to fulfil the obligations of their treaty - having failed to afford the national satisfaction demanded for a national wrong - having themselves officially stated to our resident that their army was hostile to the Govt., that their troops refused to obey their orders & that they were unable to coerce or control the soldiery ... to annex the Punjab to the British Empire in India."¹

Out of these four alternatives, Dalhousie felt that the best would be the last one. It had advantages both immediate and long range. It would

"afford us punishment on the criminal who murdered our officers, reimbursement of the expence we have incurred, reparation of the national wrong done us by the State of Lahore, and further which affords us the only means of securing our tranquillity of our frontier & the safety of our Subjects."²

The last consideration was the most important because the earlier policy followed by Hardinge, which Dalhousie characterised as the "experiment" of having "a strong and friendly Hindoo Govt." between "the Sutledge and the Khyber"² had in his eyes failed.³ Dalhousie had no hope of solving the problem by changing the personnels of the Darbar:

"... the result of the Experiment is such as to have satisfied me & others who know the people we deal with, better than I, that we have not a reasonable ground for believing that we shall ever be able to build up a strong and friendly Govt. to rule the Punjab."⁴

This was because

"the materials are wanting for doing so. There

-
1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 15 August 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, ff.198-200.
 2. Ibid. f.211.
 3. Ibid. ff.202, 210.
 4. Ibid. f. 202.

never has been a Panjab nation for centuries. It has been a congeries of independent and baffling tribes, until the strong mind and strong arm of Runjeet reduced the whole into obedience to himself, the head of the dominant sect, the Sikhs. Since he passed away, there has not been even a pretender to the possession of either the strong mind or the strong arm."¹

That the Lahore State was seething with anti-British feeling made annexation indispensable. It had become necessary for the very reasons which made the British earlier desire a friendly Sikh State as a buffer and not take their frontier to the Afghan border. They should annex it, he explained,

"in order to secure the permanent peace of India and to remove the Evil of a turbulent Enemy on our frontier, whereby the subjects of our States wd. be Endangered & our attention & our means diverted from the measures, wh. we have designed for increasing the prosperity of our Country & the happiness of our people."²

The sum and substance of his letter was that "we shall not succeed in establishing a friendly Sikh State" and "to go on now with the same policy is only to make great pecuniary sacrifice & needlessly to subject ourselves to great labour & anxiety for an object we shall fail in detaining".

Since the Lahore State, according to him, had violated the treaties, the British had a right to adopt any policy they chose. He felt that of the four alternative policies that lay before them, the best was to annex the state which he

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 15 August 1848. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.202.

2. Ibid. f.200.

suggested "we ought to do at once".¹

The only difficulty in adopting this course, according to Dalhousie, could be financial. He was conscious of it and even promised to look into that aspect of the question but his "impression" at the moment was "that we ought to annex the Punjab and that we shall do so."²

The circumstances that led Dalhousie to write this letter in which he strongly recommended annexation and almost hinted that it was coming should be noted. A rebellion had taken place at Multan against the authority of the Lahore Government which worked under the supervision of the British resident under the terms of the Treaty of Bhairawal. Two British officers who had gone to see that authority established in that Subah under the Lahore State, when its old Nazim had resigned and a new one appointed to take his place, were murdered and the rebellion begun. It was soon found that in crushing this rebellion, no reliance could be put on the Darbar army. The Darbar and the Chiefs also did not show much enthusiasm in crushing the revolt and all the effort that was made in suppressing it in its initial period was by the British assistants on the frontier and the Bahawalpur troops.³ On the other hand, the resident

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 15 August 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, ff. 214-215.

2. Ibid.

3. H.B. Edwardes had taken the initiative but was helped by E. Lake and A. Taylor. The Darbar official who had been helpful was Cortlandt but he was a foreigner and so his help was not indicative of the attitude of the Darbar and the Chiefs.

suspected the Darbar and the Chiefs - something of which he became sure by the end of July 1848 - to be conspiring not merely to overthrow the British authority as exercised under the terms of the Treaty of Bhairawal but to turn the British out of northern India. According to Dalhousie such a situation made necessary a new Panjab policy because the events proved that two of the planks on which the old policy rested were not there. Of the four courses that he could think of as alternatives to the existing policy, he himself was for annexation.

The point needs emphasis because it is generally believed that Dalhousie thought of annexing the Panjab only when he heard of the defection of Sher Singh at Multan and the beginning of the "national war" against the British as distinct from a local revolt. The fact is that on 15 August when Dalhousie suggested annexation, Sher Singh was participating in the British effort under General Whish to suppress the Multan revolt. Dalhousie, on that date, had no idea of even the quarrel of Chatter Singh and Abbott. The two had fallen out by 15 August but Chatter Singh had not started any active hostility against the British till then. In any case, Dalhousie had no information about it. He learnt of Chatter Singh's quarrel with Abbott soon after 15 August but had no idea of the active hostilities until about 11 or 12 September. That was because until 23 August

Currie believed that the matter would be settled amicably. He gave his own opinion that Chatter Singh had finally decided to revolt only by the despatch dated 30 August which reached the Governor-General on 10 or 11 September.

The opinion thus officially given strengthened Dalhousie's case for annexation. The actions of Chatter Singh were for Dalhousie the proof of the widespread conspiracy against the British. On receiving this despatch, he therefore put forth his proposal for the consideration of his Council. In a minute of 11 September 1848, he wrote:

"I sincerely desire, as is well known to the Council to avoid the necessity for totally subjecting the Punjab to the British Rule -

I think it ought to be avoided as long as any chance can be supposed to exist of a strong Hindoo Govt. being formed."

But this, he proceeded to write would not be possible and so Panjab ought to be annexed:

"I do not, however, hesitate to express a clear opinion that the experience of the last two years, and more especially of the last four months, has almost conclusively proved that such a Govt. is not to be looked for.

Under these circumstances, I conceive that regard for the security of our frontier, for the tranquillity of our own Provinces, for the maintenance of the reputation of our own name and of the conviction of our own power will not permit us to pass over such national outrages as are now being committed against us in the Punjab and that we shall in the end be compelled to submit this Govt. which cannot rule its own subjects or control its ungovernable Army, and to take possession of the Country in order to ensure the peace and security of our own."¹

1. Minute by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India dated 11 September 1848. I.S.C. 7 October 1848, No.517.

Dalhousie's wording in the Minute, as would be expected in an official communication, was cautious and only hinted at what he felt the British would be eventually required to do. But he was sure that this was what would have to be done. He had already

"addressed to the Commander-in-Chief some weeks ago a Secret and Confidential communication requesting him to favour me with his opinion as to the military force which would be necessary, in the event of the British Govt. being compelled to resort to extreme measures, to enable us with facility to take possession of the Punjab, disband its army, disarm its Chiefs and the people and dismantle its forts. I requested his opinion as to the force which would be necessary to retain secure possession of the Country when we had taken it."¹

Clearly Dalhousie had made up his mind about annexing the Panjab and in anticipation of the home authorities or at least the President of the Board of Control approving his suggestion in the letter of 15 August of doing so and had begun preparing for it. To strengthen his hands, he requested "the Council to meet to consider this most important subject."²

The Council met eighteen days later and recommended the annexation. With Chatter Singh's revolt strengthening Dalhousie's case, it would most probably have done that even if nothing else had happened in the Panjab. But by the time the Council met, news had come of Sher Singh's defection at Multan. The Council already knew about it from

1. Minute by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India dated 11 September 1848. I.S.C. 7 October 1848, No.517.
2. Ibid.

other quarters when the Resident "sent by express" the information which

"not only confirmed the intelligence that Raja [Sher Singh] had gone over to the rebel, Dewan Mulraj with the whole Sikh army under his command [but also] proved by the Raja's letters under his own hand and Seal that he had joined in the rebellion deliberately with premeditation."¹

It deliberated on a new Minute of the Governor-General, perhaps drawn, on hearing of the news of Sher Singh's revolt. This Minute was not cautious in its language as the earlier one of 11 September 1848 had been, and was categorical in suggesting annexation. It began by giving an account of what had happened in the Panjab since the rebellion of Mulraj began eight months earlier and argued:

"... the course of events, as they have developed themselves, and long and anxious considerations of this important subject, have finally and immovably confirmed in my mind the conviction which the earlier events of the insurrection at Mooltan long since had founded, that there will be no peace for India, nor any stability of Government in the Punjab, nor any release from anxiety and costly defensive preparations on our frontier, unless the British Government, justly indignant at the unprovoked and treacherous aggression once again committed against them by the Sikhs, shall now effectually provide against future dangers by subverting for ever the Dynasty of the Sings, by converting the Punjab into a British province, and by adopting the only measure which will secure the observance of peace by the Sikhs, namely depriving them utterly of all the means of making war".²

He emphasised that he still believed that the best

1. Minute by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India, 30 September 1848. I.S.C. 7 October 1848, No.621.
2. Ibid.

policy would have been to have a "strong, friendly, Hindoo Government in the Punjab" but was now "convinced that such a Government cannot be formed". This was not only because "the Chiefs of the Punjab are utterly powerless and worthless" but also because there was no "assurance of the fidelity of the Chiefs".¹

Both the members of the Council showed their concurrence with the Governor-General. In doing so, they particularly emphasised the point that the Chiefs of the State were arrayed against the British. They thus reinforced the argument of Dalhousie that there was no chance of having a friendly state in the Panjab. Hon'ble F.Millet wrote:

"The Khalsa state was spared after a Signal overthrow of its army, the result of severe conflicts consequent on a most unprovoked aggression and it was propped up by the strength of the British force when unable to support itself Yet after a brief period of little more than two years, we see the Sikh army and population and nearly all the Chiefs arrayed in open hostilities against us, thus evincing a deep rooted and irreconcilable hatred while [which] seeking [seeks] the destruction of our power in the Punjab, compels us in self defence to deprive them of the means of future mischief."²

The other member Sir J.H.Littler, who knew the Panjab well because he was the head of the British contingent stationed at Lahore before joining the Council, also emphasised the fact of the Chiefs' hostility to the British. He described them as "a faithless treacherous race, and on

-
1. Minute by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India, 30 September 1848. I.S.C. 7 October 1848, No.621.
 2. Minute by Hon'ble F.Millet dated 30 September 1848. I.S.C. 7 October 1848, No. 622.

whom reliance can never be placed." This is what he wrote in the most important part of his Minute:

"The occupation of Lahore by British troops according to the Treaty of December 1846, was effected at the earnest solicitation of the Members of the Darbar on behalf of the young Maharaja with the view of serving the tranquillity of the Country as well as their own safety.

That such a change should have come over the minds of the Chiefs during the short period of two years and the anxious desire evinced by the whole Sikh population to break off all connexion with the British is most unaccountable, and can only be attributed to an unfounded apprehension and dread of the Punjab being ultimately converted into a British province, and of the overthrow of the Khalsa Raj.

At present, they appear to be guided solely by their Chiefs and Sirdars, a faithless treacherous race, and on whom reliance can never be placed."¹

A week after this meeting in which Dalhousie and the Council members had discussed the subject, Dalhousie wrote to Hobhouse:

"The Govt. of India after anxious and grave deliberation have without hesitation resolved, that the Punjab can no longer be allowed to exist as a Power and must be destroyed."²

Dalhousie did not announce this decision publicly. The Resident at Lahore, however, was given a hint on 3 October in an official letter in which he was informed that "the Governor-General in Council considers the State of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes at war with

1. Minute by Hon'ble Sir J.H.Littler, G.C.B., dated 30 September 1848. I.S.C. 7 October 1848, No.623.
2. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 October 1848. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476. f.252.

the British Government."¹ Five days later, Dalhousie told Currie about it more explicitly in a private letter.

"To the last, I have sought honestly to give effect to a policy which I approved. I have sought to avoid war or conquest. I now seek no longer to pursue a policy which I am satisfied can never be successful, and I have resolved to prosecute with vigour a war, which on the part of the Govt. of India I had hoped to have avoided. The Sikhs have forced me, for this Govt., again to draw the sword, and I beg you to interpret my words in their clearest and most emphatic meaning when I say that being compelled to it I have drawn the sword, and have thrown away the scabbard, both in relation to the war immediately before us, and to the stern policy² which that war must precede and establish."²

Dalhousie, however, did not want that the ultimate policy should be made public though the assistants were to be told about it. He ended his directions to Currie with the observation:

"The remarks I have made and the instructions the Govt. have issued will give you the cue as to the resolution it has formed. Nothing should be said as to our ultimate policy at present, but your assistants may with advantage be cautioned not to make more frequent mention of the future Govt. of the Maharaja than need be."³

Dalhousie's reluctance in publicly declaring that annexation would follow the close of the war may have been partly due to the fact that he was expecting some directions from the home authorities on the subject. He had written to

1. Secretary to Currie, 3 October 1848, quoted in Currie to Dalhousie, 12 October 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, p.103; Currie to Gough (?) 13 October 1848. Ibid. pp.107-8.
2. Dalhousie to Currie, 8 October 1848. Ibid., p.100.
3. Ibid., pp.101-102.

Hobhouse on 15 August and could have reasonably hoped for some directions, conveyed privately if not officially, in the first or second week of November. He could have afforded to have waited till then because there was no likelihood of his annexing the State before the middle of November because the preparations of the Commander-in-Chief for a large scale operation, originally planned to begin in November were not completed so far. Perhaps he was conscious of two other disadvantages of a public declaration of annexation even before Currie had pointed them out to him. It would have put the British resident and his assistants, then engaged in "Superintending and aiding the administration of the Lahore State" in "an anomalous position". It could also rouse "the whole country up at once as one man to destroy us if possible."¹

By the last week of January, Dalhousie received the instructions from home. He was to review the question of annexation and not to adopt it till the home authorities themselves had given a mature consideration to the problem of the future of the Panjab. It was only in the case of emergency that he was given the right to annex the Panjab on his own.²

-
1. Currie to Dalhousie, 12 October 1848. Private Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh. p.103.
 2. See references given in the footnote on p.258 All the references have to be read together to reach the above conclusion.

This despatch and the letters of Hobhouse explaining what the home authorities, including the Prime Minister, wanted Dalhousie to do, came at a time when the war had entered into its last and crucial phase. Gough and Sher Singh had already fought three battles which did not seem to have created a favourable impression of the military prowess of the British in their ~~own~~ Indian empire. On the top of it, Dost Muhammed had marched within the boundaries of the Panjab and had "seized Peshawar publicly."¹ Dalhousie felt that these events made annexation all the more necessary. He, in fact, now linked its necessity with "national self preservation", by which he meant the security as well as the future of the British Empire in India. This is what he wrote to Hobhouse on 21 February 1848:

"I cannot think that after hearing of the course of events as it has run and especially of the Afghan interference, that Either you or the authorities at the India House will entertain any doubt as to what it will be my duty to do on your behalf.

But I am earnestly desirous to free myself from all appearance of want of candour in speaking to you on this point; and I will therefore repeat to you, that whatever reasons I saw for the policy I advocated in September, they have been strengthened fifty-fold by the Events that have since occurred.

Let me remind you, as I have already said to the Chairman yesterday in nearly the same words that we are now engaged with a formidable Enemy, - with that power wh. in India has been regarded as the one fit to cope with us. The eyes

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 February 1849. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, f.311.

of all India are on us now. The Events of the Campaign have unhappily been such as that 3 indecisive actions, with the loss of guns on two occasions & heavy slaughter of our troops, have justified for the time the belief that Even a Single nation may successfully resist the power, wh. once was thought irresistible by the force of the combined powers of India.

Above all the Ameer of Cabul, proclaiming himself the Apostle of Islam, and calling on all Mussalmans to join in a Holy War against the Feringhees, has joined the inveterate Enemies of his people in order to [a] combined attack on us. There is a Mahommedan invasion from the West.

This is no question of provinces. This is a direct appeal to the Mohommedan India. - If you do not boldly meet this invasion, crush it and eject the invader, and hold as your own every foot of the territory which has been forcibly taken by the Mussulman from under the protection of Britain, you will be considered as having been worsted; you will assuredly encourage hopes of restored supremacy in the minds of Mahommedan States & people here in India; where hostility is now dormant perhaps, but where it is not, and where it never will be, Extinct: you will lay the first hand on the fabric of your own power in India; and you will take the first step towards retiring some day from it.

I regard this now as a question of national self preservation. If the national superiority be fully vindicated in the eyes of the native powers now, I apprehend nothing in the future. If not - if this Mahommedan invasion be submitted to, if concession or compromise be made - if anything be done wh. shall appear to fall short of full assertion of absolute superiority now over this Enemy, & of maintenance of it hereafter; I believe in my conscience, it will be the beginning of misfortune & of dangers to this Empire."¹

That being his feeling, he felt it necessary that the Panjab must be annexed. He wanted Hobhouse to

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 21 February 1849. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add.MSS. 36476, ff.402-404.
Note: The underlines are those of Dalhousie.

"appreciate the motives wh. lead me frankly and honourably to declare to you beforehand that I adhere to the conviction I have previously laid before you - & that I have been confirmed by subsequent Events in the conclusions on wh. I must act, in the absence of positive orders to the contrary, when the time for acting comes."1

Events, however, moved with a rapidity that prevented Dalhousie from waiting for "positive orders", if he expected them in response to this letter. The very day, he was writing it from Ferozepur, Gough was fighting the battle of Gujrat in which the combined armies under Chatter Singh, Sher Singh and the son of Dost Muhammed were routed. Three weeks later, Sher Singh and Chatter Singh were to surrender. Within a fortnight of that surrender the Afghans were to leave the Panjab and (the) Peshawar was to be occupied by the British forces.

An important consequence of the war as it was waged after November 1848 was that remnants of the Darbar and the Chiefs who were at Lahore had ceased to have any say in the affairs of the State. Perhaps believing that annexation was inevitably to follow the close of the (campaign) against the Atariwala Sardars, the Chiefs dared not show any keenness about it either. The result was that the entire administrative machinery of the Darbar stood wrecked and Dalhousie felt, perhaps correctly that if no decision on the

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 21 February 1849. Broughton Papers. Br. Mus. Add.MSS. 36476, f. 405.

future of the Panjab was immediately taken on his own responsibility "the whole Country (already without Govt. or army) wd. have been in anarchy and confusion."¹ He therefore annexed it and left it to the home authorities to reverse the decision if they did not like it.² He wrote to Hobhouse a few days after the annexation:

"I am fully aware of the heavy responsibility I have assumed. I neither shrink from it, nor quail under it. If Her Majesty's Govt. and the Court think my act wrong and mischievous [,] there is no physical impossibility in the reversal of it. If you think that I have done what is unjust to the State of Lahore, or injurious to the crown of Britain, let each of you do his duty like a man. Disallow my act, reverse my policy. You will disgrace me, of course: but do not let that stand in your way. I shall submit quietly to the consequences now: well satisfied that the disgrace will be but temporary - that Time and Events will right me - and that a very few years only will pass before the course of affairs in the Punjab will prove the correctness of my views and will compel you to³ the adoption of the Policy wh. I have set up."

Note: Before sending the despatch of 24 November 1848 in which Dalhousie was directed to reconsider his proposal for annexing the Panjab and was told not to act on his own in adopting a new Panjab arrangement, Hobhouse consulted Russell, Auckland, Henry Lawrence and "others". They did

1. Dalhousie to Col.Low, 25 April 1849, Low Papers. Home Misc. 828.

Note: There are no folio or page marks on these papers.

2. This was by a proclamation dated 29 March 1849. For copy of the proclamation see E.Arnold, Dalhousie's Administration. pp.202-204.

3. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 April 1849. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36476, ff.500-501.

not favour annexation. Hardinge also gave his opinion against annexing the Panjab. The result was that Hobhouse, who had been opposed to Hardinge's arrangements as laid down in the Treaty of Bhairawal and who at one stage believed that the British would be ultimately forced to annex the Panjab¹ directed Dalhousie not to make a declaration of the aims of the British (obviously still being discussed) as long as the war lasted nor to annex it when the war was won. There is no evidence to the effect that Hobhouse privately encouraged Dalhousie "to annex the country on his own responsibility and then expect the acquiescence of the home Government" as has been suggested by G.D.Bearce.² On the contrary, Hobhouse repeatedly asked Dalhousie to occupy the Panjab militarily after the war was over but to leave the decision about annexation or any

-
1. Hobhouse to Hardinge, 7 November 1846. Broughton Papers. Home Misc. 853, p.64; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 6 July 1848, Ibid. 859, pp.29-30; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 6 October 1848, Ibid. pp.55-56.
 2. G.D.Bearce, British Attitudes towards India, p.206.

alternative arrangements to the Cabinet in England.¹

-
1. Hobhouse to Russell, 7 October 1848, Broughton Papers, Home Misc. 847, pp.18-19;
 Russell to Hobhouse, 11 October 1848, Ibid., Home Misc. 846, p.24;
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 23 October 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 859, pp.60-62;
 Auckland to Hobhouse, 30 October 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 846, pp.30-31.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 November 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 859, p.71;
 Russell to Hobhouse, 9 November 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 846, p.38;
 Hobhouse to Russell, 10 November 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 847, pp.27-28.
 Hobhouse to Russell, 19 November 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 847, p.29.
 Russell to Hobhouse, 20 November 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 846, pp.39-40.
 Hobhouse to Russell, 22 November 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 847, pp.30-31.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 November 1848. Ibid., Home Misc. 859, pp.77-79.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 December 1848. Ibid., Ibid., p.87.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 6 January 1849, Ibid., Ibid., p.97.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 February 1849, Ibid., Ibid., p.108.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 March 1849. Ibid., Ibid., p.138.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 4 April 1849. Ibid., Ibid., p.143.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 May 1849, Ibid., Ibid., p.156.
 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 May 1849, Ibid., Ibid., pp.164
 and p.166.

Conclusion

British policy towards the Panjab after the arrival of Sir Henry Hardinge in India can be divided into three phases: the first from his arrival until the beginning of the first Sikh War in December 1845, the second from then until the Treaty of Bhairawal in December 1846, the third from then until the annexation of the Panjab state by his successor, Dalhousie in March 1849.

The old policy followed by the British since 1809 was to have a strong Sikh State in the Panjab to act as a buffer between the Afghans and the Satlej which they had fixed as the boundary for their own empire in India. The existence of such a buffer suited the British interests well. They were concerned with the Afghan frontier and its defence both because they had become the paramount power in India up to the river Satlej and because till the middle of the nineteenth century, they had the fear of one or other of the European powers threatening it. There was, however, reluctance to undertake this costly task themselves. The next alternative then possible was to have a state in the Panjab that would itself be interested in defending the frontier which otherwise would have been their responsibility.

A strong Sikh state was ideally suited for that. It was not likely to join hands with the Afghans both for historical and religious reasons. The enmity of the two

people was of long standing, and the Sikhs were bound to be in constant dread of the Afghans and ever watchful of the Khyber pass and the power beyond it.¹

For this policy to succeed, there were two conditions that the Sikh State should have fulfilled. The first was that it should have been strong enough to defend itself against the Afghans. The second was that it should have trusted the British and been on friendly terms with them. Both these conditions were ideally fulfilled by the kingdom created by Ranjit Singh and served the purpose intended of it very well as long as he was alive. After his death in 1839, the two conditions on which the success of this policy depended started disappearing. Could that policy still be pursued when the prerequisites necessary to make it a success were not there? Hardinge's two predecessors were too busy elsewhere to give sufficient attention to this problem. Moreover such eventualities might arise only occasionally and would last only for a short while. The problem arose in its acutest form only during the time of Hardinge. In fact, for some time after Hardinge's arrival too this state looked strong and its Government striving to win the friendship of the British.

1. Most of the important conquests of Ranjit Singh after the Treaty of Lahore (1809) were at the expense of ^{the} Afghan. - Multan, Kashmir and Trans Indus were all part of Afghanistan before the rise of Ranjit Singh.

It was the assassination of Hira Singh on 21 December 1844 that threatened to change the situation completely. Hardinge saw in it the beginning of a serious problem for the British. He believed it arose from the Sikh army at Lahore. That army had developed the institution of the Panchas and through it become a powerful factor in the politics of the State. It was, however, extremely excitable by nature and would make a strong and stable government in the Panjab impossible. Its rising on the instigation of the rival chiefs to murder the wazir and its subsequent lack of discipline made Hardinge anxious.

His anxiety was two-fold. Primarily, he feared that the Sikh state, which had hitherto acted as a useful buffer was now heading towards dismemberment. In the convulsion and the mutinous state of the army that manifested itself on the assassination of Hira Singh, he saw its disintegration imminent. He believed that the Sikh State would soon lose the hills to the Rajputs under Gulab Singh. In the muslim majority areas of Kashmir, Multan and Trans Indus there would emerge muslim states. What would then remain would be an extremely weak state at Lahore. Would then the Afghan frontier be defended? Would then even the Satlej boundary of the British possessions itself be safe? Hardinge did not feel sure. His solution was that if Sikh rule over the entire Panjab could not last, the British must step in. In fact, he began to concentrate British troops on the frontier.

The eventuality envisaged by him did not arise but it led to an important correspondence with Ripon, the then President of the Board of Control in Peel's ministry. Ripon did not share his apprehensions. He regarded Hardinge's fears of the dangers arising from the emergence of the Muslim states as illusory. He, perhaps, doubted whether these powers would ever come into existence. In the emergence of the Rajput state on the hills which perhaps he expected, he actually saw the solution of the defence of the Afghan frontier. Two weak states, not quite friendly, looking to the British for advice could in fact be made to play that role.

Hardinge's other fear on hearing of the assassination of Hira Singh was from the Lahore army. It had increased its power and was likely to increase it still more. This army might itself pick a fight with the British. It might be provoked to it by some chiefs desirous of retaining their popularity with it. It might be provoked to do it by other chiefs who feared and dreaded it so that they might get rid of it. It might be instigated to force the British to institute a subsidiary system for the Panjab. This made it necessary for him not only to continue with the British troops he had originally ordered to be on the frontier but to increase them still farther later on.

This alone was not enough. There were the Cis-Satlej possessions of Dalip Singh that attracted his attention on

Hira Singh's assassination. As long as they were there and as long as they were part of the Lahore kingdom, a section of the mutinous Sikh army could not be prevented from being stationed there. There was particular danger if the fresh contingents coming from Lahore to replace the old one might be less amenable to the control of the British resident with whom the supervision of these territories rested. He wanted to seal off the Satlej border to this army and under the belief that the Rani, then known to be frightened of the army, would cross the Satlej together with the young Maharaja, thought of declaring these territories to be held on a personal tenure by Dalip Singh. It was an important matter and so he thought of taking Ripon into his confidence. As in the case of his envisaging the dismemberment of the Sikh kingdom, here too what he expected did not happen. But his raising the question with Ripon most probably became the immediate cause of the war. Ripon discussed the matter with Clerk, who was then in England. Clerk, though believing that the tenure on which they were held were not personal to Dalip, suggested that the administration of these territories ~~to~~ be taken over. Ripon went farther and hinted that these territories be demanded from the Government at Lahore and made British possessions. This intention of the British leaked out to the Sikh army through the indiscretion of Clerk. Hardinge believed that Mohan Lal had heard it from Clerk and passed it on to his brother-in-law Hodges in

India, and that the latter passed it to the Darbar. The dominant army could not be ignorant of it and became excited. Actually Jawahir Singh, the then wazir who himself was to be a victim of the wrath of the army for having brought about the murder of the royal prince Peshora Singh worked upon the army just before his death. The Chiefs and the Rani frightened of the menacing character of the army that had publicly tried and killed the wazir, took advantage of the excitement in the army and instigated it to cross the Satlej and the result was the first Sikh war.

Because of the precautions that he had taken on the frontier, Hardinge never really believed that this war would come. When it did come, therefore, he had no pre-determined policy. He was anxious, however, to end the war as quickly as possible for fear of adverse reaction in England and so after two hard fought and narrowly won battles, he promised the Chiefs in the midst of the war itself that the Sikh State would not be wiped away. This was done both privately and publicly. This served the purpose it was intended for namely, to widen the wedge between the Chiefs and the army which the momentum of the war threatened to bridge. The Chiefs were afraid of the army, and right from the beginning of the war were trying to remain on the good books of the English. This assurance of Hardinge's, therefore, was "a master stroke of policy."¹

1. Confidential notes of H.B. Edwardes on J.D. Cunningham's History of the Sikhs. Henry Lawrence Papers.

In spite of this assurance, however, there was bound to be a change in the British attitude towards the Sikh State in the Panjab. The fact that the Sikh army had challenged the British might was too big an event to have gone unheeded. The old policy of having a strong Sikh State as a buffer could not be relied upon when its army at least had proved unfriendly. Hardinge felt that to prevent the repetition of these events both the State and its army ought to be weakened. This was done by stipulating in the Treaty ending the war that the army would be reduced to one-fourth of its former strength. The resources of the State that sustained this army were also reduced by taking away the Jalandhar doab, the richest of the areas under it.

But how about the Afghan frontier which a weak Sikh State could not protect? Here, it seems, he remembered that Ripon had pointed out the possibility of having a Rajput state on the hills to act as a counterpoise to the Sikh state so that both might look to the British for advice. To make it a sufficiently strong counterpoise to the Sikhs, not only Jammu under Gulab Singh was made independent of the Sikh rule but Kashmir and Hazara when offered for the war indemnity by the Darbar were transferred to him. In fact by doing this Gulab Singh was so placed as to enable him to play the role of defending the Afghan frontier in collaboration with the Sikh State much more effectively because the boundary of the state under him extended right

to the Trans Indus districts of the Sikh State.

This ends the first phase of British Policy towards the Panjab between 1844 and 1849. It has been widely discussed but the chief work on it remains that of J.D. Cunningham. He was right in his main thesis about how the war came but was wrong when he threw most of the blame onto Broadfoot, the then Agent of the Governor-General on the North-West Frontier. This was particularly so when he asserted that Broadfoot was solely responsible for the proceedings about the Cis-Satlej possessions of Dalip Singh. He was evidently ignorant of Broadfoot having the complete support of the Governor-General. Though the Governor-General doubted Broadfoot's opinion that these territories were really held on personal tenure wanted them to be declared as such. That the President of the Board of Control actually wanted that these territories be completely taken over, he either did not know or felt it too dangerous to mention. Dr. K.C.Khanna had sought to correct Cunningham's undue emphasis on Broadfoot's actions on the frontier but like the celebrated author of the History of the Sikhs completely ignored that Ripon and Clerk in England had desired to go much farther and it was the leakage of this intention that had contributed more to the first Sikh War breaking out than the proceedings and actions of Broadfoot.

In the matter of creating Jammu and Kashmir as a separate state too, Cunningham seems to have ignored one

important consideration. He was perhaps ignorant of it. He had attributed it to Gulab Singh's treachery and the desire to weaken the Sikh State. He was right when he mentioned the second of the two reasons but unduly emphasised the first. The treachery might well have been there but what seems to have been an important consideration, apart from the one of weakening the Sikh State, was the possibility of defending the Afghan frontier under the arrangement. The best way of doing that, of course, would have been to have a strong Sikh State, but now that Hardinge had decided to weaken it, the next best was the one of having Rajput state on the hills and Sikhs on the plains and both looking to the British for advice. That this arrangement would really succeed in defending the Afghan frontier had been pointed out by no less a person than Ripon and he could, therefore, adopt it.

The end of the war began a new phase in British Policy towards the Panjab. Hardinge would ^{or} have preferred annexation, had it been possible without a long war. But once new arrangements had been made, he seems to have been sincere in giving them a trial. That he should have agreed to leave behind British troops at Lahore and thus agree even to a subsidiary system which he believed was the last thing that the British should have thought of for the Panjab, is proof that he was keen on seeing a stable Government established

there. In a weak Sikh state lying between the British and the Afghan frontier, this was even more necessary than in the state that existed there before the war. He rightly felt that the reduction of the Sikh army was the first essential for internal stability and this could not be done without the British help. That he agreed to leave the British troops at Lahore only for nine months reveals his reluctance to place the Panjab under a permanent subsidiary system.

But could the Government that had emerged out of the Sikh war stand after the British had withdrawn their troops from Lahore? It was an important question which assumed a special urgency for him when he heard of his own ministry resigning in England and his political opponents taking over.¹ When the Rani and Lal Singh, who conducted the administration after the Treaty of Lahore, themselves confessed that they could not manage, he thought of a new plan of supervising the entire administration through the British Agent. He sketched out the whole scheme for the approval of the new President of the Board of Control in the new ministry. It was discussed but before the sanction

1. It must be remembered here that in the new ministry, the President of the Board of Control was Sir John Hobhouse who attached much more importance to the Russian designs on the Afghan frontier than the ministry of Peel and the President of the Board of Control in that ministry.

came Hardinge's Secretary, F. Currie and H. Lawrence had already obtained the approval of the Sardars of Lahore to the new arrangement.

The Treaty of Bhairawal began the last and the most important phase of British policy towards the Panjab during the period under study. It was a novel experiment never tried in any of the Indian states. The old administrative machinery stood intact with the Darbar at Lahore, and Nazims and Kardars spread out. But they had side by side the Resident at Lahore and his assistants wherever he deemed it proper to place them. The Resident was all powerful, but how was he to conduct himself in relation to the Darbar and the subordinates under it? This was an important matter because the success or failure of the experiment was to depend on it. Hardinge evidently did not give enough thought to the problem. He left it to the discretion of the man on the spot.

The intention of this arrangement was to put the state on a sound footing so that after eight years it might be able to play the role of a buffer effectively. But how was this to be done? Evidently it could be done only by removing the abuses in the old administration machinery so that it might be able to function more effectively when left on its own. But at the same time there was the more important task of the reduction of the Sikh army. The work

had been left unfinished by Lal Singh and had priority over other reforms.

Under the circumstances, it was politic to have the co-operation of the Darbar and the chiefs in any steps of improvement, though this might have meant going slow. This is what Henry Lawrence sought to do. He, in fact, wanted to keep the Darbar in good humour because its composition was such that the loyalty of all its members to the British could not be taken for granted.

Henry would not also think of alienating the chiefs whom this Darbar represented. They constituted the material out of which a stable Government was, in fact, ultimately to be formed. Henry's plan of not giving any offence to the chiefs was politically wise because the Treaty of Bhairawal had deprived the Rani of power and influence. With the prestige attached to her as the widow of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the mother of Dalip Singh, she could be a rallying point of dissatisfaction.

Unfortunately for Henry Lawrence his brother, John Lawrence stood for everything that would hit the chiefs as a class. As the Commissioner of the Jalandhar doab, he had initiated and carried through a jagir policy which had hit all types of jagirdars. The hill chiefs expecting their old territories were reduced to the level of ordinary jagirdars. Others who expected theirs in perpetuity received them for life. They were also deprived of the contingents that gave

them social status. Important members of the Lahore Darbar also lost their jagirs in the Jalandhar doab. His summary settlement there at the same time made Chaudharis and Lambardars angry. In his hurry to finish the Summary Settlement as early as possible and in his desire to make the land revenue on the cultivator as light as he could, he failed to make proper provisions for the Inams of Chandharis and Lambardars or compensate them in any way for the privileges that they had lost. These influential classes in all probability spread their discontent on the other side of the border and made the chiefs, Chandharis and Lambardars in the Lahore state apprehensive.

With the supervision of the administration of the Lahore state under the British, the chiefs and notabilities there were likely to feel concerned at what John was doing in the Jalandhar doab. In a way their apprehensions might have turned into real danger when John Lawrence came over to Lahore and soon after his arrival began the Summary Settlement in the Lahore state itself. It involved not merely fixing the land revenue in money terms but also direct administration there by the British assistants with Nazims and kardars set aside to brood over the privileges they once had. It involved complete overhaul of the economic administration of the Lahore Darbar with Dina Nath the cleverest and the most intelligent member of the Darbar, losing the grip that he had over it before John came to

settle the land revenue. It even meant that the Darbar felt that its co-operation was, henceforth, to be completely dispensed with. The Summary Settlement involved also the collection of old arrears from the influential chiefs by threats of imprisonment and confiscation of jagirs.

John's measures in the Jalandhar doab and later in the Lahore state had in a sense introduced an element of dichotomy in British Policy towards the Panjab at least as it was followed in practice after the Treaty of Bhairawal. Henry had sought to win the Sardars and the chiefs; John, on the other hand, cared more for the cultivators and the oppressed.

John's jagir and revenue policies in the Jalandhar doab and his Summary Settlement of the territories under the Lahore state succeeded in undoing Henry's work as the resident. It alienated the Darbar and the chiefs within a year and a quarter of the Treaty of Bhairawal by which they had willingly agreed to put themselves and the administration of the state under the supervision of the British. Currie who had a hand in making the chiefs agree to the Treaty of Bhairawal in December 1846 noticed it and felt apprehensive when he came to take charge of the residency. Soon after his arrival when the two British officers at Multan were assassinated and Mulraj revolted, Currie felt himself and his assistants isolated from the Darbar and the chiefs when their co-operation was most needed.

We are tempted to ask why Hardinge allowed this dichotomy to be introduced in his Panjab-policy. The explanation to a great extent lies in the unco-ordinated nature of the different aspects of that policy. There was no overall plan in which Hardinge could fit the social and economic measures that he would sanction for execution. The probable explanation of his approving the Jagir and Summary Settlement in the Jalandhar doab with its bias against the chiefs may lie in his belief that thereby he was bringing the administration of the newly acquired territory into conformity with the general pattern elsewhere. John had pointed out to him that politically also it was desirable to make the mass of the people feel the benefit of the change from Sikh to British rule. He was evidently then ignoring the difficulty that he was creating for Henry in his plan of work at Lahore.

The explanation of Hardinge's sanctioning the Summary Settlement in the Lahore state, which perhaps contributed a great deal to the ultimate failure of the Bhairawal arrangement, is different. When he was required to do this, he did not have Currie with him. Currie, on whom he had depended a great deal in the Panjab policy that he had pursued so far, had moved to Calcutta as a member of the Council. His place was taken by H.M.Elliot who was a brilliant revenue officer but completely new to the complexities of the Panjab. Hardinge, who would himself give

close attention to the political aspect of the Panjab question, seems to have depended on the advice of his new Secretary, H.M.Elliot in a matter like sanctioning the introduction of the Summary Settlement in the Panjab. There was another reason why Hardinge did not feel it necessary to object to John undertaking the work. Henry, whose policy of working in co-operation with the Darbar and the chiefs, was ultimately to be upset by John's measures, had himself recommended that John be allowed to start the Summary Settlement.

But why should have Henry done that? That is a complicated story. The explanation most probably lies in his wish to prevent Currie from coming to Lahore when he was himself being forced to leave the residency due to illness. He had received the Lahore appointment after the Treaty of Bhairawal because the Sardars at Lahore had insisted on it. Hardinge had then wanted to appoint Currie as the resident. The governor-general seems to have given way to the wishes of the Sardars because Currie was about to become a member of his Council but more than that because he expected then that Henry with his weak health would not be able to stand the strain of work at Lahore. He perhaps felt that then it would be easier to shift Currie without either offending the Sardars or Henry Lawrence. As expected by Hardinge, the health of Henry did really break down but he refused to give up his Lahore appointment permanently.

He handed over the residency to John to act for him at Lahore, left for Simla and from there continued seeking permission to go on sick leave to England. That created a problem for Hardinge. Currie, by now a member of the Council, could not be expected to give up a permanent seat there for a temporary post at Lahore. Hardinge, however, proceeded tactfully. He excited Currie's ambition by emphasising the special nature of the work at Lahore. He pointed out to Henry Lawrence the difficulty of his going on leave without a special recommendation from the Governor-General to the home authorities. The result was that Henry and Currie agreed to an arrangement for which Hardinge was to secure the approval of the authorities in England. By this agreement, Henry was to go on leave for two years to England and Currie to take his place, without giving up his seat in the Council. In spite of this agreement, however, Henry seems to have continued to believe that Currie might yet not come to Lahore. The home authorities might not agree to the recommendations of Hardinge. For a member of the Council to come to take another appointment was against precedents.

Until the sanction of the home authorities had come and Henry officially ceased to be the resident at Lahore, John acted for his brother. Henry had actually wanted John to take his place when he himself would be in England. He had repeatedly hinted as much to Hardinge. The latter would

not agree because he wanted Currie. If however the home authorities did not agree to the arrangement agreed upon by Currie and Henry, John might yet be appointed.

While it was still uncertain how long John would remain at Lahore, he asked the Governor-General's sanction to start the Summary Settlement in the Lahore kingdom. The latter did not object if Henry Lawrence for whom John was then acting, approved of a detailed plan. John consequently prepared one and sent it to Henry. The latter, conscious of its serious political implications, prevailed upon John to modify it so as to find room for the Darbar's co-operation in the work and to show less severity to the chiefs while collecting arrears from them. It was this modified plan that Henry recommended to the government. Even this was done by Henry most reluctantly.

Henry most probably felt that John's success in the Summary Settlement would make Hardinge less eager to send Currie to Lahore. He also, perhaps, believed that John's success in the Summary Settlement of the Lahore state on the modified plan he had recommended to the Government might enable John to continue at Lahore for the entire period of his stay in England. Moreover, he was hardly in a position to make an issue of the Summary Settlement with John at this stage. Ill and worn out he was desirous of leaving for England.

In practice John did not act according to the spirit

of the plan forwarded to the Government. He went about in the way that was natural to him. The Darbar was ignored, Nazims and kardars were set aside to make room for young English assistants and chiefs were treated harshly. He, in fact, brought the dichotomy in the British Policy towards the Panjab after the Treaty of Bhairawal to its climax.

This dichotomy seems to have gone a long way in the failure of the British Policy to prop up a stable Government in the Panjab by supervising the administration of the state for eight years. It united the chiefs with the discontented Lahore army in hating the British. It is significant that in the crises that followed the murder of the two British officials at Multan, more and more chiefs participated in the war which was for some time fought quite desperately. It is also significant that they openly proclaimed that they did so against the British and declared that their object was "to eradicate and expel the tyrannous feringees". If all of them did not do so, it was perhaps because they did not feel sure whether the British were fighting for the Maharaja to preserve the state or for conquest and annexation. Perhaps their division into rival factions and the feeling that the British would ultimately win had also something to do with it. But the large number that fought under the leadership of the two Atariwala Sardars in the winter of 1848-49 was sufficiently indicative of the Chiefs'

resentment against the British. The explanation why the Chiefs felt thus within two years of their having themselves sought British intervention in their independent state may be found in the social and economic policies that the British pursued in the Jalandhar doab in 1846-48 and in the Lahore state in 1847-48.

Appendix I

Cunningham's History of the Sikhs

§1. Though more than a century has passed since it was written,¹ Cunningham's History of the Sikhs is still a standard work.² His periodization of Sikh history and his basic opinions are largely acceptable now. That Sikhism was in the traditions of the Bhakti cult³ and arose out of the contact between Hinduism and Islam has become axiomatic.⁴ That the persecution of the Mughals drove the Sikhs to assume a militant character is admitted without debate.⁵ His conception of the period between 1716 and 1764 as that of the establishment of Sikh Independence, aided by the rivalry between the Afghans and the decaying political authority of the Mughals remains unchallenged. His fifth chapter in which he has described the misls as "Theocratic confederate Feudalism" is controversial but the alternative concepts are no less so. The achievements of Ranjit Singh in creating a strong monarchy are covered in two chapters which are regarded as important source material for writing on the Sikh Maharaja. The post-Ranjit Singh period

-
1. Written in 1848, it was first published in 1849. The second edition came out in 1853.
 2. P.Spear, The Oxford History of India, Part III (re-written in 1958) p.619. "J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (Oxford 1918) remains the best descriptive work on the Sikhs up to 1846."
 3. A.C.Bannerjee, Anglo-Sikh relations. Introduction p.xxxii; Indu Bhushan Bannerjee, Evolution of the Khalsa Introduction. Vol.I. p.1.
 4. Arnold Toynbee in Forward to Selections from the Sacred of the Sikhs repeats the same view.
 5. Indubhushan Banerjee, Evolution of the Khalsa, Introduction, Vol.I. p.4 and pp.12-14.

including the after effects of the Tripartite treaty and the first Afghan war is the background to the final thesis of the last chapter, entitled 'The War with the English'.

Cunningham argues in this chapter that the Sikh army and its 'Panchas', by 1845 a political force in the Lahore State, did not want war. The selfish leaders of the state did, however, with the intention of having the troublesome army destroyed and of securing an alternative arrangement beneficial to them. The leaders succeeded in their plan partly because Hardinge, the Governor-General, was tactless,¹ but chiefly because the Agent of the Governor-General on the frontier, Major Broadfoot, was provocative in his actions²

-
1. The Governor-General's tactlessness consisted in bringing the boats from Bombay to make bridges across the Satlej, in equipping troops in Sindh and in garrisoning troops in the north-west provinces. These gave the impression of aggressive designs (History of the Sikhs, p.286). The rapid approach to the frontier added to the Sikh suspicions (Ibid. p.293).
 2. Cunningham gave the following acts of Broadfoot as provocative:
 - (i) The Cis-Satlej possessions of Dalip Singh were declared to be under British protection and liable to escheat to the British Government on the death of Dalip Singh. Broadfoot acted on this principle even though this was not formally announced to the Lahore Government.
 - (ii) Display of force in the affairs of Anandpur-Makhowal.
 - (iii) Broadfoot's treatment of the Lahore force that came to relieve the force at Kot-Kapura.
 - (iv) Bridge-boats prepared at Bombay were not only dispatched to Ferozepore but they were armed and escorted by strong guards of soldiers.

"... every act of Major Broadfoot was considered to denote a foregone resolution, and to be conceived in a spirit of enmity rather than that of goodwill" (also to be noted is the footnote to this remark).

Cunningham's History of the Sikhs, pp.287-289.

and gave the impression that the British were preparing for an offensive. In the battles of the war that resulted, the Sikh army believing that it was fighting a defensive war, fought heroically but the commanders betrayed them and this is how the British won. The army was destroyed and Lal Singh, Tej Singh, Gulab Singh and Rani Jindan gained by the new arrangements which again according to Cunningham were defective. The authors of the arrangements were, therefore, criticised.

Cunningham's last chapter was one of the most controversial ever written by a British official connected with the events himself. We should make an attempt at understanding why he wrote it and the reaction it produced in the individual criticised in it. The history of the controversy evoked by the last chapter, which continued right till the close of the nineteenth century is also worth tracing. Some of the documents contained among the Lawrence Papers help us a great deal in both.

§ 2. J.D.Cunningham came from a talented Scottish family. Out of the twenty-three Cunningham's listed in the Dictionary of National Biography published in 1886, thirteen belong to the nineteenth century, and out of these thirteen

as many as six¹ are members of the family of which Joseph Davey Cunningham himself was one. Another member, Sir Alexander Cunningham, of the same family, finds a place in the supplement to the Dictionary published in 1901. What is interesting is that all these seven - his father, two uncles, and three brothers besides him - have literary connections. His father, a poet of some reputation, was a friend of Carlyle and an acquaintance of Sir Walter Scott. The former admired him and "the latter was favourably impressed with his style".² It was Sir Walter Scott who had secured a cadetship for Joseph and his brother Alexander in the Company's army in the same year.³ In India both the brothers attracted the attention of Lord Auckland and he selected Alexander to be his A.D.C. and Joseph for the work as assistant to the political agent on the Satlej frontier.

There was much in common between the two brothers. Both were antiquarians and contributed regularly to the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. If one wrote "Notices of Some Unpublished Coins of the Indo-Scythians",⁴ the other had an article entitled "Inscriptions from the

1. These six are: (i) Allan Cunningham vol.xiii, pp.308-310; J.D.Cunningham, ibid., pp.314-16; (iii) Peter Cunningham, ibid., p.321, column ii; (iv) Francis Cunningham, ibid., p.312; (v) Thomas Mounsay Cunningham, ibid., pp.317-318; (vi) Peter Miller Cunningham, ibid., pp.316-317.
2. Dictionary of National biography, vol.XIII, p.309.
3. Rev.David Hogg, Life of Allan Cunningham, pp.278-279.
4. By Lieut.Alexander Cunningham, Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol.XIV, Pt.I. January to June 1845, p.430.

Vijyamandir, Udaypur etc."¹ Alexander had "An Essay on the Arrian Order of Architecture, as exhibited in the Temples of Kashmir".² Joseph had "Notes on the Antiquaries of the Districts within the Bhopal Agency".³ The Government published Alexander's "Memorandum detailing the boundary between the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh and British India";⁴ it published also Joseph's "Notes on Moorcraft's Travels in the Ladakh, and on Gerard's Accounts of Kunwar".⁵ In fact, the similarities between the two can be carried much farther. Both had seen action in the first Sikh War and were very much interested in things Sikh. Both in their professional capacity, had come in contact with Gulab Singh:⁶ Joseph before the first Sikh War and Alexander after it. But while Joseph wrote a History of the Sikhs, lost his political appointment and died soon after in disgrace, Alexander was more discreet, did not write anything on the Sikhs, wrote a Geography of Ancient India, lived to become a K.C.I.E. and the pioneer of archaeological

-
1. Capt.J.D.Cunningham, J.A.S.B. vol.VIII - January to June 1848, p.68.
 2. J.A.S.B. vol.XVII - Part II, July to December 1848, p.241.
 3. J.A.S.B. vol.XVI. Part II - July to December 1847, p.739.
 4. J.A.S.B. vol.XVII. Part I. January to June 1848, p.295.
The boundary was determined by P.A.Vans Agnew and Alexander Cunningham but the Memorandum was written by the latter.
 5. J.A.S.B. vol.XIII. Part I. January to June 1844, p.172.
 6. The founder of the Jammu and Kashmir state, in March 1846.

work in the country he served.¹

To pay exclusive attention to the author of the book under discussion, the following points should be remembered to understand why he wrote the last chapter. During his near eight years stay in the North Western Agency from 1837 onwards, he had served for the first two and a half years under Colonel Wade and for the rest under G.Russell Clerk, Colonel A.F.Richmond and Major George Broadfoot. He was in a sense the disciple of Wade who had handled the Anglo-Sikh relations from 1823 to 1840. Wade and Ranjit-Singh were personal friends and while continuing to play their political game, they almost always succeeded in resolving the differences between the two Governments amicably. The two would be considerate to each other's position and limitations and would always avoid disputes reaching a breaking point. In fact, Wade to a great extent even owed his position as the head of an independent agency at Ludhiana to the ruler of the Sikhs. It was through Ranjit Singh that he made himself independent of Murray, under whom he had to work till 1827.² On Ranjit Singh's

-
1. A Summary Biographical Memoir of Major-General Sir Alexander Cunningham in Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India - Majumdar, pp.liv-liv.
 2. R.R.Sethi, The Lahore Durbar (In the light of correspondence of Sir C.M.Wade, 1823-1840) p.24.
E.R.Kapadia, The Diplomatic Career of Sir Calude Wade: a study of British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840, p.22.

request Lord Amherst had entrusted Wade with the handling of matters concerning the Cis-Satlej possessions of the Maharaja.¹ Murray on the other hand, was henceforth confined to superintend the Protected States of the Cis Satlej area. In the disputes that soon arose between Ranjit Singh and the Cis-Satlej chiefs, Wade would take the side of the Lahore ruler and Murray that of Paliāla, Nabha and Jind.² There was soon a controversy in the official correspondence between Wade and Murray, much to the embarrassment of the Government at Calcutta.³ In essence the controversy arose over Murray's wish whenever possible to curtail the powers of Ranjit Singh. Wade on the other hand, believed that the British were bound to preserve to Ranjit Singh the integrity of his territory even in the Cis-Satlej region as much as to any other independent state.⁴ Wade's main object, it seems, was to maintain harmony between the British and the Sikh Government. The controversy between Murray and Wade ended with the former's death in 1831 but seems to have left behind a feeling of jealousy and rivalry between the two agencies of Ambala and Ludhiana. After 1831 the agency at Ambala was under the charge of Sir George Clerk. Here we must note that

1. Ibid., pp.55-57.

2. For the details see, R.R.Sethi, The Lahore Darbar, Chapters III, IV, V.

3. Ibid., p.28.

4. Ibid., p.27.

Henry Lawrence had his first experience as a political under Clerk, whom he admired greatly.¹

As long as the Maharaja was alive Wade was successful but with Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, in the midst of the Afghan war, the jealousy of the Sardars of the Lahore court, born out of Ranjit's liking for Wade, asserted itself.² The rival groups of Fakir Aziz-ud-din and of Dhian Singh made things extremely difficult for Wade. Dhian Singh succeeded in even prejudicing Nao Nihal Singh, the de facto ruler of the Punjab at the moment. In the meantime the situation that had developed in Afghanistan made it necessary that there should be active co-operation on the part of the Lahore authorities. Auckland under the circumstances, had no option but to remove Wade from Lahore. This was on 29 January 1840. For Cunningham it was a shock. He may have regarded Dhian Singh and the Sardars at Lahore as the villains in the proceedings which

1. H.B. Edwardes & Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence, p.140.

Henry Lawrence's, Essays, Military and Political were "respectfully inscribed" to Clerk under whom he had "Graduated in the Best School of Indian Statesmanship".

The dedication of the book runs as follows:

" To

Sir George Russell Clerk, K.C.B.

under whom

The writer of these Essays

Graduated in the Best school of Indian Statesmanship

This volume

Is respectfully inscribed"

2. E.R. Kapadia, The Diplomatic Career of Sir Claude Wade, p.376; also the footnote on pp.265-266.

had resulted in the removal of Colonel Wade and G.R.Clerk, the head of the rival agency at Ambala, getting the appointment of the coveted Ludhiana agency also. And since Clerk had for some months past been acting at Ludhiana when Wade was on the Afghan frontier, he might well have looked upon the removal as the result of intrigue between Clerk and Dhian Singh.¹ Cunningham seems to have neither forgiven nor forgotten this incident and this explains to some extent the tone and contents of his last chapter.

From that view point, Cunningham's quarrel with Broadfoot in 1845 is also worth noting.

In 1842 Cunningham had gone on an extremely delicate mission to Jammu, Kashmir and Tibet. The British at the moment had suffered a reverse in Afghanistan and needed aid. Lahore, being in a state of turmoil, Gulab Singh and Jammu had special importance. But the situation was complicated because Gulab Singh's general, Zorawar Singh, had become involved in a war with Tibet and China. Without giving any offence to the Dogra chief, Cunningham was expected to prevent "the Lahore and Nepal dominions to

1. According to E.R.Kapadia, Clerk intentionally supported Dhian Singh and Nao Nihal Singh against Wade so that he might succeed to the agency resulting from the proposed amalgamation of the Ambala and Ludhiana agencies. Ordinarily Wade would have taken charge of it on his return from Peshawar - See E.R.Kapadia, Diplomatic Career of Sir Claude Wade, p.382 and footnote No.3. on the same page.

march with one another behind the Himalayas".¹ It was feared that since the English at the moment were themselves at war with China "the emperor of Pekin might confound independent Sikhs with the predominant English."² To secure the trade with Tibet as it existed before Zorawar Singh had started his war was another consideration.³ Cunningham was fortunate in effecting both these things. He prevailed upon Gulab Singh to surrender certain territories which his general had seized from the Tibetans, and the trade with Ladakh was restored to its old footing. We may say fortunate because Zorawar Singh had suffered a defeat and was killed. Gulab Singh, therefore, readily agreed to what was in the nature of an arbitration by Cunningham.⁴ His mission was thus a success,⁵ but out of

1. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, (2nd.ed.) p.249.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Even after the death of Zorawar Singh, the war between the Tibet forces and Gulab Singh continued for some time more. Zorawar was killed on 10 December 1841, and Cunningham succeeded in getting peace effected on 15 August 1842. Two treaties were signed: one between Lhasa officers and officers of Gulab Singh and the other on behalf of the Government of Lahore and the Emperor of China. For the text of the treaties, see M.K.Panikkar, The Founding of the Kashmir State: A biography of Maharaja Gulab Singh, second impression, 1953, pp.84-89.

5. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, (second ed.)p.251. Note: In the book, the author hides his own role in the transaction by referring to "... a British officer was sent to see that the grand Lama's authority was fully re-established"(Ibid., pp.249-250). The British officer sent was Cunningham himself.

it was born his quarrel with Broadfoot.

Major Broadfoot, who had succeeded Colonel Richmond as the political agent on the frontier, had to deal with what might be called the Mulla Ahmed case. Mulla Ahmed, a secret agent once employed by British officers in Kabul, had later shifted his activities to Kashmir. He informed the major that Colonel Richmond, through him, had carried on negotiations with the then Governor of Kashmir, Gulam Muhi-

-ud-din, for the transfer of the "allegiance" of that state to the British.¹ Cunningham was supposed to have full knowledge of the transaction. Major Broadfoot in the beginning did not believe the Mulla² but was later convinced that he had an understanding with Richmond and forwarded all the papers to the Governor-General with the observation that Mulla Ahmed himself had been under the impression that he was in secret communication with the British "not wholly without reason".³ The Governor-General directed Broadfoot to send all the papers to Lt. Cunningham and to request him to give a distinct account of the whole transaction.⁴ Cunningham admitted that he and Colonel Richmond had had letters from both the Mulla and the governor of Kashmir. But he categorically denied

1. G.Broadfoot to F.Currie, 3 February 1845. Para.7.I.S.C. 4 July 1845, No.81.
2. G.Broadfoot to P.Nicholson, 3 February 1845. Para.2. Ibid. No.84.
3. G.Broadfoot to F.Currie, 8 February 1845. Para.5. Ibid. No.85.
4. F.Currie to G.Broadfoot, 4 March 1845. Paras. 1&2. Ibid. Note: Colonel Richmond was away from India. Hence the enquiry was made from J.D.Cunningham.

that he or Colonel Richmond had given any encouragement in the matter.¹

That Broadfoot had given credence to the Mulla made Cunningham extremely angry, and he wrote a bitter letter to his superior. Broadfoot wrote an angry letter back.² The Governor-General knew of this quarrel and may have wondered whether it would be proper to retain both in the same agency³ when the first Sikh war came in which Broadfoot was killed⁴ and his place taken by Henry Lawrence⁵ who as we have already pointed out, was a disciple of Clerk.

Immediately on the cessation of hostilities, Cunningham was required to draw up a memorandum on Suchet Singh's treasure at Ferozepore.⁶ Gulab Singh, now no

1. J.D.Cunningham to G.Broadfoot, 23 March 1845. Paras. 9, 10 and 15. Ibid., No.96.
2. G.Broadfoot to J.D.Cunningham, 8 April 1845, Para.15, Ibid., No.97. Also see, Tarit Kumar Mukerjee, 'Joseph Davey Cunningham - Some of his Activities in India'. Bengal, Past and Present, Vol.LXXVI. Part I, pp.117-18. Note: Broadfoot disliked the "insinuation" of his running down his predecessor, made by J.D.Cunningham.
3. Hardinge in his MSS. "Notes on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs" refers to Cunningham's quarrel with Broadfoot. He also seems to suggest that for that reason he was "detached on duty to Bhawalpur". The work at Bhawalpur was of a temporary nature (demarcating the boundary between Bahawalpur and Bikaner) and it seems that Hardinge had made up his mind to remove him after Cunningham had finished this work but then the war came.
4. On 21 December 1845 the first day of the battle of Ferozeshah. For details see Major W. Broadfoot, The Career of Major George Broadfoot, p.392.
5. Henry Lawrence received Currie's letter "to come with all despatch". F.Currie to H.Lawrence, 24 December 1845, quoted in Sir H.B.Edwardes & Herman Merivale, Henry Lawrence, p.371.
6. The memorandum was drawn up on 8 April 1846, i.e. barely a month after the Treaty of Lahore (9 March 1846).

longer a Lahore functionary, claimed it as a brother of the late Suchet Singh. Cunningham recommended it to be handed over to the Lahore state according to the law of escheat prevalent during the time of Ranjit Singh and after. Hardinge did not like this memorandum. He thought it to be a case of partiality towards the Sikhs, and removed Cunningham to the Bhopal Agency.¹

The above account reveals that Cunningham had his grudges on grounds, both personal and public against Clerk, Broadfoot, Henry Lawrence and Hardinge - and also the Sikh Sardars whom he regarded as intriguing by nature and selfish in their intentions. He argued that the British policy towards the Panjab, conducted as it was by people who had no grasp of the realities of the situation at Lahore had been full of errors. They had played the game of the chiefs at Lahore.

Cunningham seems to have been writing his book in a leisurely way but it appears that he suddenly felt that it was necessary to get it published as soon as possible. Perhaps the outbreak of Mulraj's revolt began the impulse.²

1. A copy of the Memorandum is to be found with the 'Secret Notes of Hardinge on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs'. He writes in the 'Notes' that he had removed Cunningham to Bhopal because he was partial towards the Sikhs.

2. Mulraj revolt began on 19 April 1848.

Later the events in the Panjab became all the more serious, and publishing it seemed to have assumed new urgency both for him and his brother Peter Cunningham who was to arrange for its publication in England.

Joseph sent a part of the book on 28 April 1848 to the Court of Directors for permission to have it published. He also sent with it the preface intended for the book. This preface we find in the book as dated 9 December 1848. He requested the answer to the application be given to Peter. Joseph later argued, perhaps rightly, that the preface and the application made it clear that he was seeking permission to use unpublished official documents.¹ As it was, in the portion of the book accompanying the latter, no use had been made of such papers. This part of the book was shown to Professor Wilson who saw nothing objectionable in its publication.² The second part of the book had not so far reached the Court.

In the meantime the Under Secretary of the Court of Directors conveyed permission on 17 August 1848 to publish the book with the remark that the "court could be no parties to it" and the caution that the author would bear the "responsibility for opinions and statements" in the book. This was interpreted by Peter as sufficient permission

1. J.D.Cunningham to H.M.Elliot, 12 August 1850, I.P.C. 6 September 1850. No.209.
2. Hardinge to H.B.Edwardes, 20 December 1850. Henry Lawrence Papers.

to publish the entire book and he did not feel it necessary to show the second part of the book which he had soon received from his brother. In view of the permission and its tone, "The Court could be no parties to it" was interpreted as meaning that it (i.e. the Court) could not publish the book nor meet the expences of its publication and not that the author was not to publish the book at all. The phrase "responsibility for opinions and statements" was interpreted as meaning that the author would be answerable to individuals who had been criticised in the book.¹

Why is it that J.D.Cunningham did not send the entire book when he sought permission to publish it? It seems that on 28 April 1848, when he sent the first part, he was still writing the later chapters or giving them finishing touches. In the last two chapters there are repeated references to Henry Lawrence's article entitled "Lord Hardinge's Administration" which was published in the Calcutta Review of December 1847. Cunningham appears to have studied the article very thoroughly. He rebuts its arguments again and again in the footnotes of his last chapter.² Maybe the article itself provoked him to write the last chapter. But even if that was not the case, he was

-
1. J.D.Cunningham to H.M.Elliot, 12 August 1850. India Political Consultations, 6 September 1850, No.209.
 2. See, J.D.Cunningham's History of the Sikhs (1st ed.), footnotes on pp.294,302,303,306,309,319.

certainly revising and correcting the chapters and adding additional footnotes. In his hurry, perhaps, he had sent the first part of the book so that the Court might begin to consider his application. He actually wanted the second part of the book also to be shown to the Court but his brother to whom it was sent in fact did not do so, for reasons already given.¹

The hurry that he and his brother were in to have the book published suggests that Joseph wanted that mistakes originating with Clerk² and made worse by Hardinge and Broadfoot³ should be known in England. Hardinge's Panjab arrangements effected in 1846 had collapsed and the second Sikh war was spreading. Perhaps he thought that his book would be helpful in the formulation of a proper Panjab policy which was being widely discussed at the moment in England.⁴ The fact that Lord Auckland was in the Cabinet gave him perhaps reason to think that the last chapter in the book might in some ways have that effect.⁵

-
1. J.D.Cunningham to H.M.Elliot, 12 August 1850. I.P.C. 6 September 1850. No.209.
 2. See note at the end of the chapter.
 3. For these see footnotes on p.338
 4. Colonel Wade in England was publicly criticising Hardinge's Panjab arrangements and was suggesting that his own should be adopted after the war (the Second Sikh war) then in progress. India Office Library Tract 9. C.M.Wade, Notes on the State of our Relations with the Punjab, And the best mode of their settlement. The tract is dated 5 November 1848.
 5. Lord Auckland died in December 1848, but this was after J.D.Cunningham had even written the later chapters of the book not originally sent to Peter or the Court of Directors.

Unfortunately for Cunningham, the termination of the war and the annexation of the Panjab by Lord Dalhousie on his own responsibility by the time the book was published settled the matter of the Panjab and the last chapter of Cunningham's book did not serve the purpose for which it was intended. On the other hand, as Cunningham himself perhaps expected, it gave rise to a controversy which threatened to become as embarrassing as that of Outram and Napier, for the Cabinet, the Court of Directors and the Government of India.

His dismissal from the political service as was desired by the Court of Directors¹ and Dalhousie's tact²

1. Secret Committee to the Governor-General of India, 5 May 1849. Boards Drafts of Secret Letters to India, vol.19, No.1371; Secretary to J.D.Cunningham, 13 June 1849, I.S.C. 29 Sept.1849, No.1. Minute by the Governor-General of India dated 4 July 1849, Ibid., No.5; Secretary to Resident at Lahore, 11 July 1849, Ibid., No.6; Hobhouse to Hardinge, 26 April 1849. Broughton Papers, Home Misc. 847, p.60; Hardinge to Hobhouse, 26 April 1849, Ibid., Home Misc. 846, p.111; Hardinge to Hobhouse, 27 April 1849. Ibid., p.113; Secretary to J.D. Cunningham, 26 May 1850. I.P.C. 6 May 1850, No.210; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 25 April 1849, Broughton Papers, Home Misc. 859, p.151; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 May 1849. Ibid., p.160; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 July 1849. Ibid., p.187; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 1 August 1849. Ibid., p.198; Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 6 Nov.1849. Ibid., p.224. It seems that both the Court of Directors and the President of the Board of Control were anxious to mollify the feelings of Hardinge who had taken the publication of the book as an attack on his entire Panjab policy. Although it was Dalhousie who officially took the decision to remove Cunningham from the political service, this was because the home authorities had noticed the matter and wanted Cunningham's removal.
2. He prevented officials like Henry Lawrence from starting a public controversy in the press.

in handling the matter in India did succeed in keeping the threatened controversy within bounds. But in a subdued form in the beginning, more openly and with some heat later on, it continued right till the end of the nineteenth century.

§ 3. Lord Hardinge was the first to take note of the book and tried to fight Cunningham's thesis on the war through Kaye. Kaye who was then in England wrote a review of the book which gave Hardinge's views on the war, thereby rebutting Cunningham's charges and "insinuations". This review, in fact, mostly dealt with the last chapter of Cunningham's History.¹

In anticipation of a debate in Parliament in which he thought his Panjab policy would be criticised on the basis of the book, Hardinge prepared detailed notes on the book to be used in the course of discussion by "Graham or any other frd. of mine". Even Peel made himself master of these notes and other official papers to be ready to speak,

1. Out of the thirty-five pages, as many as seventeen are devoted to the last chapter of the book and ten to the eighth. See, "Cunningham's History of the Sikhs" Calcutta Review, vol.XI, No.XXII. (June 1849) Article VII, pp.523-558.

if required on the subject.¹

Hardinge and his son wrote personal letters² to Henry Lawrence on Cunningham's book and also sent him a copy of the History.³ Lawrence, on receiving the book, the letters of the Hardinges and perhaps a copy of the review written by Kaye wrote to the then editor of the Calcutta Review, the Revd. Alexander Duff, commenting on the book and on Kaye's review. Duff while acknowledging Henry's letter regretted that he had received it a day too late, otherwise he would have liked to add Henry's remarks to Kaye's review, which he had no hesitation in agreeing with Henry was inadequate. He, however, promised that any

1. Hardinge to Herbert Edwardes, 20 Dec. 1850. Henry Lawrence Papers.

"In the instance of Capt C's Book, shortly after it came out, I heard that Mr. G. Thompson intended to make his speech on the authority of the writer, & as the minister under whom I had acted was in the Hse of Com^s [sic. It should be Lords] I wrote at his desire the notes I now in strict confidence send you. They are a brief statement of facts & in the expectation of a Debate Sir Rob^t. had made himself perfectly master of them. They were written in the 3rd person in order that they might be handed in course of discussion to Graham or any other fd. of mine".

2. Henry Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 23 March 1849. Henry Lawrence Papers.

C.S. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 4 April 1849. Ibid.
 Note: C.S. Hardinge was the eldest son of Henry Hardinge and later inherited the Viscountcy from his father. He was the private secretary of his father when the latter was the Governor-General of India.

3. H. Hardinge to Henry Lawrence, 24 March 1849.

"I wrote to you yesterday a few comments on Capt. Cunningham's History of the Sikhs which I have sent to you through Lushington"

remarks that Henry would like to pass on would be incorporated in an article which Marshman was writing for the next number of the Calcutta Review. This article was to be on the Second Sikh War. Duff also promised to make his own comments on the book from the view point of religion in "Church observer",¹

Henry Lawrence, meanwhile, sought Lord Dalhousie's permission to write against the "misrepresentation of the acts of Govt," and "the slander of himself as well as others" in the Indian press on the basis of this book. Dalhousie's attitude was not very encouraging. He feared it would become a controversial correspondence. He all the same allowed Henry Lawrence to send his contradiction of "the false inferences of the whole press" but to do it without publicly giving out his name. Dalhousie's advice was to send the contradiction "without signature, but

1. Revd.Duff to Henry Lawrence, 7 July 1849. Henry Lawrence Paper. Note: This letter is in an envelope on which is written "Cunningham's History of the Sikhs". The last page of the letter is missing and so the name of the man addressing the letter is little difficult to determine. The way it has been addressed makes it clear, however, that it must be from the editor of the review. The editor then was Revd.Alexander Duff.

authenticating his letters to the Editor privately".¹
 Dalhousie's attitude seems to have prevented Henry Lawrence from entering the controversy. He did not contribute his share to Marshman's article,² nor did he write anything by way of an article for the press.³ But the way he felt about Cunningham's book can be gathered from two of his rough drafts. One of them runs as follows:

"I hope to be able to prove to you & your Readers that Captain C's Book is an untrue book. I might show that throughout it is an illusion, dealing in fancies & speculations rather than in facts attributing motives & long considered schemes & policy to so barbarous [a people] who

1. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 6 Sept. 1849. Broughton Papers. Br.Mus.Add.MSS. 36,477, f.75.
 After making a few comments on Cunningham's book and the reaction it produced in the press in India, Dalhousie wrote:
 "... Sir H.Lawrence lately wrote to me, complaining not only of the misrepresentation of the acts of Govt., but of slander of himself as well as others, and asking me leave to answer these articles. After consideration, I told him I cd not agree to his commencing in the newspapers what wd. become a controversial correspondence. At the same time I thought it very desirable that these false inferences of the whole press shd. go altogether without contradiction: and I have therefore allowed him to write his contradictions, & to send it without signature, but authenticating his letter to the editor privately".
2. An examination of Marshman's article reveals that there is not a word on the first Sikh war or any point touched by Cunningham in his book. Calcutta Review (old series) vol.XII, No.XXIII (September 1849). Art.VI. 'The Second Punjab War', pp.238-296.
3. H.Hardinge to H.B.Edwardes, 20 December 1850. Henry Lawrence Papers. After making a few remarks on Cunningham and the book, Hardinge wrote:
 "Lawrence had intended to write - but want of leisure & ill-health have prevented him".

acted from day to day by the day's impulse. I might prove all this. Capt.C. believes it & therefore I say his mind is not balanced to sober realities."¹

Another one by Henry was like this:

"On two grounds it [the book] requires an answer. The author has written in an anti-English spirit & more as a Sikh than Christian; more as a Punjabee than an Englishman."

Later,

"We are by no means satisfied that much courage was displayed Had Capt. C. when he was employed on the frontier for nearly ten years boldly denounced the wicked policy he was aiding in carrying out; had he confronted Mr. Clerk, Major Broadfoot & Col Lawrence & placed his position in the [blank]; had he published his book or otherwise publicly made known his sentiments while Lord Hardinge was in India, we might have admired his consistency however we might doubt his wordy wisdom; but when most of the actors have passed off the stage & he who alone, could have avenged the act, had left India² we confess we cannot perceive the courage."

It takes up the press that had taken up Cunningham's cause to task also:

"To those leaders of public opinion who have denounced Govt. in this matter³ we may ask how they would have liked the confidential correspondence of their offices to have been published without their knowledge even while important arrangements were still incomplete. How they would have liked their foremen & most confidential servants to have succeeded in their duties only by over-reaching their opponents by bribing some & deluding others, No Editor, no

-
1. This is in Henry Lawrence's hand-writing. There is no date on it but it must have been written sometimes on receiving the letters of Hardinge and going through the book. Henry Lawrence Papers.
 2. The reference is to Harding.
 3. Dismissal of J.D.Cunningham from political service.

man of business, no office public or private in the world would allow such dealings & yet [illegible] Capt C. is to be permitted while the Ink is scarcely dry announcing the result of a second & hard fought campaign, to announce to his country, to the reading native public of India, to jealous princes and rival Russia that our policy has been dishonest & grasping & that our eventual success was the price of perfidy."

Thus Henry felt but did not publicly write anything to start a controversy. He, however, passed on the book to an American missionary to be examined from the religious view point. This is the reply that Henry received:

"Last winter you handed me Cunningham's History of the Sikhs to look over with a request that I would note anything I might find in it contrary to what I deemed to be the truth. For a long time I was able to give it but little attention. But at length I went through the History & looked into appendices; and now I return the book, with thanks for the opportunity of reading it. Although the author everywhere exhibits sentiments which are worthy only of reprobation, I cannot say that I met with any important facts which my knowledge of the subject enabled me to take objection to. I have not read the Granth [the holy book of the Sikhs] as I mentioned to you before but the information I have all along received respecting them agrees in the main with what Cunningham says".

In the winter of 1850, Henry's disciple H.B.Edwardes was in England. He was being treated as a hero for his role in the Second Sikh War. To let the English public know of his fight against Mulraj in detail he was at the moment writing A Year on the Panjab Frontier. To clarify

1. J.Newton to Henry Lawrence, 29 July 1851. Henry Lawrence Papers.

a few incidents of the first Sikh war for the Introduction of the book,¹ he wrote a rough draft of that introduction and sent it to Hardinge. It was natural that while the first Sikh War was under reference, Cunningham's History of the Sikhs should also come up for discussion. Hardinge sent to Edwardes "in strict confidence" the "notes" on the History that he had prepared originally for his defence in Parliament with permission to "use the material at your discretion".²

It appears Edwardes thought of writing a book or an article contradicting Cunningham's observations in the last chapter of the History of the Sikhs. Using Hardinge's notes mainly, he prepared his own "Confidential Notes on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs".³ The amount of labour he gave to their preparation shows the seriousness of his intention to rebut Cunningham's thesis.

But he never did so. All he did was to have a fling at Cunningham in the preface to A Year on the Punjab Frontier which he had dedicated to Sir Henry Lawrence. The first two paragraphs of the Preface are:-

1. H.B. Edwardes had actually sent the Introduction to Hardinge who had done few corrections in it. The manuscript of the Introduction (part of it) with red "Notes" lie in the H. Lawrence Papers. The corrections were suggested in a private letter. H. Hardinge to H.B. Edwardes, 9 November 1850. Henry Lawrence Papers.
2. H. Hardinge to H.B. Edwardes, 20 December 1850. Ibid.
3. These notes in manuscript are in a note-book, lying in the Henry Lawrence Papers.

"If anyone expects to find in this book an attack on the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, the Resident at Lahore, the Board of Control, or anyone of the four-and-twenty Directors of the Hon'ble East India Company, he is deemed to be disappointed.

I have no grudge to pay off, no grievance to complain of, no official secret to betray, not even one document to publish consistently with my own honour and that of the Government I am proud to serve."¹

Cunningham's History of the Sikhs, we thus see was making Hardinge and his Panjab politicals fairly angry. This was particularly true of the chapter on 'The War with the English'. Within a couple of years of publication, the last chapter of the book had been submitted to three critical examinations. Hardinge had written one for Peel and Parliament, Kaye for the Calcutta Review, and Edwardes for we do not know what. Henry had wanted to write on it too but "ill-health and overwork" or the discouragement of Dalhousie came in the way of his writing for the press. The line of the defence against Cunningham's charges, as it appeared in Kaye's review of the book, in the notes of Hardinge and in the confidential notes of Edwardes was the same and may be analysed as follows:-

1. J.D.Cunningham's view that the British had no right to take the Cis-Sutlej States under British protection was

1. Major Herbert B.Edwardes, C.B., H.E.I.E.S., "A Year on the Punjab Frontier", vol.I, p.viii. Preface, 1st two paragraphs.

rebutted on the plea that Satlej and not the Jumna had long been the British frontier. Therefore Broadfoot was right in regarding the Cis-Satlej possessions of Dalip Singh as under his protection as Agent of the Governor-General on the North-West Frontier. There was, therefore, no provocation in preventing the entry of Sikh guards without the agent's permission even though they might only be coming to replace others. The other acts of Broadfoot which Cunningham had criticised, were also defended and it was argued that no offence was given by him to the Sikh army as to have provoked them and so play into the hands of their leaders.¹

2. Cunningham's charge that Lal Singh was in secret communication with the English so that the army would be destroyed was more difficult to meet but it was explained on the plea that Lal Singh was actually trying to deceive the English while communicating with them. Lal Singh's communications with Peter Nicholson and Broadfoot were admitted but it was argued that he was playing a double game. He wanted to remain on favourable terms with the English but at the same time did his best to see that his side won. It was a treachery against the English and not

1. Hardinge's MSS. "Notes on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs", Lawrence Papers; Edwardes MSS. "Confidential Notes on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs; Calcutta Review, No. XXII - Vol. XI. June 1849. Art. VII. Cunningham's History of the Sikhs, pp. 545-48.

for them.¹

3. Cunningham had attributed treachery to Tej Singh, the Commander-in-Chief, as also to Runjhor Singh who commanded the troops at Buddowal and Aliwal. Their role was explained on their imperfect knowledge of the position of the English forces in the battle fields. It was also argued that Tej Singh, at least, though the Commander-in-chief, was acting on the orders of the "Panchas".

4. Cunningham's most serious charge was that Jammu was cut off from the Panjab and placed under Gulab Singh because he had helped in the destruction of the Sikh army at Sobraon. According to him the transfer of ^{Kashmir to} Gulab Singh was the reward for the same thing.

In the case of Jammu the explanation given was that its severance under Gulab Singh from the Panjab was encouraged and accepted not because he had helped at Sobraon but partly because the Lahore state had to be weakened by separating the hill areas from the plains and partly because he had remained neutral in the two battles fought earlier.² As for Kashmir, the Lahore state ceded

-
1. Hardinge's MSS. on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs, sub-title 'Lal Singh's treachery'; Edwardes's MSS. Confidential Notes on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs under the sub-title: 'Raja Lal Singh treachery'; Calcutta Review. No.XXII - Vol.XI. June 1849. Article VII. 'Cunningham's History of the Sikhs', pp.549-50.
 2. Hardinge's MSS. Notes on 'Cunningham's History of the Sikhs'; Edwardes MSS. 'Confidential Notes on Cunningham History of the Sikhs'; Calcutta Review, No.XXII - Vol.XI. June 1849. Art.VII. 'Cunningham's History of the Sikhs.' p.550.

it to the British because it could not pay the war indemnity and they sold it to Gulab Singh. There was nothing dishonourable in the transaction because he was not the minister of the Lahore state.¹ After the war, he was only associated with Dina Nath,^{and} Fakir Nur-ud-din to make terms of peace with the British.

§ 4. In 1853, two years after the death of the author, appeared the second edition of the book with an additional preface written by J.D.Cunningham. This was written four months after Kaye's review of the first edition. We find here the author claiming an Englishman's right to say things "without either idly flattering or malignantly traducing his country, and also without compromising his own character as a faithful and obedient servant of the State."²

In the new edition the book suffered only a slight change in the text. The few changes that were there were

-
1. Hardinge in his MSS. Notes on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs writes that he resigned as minister of the state because he could not remain a minister with Rani Jindan as the Regent. Edwardes in his 'Secret Note, on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs writes, " he was not the Vizier" and was associated with others to effect peace with the English. Kaye in his review of the book did not comment on this.
 2. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, (2nd.ed.) p.x. 'Authors Preface to the Second Edition'.

all in the last chapter. There was one big change.¹ The others were minor. These changes were in consideration of the feelings of Sir Charles Napier and Lord Gough who had personally pointed out some errors to him.² In matters of opinion, however, he made no change. That this was so, we have on the assurance of his younger brother, Peter Cunningham "not from obstinacy but from a firm conviction that he was right."³

1. This change was in a paragraph to which Kaye's article had taken particular objection. The author re-drafted the paragraph more for the consideration of Lord Gough's feelings than because it had been severely criticised in the Calcutta Review.

In the first edition:

"But the warlike rage, or the calculating policy of the leaders, had yet to be satisfied, and standing with the slain heaped on all sides around them, they urged troops of artillery almost into the waters of the Sutlej to more thoroughly destroy the army which had so long scorned their power. No deity of heroic fable received the lining within the oozy gulphs of the oppressed stream, and its current was choked with added numbers of the dead and crimsoned with the blood of a fugitive multitude:

'Such is the lust of never dying fame'

But vengeance was complete;"

In the second edition, substituted by

"But the necessities of war pressed upon the commanders, and they had effectually to dispose that army which had so long scorned their power. The fire of batteries and battalions precipitated the flight of the Sikhs through the waters of the Sutlej, and the triumph of the English became full and manifest".

2. Captain J.D.Cunningham to Secretary Government, 12 August 1850. Para.6th. I.P.C. 6 September 1850. No.209. Also "Advertisement" to the Second edition, p.vi. Advertisement is written by Peter Cunningham, publisher of both the editions. It is dated 18 Jan.1853.
3. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, (second edition) pp. v,vi. "Advertisement".

A special feature of the new edition was two additional footnotes in the last chapter, making reference to Kaye's review of the first edition of the book.¹ Kaye's article was referred to and his arguments giving opinions opposed to that of Cunningham rebutted. We have already seen that Kaye's review represented the viewpoint of Hardinge on the controversial last chapter. In the new edition, then, we find this controversy reflected in the footnotes. Cunningham seems to have taken special care in writing these footnotes because he suspected "The reviewer writes like one possessed of official knowledge".² The thesis that the war began with the provocation given by the British Agent on the frontier and was won in collaboration with the other side was repeated. The additional footnotes actually gave the point a special emphasis.

The controversy whether the Sikh leaders were in collaboration with the English continued right through the nineteenth century both among the English and Indian

1. J.D.Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, (2nd. ed.) footnotes on pp.288,299.

These two footnotes are put in square brackets and begin by referring to the Kaye's review of the first edition of the book in the Calcutta Review of June 1849.

2. Cunningham's History of the Sikhs (2nd. ed.) footnote on p.288. Quoted sentence is part of the footnote.

writers. The fact is that the charge of treachery on the part of the Lahore leaders is older than Cunningham's History of the Sikhs. Colonel Mouton, a french employee of the Lahore state was the first to give currency to it. He did so in France when he wrote a report on the first Sikh War.¹ Treachery was referred to in A History of the Reigning family of Lahore written by Carmichael G. Smith in 1847. Cunningham's contribution lay in linking up the behaviour of the Sikh leaders with their prior understanding with the British. In particular, he threw light on the understanding effected with Gulab Singh before the battle of Sobraon. He had, in addition, attributed the success of the Sikh leaders in their game to the acts of Broadfoot, Peter Nicholson and Henry Lawrence and named them in the book. His being a 'political' himself made a difference too and so the charge of treachery on the part of Lal Singh, Tej Singh, Gulab Singh and Rani Jindan is associated mostly with the last chapter of his History of the Sikhs.

In 1865 Lepel H. Griffin wrote The Panjab Chiefs.

It "was written by the desire of Sir Robert Montgomery".²

1. Major W. Broadfoot, The Career of Major George Broadfoot, p.420. (The author does not give the name of Col. Mouton but the reference is clear enough). An English translation of Mouton's report has been brought out by Ganda Singh, The First Sikh War, 1845-46, translation of Colonel Mouton's Report with an introduction.
2. Lepel H. Griffin, Punjab Chiefs. Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families in the territories under the Punjab Government (1865) Preface p.i. Sir Robert Montgomery was the member of the Board of Administration that governed Panjab from 1849 to 1853. He succeeded John Lawrence as the Lt. Governor of the Panjab.

Griffin seems to have made an extensive use of Edwardes's notes on Cunningham's History of the Sikhs in drawing material for an estimate of the strength of the Sikh army before 1845 and in depicting the role of Tej Singh and Lal Singh in the first Sikh war. The arguments as well as the language make that clear.

But while the chiefs were reading Griffin, the people were singing a Var of Shah Muhammad. The poem is in many ways the last chapter of Cunningham expressed in Panjabi verse. The battles and the heroism of the soldiers in the first Sikh war are described graphically with Gulab Singh, Rani Jindan and other leaders having treacherously let them down.¹

In the early seventies appeared the biography of Sir Henry Lawrence by Herbert B. Edwardes and Herman Merivale. Unfortunately Edwardes died after writing only half the book and we can only guess whether he would have made any comments on Cunningham's History. Perhaps he would have used his 'Confidential Notes' so laboriously prepared twenty years earlier. Merivale who completed the work avoided the war on the plea that in it "Henry bore

1. The British Museum Catalogue (of Hindi, Panjabi, Sindhi, & Pushto) describes it as "A poem on the decline of the Sikh Power, and the progress of British rule". The first publication of the poem as indicated by its earliest edition is 1873 but we would do well to place the time when it first came to be sung in a popular form in the sixties of the last century.

rather a political part than a military one."¹ He, however, rightly noted that the book had perturbed Hardinge a good deal. The exact words of Merivale are as follows:

"The publication of the work of Major Cunningham (History of the Sikhs) in which it was suggested that the great cause of the 'Khalsa' was in fact 'sold' by the Sikh leaders on that occasion, excited a controversy which it is unnecessary now to revive but which produced at the time a good deal of soreness, especially in the mind of Sir Henry Hardinge."²

R.Bosworth Smith, the biographer of Lord Lawrence, however, did face the controversy and partly, if not fully, accepted Cunningham's view.³

In 1883 appeared Col. G.B.Malleson's Decisive Battles of Indian History. He wrote a chapter on Ferozeshah and Sobraon⁴ and basing himself completely on the History of the Sikhs described the understanding of the Sikh leaders with the English politicals in details.⁵ With the publication of this book the controversy over the reasons

1. H.B.Edwardes and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence, Third edition, p.381.
 2. Ibid. p.380.
 3. R.Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol.I, Sixth edition. 1885. pp.160-164.
 4. Col.G.Malleson, The Decisive Battles of Indian History Chap.X.
 5. Ibid. pp.316-324.
- Note: In a footnote on p.324 the author rebuts the view put forth by H.Edwardes that Tej Singh's action could be explained by the alternative explanation of cowardice. This explanation appeared in the Calcutta Review, vol.VI in September 1846 a few months after the close of the First Sikh war. Colonel Malleson believed this article to be by H.B.Edwardes.

for the English victory and the role of the Sikh leaders cropped up afresh.

In 1888 was published The Career of Major George Broadfoot by Major W. Broadfoot. The biography was stated to have been compiled from "His Papers and those of Lords Ellenborough and Hardinge".¹ In the preface, there is a word of thanks for Viscount Hardinge in these words:

"To Viscount Hardinge, for much information about Major Broadfoot; for many original letters and despatches connected with the Punjab; and for reading part of the manuscript and adding remarks which have a special value from one who was private secretary to the Governor-General in 1844, and throughout the first Sikh war".²

The author who was the brother of George Broadfoot seems to have based himself mostly on the defence written by Hardinge to be used in the debate in the Parliament, and defended Broadfoot's action. He rebutted the view that the Sikh leaders were in any way helpful to the British in the war and denied that the latter had entered into any understanding with them before or in the midst of the conflict.³ This biography was to be the last defence of Hardinge's view point in the nineteenth century.⁴ Cunningham'

-
1. Major W. Broadfoot, The Career of Major George Broadfoot, title page.
 2. Ibid., Preface, pp. 7-8.
 3. Ibid., pp. 419-424.
 4. In his father's biography (Viscount Hardinge, Hardinge) C. S. Hardinge avoids the controversy and does not even mention the name of Cunningham but certainly gives the details of the war in a way as to bear out his father's version. He quotes H. Lawrence, H. B. Edwardes, Broadfoot and Hardinge. Ripon correspondence).

version was by now generally accepted in its entirety.

Sir George Campbell, who as a young man had, immediately after the first Sikh war, brought about the settlement of the area where all the battles were fought read Broadfoot's biography in Egypt, and this is what he wrote:

"The immediate collision was, however, I think hastened by the imprudence on the part of the British Frontier Agent, Major Broadfoot. I know of some things done by him which it would be difficult to defend I am but one of the very few survivors who know the real facts, and I should not have thought it desirable to rake them up if there had not been published the other day a biography of Major Broadfoot which puts them I think, in a very misleading way; therefore I wish to say something of what I know."¹

Campbell then traced the different acts of Broadfoot contributing to the final outbreak of the war, and remarked:

"It is recorded in the annals of history or what is called history, which will go down to posterity, that the Sikh army invaded British territory in pursuance of a determination to attack us. And most people will be very much surprized to hear that they did nothing of the kind" What they did was to cross the river and entrench themselves in their own territory Under all circumstances, Major J.D.Cunningham, the historian of the Sikhs, seems to have much to bear him out when he says that they honestly believed that they were acting in defence of their territory. Broadfoot's doings in regard to it came to very near a political annexation In irritation they crossed the river and defied us to turn them out, and so war came."²

-
1. Sir George Campbell, Memoirs of my Indian Career, Vol.I. p.73.
 2. Ibid., p.78.

This is a strong defence of part of Cunningham's last chapter. He did not comment on the battles and the chiefs but even as he was writing these lines, Muhammed Latif was publishing his History of the Punjab in which he was accepting Cunningham's view that the chiefs had first provoked the war¹ and then betrayed it to ruin and destruction.²

By the end of the nineteenth century, the contemporaries of the events passed away and the controversy ceased to exist. Already in the ascendancy, Cunningham's account of how the first Sikh war came and how it was won is by and large accepted by all students of history now. His last chapter, as indeed the rest of the work, remains authoritative and practically the last word on 'The War with the English'. The quality of his work has covered up any prejudices that the chapter reflected against people with whom, he had some scores to settle.

Note:

J.D.Cunningham refers to the following mistakes of Clerk. They are referred to mostly in the footnotes of Chapter VIII. They consisted in not helping sufficiently

-
1. Syed Muhammed Lalif, History of the Panjab (1891) pp.531-539.
 2. Ibid., pp.541-543.

strongly the de jure ruler of Lahore Kharak Singh from 27 June 1839 to 5 November 1840. (From 8 October 1839 onwards Nao Nihal Singh, the only son of Kharah Singh was the de facto ruler of Lahore. He kept his father almost in captivity and never allowed him to see outsiders), being unduly considerate to the wishes of the Sardars when Wade was tough with them, conveying wrong estimates of Dhian Singh's capabilities to the Government and estimating erroneously the respective merits of the hill soldiers under Gulab Singh and hill chiefs on the one hand and Sikh soldiers on the other.

1. Footnote p.229. Clerk did not transmit Sher Singh's letter making claim to be the ruler of Lahore in place of Kharah Singh quickly enough to the Government. It is to be noted that Wade's policy in which he had the support of Lord Auckland was to strengthen the position of Kharak Singh.

2. p.239 and footnote. The premature assurance by Clerk with which Lord Auckland was not satisfied, to the Sikhs that "English force should not again march through Sikh territory". Wade at the moment was for being firm with the Sikh Sardars and not too considerate to their wishes.

3. Footnote, p.242. Clerk's erroneous estimate of the troops of Jammu Rajas and other Rajas of the hills relatively to the Sikhs.

4. Footnote, p.243. Clerk's proposition to Sher Singh (by now the ruler of Lahore) in March 1841 to put down the mutinous troops in Lahore by marching the British troops there.

5. Footnote, p.252. Clerk's overtures to Dhian Singh's capacity: "his talent and aptitude for business".

6. Footnote, p.253. Clerk not placing confidence in the friendship and efficiency of the Sikhs. Also his "low estimate of the Sikhs and their presumed inability to resist the Afghans".

Appendix II
Biographical Notes

Part I. (British Officials)

Abbott, Sir James (1807-1896).

Born on 12 March 1807; educated at Addiscombe; joined E.I. Company's military service and posted as a cadet with Bengal artillery in 1823; served at Bhartpur in 1825-26; was with the army of the Indus in 1838-39; went with D'Arcy Todd to Herat in 1839; sent by Todd to Khiva in 1840 to negotiate with the Khan of Khiva for the release of the Russian captives held by the Khan; went to Russia from where he went to England and stayed there till 1843; after the first Sikh War appointed Boundary Commissioner and demarcated the boundary between the Panjab State and the newly established state of Jammu and Kashmir under Gulab Singh; political assistant at Hazara serving under the British resident at Lahore in 1847-48; Commissioner of Hazara after the annexation of the Panjab in 1849; remained in Hazara till 1853; retired in 1879; died on 6 October 1896; also a man of letters; wrote Narratives of a Journey from Herat to Khiva, Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Broadfoot, George (1807-1845)

Born in 1807; educated privately in various day schools; joined E.I. Company's military service in 1825 and posted to 34 Madras Native infantry; Orderly Officer at Addiscombe College from 1832 to 1837; appointed to the Commissariat Department of the Madras Army in 1838; sent to Satlej frontier on the outbreak of the First Afghan War; sent to Kabul commanding the escort with the families of Shah Shuja and Zaman Shah in 1841; accompanied Sir Robert Sale's army from Kabul to Jalalabad the same year; fortified Jalalabad and became a garrison officer during its seige by the Afghans; was with General Pollock's army in the campaign of 1842 and distinguished himself in the actions in the Khyber, at Tezin and Manu Kheyl; made Commissioner of Tenasserim by Ellenborough in 1843; appointed Agent to the Governor-General on the N.W. frontier by Hardinge in November 1844; mortally wounded at the battle of Ferozeshah on 21 December 1845.

Broughton, De Gyfford, John Cam Hobhouse (1786-1869).

Born on 27 June 1786; educated at Westminster school and Trinity College, Cambridge; friend of Byron and travelled with him on the continent; committed to Newgate in 1819-20 (for about two and half months) for breach of privilege of the House of Commons; M.P. for Westminster; Secretary for

War in 1832-33; Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1833; M.P. for Nottingham in 1834; President of the Board of Control from 23 April 1835 to 4 September 1841 and again from 6 July 1846 to 3 February 1852; M.P. for Harwich in 1848; died 3 June 1869; wrote his Recollections of a Long Life, and a number of papers on literary, classical, political and historical subjects.

Clerk, Sir George Russell (1800-1889).

Born in 1800; educated at Haileybury; joined H.E.I.C.S. as a writer in 1817; held civil and political appointments in Bengal, Rajputana and Delhi from 1817 to 1831; in charge of the Ambala agency from 1831 to 1840; the Agencies at Ambala and Ludhiana were amalgamated in 1840 and Clerk was in charge of the combined Agency from March 1840 to June 1843; acted as the governor of the North-West Provinces from March 1840 to June 1843 when he left for England; came back as a provisional member of Council in 1844; twice Governor of Bombay - from 1847 to 1848 and from 1860 to 1862; Under Secretary of the Board of Control from 1856 to 1858; permanent under-Secretary of State for India from 1863 to 1876; died on 25 July 1889.

Currie, Sir Fredrick (1799-1875)

Born on 3 February 1799; educated at Charterhouse and Haileybury; joined H.E.I.C.S. as a writer in 1817; served in various capacities in the revenue and judicial departments for the next twenty years; was a Judge of the Sadr Adalat of the North Western provinces from 1840-42; appointed Secretary to the foreign department in 1842; was with Hardinge in the first Sikh War, 1845-46; after the battle of Sobraon drew up the Treaty of Lahore; made a Baronet in January 1847; officiated as a member of the Council from April 1847 to January 1848; resigned and worked as Agent of the Governor-General on the North-West Frontier from March 1848 to January 1849; joined the Council in March 1849 and remained there till 1853; came to England and elected a director of the E.I. Company in 1854; was elected the Chairman of the Court of Directors in 1857; was, in fact, the last Chairman of the Court of Directors; one of the seven members of the first Council of the Secretary of State for India elected by the expiring Company; vice-president of this Council from 1858 to 1875; died on 11 September 1875.

Cust, Robert Needham (1821-1909)

Born on 24 February 1821; educated at Eton and Haileybury; joined H.E.I.C.S. in 1843; served in the N.W.Provinces and

the Panjab in 1844 and 1845; present at the battles of Mudki and Ferozeshah in December 1845; acted as the Agent of the Governor-General on the N.W. Frontier from 21 December 1845 to 10[?] February 1846; deputy-Commissioner of Hoshiarpur in 1846 and 1847; deputy Commissioner of Ambala in 1848-49; prepared a report on the Panjab and its capabilities in 1849-51; magistrate at Benares and later in charge of Banda in Bandelkhand in 1851-54; came to England and called to Bar from Lincoln's Inn in 1855; took part in the Settlement of the Panjab after the mutiny in 1858; Home Secretary to the Government of India in 1864-65; retired in 1867; later the Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; published many books on the religions and languages of the world; died on 28 October 1909.

Edwardes, Sir Herbert Benjamin (1819-1868)

Born on 12 November 1819; educated at King's College, London; joined E.I. Company's military service in 1837 and posted as a cadet in the Bengal infantry in 1841; second lieutenant in the Bengal fusiliers in 1842; was the Urdu, Hindi and Persian 'interpreter' to his regiments; contributed to Delhi Gazette, 'Letters of Brahminee Bull in India to his Cousin John Bull in England'; aide-de-camp to Sir Hugh Gough at the battles of Mudki and Sobraon in 1845-46; assistant to Sir Henry Lawrence in 1846-47; in charge of

Bannu in 1847; won the victories of Kineyri and Suddoesam against the troops of Mulraj in 1848; came to England in 1850; Commissioner of Peshawar from 1853 to 1859; Commissioner of Amballa in 1862; returned to England finally in 1865; Major-General and C.S.I.; vice-President of the Church Missionary Society; died on 23 December 1868.

Elliot, Sir Henry Miers (1808-53)

Born on 1 March 1808; educated at Winchester School and destined for New College, Oxford; joined H.E.I.C.S. in 1826; was assistant successively to the collector of Delhi, the political agent at Delhi, and the collector of Mooradabad; secretary to the Sadr Board of Revenue; succeeded F. Currie as Foreign Secretary in February 1847; negotiated the Treaty by which Panjab was annexed in March 1849; compelled by failing health to seek change of climate by going to England; died on his way home at Simon's Town, Cape of Good Hope, on 20 December 1853; known as a historian of some eminence; published the first volume of his Bibliographical Index to the Historians of Mohammedan India and left behind the materials for The History of India, as told by its own Historians which were edited after his death by Professor John Dowson and Sir E.C. Bayley.

Hogg, Sir James Weir (1790-1876)

Born on 7 September 1790; educated at Belfast and Trinity College, Dublin (Scholar); admitted at Gray's Inn, London 'for the Irish bar' in 1811; said to have been called to the bar from Gray's Inn; practiced at Calcutta from 1814 to 1822; Registrar of the Supreme Court, Calcutta from 1822 to 1833; returned to England in 1834; M.P. for Beverley from 1835-47 and for Honiton from 1847-57; elected deputy-chairman of the Company for 1845-6, 1850-1, and 1851-2; chairman for 1846-7 and 1852-3; for all practical purposes represented the E.I.Co., in Parliament; refused the Governorship of Bombay in 1853; one of the seven members of the first Council of the Secretary of State for India elected by the expiring Company; retired in 1872; died on 27 May 1876.

Lake, Edward John (1823-1877)

Born on 19 June 1823; educated at Wimbledon and Addiscombe; joined the E.I.Company's military service in 1840 and posted with the Bengal Sappers and Miners at Delhi; sent to suppress an outbreak at Kaithal in 1841 and there made the acquaintance of Henry Lawrence; served as a settlement officer in Ambala district under Major G.Broadfoot in 1845; participated in the first Sikh War at the battles of Mudki and Aliwal; assistant of John Lawrence at Kangra in 1846;

worked in the Lahore residency in 1847-8; led the Bahawalpur troops which fought in collaboration with H.B. Edwardes against Mulraj in the battle of Suddoosam; Commissioner of Jalandhar doab in 1855-60; secured Kangra in mutiny; financial commissioner of the Panjab in 1865-7; retired with the rank of major-general in 1870; died 7 June 1877.

Lawrence, Sir George St. Patrick (1804-1884)

Brother of Sir Henry Lawrence and of John Laird Mair Lawrence; born on 17 March 1804; educated at Addiscombe; joined the E.I. Company's military service and posted with the Second regiment of light Cavalry in Bengal in 1822; was adjutant from 1825-34; took part in the first Afghan War in 1838-9; political assistant and military secretary to Sir William Hay Macnaghten, the envoy to Afghanistan; in charge of ladies and children in the retreat from Kabul in 1842; Principal assistant to the political agent in the Panjab in 1846-8; taken prisoner during the Second Sikh War in 1848 and released in 1849; deputy Commissioner of Peshawar in 1849; political agent in Mewar in 1850-7; resident for the Rajputana States in 1857-64; held chief command of the forces in Rajputana in 1864-6; became honorary lieutenant-general in 1867; published Forty-three Years in India in 1874; died 16 November 1884.

Lumsden, Sir Harry Burnett (1821-1896)

Born on 12 November 1821; educated at Bellevue Academy, Aberdeen and Mr. Dawes's school, Bromley; joined the E.I. Company's military service and posted with the 59th Bengal Native Infantry in 1838; with 33rd. Native Infantry in forcing the Khyber in 1842; participated in the Satlej/^{campaign} in 1845-6; placed under George Lawrence at Peshawar in 1847; participated in the battle of Gujrat in 1849; sent on a mission to Kandhar with (Sir) P.S.Lumsden and Dr. H.W.Bellew to ensure the proper application of the subsidy to the Amir in 1857-8; C.B. in 1859; with the Waziri expedition in 1860; commanded the Hyderabad contingent in 1862-9; Major-General in 1869; left India in 1869; K.C.S.I. in 1873; Lieutenant-General in 1875; died 12 August 1896.

Mackeson, Fredrick (1807-1853)

Born on 28 September 1807; educated at the King's School Canterbury and in France; joined the E.I. Company's military service in 1825 and was posted to the 14th Bengal Native Infantry; stationed as Assistant Political Agent at Ludhiana in 1835; accompanied Sir A.Burnes to Kabul in 1837; distinguished as a frontier and political officer in the first Afghan War, in the Khyber and at Peshawar; participated in the battle of Aliwal; superintendent of Cis-Satlej territory in 1846-48; appointed Governor-General's

Agent with the Commander-in-Chief' in December 1848 and functioned in the Panjab Campaign of 1848-49 in that capacity; commissioner of Peshawar in 1851-53; assassinated by a religious fanatic on 10 September; died 14 September 1853.

Ripon, Earl of (1782-1859)

Better known as Robinson, Fredrick John, Viscount Goderich; born on 30 October 1782; educated at Harrow and Cambridge; entered Lincoln's Inn in 1802; Tory M.P. for Carlisle borough in 1806 and Ripon in 1807; under-Secretary for colonies in 1809; lord of Admiralty in 1810; privy Councillor in 1812; joint pay-master-general of forces in 1813-17; created Viscount Goderich in 1827; Secretary for War, member of the Board of Control and leader of the House of Lords in 1827; became Prime Minister after Canning's death in August 1827 but resigned in January 1828; Secretary for War and Colonies in 1830-33; resigned and accepted the post of Lord Privy Seal in 1833; created Earl of Ripon in 1833; president of the Board of Trade (in Peel's Cabinet) in 1841-3; president of the Board of Control after the death of Lord Fitzgibbon in 1843-6; spoke for the last time in the House of Lords on 14 May 1847; died on 28 January 1859.

Smith, Sir Harry George Wakelyn (1787-1860)

Born on 28 June 1787; educated privately; entered the 95th Rifles in 1805; served in South America for some time in 1807; fought in the Peninsular War, participating in the battles of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, 1809-14; fought in the battle of Waterloo in 1815; went out to India as adjutant general under Gough in 1842; served in Gwalior and the first Sikh War: led the charge against the Sikhs at Aliwal and commanded the first division of infantry at Sobraon in 1846; made a baronet and major-general after the first Sikh War; appointed Governor of Cape in 1847; routed the Boers under Pretorius at Baron Plaatz in 1848; put down Kaffir rebellion in 1850; returned to England in 1852; held District Commands in England in 1853-9; Lt.-General in 1854; died on 12 October 1860; author of an Autobiography published in 1901.

Tucker, Henry St. George (1771-1851)

Born on 15 February 1771; educated at Hampstead; went to Calcutta as a Midshipman in 1786; obtained Clerical work at Calcutta; Secretary to Sir W. Jones in 1790-2; obtained a "writership" in 1792; was Captain of Voluntary Cavalry Corps in 1796; Military Secretary to Lord Wellesley in 1799; Secretary in the Revenue and Judicial Department to the Government of India in 1799; Accountant General in 1801 and

1805 and in that capacity made large economies; Member of the Board of Revenue in 1808; Secretary to the Government in 1812; Chief Secretary in 1814; left India in 1815; became a Director of the E.I. Company in 1826; elected Chairman of the Company in 1834 and again in 1847; died on 14 June 1851.

Vansittart, Henry (1817-1896)

Born on 1817; educated at Eton and Haileybury; joined H.E.I.C.S. in 1837; assistant to the Commissioner of Revenue in the Bhuṅgalpore division in 1838; transferred as assistant to the Commissioner of Meerut Division in 1839; official assistant to the Political Agent at Amballa in 1839; assistant to Governor-General's Agent in the Panjab and N.W. Frontier in 1840-43; superintendent of Dehra Dun in 1843-46; Deputy Commissioner under John Lawrence in 1846-51; captured Bhai Maharaj Singh in 1849; on furlough to Europe in 1851-6; returned to India and Collector of Farrukhabad in 1857-8; Civil and Session Judge of Bareilly in 1859; resigned in March 1872; died in 1896.

Wade, C.M. (1794-1861)

Born on 3 April 1794; did not have any formal education; at an early age of 15 joined as an ensign in the Madras army in 1809; participated in the Gwalior campaign on 1815;

worked as Extra-Assistant in the office of Surveyor-General of India in 1820-1; appointed Political assistant at Ludhiana in 1823; in charge of Shah Shuja, the exiled King of Afghanistan and worked as political assistant under Captain William Murray in 1823-27; given independent charge of foreign relations with the Panjab and trans-Indus States in 1827 and held the post till 1840; was the medium of intercourse between the British Government and Maharaja Ranjit Singh; won the complete confidence of Ranjit Singh who was very friendly with him; was sent on a special mission to Peshawar to lead a mixed force of the British and the Sikhs into Afghanistan in 1839; forced the Khyber pass on 23 July 1839; captured Ali Masjid and entered Kabul; on his return was transferred from Lahore and made Resident, Malwa, with headquarters at Indore; held that office from 1840 to 1844; retired in 1844; died on 21 October 1861.

Part II

(Officials and other persons prominent in the Lahore State)

Missar Amir Chand (- 1881).

Nephew of Ram Jas, one time the munshi of Mahan Singh's (father of Maharaja Ranjit Singh) treasurer; joined Ranjit Singh's service in 1830 and began his career under his uncle who was then in charge of a small service treasury; went to

Kashmir to collect land revenue in 1838; went to Peshawar in charge of Camp treasury along with Prince Nao Nihal Singh in 1839; appointed the Governor of Gujrat and Pind Dadun Khan in 1844; his jagir attached by John Lawrence for not rendering accounts in 1847; died in 1881.

Atar Singh Kalianwala (-1851)

Son of Dal Singh Naherna; went to Peshawar under the command of Prince Nao Nihal Singh in 1834; left his army and came to Lahore, and so Maharaja Ranjit Singh confiscated his jagir and property; jagir restored by Ranjit Singh's Successor, Maharaja Kharak Singh; Sher Singh when he ascended the throne, added to Atar Singh's jagirs; Sher Singh also made him the Adalti of Lahore and the surrounding districts; refused to proceed to Kashmir to suppress Shaikh Imam-ud-din's rebellion and so his jagirs were confiscated in September 1846; the jagirs were returned to him in November 1846; member of the Council of Regency set up by the Treaty of Bhairawal; on the outbreak of Multan revolt ordered to proceed to Multan in command of all the available irregular troops but was soon after recalled to Lahore; later he and his troops accompanied the Sikh army under Sher Singh to Multan; on the first day of the defection of Sher Singh was carried off with the revolt, but either the same day or the next fled and joined H.B. Edwardes;

on annexation, his personal jagirs were conferred on him for life, one-fourth of which was to descend to his heirs in perpetuity; died in December 1851.

Avitabile, Paolo Di (1791-1850)

Italian by birth, served in the Neapolitan Militia in 1807-09; joined the regular army of the King of Naples, subject to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1812; after the defeat of Napoleon, left Italy and went via Constantinople to Persia in 1820 and stayed there for six years; went to the Panjab and joined the service of Ranjit Singh in 1826; made the Governor of Wazirabad in 1827; the Governor of Peshawar in 1834; ruled with severity and success; together with Ventura the highest paid European officer in Ranjit Singh's service; also had a jagir worth Rs.20,000 per annum; returned to Europe in 1843; awarded the Cross of the Legion of Honour and the title of General in the French army; died in 1850.

Bakshi Bhaggat Ram.

Son of Baisakhi Ram, a petty goldsmith of Lahore; joined Ranjit Singh's service and began career as a Moharir in Tosha Khana; appointed Assistant Accountant of Privy Purse in 1824; sent to Kohistan, Jalandhar doab, Tira, Sujjanpur,

etc. along with Prince Sher Singh, to collect revenues; on his return, made a Bakhshi of 50 platoons of infantry, 8 regiments of cavalry, and 20 platoons of artillery and held this position during the remainder of Ranjit Singh's reign and that of Kharak Singh; Maharaja Sher Singh granted him a jagir worth Rs.3000 in Ajnala and Sorapur in 1841; was very popular with the army, and after the death of Sher Singh became very influential with it; pay master of the troops in 1846; did not render accounts for a long time till John Lawrence forced him to do so in 1847/48.

Chatter Singh Atariwala (- 1858)

Son of Jodh Singh an employee of Ranjit Singh since 1805; good farmer and took no great share in the politics of the State during the reigns of Ranjit Singh, Kharak Singh and Sher Singh; daughter, Tej Kaur, betrothed to Maharaja Dalip Singh in 1843 and that made him politically active; a friend of Gulab Singh and took up arms in latter's favour in December 1844; sent by Jawahir Singh against Prince Peshawara Singh in June 1845; had a hand in the murder of the Prince in August-September 1845; fearing the wrath of the Lahore army, avoided Lahore for some time; the governor of Peshawar from August 1846 to April 1847; governor of Hazara from April 1847 to August 1848; rebelled against the British in August 1848; captured Peshawar on 3 November 1848

and the fort of Attock on 2 January 1849; joined his son, Sher Singh, on 16 January 1849; fought side by side with his son in the battle of Gujrat on 21 February 1849; surrendered with the defeated Sikh army on 12 March 1849; placed under surveillance at Atari from April 1849 to January 1850; sent as prisoner first to Allahabad and then to Calcutta; released in 1854; died at Calcutta in 1858.

Dhian Singh (1796-1843)

Son of Mian Kishor Singh, a petty jagirdar in Andarwah (Jammu); second of the three dogra brothers who came to prominence during the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh; born in 1796; began as a private (mercenary) trooper; won the confidence of Maharaja Ranjit Singh who granted him the title of 'Raja-e-Rajgan' in 1826; soon became the wazir of the Panjab under Ranjit Singh; chiefly responsible for the conduct of all negotiations with the British Government; Maharaja Kharak Singh, soon after his accession, withdrew from him the privilege of free admission into the royal apartments, thus depriving him of the opportunity to represent state matters to the king privately; won over Prince Nao Nihal Singh and threw the Maharaja into captivity; after the death of Nao Nihal Singh sided with Sher Singh's bid for the throne and became the wazir when Sher Singh sat on the throne; together with Maharaja Sher Sing was killed by the Sindhianwala chiefs on 15 September 1843.

Dina Nath (- 1857)

Came of a family that originally belonged to Kashmir but had followed its fortunes to Delhi, Lucknow and finally to Lahore son of Bakht Mal, a subordinate civil servant and historian at Delhi; came to Lahore at the instance of a relative, Diwan Ganga Ram in 1815; employed under his relative in the State Office and worked with intelligence and diligence; brilliance manifested itself when the affairs of the Multan were being set in order after its conquest by Ranjit Singh in 1818; made the head of the State Office at the death of his relative in 1826; promoted to the headship of the Finance Department on the death of Diwan Bhawani Das in 1834; influence on Maharaja Ranjit Singh grew rapidly and was made a Diwan in 1838 and many jagirs granted to him; after Ranjit Singh's death, maintained his position through the years of anarchy that followed; served the state during the rule of Kharak Singh, Nao Nihal Singh, Sher Singh and Dalip Singh; has been described as the "Talleyrand of the Panjab"; was the most intelligent and influential member of the Council of Regency constituted by the Treaty of Bhairawal; after annexation, confirmed in all his jagirs worth Rs.46,460 annually; died in 1857.

Gulab Singh (1792-1857)

Son of Mian Kishor Singh, a petty jagirdar in Andarwah

(Jammu); eldest of the three dogra brothers who came to prominence during the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh; born on 18 October 1792; joined the Sikh army as a horseman about 1811; presented to Maharaja by Missar Diwan Chand at Rohtas in 1812; impressed with his handsome appearance, fine stature and noble bearing, Maharaja gave him the command of twenty-two horsemen, and territories^{of}/Kahrooni, Bhandian and Bahol in jagir; placed in command of 200 horsemen a little later; Jammu was placed under the supervision of Dogra brothers in 1820; the three Dogra brothers were also granted extensive jagirs in Jammu about the same time; Gulab Singh looked after these jagirs because the other two brothers lived at Lahore; sided with Mehtab Kaur (widow of Kharak Singh) in her struggle against Sher Singh in 1840; retired to Jammu when Sher Singh became the Maharaja; negotiated the first Treaty of Lahore (9 March 1846) with the British as the wazir of the Lahore Government after the first Sikh war; resigned and signed the Treaty of Amritsar (16 March 1846) with the British by which he was recognised as ruler of Jammu, Kashmir, and all the hill territory between the Ravi and the Indus; his role in the Second Sikh War, as in the first, has been a subject of controversy; died 7 August 1857.

Hira Singh (-1844)

Son of Raja Dhian Singh; a great favourite of Ranjit Singh; roused the army against the two Sindhianwatia Sirdars, Ajit Singh and Lehna Singh, who had murdered both Maharaja Sher Singh and the father of Hira Singh; became the wazir with Dalip Singh proclaimed as the Maharaja on 17 September 1843; crushed the rebellion of Fateh Khan Tiwana in Dera Ismail Khan in November 1843; put down the insurrection of Kashmira Singh and Peshawara Singh in February/March 1844; crushed the rebellion of his own uncle, Suchet Singh on 26 March 1844; sent army against Kashmira Singh, Attar Singh Sindhianwalia and Bhai Bir Singh in May 1844; led to a skirmish which resulted in the death of Kashmira Singh, the Sindhianwalia chief and the Bhai; isolated from his own uncle Gulab Singh by depending on Pandit Jhalla and because of the quarrel arising out of claims to Suchet Singh's treasure; made the Sikh Sardars his enemies by confiscating their jagirs on the advice of Jhalla; on finding the Sikh army roused against him by the Sikh Sardars, tried to seek safety in flight from Lahore to Jammu; overtaken and slain on 21 December 1844.

Shaikh Imam-ud-din (- 1859)

Son of Ghulam Muhiy-ud-din, the governor of Kashmir under the Sikh rule in 1842-4; Nazim of Jalandhar doab in 1842-4; on his father's death succeeded him as the governor of Kashmir; had extensive jagirs in the Jalandhar doab; thought to be a very rich man in the Panjab; perhaps the best dressed man in the country; good education and natural intelligence improved his power of conversation, which he further polished by the use of Persian idioms; refused to hand over Kashmir to Gulab Singh in April 1846; yielded in November 1846 when Henry Lawrence led the Sikh armies against him; declared that he was acting on the orders of Lal Singh and this led to the trial of the Lahore wazir; Imam-ud-din, though a willing party to the treason, was pardoned; restored to his Lahore estate and property, earlier confiscated; helped Lieutenant H.B. Edwardes at Multan in the Second Sikh War; rewarded with the title of Nawab, a life pension of 11,600; his jagir of Rs.8400 was confirmed on him; raised two troops of cavalry for service at Delhi in 1857; died in March 1859.

Jawahir Singh (- 1845)

Brother of Rani Jindan and the maternal uncle of Maharaja Dalip Singh; was uncared for during the time of Ranjit Singh and was often seen by the authors of Tahquiqat-i-Chisti

roaming about the streets of Lahore, barefooted and with hawks in his hands; aimed at becoming the wazir in the reign of Dalip Singh; fulfilled his ambition on 15 May 1845; made the mistake of having Jawahir Singh murdered when the Panchas had guaranteed the latter his life; tried and killed by the Panchas on 21 September 1845.

Missar Jhalla (-1844)

Brahman of Jammu; clever, ambitious, iron-willed and energetic; tutor of Hira Singh (the son of Raja Dhian Singh); became deputy prime minister under his pupil in 1843-4; terror to all the Chiefs of the Lahore Darbar; might have succeeded in bringing order out of the chaos, but had certain grave temperamental defects; rude in his behaviour to others, including Rani Jindan; killed with Hira Singh on 21 December 1844.

Missar Lal Singh (-1866)

Son of Missar Jassa Mal, a petty writer in Ranjit Singh's treasury; belonged to village Singhuin in Jhelum district; employed in the treasury in 1832; succeeded to his father's position on the latter's death in 1836; was crafty and was influential among his partizans; conspired for the death of Missar Beli Ram and Bhai Gurmukh Singh, his benefactors and

patrons; succeeded to Beli Ram's position as Chief Treasurer in 1843; was a great favourite of Rani Jindan; became the wazir just before the first Sikh War; was the executive minister of the Lahore Government between the Treaty of Lahore (11 March 1846) and the Treaty of Bhairawal (16 December 1846); was found implicated in Sheikh Imam-uddin's refusal to hand over Kashmir to Gulab Singh; was tried in December 1846 and was banished first to Agra and then to Dehra Dun; died in 1866.

Dewan Mulraj (1815 ? - 1851).

Son of Sawan Mal, the Nazim of Multan from 1820-40; succeeded his father on the latter's assassination in October 1840; imposed a heavy Nazarana by the then Lahore wazir, Hira Singh; Hira Singh's successor, Jawahir Singh reduced the Nazarana but it was only partially paid when Jawahir Singh was killed; defeated a force sent by Lal Singh to collect the arrears in 1846 after the First Sikh War; went to Lahore on the guarantee of personal security given by Henry Lawrence; agreed at Lahore to an arrangement by which he gave up one-third of the Subah but for the rest was to pay an amount which was in excess of the earlier one by one-third; when after the Treaty of Bhairawal, the Council of Regency working under the supervision of the British resident introduced the practice of hearing appeals against

him, went to Lahore in November 1847 to get the modification of the new practice; did not succeed and submitted his resignation in December 1847; prevailed upon by John Lawrence, then acting as the resident, to continue for another year; agreed on the condition that his resignation be kept a secret; Currie renewed the question of his resignation, discussed it with the Darbar, and appointed Kahan Singh Man as his successor; handed over charge of the fort of Multan on 18 April 1848; the murder of the two British officials the next day began the Multan revolt which later led to the Second Sikh War; tried for the murder of the two British officers after the Second Sikh War in June 1849; sentenced to death; but Dalhousie commuted this sentence to one of transportation for life; before arrangements could be made to send him out of India, died at Calcutta on 11 August 1851.

Bhai Nidhan Singh (-1856)

Son of Bhai Kahan Singh; nephew of Bhai Ram Singh who represented the Sikh theocratic element in the court of Ranjit Singh and also in the Darbar after latter's death; Nidhan Singh took Ram Singh's place when the latter died in November 1846; one of the eight members in the Council of Regency in 1847-8; a very silent member of the Council; remained a member of the Council till annexation of the Panjab; died in 1856.

Nur-ud-din (-1852)

Son of Ghulam Mohaiudin (different from the father of Shaikh Imam-ud-din) and the youngest brother of Faqkir Aziz-ud-din; took service under Ranjit Singh in 1810; served as an officer in the civil administration at Gujrat, Jalandhar, Daska, and Wazirabad from 1810 to 1818; usually stayed at the capital after 1818; like his brother, had a very respected position in the darbar of Ranjit Singh; enjoyed the same respect after Ranjit Singh's death also; one of the eight members of the Council of Regency in 1847-8; was not an active member of the Darbar and was one of the most disinterested of the Lahore Chiefs in the politics of the state; did not participate either in the Multan revolt, or in the rebellion of Attar Singh and Sher Singh Sindhianwalias in 1848-9; the British on annexation of the Panjab confirmed to him for life all his jagirs and allowances in 1850; died in 1852.

Peshawara Singh (1818-1845)

Reputed or adopted son of Maharaja Ranjit Singh; presented to the Maharaja by Daya Kaur (formerly a widow of Sahib Singh Bhangi) taken as a wife by Ranjit Singh in 1811; was supposed to be born in 1818 when Ranjit Singh had conquered Peshawar and so given the name of Peshawara Singh; was popular with the Sikh army and made repeated bids for the throne in 1843-5; Jawahir Singh had him murdered in September 1845.

(or Ranjor)

Ranjodh/Singh Majithia (-1782)

Youngest son of Sardar Desa Singh Majithia by a hill woman and so a step brother of Lehna Singh Majithia; referred to as the illegitimate son of Desa Singh in the proceedings of the years 1846-1847 of the Lahore Darbar; was a general in the Sikh army; when Lehna Singh left Lahore in 1844 on pilgrimage, he gave charge of all his estates to Ranjodh Singh; led the Sikh armies in the battles of Budhowal and Aliwal in the first Sikh War; had dispute with his brother Lehna Singh Majithia about the property in 1846; dispute settled on the intervention of Henry Lawrence; member of the Council of Regency formed under the Treaty of Bhairawal in 1847-8; soon after the revolt at Multan was detected in treasonable correspondence with Mulraj; placed in confinement and released only after the annexation of the Panjab; the British granted him a cash pension of Rs.3,000 per annum; died in 1872.

Shamsher Singh Sindhianwalia (-1871)

Son of Budh Singh; nephew of Lehna Singh and the first cousin of Ajit Singh, the two Sindhianwalia Sardars who had conspired the murder of Maharaja Sher Singh and his wazir Dhian Singh in September 1843; Shamsher Singh then at Peshawar and so did not join the conspiracy; his jagirs, therefore, not confiscated by Hira Singh when the latter

became the wazir; commanded a brigade in the Satlaj campaign of 1845-6; one of the eight members in the Council of Regency in 1847-8; shunned politics and more or less a silent member of the Darbar; the Civil and Military establishment in Majha was placed under him in February 1848; commanded a division of the Sikh army that participated in the first seige of Multan in August-September 1848; carried off with Sher Singh's defection but the very next day escaped from Sher Singh's camp and joined H.B.Edwardes; after annexation personal jagirs conferred on him, one-fourth of which were to descend to his male issue in perpetuity (after mutiny this figure was raised to two-thirds); died 1871.

Sher Singh Atariwala (-1858)

Son of Chatter Singh; came to prominence in Lahore politics after the betrothal of his sister to Maharaja Dalip Singh in 1843; appointed governor of Peshawar in place of Tej Singh in 1844; put down an insurrection in Yusafzai in 1846; appointed a member of the Lahore Darbar in August 1846; expected wazarat on the fall of Lal Singh in December 1846; member of the Council of Regency set up by the Treaty of Bhairawal; commanded the Lahore contingent ordered to march to Multan in April 1848; with the contingent at Chichawatni till June 1848; marched with this contingent to Multan on hearing of H.B.Edwardes victory at Kineyri (18 June 1848);

joined Edwardes, pitching his camp at Suraj Khund, three miles from Tibi where Edwardes himself was encamped; joined the first siege of Multan begun on 4 September 1848; heard of his father's revolt at Hazara and joined Mulraj on 14 September 1848; issued a proclamation on 15 September 1848, asking the Sikhs to rise against the British; finding Mulraj suspicious of him, moved north on 9 October 1848; threatened British position at Lahore in the last week of October; led the Sikh armies in the encounter of Ramnagar on 21 November 1848, the battle of Saddulapur on 16 December and that of Chilianwala on 13 January 1849; led the Sikh army that lost the battle of Gujrat on 21 February 1849; surrendered with the defeated Sikh army on 12 March 1849; placed under surveillance at Atari from April 1849 to January 1850; sent as a prisoner first to Allahabad and then to Calcutta; released in 1854 and allowed to choose his own residence; died at Benares in 1858.

Suchet Singh (1801-1844)

Son of Mian Kishor Singh, a petty jagirdar in Andarwah (January); the youngest of the three dogra brothers who came to prominence during the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh; one of the most polished courtiers of the Lahore Court under Ranjit Singh; a bold and gallant young man, and a perfect

soldier in appearance; held command of a large force of Ghorcharas; in political and administrative matters, far inferior to his brothers; Ranjit Singh seldom employed him on active duty and his services were employed in the congenial atmosphere of the Court; began to develop political ambitions in the anarchy that followed the death of Ranjit Singh; espoused the cause of Peshawara Singh in 1844; met a violent death at Lahore on the orders of his own nephew, Hira Singh in March 1844; left treasure at Ferozepore (besides his property in the Lahore State) which was claimed by Gulab Singh, Hira Singh and the widow of Suchet Singh; also claimed by the Lahore Government.

Tej Singh (1799-1862)

Son of Missar Nidha, a Brahman from Meerut district; nephew of Jamandar Khushal Singh who was Deoriwala or chamberlain of Maharaja Ranjit Singh's Darbar; took service in the Court of Ranjit Singh in 1811 at the age of twelve; at the Court represented his uncle; joined army in 1816 and rose rapidly; soon became a divisional commander; had 22 regular battalions under his command by 1831; sent to Hazara in 1838; succeeded General Avitabile as the governor of Peshawar in 1839; instructed to aid the British against the Afghans; remained neutral in the fight between Sher Singh and Mai Chand Kaur (widow of Kharak Singh) about the throne in 1840;

the governor of Peshawar second time in 1841-4; when the troops at Peshawar became mutinous on hearing of the news of Raja Suchet Singh's murder, handled the situation calmly and firmly; was the Commander-in-Chief of the Sikh forces that crossed the river Satlej in 1845; marched with Henry Lawrence to subdue the rebellion of Sheikh Imam-ud-din in September/October 1846; was the foremost member of the Council of Regency in 1847-8; remained loyal to the British in the Second Sikh War; the personal jagirs amounting to Rs.92,779 were confirmed to him for life after annexation; useful to the British in the disbandonment of the Sikh army and the formation of a new native force in the Panjab in 1847-57; was of much assistance in raising horsemen to crush the mutiny in 1857; made the Raja of Batala and all his jagirs were consolidated near Batala in 1862; two-thirds of the jagirs were conferred on him in perpetuity in 1862; died 2 December 1862.

Abbreviations

B.C.	Board's Collections.
Home Misc.	Home Miscellaneous.
I.P.C.	India Political Consultations.
I.S.C.	India Secret Consultations.
S.L.	Secret Letters.
Br.Mus.Add.MSS.	British Museum Additional Manuscripts.
I.O.L.	India Office Library.
J.A.S.B.	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Unpublished Documents

I. Private Papers.

(i) In the British Museum

RIPON PAPERS: Add.Mss.	40,868	April	-June	1844
" "	40,869	July	-October	1844
" "	40,870	November	-December	1844
" "	40,871	January	-March	1845
" "	40,872	April	-June	1845
" "	40,873	July	-September	1845
" "	40,874	October	-December	1845
" "	40,875	January	-March	1846
" "	40,876	April	-May	1846
" "	40,877	June	1846 - February	1851

These papers were presented to the Museum in 1923. They contain the correspondence of the first Earl of Ripon, better known as Viscount Goderich. He was the president of the Board of Control in Peel's ministry from June 1843 to June 1846. In all there are nineteen volumes. For the purposes of this thesis, ten have been consulted.

PEEL PAPERS: Add.Mss.	40,464	July 1841 - August	1843
" "	40,465	September 1843 - December	1844
" "	40,466	January 1845 - 14 June	1847

These are part of the Peel papers, containing the correspondence between him as the Prime Minister and Ripon as the President of the Board of Control. The first of these three volumes also gives his correspondence with Ripon when the latter was the President of the Board of Trade. Of these volumes the most useful was Add.Mss.40,466.

BROUGHTON PAPERS: Add.Mss. 36,475 June 1846 - December 1847
 " " 36,476 January 1848 - May 1849
 " " 36,477 June 1849 - March 1852

These are part of the political and private correspondence of Sir John Cam Hobhouse, later Lord Broughton when he was the President of the Board of Control in the ministry of Sir John Russell. He was the President from July 1846 to February 1852. These papers were bequeathed by him to the British Museum in 1869 but sealed up by his directors till 1900. The chief drawback of this correspondence is that it contains only the letters written to Hobhouse and none that were written by him.

(ii) In India Office Library.

HENRY LAWRENCE PAPERS - Boxes dated 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852.
 - Cunningham Papers
 - Broadfoot Papers.

These Papers have been made over on a temporary loan to the India Office Library. On the letters and papers too, the year and sometimes even the month is missing. The papers are now put in different boxes, according to the year to which they belong. Most of the undated letters and papers have two types of pencil marks on them which are supposed to indicate the year in which they were written. In some cases, they do not agree. One type of pencil mark seems to be either by H.B.Edwardes or by Herman Merivale who wrote, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence in 1873. The others appear to have been put by J.L.Morison who wrote a biography of Henry Lawrence under the title, Lawrence of Lucknow in 1934. In a few cases, the dates indicated by both the two types of Pencil marks are wrong.

BROUGHTON PAPERS.

Home Miscellaneous 844. Miscellaneous Home Correspondence with the President (including Correspondence with H.M.Queen Victoria, the Cabinet etc. 1846).

Home Miscellaneous 845. Miscellaneous Home Correspondence with the President (including Correspondence with H.M.Queen Victoria, the Cabinet etc. 1847-48)

Home Miscellaneous 846. Letters from H.M. Queen Victoria, the Cabinet etc. to the President, 1848-51.

Home Miscellaneous 847. Letters to H.M. Queen Victoria, the Cabinet etc. from the President 1848-51.

Home Miscellaneous 850. Correspondence between the President and the Chairman. 1847-48.

Home Miscellaneous 851. Letters from the President to the Chairman. 1848-52.

Home Miscellaneous 852. Letters to the President from the Chairman. 1848-52.

Home Miscellaneous 853. Correspondence between the President and the Governor-General of India. 1846-47.

Home Miscellaneous 854. Correspondence between the President and the Governor-General of India. 1847-48.

Home Miscellaneous 855. Letters from India (Governors-General, Governors, etc.) to the President. 1849-1852.

These volumes were forwarded to the India Office Library in January 1903. These are Copy Letter Books containing the Private or Demi-official Correspondence of Sir John Hobhouse. These papers are very useful because, unlike the Broughton Papers lying in the British Museum, they not merely contain the letters written to Hobhouse (Copies in the case of the Broughton Papers lying in India Office Library) but also the copies of the ones written by him. Each letter is also given sub-headings, indicating the different topics dealt with in the letter.

LOW PAPERS

Home Miscellaneous 828. part e. Correspondence between Lord Dalhousie and Colonel Low, 1849-56.

It is difficult to say as to who sent these papers to the India Office Library and when. They contain the correspondence of Sir John Low, Agent to the Governor-General for Rajputana in 1848-52.

HENRY VANSITTART PAPERS.

They are in the custody of Mrs. Hilda Moorehouse, grand-daughter of Henry Vansittart.

II. Manuscript Records.

All the manuscript records used are from those lying in the India Office Library. Those that have been used are:

Political Letters from India	1844-1849
Political Records to India	1844-1849

Boards drafts of Secret Letters to India: 5 January 1844 to 24 December 1845 (Vol.18); 7 January 1846 to 20 December 1847 (Vol.20); 20 January 1848 to 24 December 1849 (Vol.19).

Secret Letters to India 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849.
 Secret Letters from India 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849.
 Enclosures to Secret Letters from India. Vol.103 and 104.

II. Manuscript Records (cont.)

India Secret Consultations dated,

23. 4. 1844
 4. 4. 1845
 4. 7. 1845
 31. 7. 1846
 26.12. 1846
 31. 7. 1847
 30.10. 1847
 29.11. 1847
 31.12. 1847
 31. 1. 1848
 25. 2. 1848
 29. 7. 1848

India Political Consultations

13. 6. 1846
 26.12. 1846
 2. 1. 1847
 23. 1. 1847
 13. 6. 1847
 20. 6. 1847
 31.12. 1847 Part 5
 31.12. 1847 Part 6
 31.12. 1847 Part 7
 31.12. 1847 Part 8
 31.12. 1847 Part 9
 31.10. 1849
 4. 1. 1850
 6. 9. 1850
 13. 9. 1850

Board's Collections:

104068, 117156, 117157, 117165, 117166,
 117167, 117168, 117169, 117170, 117172,
 117173, 110840, 126896.

Home Miscellaneous: No.760 and 761.

B. Published Documents.

I. Printed Private Letters.

The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell,
 (1840-1870) Vol.I, edited by G.H.Gooch. London 1925.

Published Documents (cont.)

The Private Correspondence concerning the Anglo-Sikh Wars, edited by Ganda Singh. Amritsar 1955.

Note: This collection of letters is taken from the Currie Papers lying at Deccan College and Post Graduate Research Institute, Poona.

Private Letters of the Marquis of Dalhousie, edited by Baird, J.G., London 1911.

The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough in his Correspondence with Duke of Wellington and the Queen. edited by Colchester, Lord. London 1911.

The Letters of Queen Victoria. Vol.II - 1844-1853, edited by A.C.Benson and V.Esher, London 1908.

II. Published Records

Selections from the Records of the Government of India (Home Department) No.II & VI.

Selections from the Records of the Government of India (new series) No.XVI

General Report on the Administration of the Punjab, 1849-50 & 1850-51

Punjab Government Records. Vol.III, Lahore Political Diaries, 1847-48; Vol.IV, Lahore Political Diaries, 1846-49; Vol.V, Lahore Political Diaries, 1847-49; Vol.VI Lahore Political Diaries. 1847-49. Allahabad, 1909.

Press Lists of old Records in the Punjab Secretariat. Vol.VIII, North West Frontier Agency. Correspondence with Government 1840-45.

Vol.IX, Lahore Agency and Residency, 1846-47.

Vol. X, Resident Lahore and Chief Commissioner, Cis and Trans Satlej territories, 1st January 1848-7 April 1849.

Sita Ram Kohli, Catalogue of Khalsa Darbar Records Vol.I & II. Lahore 1919.

III. Parliamentary Papers

Papers relating to the late Hostilities on the North-West Frontier of India. Accounts and Papers 1846
Vol.XXXI

Further Papers relating to the late Hostilities on the North-West Frontier of India and the Conclusion of Treaties with the Maharaja Dhuleep Singh of Lahore, and the Maharaja Ghulab Singh of Jammu. Accounts and Papers 1847, Vol.XXXI.

Papers relating to the Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, on 16th of December 1846 for the Administration of the Lahore state during the Minority of Maharaja Duleep Singh. Accounts and Papers 1847, Vol.XLI.

C. Tracts, Journals, Magazines and Newspapers.

I. Tracts.

Briggs, Major-General, E.I.C.S., What are we to do with the Punjab? London 1849

Caulfield, Major-General, C.B. The Punjab and the Indian Army. London 1846

Gore, Montague. Remarks on the Present State of the Punjab. London 1849.

Smith, Lieut. R.Baird. Agricultural Resources of the Punjab, being a Memorandum on the application of the Waste Waters of the Punjab to Purposes of Irrigation. London 1849.

Wade, C.M. Lt.Col. A Narrative of the Services, Military and Political
London 1847.

Wade, C.M. Lt.Col. On the State of our Relations with the Punjab and the best mode of their Settlement.

Ryde, Isle of Wight, 1848.

War in the Punjab, No.1.

London 1849

History of the Campaign on the Sutlej and the War in the Punjab. London 1846

II. Journals, Magazines and Newspapers.

1. Bengal, Past and Present.

Jubilee Number. 1957. Vol.LXXVI. Part I.
Serial No.142.

Tarit Kumar, 'Joseph Davey Cunningham - Some of
his Activities in India'.

2. Calcutta Review (old Series)

No.II - Vol.I, August 1844 (Third edition)
'Recent History of the Punjaub'.

No. V - Vol.III, April 1845 (second edition)
'Miscellaneous Critical Notices

1. The Political Relations existing between the British Government and Native States and Chiefs, Subject to the Government of the N.W. Provinces as they stood in 1840. Revised and corrected to 1843, by Andrew D'Cruz. Calcutta, 1844.
4. Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab, containing a particular account of the Government and character of the Sikhs, from the German of Baron Charles Hugel. With notes by Major T.B.Jervis, F.R.S., together with characteristic illustrations, &c. Published under the patronage of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors of the East India Company.'

No.IX. - Vol.V. March 1846 (second edition)

'Miscellaneous Critical Notices.

Recent Works on the Punjab.

2. Adventures of an officer in the Service of Ranjit Singh; by Major H.M.L.Lawrence, Bengal Artillery, British Resident at the Court of Nepal; late Assistant to the Political Agent in Charge of British Relations with Lahore. 2 Vols. Messrs. Thacker and Co.

3. The Punjaub; being a brief Account of the Country of the Sikhs; its Extent, History, Commerce, Production, Government, Manufactures, Laws, Religion, &c.; by Lieut. Colonel Steinbach, late of the Service of Maharaja Runjit Singh, and his immediate Successors.
4. Travels in India, including Sindh and the Punjaub; by Captain Leopold Van Orlich. Translated from the German by H.Evans Lloyds, Esq. 2 Vols. 8vo. Messrs Thacker and Co.'

No.XI - Vol.VI, September 1846 (second edition)

Art.6.- 'The Sikh invasion of British India in 1845-46'

No.XIV- Vol.VII, June 1847 (second edition)

Art.1,- 'Macgregor's Sikhs - Political Agency in the East'

No.XV - Vol.VIII, September 1847 (second edition)

Art.7.- 'The Lahore Blue Book'

No.XVI- Vol.VIII, December 1847 (second edition)

Art.6,- 'Lord Hardinge's Administration'

No.XVII-Vol.IX, June 1848 (second edition)

Art.6,- 'The Reigning Family of Lahore'

No.XIX- Vol.X, September 1848 (second edition)

Art.1,- 'The Jhelundur Doab'

No.XXII-Vol.XI, June 1849 (second edition)

Art.7,- 'Cunningham's History of the Sikhs'

No.XXIII -Vol.XII, September 1849 (second edition)

Art.6,- 'The Second Punjaub War'

3. Journal of the Panjab Historical Society

Vol.III, No.2 (1915)

J.Hutchinson and J.Ph.Vogel, 'The Punjab Hill States'

Vol.VI, No.2 (1916)

Shaikh Abdul Qadir, 'An Unpublished Diary of Sikh times'

J.Hutchinson and J.Ph.Vogel, 'History of Nurpur State'

Pt. Sheo Narain, R.B. 'General Ventura'

Vol.VII, No.1 (1918)

J.Hutchinson and J.Ph.Vogel, 'History of Mandi State'

Sita Ram Kohli, 'Land Revenue Administration under Maharaja Ranjeet Singh'

Vol.VIII, No.1 (1920)

'The Ballad of Ram Singh's two Rebellions'

J.Hutchinson and J.Ph.Vogel, 'History of Kangra State'

Vol.VIII, No.2 (1921)

J.Hutchinson and J.Ph.Vogel, 'History of Jammu State'

Vol.XI, Pt. 1 (1931)

J.Hutchinson, 'Jaswan State, Guler State, Siba State, Kuttlehr State, Bangahal State'

Jagat Singh, 'The Unpublished Letters of Sardar Chatar Singh Atariwala'

4. Journal of the Panjab University Historical Society

Vol.1, Part 1 (April 1932)

R.R.Sethi, 'The Revolt of Kashmir, 1846'

~~Professor~~ Sita Ram Kohli, 'The Multan Outbreak and the trial of Diwan Mul Raj'

Vol.1, Part II (December 1932)

R.R.Sethi, 'The Trial of Raja Lal Singh'

Vol.II, Part I (April 1933)

R.R.Sethi, 'The Treaty of Bhyrowal or Second Treaty of Lahore'

Vol.II, Part II (December 1933)

K.C.Khanna, 'The Multan Outbreak of April 1848'

Vol.III, Part I (April 1934)

Sri Ram Sharma, 'Raja Sansar Chand of Kangra'

Vol.III, Part II (December 1934)

J.F.Bruce, 'Sir Henry Lawrence'

Vol.IV, Part I (April 1935)

R.R.Sethi, 'Maharaja Gulab Singh and the Second Sikh War'

Sri Ram Sharma, 'The Rise of Sansar Chand'

Vol.IV, Part II (December 1935)

R.R.Sethi, 'The Cis-Sutlej States and the first Sikh War'

Muhammad Baquir Malik, 'Tarikh-i-Panjab'

Vol.VII, (December 1941)

S.L.Bhalla, 'The British Government and Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1809-1814)'

Vol.VIII, (April 1944)

Bakht Mal, Khalsa Nama

Anonymous, Tarikh-i-Sikhan^y

Daya Ram Pandit, Sher-o-Shakr

Lala Sohan Lal Suri, Umdat-ut-Tawarikh

M.Ahmad Baksh Chisti, An Unpublished Diary of Sikh Times

General M.Ventura Zafar Nama

Dewan Amar Nath, Zafar Nama Ranjit Singh

Ghulam Muhayyad Din,	<u>Tarikh-i-Panjab</u>
Rattan Chand,	<u>Khalis Nama</u>
Anonymous,	<u>Tazkara-i-Multan</u>
Mufti Ali-ud-din,	<u>Ibrat Nama</u>
Dewan Ajudhia Parshad,	<u>Waquai-i-Sikhan</u>
Anonymous,	<u>Waqui-Jang-Pheroshahr</u>
Anonymous,	<u>A Narrative of the Battle of Sobrahli (Sabraon)</u>
Muhamad Naqi,	<u>Sher Singh Nama</u>
Vol.X, (April 1947)	
Jagmohan Mahajan,	'The Private Correspondence Of Sir Frederick Currie'

5. Edinburgh Review

Vol.LXXXIX. January 1849 pp.184-221.

'The Panjab'

Vol.XCVII, January 1853

'The Indian Army'

Vol.cvi. October 1857 pp.183-220

'Napier'

6. Quarterly Review

Vol.LXXVIII. June 1846 pp.181-215

'The War of the Panjab'

Vol.LXXIX. December 1846 pp.269-272

'Note.- War of the Panjab'

Vol.CIV. October 1858 pp.475-515

'Sir Charles Napier'

7. The Times

30 March 1849. Page 3, Column 3.

'The battle of Chillianwala'

6 April 1849 Page 6, Columns 1,2,3.

'Captain Cunningham's History of the Sikhs'

8. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress

1938

P.N.Khera, 'Development of British Political
Agencies in the Panjab, 1809-45'

1939

Dr.Indubhushan Banerjee, 'Kashmir Rebellion and the
Trial of Raja Lal Singh'

1945

P.N.Mukerjee, 'Lord Dalhousie's Panjab Policy:Did
Did he think of establishing a
1950 'Hindu Power there'?

Ganda Singh, 'Three Letters of Mai Jind Kaur'

9. Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission

Vol.XII, Part II, December 1940

Ganda Singh, 'Some new lights on the Treaty of
Bhairowal (Dec.16 1846) thrown by
Private Letters of Sir Henry Hardinge'

Vol.XXXV, Part II, February 1960

Ahluwalia, M.L., 'Some Facts behind the Anglo-Sikh
Wars - Part I'

Vol.XXXVI, Part II, February 1961

Ahluwalia, M.L., 'Some Facts behind the Anglo-Sikh
Wars - Part II'

10. Journal of the Indian History

Vol.I, 1921-22.

Sita Ram Kohli, 'The Army of Ranjit Singh - Part I'

Vol.II, 1922-23

Sita Ram Kohli, 'The Army of Ranjit Singh - Part II'

Vol.XIII, 1934.

Sita Ram Kohli, 'The Army of Ranjit Singh - Part III'

Vol.XIV, 1935

Sita Ram Kohli, 'The Army of Ranjit Singh - Part IV'

Vol.XX, 1940

Spear, T.G.P. 'The British Administration of Delhi Territories (1803-1851)

Vol.XXIV, 1946

Jagmohan Mahajan, 'Treaty of Bhyrowal: December 1846 - An Historical Revision'

Vol.XXVII, 1949

Ganda Singh, 'Some Correspondence of Maharaja Duleep Singh'

11. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal

Vol.XIII. Part I. January to June 1844

Cunningham, J.D. Lieut. 'Notes of Moorcroft's Travels in Ladakh, and on Gerard's Account of Kunwar, including a general description of the latter district. Communicated by the Government of India'

Vol.XIV. Part I. January to June 1845.

Cunningham, Alexander Lieut. 'Notice of Some unpublished Coins of Indo-Scythians'

Vol.XVI. Part II. July to December 1847.

Cunningham, J.D. 'Notes on the Antiquities of the
Captain. Districts within the Bhopal Agency'

Vol.XVII. Part I. January to June 1848.

Cunningham, J.D. 'Inscriptions from the Vijay Mandir,
Captain. Udaypur etc.'

'Extract of a letter from Captain
J.D.Cunningham, Political Agent,
Bhopal'

'On the ruins of Putharee'

'On the Lingum at Bhojpur'

Cunningham, 'Journal of a trip through Kulu and
Alexander Captain. Lahul, to the Muree Lake in Ladakh
during the months of August and
September 1846'

'Verification of the Itinerary of
Hwang Tsang through Ariana and
India, &c.'

'Proposed Archaeological
Investigation'

'Memorandum by Capt.A.Cunningham,
detailing the boundary between the
territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh
and British India, as determined
by the Commissioners, P.A.Vans
Agnew, Esq. and Capt. A.Cunningham,
of Engineers'

Vol.XVIII. Part II. July to December 1849.

Anderson, W. 'Revenues of States beyond the
Captain. Sutlej, about 1750 to 1800, -
Sketch of the Recorded.'

Cunningham, J.D. 'Note on the Limits of perpetual
Captain Snow in the Himalayas.'

D.Theses (Unpublished)

- Kapadia, E.R. The Diplomatic Career of Sir Claude Wade: a study of the British relations with the Sikhs and the Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840. London University, M.A.Thesis, 1938
- Khanna, K.C. Anglo-Sikh Relations, 1939 to 1949. London University, Ph.D.Thesis, 1932
- Lai, R.C. Re-organisation of the Panjab Government, 1847-57. London University, Ph.D.Thesis, 1937

E. PUBLISHED WORKS

- Aitchison, Sir Charles:- A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries. Vol.viii. Calcutta, 1892.
- Aitchison, Sir Charles:- Lord Lawrence (Rulers of India Series) Oxford 1894
- Akbar, Mohammad:- The Punjab under the Mughals. Lahore 1948.
- Arnold, Edwin:- The Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India, Vols.I & II. London 1862.
- Argyll, Duke of:- India under Dalhousie and Canning. London 1865.
- Baden-Powell:- The Origin and Growth of the Village Communities in India. London 1899.
- Baden-Powell:- Land System of British India. Oxford 1892.
- Barkley, D.G.:- Directions for Revenue Officers in the Punjab. Lahore 1875.
- Bell, Major Evans: The Annexation of the Punjab and Maharaja Daleep Singh. London 1882
- Bell, Major Evans: Retrospect and Prospects of Indian Policy. London 1868.
- Broadfoot, P.:- The Career of Major Broadfoot. London 1888.

- Buckland:- Dictionary of Indian Biography.
London 1906.
- Burton, R.G.:- The First and Second Sikh Wars.
Simla 1911.
- Calvert, H.:- Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab.
Lahore 1936.
- Cavalry Officer, A.:- Military Services and Adventures in
the Far East, including sketches of
the Campaign in 1845-46.
London 1847.
- Cave-Brown:- The Punjab and Delhi. London 1861
- Chabra, G.S.:- The Advanced History of the Panjab
Vol.II Ludhiana [1960]
- Chopra, Gulshan Lall:- The Punjab as a Sovereign State
(1799-1839) Lahore 1928
- Court, Major Henry:- History of the Sikhs. Lahore 1888.
- Cunningham, Captain
Joseph Davey:- A History of the Sikhs. London 1849
- Cunningham, Captain
Joseph Davey:- A History of the Sikhs. London 1853
- Cust, R.N.:- Memoirs of past years of a
Septugenarian. Printed for private
circulation. London 1904.
- Cust, R.N.:- Linguistic and Oriental Essays,
Part V. London 1906.
- Darling, M.L.:- The Panjab Peasant in Prosperity and
Debt. Oxford University Press 1925
- Diver, Maud:- Honoraria Lawrence. London 1936.
- Dodwell, Henry:- Cambridge History of India.
Vol.V & VI. Cambridge 1929.
- ~~Dutt, R.C.:-~~ India in the Victorian Age.
~~London 1906~~

- Dutt, R.C.:— The Economic History of India under Early British Rule. From the Rise of British Power in India to the Accession of Queen Victoria. (4th edition) London 1916
- Dutt. R.C.:— The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age from the Accession of Queen Victoria to the Commencement of the 20th century (4th edition) London 1916.
- Edwardes, Sir.H.B.:— Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major-General Sir H.B.Edwardes by his wife. London 1886.
- Edwardes, H.B. and Merivale, H.:— Life of Sir Henry Lawrence (Third ed.) London 1873.
- Edwardes, Sir Herbert:—A Year on the Punjab Frontier. Two Volumes. London 1851.
- Edwardes, Michael:— The Necessary Hell. London 1958.
- Eglar, Zekiye:— A Punjabi Village in Pakistan. Columbia 1960
- Gibbon, Fredrick P.:— The Lawrences of the Panjab.
- Gordon, General Sir John:— The Sikhs. London 1904.
- Gough, General Sir Charles and Innes, Arthur D.:— The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars. London 1897
- Griffin, Sir Lepel H.:—Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab. Lahore 1865.
- Griffin, Sir Lepel H.:—The Rajas of the Punjab, being the History of the Principal States of the Punjab and their Political Relations with the British Government. Lahore 1890.
- Griffin, Sir Lepel H.:—Ranjit Singh (Rulers of India Series) Oxford 1892
- Gupta, H.R. Studies in the later Mughal History of the Punjab. Simla 1944.

- Gupta, H.R.:— A History of the Sikhs. Vol.I.
Simla 1952.
- Gupta, H.R.:— Panjab on the Eve of the First Sikh War 1844. Hoshiarpur 1956.
- Hardinge, Viscount:— Hardinge (Ruler of Indian Series)
Oxford Clarendon Press 1891.
- Hasketh, Pearson:— The Hero of Delhi. London 1939.
- Honigberger, John
Martin:— Thirty-five Years in the East
London 1852
- Hogg, Revd.David:— Life of Allan Cunningham. London 1875
- Innes, J.J.Macleod:— Sir Henry Lawrence. London 1898.
- Kaye, John William:— History of the Administration of the East India Company. London 1853.
- Kaye, John William:— Lives of the Indian Officers.
Vol.I and Vol.II. London 1889.
- Khalsa College,
Amritsar:— Maharaja Ranjit Singh: centenary volume. Amritsar 1939.
- Khilnani, N.M. The Punjab under the Lawrences (The Punjab Government Record Office Publication). Simla 1951.
- Khushwant Singh:— The Sikhs. London 1953.
The Fall of the Kingdom of the Punjab.
Calcutta 1962.
- Kohili, S.R.:— The Multan Outbreak and Trial of Dewan Mulraj. (P.R.O.P.) Lahore 1932
- Krishen, Indra:— An Historical Interpretation of the Correspondence of Sir George Russell Clerk. Political Agent at Ambala and Ludhiana, 1831-43. (The Punjab Government Record Office Publication Simla 1952).
- Lal, G.:— A Short History of Kashmir,
Srinagar 1929.

- Latif, Sayyad Muhammed:- History of the Panjab from the remotest antiquity to the present time. Calcutta 1891.
- Lawrence, Sir George:- Forty-three Years in India. London 1875.
- Lawrence, H.M.:- Adventures of an Officer in the Punjab in the Service of Ranjit Singh. London 1846.
- Lawrence, H.M.:- Essays, Military and Political. Seraumpore 1859.
- Lawrence, R.:- Charles Napier, Friend and London 1952.
- Lawrence, W.R.:- The Valley of Kashmir. London 1895
- Lee-Warner, William:- Life of Marquis of Dalhousie. London 1904.
- Lumsden, P.S. and Elsmie, G.R.:- General Sir Harry Lumsden of the Guides. London 1899.
- M'Gregor, W.L.:- History of the Sikhs. Vol.I & II. London 1846.
- Mahajāñ, J.:- Circumstances leading to the Annexation of the Punjab, 1846-49. Allahbad & Karachi 1949
- Malcolm, Sir J.:- Sketch of the Sikhs. London 1812.
- Malleson, Col.G.E.:- Decisive Battles in India. London 1883
- Malleson, Col.G.E.:- Recreation of an Indian Official. London 1872.
- Massou, C.:- Narratives of Various Journeys in Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Kalat and the Punjab. Vol.I & II. London 1844.
- Mohan, Lall:- Life of Dost Mohammed Khan, Vol.I & II London 1846.
- Morison, J.L.:- Lawrence of Lukhnow. London 1934.
- Morison, J.L.:- A Survey of Imperial Frontier Policy From Alexander Burnes to Fredrich Roberts. Oxford University Press 1936

- Neve, A.:— Picturesque Kashmir, London 1900.
- Osborne, Hon'ble W.G.:—The Court and Camp of Ranjit Singh, with an introductory sketch of the Origin and the Rise of the Sikh State. London 1840.
- Pannikar, K.M.:— Gulab Singh. London 1953.
- Payne, C.H.:— A History of the Sikhs. London 1911
- Pearse, Hugh:— Soldier and Traveller: The Memoirs of Alexander Gardner, Colonel of Artillery in the Service of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Edinburgh and London 1898.
- Prinsep, Henry T.:— Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab and Political Life of Maharaja Ranjit Singh with an account of the present condition, religious laws and customs of the Sikhs. Calcutta 1834.
- History of the Punjab, and of the rise, progress, and present condition of the Sect and Nation of the Sikhs (Based in part on the "Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab and political life of Maharaja Runjeel Singh" compiled by H.T.Prinsep) 2 Vols. London 1846.
- Rait, R.S.:— Life of Lord Gough. Westminster 1903.
- Roberts, P.E.:— History of India. Oxford 1939.
- Sapru, Arjun Nath:— Building of the Jammu and Kashmir State.
- Sethi, R.R.:— John Lawrence as the Commissioner of Jalandhar Doab (P.R.O.P.) London 1930.
- Shamat Ali:— The Sikhs and the Afghans London 1847.
- Sinha, N.K.:— Ranjit Singh. Calcutta 1933.
- Smythe, G.C.:— History of the Reigning Family of Lahore. Calcutta, London 1847.

- Steinback, Lt.Col.:— The Punjaub, being an account of the Country of the Sikhs, etc. including a narrative of the recent campaign of the Sutlej. London 1846
- Sufi, G.M.D.:— Kashmir, being a history of Kashmir from the Earliest Times to our own. Vol.II. Lahore 1949.
- Taylor, A.C.:— General Sir Alexander Taylor, 2 Vols. London 1913.
- Temple, Sir Richard:— Lord Lawrence (English men of action series). London 1890.
- Temple, Sir Richard:— Men and Events of My Time in India. London 1882.
- Thorburn, S.S.:— The Punjab in Peace and War. London 1904.
- Thornton, Thomas H.:— History of the Punjab and the Rise and Progress and Present Condition of the Sect and Nations of the Sikhs. 2 Vols. London 1846.
- Thorp, R.:— Kashmir Misgovernment. London 1870.
- Trevaskis, H.K.:— The Land of Five Rivers. 'An Economic History of the Panjab from the Earliest Times to the Year of Grace 1890.' Oxford University Press 1928
- Trilochan Singh and others:— Selections from the Sacred Writings of the Sikhs. London 1960.
- Woodruff, P. The Men who ruled India: The Guardians. 2 Vols. London 1954.
- The History of the Sikhs together with a concise account of the Punjab and Cashmere. Compiled from authentic sources. Printed for the publishers by D'Rozario and Co. 1846.
- Younghusband, Sir F.E.—Kashmir, London 1924.

The Maharajah Duleep Singh and the Government. A Narrative (for private circulation) London 1884.

The Sikh Invasion and British Victories on the Sutlej. Published by Blackwood & Page Office, 154, Strand. 1847.

II. Panjabi.

Prem Singh, Baba of
Hoti Mardan:-

General Hari Singh Nalwa.
Amritsar 1938.

Prem Singh, Baba of
Hoti Mardan:-

Jiwan-britant Akali Phula Singh.
Life of Phula Singh, leader of the Nihang army under Ranjit Singh, who fell in an assault on the Afghan army near Newshehra. Amritsar 1914.

Prem Singh, Baba of
Hoti Mardan:-

Jiwan-britant Maharaja Ranjit Singh.
A biography of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Amritsar 1918.

Prem Singh, Baba of
Hoti Mardan:-

Jiwan-britant Maharaja Sher Singh.
A life of Sher Singh, second son of Ranjit Singh. Ludhiana 1951.

Sardha Ram:-

Sikhan-de-Raj-di Vithia. A history of the Sikhs (1) under the Gurus from Nanak to Gobind Singh and (2) under Ranjit Singh, Kharah and Nau-Nihal Singh, with (3) descriptions of the races of the Panjab, their customs, songs, adages etc., Edited with introductions on Sarda Ram's life and works, etc. by Pritam Single Jalandhar 1956.

Seva Singh, Bhai of
Amritsar:-

Panjab te Sikh (styled on the cover Sikhan-da-Raj Kikun gia). A history of the rise, decay and fall of the Sikh kingdom after Ranjit Singh's death. Amritsar 1922.

Shah Muhammad,
Historian:-


Kissah larai raj Singhan. A metrical narrative of the decline and the fall of Sikh kingdom after Ranjit Singh's death, and of war with the English. edited by Labh Singh, Amritsar 1922.

Shamsher Singh:-

Sikh Raj da Aut. A history of the
last days of the Sikh Empire.
Ludhiana 1951.

Suraj Singh, of
Amritsar:-

Chamkde Lal. A life of Sardar Hari
Singh Kalwa, Commander of the forces
of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.
Amritsar 1912.



Sketch Map
OF THE
PUNJAB,
and the
SIKH TERRITORY.

*Drawn & Engraved
by J. G. Walker*

*Wm. H. Allen & Co.
London & Calcutta.*